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preliminary objections to the maintainability of the compensation applications filed by the appellants. They contended that the appellants had not initiated separate proceedings either under Section 10 or under Section 36B of the MRTP Act alleging unfair trade practices by the respondents and in the absence of any such separate proceedings initiated by the respondents before the MRTP Commission, the compensation applications of the appellants under Section 12B of the MRTP Act were not maintainable.- In fact, Section 12B was introduced in the MRTP Act by Act 30 of 1984 as an independent remedy for a claimant in addition to a suit that he may file to claim any loss or damage that he may suffer by reason of any monopolistic or restrictive or unfair trade practice as would be clear from sub-section (4) of Section 12B quoted above. -In the absence of any such indication of this intention of Parliament to make the provisions of Section 12B of the MRTP Act dependent on initiation of an inquiry or proceeding under Section 10 or Section 36B of the MRTP Act, the Competition Appellate Tribunal clearly erred in coming to the conclusion that interdependence of the provisions of Section 10 or Section 36B with Section 12B cannot be lost sight of and in the absence of a separate proceeding alleging unfair, monopolistic or restrictive trade practice, an application for compensation under Section 12B of the MRTP Act is not maintainable.We, therefore, set aside the impugned orders of the Competition Appellate Tribunal, but leave it open to the respondents to raise a plea before the Competition Appellate Tribunal that the appellants have not made out any case of monopolistic or restrictive trade practice or unfair trade practice in terms of Section 12B of the MRTP Act and if such plea is raised it will be decided by the Competition Appellate Tribunal on its own merits following the decision of this Court in Saurabh Prakash v. DLF Universal Ltd. (supra). The appeals are allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._8920_ OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 28463 of 2011) Girish Chandra Gupta … Appellant Versus M/s Uttar Pradesh Industrial Development Corporation Ltd. & Ors. … Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO._8921_ OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 17380 of … Continue reading

the appellant besides working as the Minister of Railways was the Head of the two Public Sector Undertakings in question at the relevant time. It also appears from the materials on record that the four persons while in London had assisted the appellant in performing certain tasks connected with the discharge of duties as a Minister. It is difficult to visualise as to how in the light of the above facts, demonstrated by the materials revealed in the course of investigation, the appellant can be construed to have adopted corrupt or illegal means or to have abused his position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage either for himself or for any of the aforesaid four persons. If the statements of the witnesses examined under Section 161 show that the aforesaid four persons had performed certain tasks to assist the Minister in the discharge of his public duties, however insignificant such tasks may have been, no question of obtaining any pecuniary advantage by any corrupt or illegal means or by abuse of the position of the appellant as a public servant can arise. As a Minister it was for the appellant to decide on the number and identity of the officials and supporting staff who should accompany him to London if it was anticipated that he would be required to perform his official duties while in London. If in the process, the Rules or Norms applicable were violated or the decision taken shows an extravagant display of redundance it is the conduct and action of the appellant which may have been improper or contrary to departmental norms. But to say that the same was actuated by a dishonest intention to obtain an undue pecuniary advantage will not be correct. That dishonest intention is the gist of the offence under section 13(1)(d) is implicit in the words used i.e. corrupt or illegal means and abuse of position as a public servant. A similar view has also been expressed by this Court in M. Narayanan Nambiar vs. State of Kerala[1] while considering the provisions of section 5 of Act of 1947. If the totality of the materials on record indicate the above position, we do not find any reason to allow the prosecution to continue against the appellant. Such continuance, in our view, would be an abuse of the process of court and therefore it will be the plain duty of the court to interdict the same.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1804 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3841 of 2012) C.K. Jaffer Sharief … Appellant Versus STATE (Through CBI) …Respondent J U D G M E N T RANJAN GOGOI, J Leave granted. 2. The judgment and order of High Court of … Continue reading

whether the learned Special Judge for CBI Cases is empowered to refer the complaint under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C to the CBI for investigation?

