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Whether the DGP can reverse the adverse remaks in the matter of integrity recorded in ACR after the lapse of 9 years ? NO. Whether the successor D.G.P. CAN CANCEL THE SAME – yes – High court dismissed the writs filed by aggerieved persons – Apex court confirmed the same. – VINOD KUMAR …….. APPELLANT(S) VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. ……….RESPONDENT(S) – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40896

Whether the DGP  can reverse the adverse remaks in the matter of integrity recorded in ACR after the lapse of 9 years ?  NO. Whether the successor D.G.P. CAN CANCEL THE SAME – yes – High court dismissed the writs filed by aggerieved persons – Apex court confirmed the same. after almost 9 years,  he … Continue reading

ELECTION CASE = DISQUALIFICATION FOR HAVING MORE THAN TWO ISSUES = Birth of third child on or after incorporation of sec. 19 (3) fasten the person with disqualification irrespective of the death of a child after birth = it is settled law that the burden of proving an exception to a rule is on the person who wants the benefit of the exception; if the 4th respondent’s case is that the fourth child born to him is dead, the burden of proving the said fact should have been placed on him and not on 6th respondent (he relied upon the decision in B. Kantha Reddy v. Mandal Development Officer-cum-Additional District Election Authority, Manopad Mandal, Mahabubnagar District and others2 in this regard); the mere act of procreation of more children than permitted after the relevant date for seeking elected office under the Act creates a disqualification as held by this Court in B.K. Parthasarathi and others v. Govt. of A.P., Panchayat Raj Dept. and others3 and Are Gangadhar v. Zilla Praja Parishad, Karimnagar and others4; that in Javed and others v. State of Haryana and others5, the Supreme Court had held that the disqualification is attracted no sooner the third child is born; in the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act,1994 there is no specific provision like in Haryana Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 that the additional child should also be alive; therefore, whether the fourth child of the 4th respondent was alive or dead is unnecessary to be gone into; this principle of law has also been ignored by the election tribunal; in any event, the order of the election tribunal is perverse and is unsustainable.= whether by death of the 4th child of 4th respondent his disqualification is erased? For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the order dt.22.07.2003 in O.P.No.5 of 2001 on the file of the Election Tribunal- cum- Principal Junior Civil Judge, Hyderabad (East and North), Ranga Reddy District, is quashed and it is declared that the 4th respondent has incurred the disqualification u/S.19(3) of the Act disentitling him from contesting for any post in the Grampanchayat of Bata Singaram Village, Hayath Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District under the Act.

reported in / published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9881 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO W.P.No.23648 of 2003 29.04.2013 A.Yadagiri …PETITIONER The Chief Election Commissioner, Hyderabad and others …RESPONDENTS <GIST: >HEAD NOTE: Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri S.Ramachandra Rao representing Sri K.R.Prabhakar. Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3: G.P. for Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Counsel for … Continue reading

On 04.06.2005, A newspaper by name “Tarun Bharat” published an article in which it was alleged that the petitioners have purchased agricultural land showing Ramesh as alive while he was dead. It was further alleged that one Ramesh Shikaji Rathod had signed the sale deed as Ramesh Shika Jadhav. = On 07.07.2005, the officials of Ghatanji P.S. registered offences punishable under Sections 420, 419, 468 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) for the acts of fraud, criminal breach of trust and impersonation against the said accused persons vide Crime No. 88 of 2005. (g) On 09.09.2005, one Rajnikant Deluram Borele, claiming himself to be a Social Worker, filed a Criminal Complaint in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ghatanji, which was registered as Case No. 92 of 2005 against the appellants-herein, Sub-Registrar and few more persons. In the complaint it was alleged that the accused had purchased the land from a dead person, namely, Ramesh Shikaji Jadhav, while the appellants were acting in their official capacity under the said Scheme. (h) Learned Magistrate, by order dated 27.09.2005, directed the Police to investigate the matter under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in 5Page 6 short the “Code”) and to submit a detailed report within one month. -It is clear that any judicial magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. = 14) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives: (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 15) In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 16) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under Section 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 of the Code.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7293 of 2009) Madhao & Anr. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 685 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7324 … Continue reading