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B.SESHASAYANA REDDY Criminal Petition No.8003 of 2010 05.10.2012 Central Bureau of Investigation, rep. by Superintendent of Police, Hyderabad Dr.G.Venkateshwar Rao S/o late G.Gopal Rao Naidu, Secunderbad Counsel for the petitioner: Sri P.Keshava Rao SC for CBI Cases Counsel for respondent : Sri K.Srinivasa Kumar <Gist: >Head Note: ?Cases referred: AIR 2001 … Continue reading

whether the goods manufactured by the appellant are liable to be taxed as ‘Parts of Television Receivers’ falling under Tariff Entry 8529 of the Central Excise Tariff contained in the First Schedule to the Central Excise Tariff Act, 1985 (in short ‘the Tariff’) or as ‘Television Receivers’ under Tariff Entry 8528 of the Tariff, for the year 1989-90. -how the goods transported by them shall not be covered by the Rule, especially as a complete or finished article, ‘presented unassembled or disassembled’. The terminology of the Rule is wide enough to cover the goods transported by the appellant, and we are not convinced that the processes required to be carried out at the satellite units are so vital to the manufacture of the Television Receivers so as to render the goods transported by the appellant lacking the ‘essential character’ of Television Receivers. Rule 2(a) of the Rules for Interpretation has been couched in wide terms, and in terms of this Rule, it is our view that the goods produced by the appellant do in fact possess the essential character of Television Receivers.The appellant had also raised the plea of double-taxation; however, in our view once the question of classification of the goods transported by the appellant has been answered in the above manner, it is not open to us to grant the appellant any relief on this ground alone. Further, it is always open to the satellite units of the appellant to avail input tax credit on the duty paid by the appellant on the goods transported by them. 32. In view of the facts stated hereinabove, we are of the view that the Tribunal did not commit any error while passing the impugned order and, therefore, the appeal is dismissed with no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4427 OF 2003 M/S Salora International Ltd. Appellant Vs. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi Respondent J U D G M E N T ANIL R. DAVE, J 1. The challenge in this appeal is to an order dated 1st April, 2003 … Continue reading

the respondent has to be held guilty of medical negligence/deficiency in service at least on four counts. The respondent did not pay any attention to the patient’s persistent complaints of pain (as he himself admitted in his referral note for ERCP) till she presented with visible signs of jaundice and thus unduly delayed the diagnostic tests that were taken only on 02.10.2000. Secondly, having conducted an “exploratory” laparotomy on 04.10.2000, he failed to even attempt locating the cause of the bile leakage suffered by the patient though all standard literature (including that cited by the respondent) pointed to cystic duct stump leak as one of the most frequent causes of such leakage – such a situation was particularly likely in this case because the cholecystectomy was proceeded with by the respondent despite his inability to clearly separate the cystic duct and the cystic artery before their dissection and ligature. Further, after conducting the laparotomy, he delayed referring the patient for ERCP for no rhyme or reason though all standard literature (and hence the corpus of knowledge and practice based thereon expected of an ordinary medical practitioner of the relevant specialty) mandated such an investigation at the earliest because that is the most widely recommended way of both diagnosing and, in some situations also treating, bile anatomy injury/obstruction evidenced by either stricture/obstruction in the biliary tree or fistular leakage of bile flow. The respondent himself knew of this, according to his repeated admissions. It is really strange that this failure could be pleaded as an error of judgment. A physician can commit an error of judgment in a case of more than one options of (or, approaches to) diagnosis and/or treatment of a patient’s condition and he honestly believing one of them to be more appropriate than the other/s for that patient, though in retrospect that may turn out to be not so appropriate or advantageous to the patient. Here, in this case, the respondnet knew full well that the patient must undergo ERCP (or, an equivalent diagnostic or diagnostic-cum-therapeutic procedure), which he was not professionally competent to conduct. Why he delayed this reference to a qualified gastro-enterologist/endoscopist, or, in this case to the PGI, when he had not even been able to identify the patient’s biliary anatomy injury, leave alone repair it, may be a ‘judgment’ of sorts of this particualr surgeon but certainly not an error of judgment that an average informed and careful surgeon would make. Finally, there is incontrovertible evidence in the form of the signed consent documents that the respondent did not discharge the duty of disclosure in case of either surgery (cholecystectomy or laparotomy) as required of him under the law governing consent. We cannot also overlook the fact that this respondent’s recording of important treatment records could be interpreted to suggest an attempt at “improving” his case but perhaps that was not deliberate. It is unfortunate that the medical board did not go into these questions with the seriousness expected of an independent body of experts. However, there is no evidence at all that the acts of the respondent /OP were the proximate cause of Reeta’s eventual death and the respondent/OP cannot be held to account for that. 20. That brings us to the question of quantum of compensation. The complainant asked for Rs. 8.25 lakh (consisting of Rs. 5 lakh towards compensation for loss/damage due to medical negligence, Rs. 1.25 lakh for reimbursement of medical expenses and Rs. 2 lakh towards mental agony), with interest thereon @ 24% from the date of dispute till payment and costs of Rs. 5,000/-. In the case of “Lata Wadhwa & Others v State of Bihar & Others [(2001) 8 SCC 197], the Apex Court had taken the value of earnings of a simple housewife at Rs. 36,000/- p.m. while going into the question of compensation on account of deaths of several people that occurred in an accident in 1989. Smt. Reeta Dogra was also a simple housewife who died in 2000. Considering only the inflation since 1989, it would be reasonable to accept the sum of Rs. 10,000/- p.m. as the equivalent earning in December 2000. Applying the deduction of 1/3rd towards personal maintenance expenses, the contribution would work out to Rs. 80,000/- approx. per annum. Reeta was 46 at the time of her death and hence a multiplier of even 10 would lead to a compensation amount of Rs.8 lakh, which would have been payable in 2001 on which interest @ 9% per annum since 2001 would not be unreasonable. However, since we cannot attribute Reeta’s death solely to the acts of negligence on the part of the respondent/OP, the interest of equity would be met if his liability for compensation were restricted to Rs.7 lakh. 21. As a result, the appeal is partly allowed and the order of the State Commission is set aside. The respondent is directed to pay to the appellant/complainant the sum of Rs.7 lakh as consolidated compensation, including cost, within four weeks from the date of this order, failing which the sum would be liable to be paid with interest @ 12% per annum from the date of this order till realisation.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL No. 248 OF 2002 (From the order dated 27.03.2002 of the Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Union Territory, Chandigarh in Complaint Case no. 6 of 2001) Rajinder Singh Dogra 3152, Sector 28 D                                                               Appellant Chandigarh versus Dr. P.N. Gupta P. N. Urology and Surgical Centre House no. 1359, … Continue reading

land acquisition =In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. As a corollary, the writ petition filed by the appellants is allowed and the acquisition of their land is quashed. However, it is made clear that this judgment shall not preclude the competent authority from issuing fresh notification under Section 4(1) and taking other steps necessary for the acquisition of the appellant’s land. If the respondents initiate fresh proceedings for the acquisition of the appellants’ land then they shall be free to file objections under Section 5A(1) and they shall also be entitled to be heard in the inquiry to be conducted by the Collector in terms of Section 5A(2) of the Act. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

1   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 11169 OF 2011   Darshan Lal Nagpal (dead) by L.Rs. … Appellants versus Government of NCT of Delhi and others … Respondents     J U D G M E N T     G. S. Singhvi, J.     … Continue reading

Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: s. 309 – Prayer for stay of criminal proceedings pending probate case – Criminal case alleging the Will to be forged – HELD: Primacy has to be given to criminal case over civil case – Orders of courts below declining to stay criminal proceedings need no interference, in view of the fact that criminal case was instituted much prior to initiation of probate proceedings and because of the conduct of the appellant and the stage in which the probate proceedings are pending – Practice and Procedure – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.41 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136. Evidence Act, 1872: s. 41 – Pendency of probate case – Its effect on criminal case alleging the will to be forged – Held: Pendency of two proceedings, whether civil or criminal, by itself would not attract the provisions of s. 41 – A judgment has to be pronounced – The genuineness of the will must be gone into – s. 41 would become applicable only when a final judgment is rendered – On facts, courts below rightly declined to stay criminal proceedings – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.309. The appellant filed an application before the Sub-Registrar, Hazaribagh, Jharkhand for registration of a will dated 3.5.1998 stated to have been executed by one Mst. `SA’, and applied before the Delhi Development Authority for grant of mutation in respect of a property in Delhi on the basis of the alleged will. Mst. `SM’, the daughter of Mst. `SA’ also made an application to the DDA for grant of mutation in respect of the Delhi property in her favour. Mst. `SM’ filed a civil suit in Patna questioning the genuineness of the will dated 3.5.1998,and also filed a criminal complaint u/ss 420/468/444/34 IPC in Delhi against the appellant alleging the will dated 3.5.1998 as a forged one. The appellant filed an application for grant of probate in respect of the will dated 3.5.1998 before the Jharkhand High Court u/s 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925. The appellant first filed a writ petition before the Delhi High Court seeking to quash the criminal proceedings and on its dismissal filed an application u/s 309 Cr.P.C. before the Metropolitan Magistrate seeking stay of the proceedings in the criminal case. The said application was dismissed. Appellant’s revision petition also having been dismissed by the High Court, he filed the instant appeal. Meanwhile Mst. `SM’ died after having executed a will in favour of respondent no.2, and the Delhi property was mutated in his name. He was impleaded as respondent no.2 in the appeal. It was contended for the appellant that a judgment in probate proceedings being a judgment in rem as envisaged u/s 41 of the Evidence Act, the criminal proceedings should have been directed to be stayed. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 41 of the Evidence Act, 1872 would become applicable only when a final judgment is rendered. Rendition of a final judgment which would be binding on the whole world being conclusive in nature would take a long time. As and when a judgment is rendered in one proceeding subject to the admissibility thereof keeping in view s.43 of the Evidence Act may be produced in another proceeding. It is beyond any cavil that a judgment rendered by a probate court is a judgment in rem. It is binding on all courts and authorities. Being a judgment in rem it will have effect over other judgments. A judgment in rem indisputably is conclusive in a criminal as well as in a civil proceeding. [Para 12] [1034-D-G] Surinder Kumar & Ors. vs. Gian Chand & Ors. AIR 1957 SC 875; Sardool Singh & Anr. vs. Smt. Nasib Kaur 1987 (Supp.) SCC 146; Mt. Daropti vs. Mt. Santi 1929 Lahore 483 and Darbara Singh vs. Karminder Singh & Ors. AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215 – referred to. Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai vs. Bhupen Champak Lal Dalal & Anr. (2001) 3 SCC 459, cited. 1.2. Pendency of two proceedings whether civil or criminal, however, by itself would not attract the provisions of s.41 of the Evidence Act. A judgment has to be pronounced. The genuineness of the Will must be gone into. Law envisages not only genuineness of the Will but also explanation to all the suspicious circumstances surrounding thereto besides proof thereof in terms of s.63(c) of the Indian Succession Act, and s.68 of the Evidence Act. [Para 13] [1038-C-D] Lalitaben Jayantilal Popat vs. Pragnaben Jamnadas Kataria & ors. 2009 (1) SCALE 328, relied on. 1.3. As noticed in several decisions of this Court, including two Constitution Bench decisions*, primacy has to be given to a criminal case over a civil case. If primacy is to be given to a criminal proceeding, indisputably, the civil suit must be determined on its own merit, keeping in view the evidences brought in it and not in terms of the evidence brought in the criminal proceedings. In the instant case, the FIR was lodged not only in regard to forgery by the Will but also on the cause of action of a trespass. Not only another civil suit is pending, but a lis in relation to mutation is also pending. [Para 10, 14 and 15] [1029-G; 1038-E; 1039-A] *M.S. Sheriff & anr. vs. State of Madras & Ors. AIR 1954 SC 397 and Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr. (2005) 4 SCC 370, relied on. K.G. Premshanker vs. Inspector of Police and Anr. (2002) 8 SCC 87 M/s Karam Chand Ganga Prasad & anr. etc. vs. Union of India & Ors. (1970) 3 SCC 694 and P. Swaroopa Rani vs. M. Hari Narayana @ Hari Babu AIR 2008 SC 1884, referred to. 1.4. Whereas the criminal case is pending before the Delhi court, the testamentary suit has been filed before the Jharkhand High Court. Since 2003 not much progress has been made therein. The Will has not been sent to the handwriting expert for his opinion, which is essential for determination of the question in regard to its genuineness. It is alleged that the Will was registered at Hazaribagh after the death of the testatrix. For the last seven years in view of the pendency of the matters before the High Courts in different proceedings initiated by the appellant, the criminal case has not proceeded, although charge-sheet has been filed and cognizance of the offence has been taken. Exercise of such a jurisdiction furthermore is discretionary. [Para 15] [1039-A-C] 1.5. In the facts and circumstance of the case, orders of the Metropolitan Magistrate and the High Court need not be interfered with. Firstly, because the criminal case was instituted much prior to the initiation of the probate proceeding and, secondly, because of the conduct of the appellant and the stage in which the probate proceedings are pending. Therefore, it is not a fit case where the Court should exercise discretionary jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India. [Para 15] [1039-D] Case Law Reference: AIR 1954 SC 397 relied on para 10 (2002) 8 SCC 87 referred to para 10 (1970) 3 SCC 694 referred to para 10 (2005) 4 SCC 370 relied on para 11 AIR 2008 SC 1884 referred to para 11 1987 (Supp.) SCC 146 referred to para 12 (2001) 3 SCC 459 cited para 12 AIR 1957 SC 875 referred to para 12 1929 Lahore 483 referred to para 13 AIR 1979 Punjab & Haryana 215 referred to para 13 2009 (1) SCALE 328 relied on para 13 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 416 of 2009. From the Judgment and Order dated 23.07.2008 of the High Court of Delhi in Criminal Revision No. 184 of 2005. Dinesh Dwivedi, S.K. Sinha, Manish Shanker and Prateek Dwivedi for the Appellant. A. Sharan, ASG, A.M. Singhvi, S.C. Maheshwari, Neera Gupta, Sadhna Sandhu, Anil Katiyar, Sandhya Goswami, H.C. Kharbanda and M.P.S. Tomar for the Respondent.


when he was a session judge, he refused to conduct a criminal case for his personal reason and when he became a high court judge, he cannot decide the same as appellate authority = It is apparent that the fact of earlier recusal of the case at the trial by learned Shri Justice S.N. Dhingra himself, was not brought to his notice in the revision petition before the High 3

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2184 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2156 of 2011)     Narinder Singh Arora ………….. Appellant   versus   State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) and Ors. ………..Respondents     O R D E R   H.L. … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860: ss. 498A and 406-Framing of charges under-FIR by wife alleging commission of offence u/s 498A and 406/34 by in-laws and husband, on basis of complaint before Women Cell-Charges framed against in-laws and husband u/s 498A and 406/34-Challenge to- Held: There was no allegation of entrustment of property by complainant-wife to her in-laws and husband and its misappropriation by them-Also no allegation of harassment of wife by in-laws with a view to coerce her to meet unlawful demand except husband-Thus, charges u/s 406 against in-laws and husband, and u/s 498A against in-laws quashed-However, charges framed against husband u/s 498A upheld. ss. 498 A and 406-Ingredients for-Explained. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: ss 227, 228, 239, 240 and 245 -Duty of court while framing of charges-General guidelines-Held: Court is to evaluate materials on record to find out if facts at their face value disclose existence of ingredients for constituting the alleged offence-It is to consider whether there is a ground for presuming that offence has been committed and not that the ground for convicting the accused is made out-Probative value of materials on record cannot be gone into. There was some matrimonial dispute between the complainant-wife and the appellant no. 3-husband. The complainant filed a complaint in the Crime against Women Cell against appellant no 1 and 2-in laws and appellant no 3, alleging harassment by them. However, the parties entered into a compromise and the complainant joined her husband. Next month the complainant came back to her paternal home for her delivery. The complainant then filed another complaint against the appellants. She recorded a statement alleging misbehavior on part of her in-laws and dowry demand made by them and that they refused to return her Stridhan. FIR was lodged under sections 406 and 498A I.P.C. against the appellants. The charge sheet was filed. The Metropolitan Magistrate held that no case was made out against all the appellants u/s 406 and appellant no. 1 and 2 for offences u/s 498A and discharged all of them. In Revision Petition, the Sessions Court held that the case u/s 406 and 498A was made out and directed the trial court to frame charges accordingly. Appellants then filed Criminal Revision Petition for quashing the charge sheet and consequential proceedings arising out of FIR. High Court upheld the order of Sessions Court. Hence the present appeal =Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. At the stage of framing of charge the court is required to evaluate the material and documents on record with a view to finding out if the facts emerging therefrom, taken at their face value, disclosed the existence of all the ingredients constituting the alleged offence. At that stage, the court is not expected to go deep into the probative value of the material on record. What needs to be considered is whether there is a ground for presuming that the offence has been committed and not a ground for convicting the accused has been made out. At that stage, even strong suspicion founded on material which leads the court to form a presumptive opinion as to the existence of the factual ingredients constituting the offence alleged would justify the framing of charge against the accused in respect of the commission of that offence. [Para 11] [723-D-F] State of Karnataka v. L. Muniswamy , [1977] 2 SCC 699; State of Maharashtra and Ors. v. Som Nath Thapa and Ors., [1996] 4 SCC 659 and State of M.P. v. Mohanlal Soni, [2000] 6 SCC 338, relied on. 2. According to Section 405 I.P.C., the offence of criminal breach of trust is committed when a person who is entrusted in any manner with the property or with any dominion over it, dishonestly misappropriates it or converts it to his own use, or dishonestly uses it, or disposes it of, in violation of any direction of law prescribing the mode in which the trust is to be discharged, or of any lawful contract, express or implied, made by him touching such discharge, or wilfully suffers any other person so to do. Thus, in the commission of the offence of criminal breach of trust, two distinct parts are involved. The first consists of the creation of an obligation in relation to the property over which dominion or control is acquired by the accused. The second is a misappropriation or dealing with the property dishonestly and contrary to the terms of the obligation created. [Para 16] [724-G-H; 725-A] The Superintendent and remembrancer of Legal Affairs, West Bengal v. S.K. Roy, [1974] 4 SCC 230, relied on. 3.1. Section 498A I.P.C. was introduced with the avowed object to combat the menace of dowry deaths and harassment to a woman at the hands of her husband or his relatives. Nevertheless, the provision should not be used as a device to achieve oblique motives. [Para 19] [726-D-E] 3.2. The term “cruelty”, which has been made punishable under Section 498A I.P.C. has been defined in the explanation appended to the said Section, to mean: (i) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health whether mental or physical of the woman; or (ii) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand. Therefore, the consequences of “cruelty”,which are either likely to drive a woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury, danger to life, limb or health, whether mental or physical of the woman or the harassment of a woman, where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand are required to be established in order to bring home an offence under Section 498A I.P.C. [Para 17] [725-C-E] 4.1. In the instant case, from a plain reading of the second complaint filed by the complainant, it is clear that the facts mentioned in the complaint, taken on their face value, do not make out a prima facie case against the appellants for having dishonestly misappropriated the Stridhan of the complainant, allegedly handed over to them, thereby committing criminal breach of trust punishable under Section 406 I.P.C. It is manifestly clear from the afore-extracted complaint as also the relevant portion of the charge-sheet that there is neither any allegation of entrustment of any kind of property by the complainant to the appellants nor its misappropriation by them. Furthermore, it is also noted in the charge-sheet itself that the complainant had refused to take articles back when this offer was made to her by the Investigating Officer. Therefore, the very pre-requisite of entrustment of the property and its misappropriation by the appellants are lacking in the instant case. The Additional Sessions Judge and the High Court erred in law in coming to the conclusion that a case for framing of charge under Section 406 I.P.C. was made out. The charges framed against all the appellants under section 406 I.P.C. are quashed. [Paras 18 and 20] [725-F-H; 726-A-F] 4.2. As regards the applicability of Section 498A I.P.C., in the complaint dated 8.11.1994 there is not even a whisper of a wilful conduct of appellants No. 1 and 2 of harassment of the complainant at their hands with a view to coercing her to meet any unlawful demand by them so as to attract the provisions of Section 498A read with Explanation thereto. The complaint refers to the talk the complainant purports to have had with her husband, appellant No. 3, who is alleged to have told her to come to Bijnore if she apologizes to his father; keeps him happy; obeys his sister and talks to her father (complainant’s) to give her Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R. and brings these articles to Bijnore. The allegation of misbehaviour on the part of appellant Nos.1 and 2 and the demand of Rs. 50,000/- and V.C.R. by them made by the complainant in her subsequent statement, dated 4.4.1995, was an after thought and not bona fide. Having carefully glanced through the complaint, the F.I.R. and the charge-sheet, the charge under Section 498A I.P.C. is not brought home insofar as appellant Nos. 1 and 2 are concerned and are quashed. However, charge framed against appellant No. 3 under Section 498A I.P.C. is upheld. [Paras 19 and 20] [726-B-F] Onkar Nath Mishra Appellant-In-Person. Pramod Swarup, Saket Singh (for D.S. Mahra), Nalin Tripathi and Anurag Sharma (Rameshwar Prasad Goyal) for the Respondents. =, 2007(13 )SCR716 , 2008(2 )SCC561 , 2007(14 )SCALE403 , 2008(1 )JT20

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 1716 of 2007 PETITIONER: ONKAR NATH MISHRA & ORS. RESPONDENT: STATE (NCT OF DELHI) & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 14/12/2007 BENCH: ASHOK BHAN & D.K. JAIN JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T [Arising out of S.L.P. (Criminal) No. 2516 of 2007) D.K. JAIN, J.: Leave granted. 2. This … Continue reading

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION= delay in transport of container – loss allowed only for ground rent for keeping the containers for the delayed period only, other claims are discarded as they are too remote=It took about a month time for opposite party No. 2 to make arrangement for the transportation of 11th container to ICD Tughlakabad by road as a result of which the delivery of even the 10 containers, which has arrived earlier could not be effected and the entire consignment was delivered to the complainant on 26th May, i.e. after a delay of about one month. 3. According to the complainant, due to the above delay in the delivery of the consignment of the imported Tube Mills, the complainant has suffered monetary loss as under: “That the complainant had suffered the following losses due to the negligence and deficiency in services rendered by the respondent: Letter of Credit charges as well as interest Rs. 3,16,970.00 Ground rent charges paid by the complainant Rs. 5,79,100.00 Amount paid to M/s. Gallium Industries For commissioning the project for delay in Arrival of full consignment. Rs. 15,15,000.00 Material/Tubes imported from Italy Rs. 8,88,724.00 Travelling allowance paid to Sh. R.S. Ponia, Sr. Officer, for his visit to Respondent No. 1 Rs. 18,554.00 _____________ Total Rs. 33,18,348.00 “ ______________

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 225 OF  1999 SKH Metals Limited, Plot No. 2, Maruti Joint Venture Complex, Gurgaon – 122 015 Haryana, India                                                            …….. Complainant(s) Vs. M/s. German Express Shipping Agency, 12/13, Hans Bhawan, 1, Bahadur Shah Zafar Marg, New Delhi – 110 002. Raina Continental Ltd., B-29-30, Vishal Tower, Janak Puri District Centre, New Delhi – 110 058                                               ……. Opposite Party (ies) … Continue reading

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