Section 10 of the Tenancy Act, observing that the expression ‘any person’, contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the parties that the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin with such admission by them. 18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There is no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all norms of interpretation which requires that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provision otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme contingent. 19. Thus, in view thereof, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court impugned before us. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850 OF 2003 Tara Chand & Ors. …Appellants Versus Gram Panchayat Jhupa Khurd & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgments and orders dated 18.9.2002, … Continue reading

the expression ‘any person’, contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the parties that the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin with such admission by them. 18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There is no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all norms of interpretation which requires that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provision otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme contingent. 19. Thus, in view thereof, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court impugned before us. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850  OF 2003 Tara Chand & Ors. …Appellants Versus Gram Panchayat Jhupa Khurd & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1.      These appeals have been preferred against  the  judgments  and orders … Continue reading

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 191(1)(c). Election- “Undischarged insolvent”-Disqualification-For election as MLA- Determination of-Held: Cannot be determined by High Court trying an election petition-A person has to be adjudged as insolvent under the Insolvency Act before attracting disqualification under Art. 191(1)(c)- Insolvency Act is a complete code and court constituted under that Act alone is competent to decide that question and not any court or authority- Dictionary or general meaning of “insolvency” has no relevance-The special meaning of “undischarged insolvent” under the law of insolvency is only applicable-The meaning of `insolvent’ under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 irrelevant-Representation of the People Act, 1951, S.100. Article 191-Disqualification-Conditions for-Election as MLA-Held: Cannot be enlarged by importing any meaning other than permissible on a strict interpretation of the expressions used therein. Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section 100-Election-Election petition-Trial-High Court- Jurisdiction of- Held : Is limited to the extent conferred by the Act- Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 329(b). Election-Voting, electing and contesting-Rights of-Held: These are statutory rights circumscribed by limitation contained therein-Therefore, if the statutes clearly indicate the policy of law, it is not open to the court to interpret such statutes to find out the legislative intent of the provisions. Section 123-Election-Corrupt practices-Bribery-Allegation that the returned candidate using his position and status secured several bottles of rum from Military Canteen and supplied them in his constituency-Witnesses did not have any personal knowledge and came to know about the matter from the employee of the Military Canteen who was not examined-Held: In the absence of examination of the said employee, evidence is vague, not clear and definite much less reliable-Hence, High Court rightly held there was no acceptable evidence which could bring the case within the expression of “bribery” under S.123-Other allegations of corrupt practices also not established. Interpretation of Statutes: External aids-Dictionary meaning-Relevancy of- Held: If an expression has acquired a special connotation in law, it must be assumed that the legislature has used it in a legal sense, not according to dictionary or general meaning. External aids-Constituent Assembly Debates-Discussion in- Reference to- Implication of-Stated. Words and Phrases : “Undischarged insolvent”-Meaning of-In the context of Art. 191(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, 1950. Insolvent”-Meaning of-In the context of S. 2(8) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. “Bribery”-Meaning of-In the context of S.123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appellant was declared elected to State Legislative Assembly. The respondent, the defeated candidate, filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on the grounds that he was disqualified from being chosen as a MLA since he was an undischarged insolvent within the meaning of Article 191(l)(c) of the Constitution and that he had indulged in corrupt practices within the meaning of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The respondent alleged that the appellant using his position and status secured several bottles of rum from a Military Canteen and supplied them in his constituency. The witnesses had no personal knowledge of the bottles being carried but they came to know about the matter from the employee of the Military Canteen who was not examined. The High Court held that the expression “undischarged insolvent” which was not defined in the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 should be given its natural meaning, instead of a technical meaning given in the Insolvency Act so that the disqualification applied to any person who was shown to be unable to pay his debts on the relevant date. The High Court referring to the Debates in the Constituent Assembly and to the suggestion of Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar that the expression “if he is an undischarged insolvent” should be in terms of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act which was not accepted by the Constituent Assembly and held that the framers of the Constitution did not want to confine the operation of the disqualification only to cases where a person was adjudged insolvent under the Insolvency Act. The High Court, therefore, accepted the submission that pre- adjudication by an insolvency court is not required and observed that a candidate who was found to be an insolvent by the Court trying the election petition and a candidate who had already been adjudicated insolvent by the Insolvency Court but who had not obtained an order for discharge were both covered by Article 191(l)(c) of the Constitution. The High Court declared the appellant as an “undischarged insolvent” and held his election as void. The High Court, however, decided against the respondent-Election Petitioner-on the allegation of corrupt practices. Hence this appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the High Court could not in deciding an election petition under the R.P. Act examine the question whether the appellant was an undischarged insolvent. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD : 1. The expression `undischarged insolvent’ has acquired a special meaning under the Law of Insolvency, the Court must understand that that is the meaning that is sought to be attributed to the expression used in Article 191(l)(c) of the Constitution. The High Court was not justified in holding that the expression `undischarged insolvent’ should be understood de hors the Insolvency Act in a general sense. [434-H; 435-A] Bhagwati Prasad Dixit `Ghorewala’ v. Rajeev Gandhi, (1985) All WC 682, referred to. 2.1. The Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 is a complete code and determination of all questions regarding insolvency including a question as to whether (1) a person is an insolvent or not, or (2) an insolvent be discharged or not and subject to what conditions, can be decided by the court constituted under that Act alone. It is only when exceptions are carved out as is done in the case of Section 2(8) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930, any other court or authority can decide such questions. [430-E] 2.2. Under the scheme of the provisions of the Insolvency Act, the exclusive jurisdiction to deal with any question relating to insolvency could be adjudicated upon only by the court constituted under that Act In such a situation, it would not be possible to hold that the High Court had, while dealing with an election petition, jurisdiction to decide a question as to whether a person is an undischarged insolvent or not. Admittedly, in this case, there is no such adjudication. Hence The High Court could not declare the appellant to be an “undischarged insolvent”. [431-F-G] 3. Conferment of power under the Representation of the People Act, 1951 to try an election petition does not amount to enlargement of existing jurisdiction of the High Court. The jurisdiction exercisable under the R.P. Act is a special jurisdiction conferred on the High Court by virtue of Article 329(b) of the Constitution. Even an ordinary Civil Court will not have jurisdiction to decide questions arising under insolvency enactment; much less a special Authority like the High Court when it is not invested with such power under the Insolvency Act. [430-G; 431-B] Upadhyaya Hargovind Devshanker v. Dhirendra Singh Virbhadrasinhil Solanki, AIR (1988) SC 915 and Bhagwati Prasad Dixit `Ghorewala’ v. Rajeev Gandhi, (1985) All WC 682, followed. 4. Under what circumstances and subject to what limitations a person could be declared to have incurred disqualification is a matter of policy of law and the courts have cautioned themselves by stating that right to vote, right to elect or contest an election is a creature of statute and circumscribed by the limitations contained therein. Therefore, so long as the Constitution or the R.P. Act indicates in clear terms as to what its policy is, it would not be open to a court to interpret such a provision by trying to find out what the intent could be by ignoring the actual expressions used. Therefore, the supposed scheme of the provisions would not afford sufficient guidance to take the view that the expression “undischarged insolvent” should be understood as meaning an insolvent who is a person who is in impecunious circumstances as is unable to repay the debt. [432-E-F] 5. Even though Article 191(1) of the Constitution does not include declaration by an insolvency court, but by reason of expression used that he is an “undischarged insolvent” it clearly indicates that he could become “discharged” only in terms of the provisions of the insolvency Acts and not otherwise. It is implicit in the expression “undischarged insolvent” that a person does not become so unless he has been adjudged insolvent and is not discharged by the court under the insolvency Acts. The expression “undischarged insolvent” has acquired a particular legal connotation and such expression cannot be used otherwise than in terms of the insolvency enactment Redundancy and tautology cannot be attributed to the Legislature. When the Legislature has used the expression “undischarged insolvent” that expression must be given its full meaning. [432-H; 433-A] 6. Article 191(l)(c) does not contemplate mere impecuniousity or incapacity of a person to repay one’s debts but he should not only be adjudged insolvent but also remain undischarged. Such a contingency could only arise under the insolvency law. Article 191(l)(c) refers to disqualification of a person from getting elected to the State Legislature. The conditions for disqualification cannot be enlarged by importing to it any meaning other than permissible on strict interpretation of expressions used therein for it is a case of disqualification. Whenever any disqualification is imposed naturally the right of a citizen is cut down and in that event a narrow interpretation is required. Therefore, the liberal view taken by the High Court to the contrary does not appear to be correct. [433-G-H] 7. In ascertaining the meaning of an expression used in a statute, certain norms are adopted. If the legislature has used an expression which has acquired a technical meaning and such expression is used ordinarily in the context of a particular branch of law, it must be assumed that because of its constant use the legislature must be deemed to have used such expression in a particular sense as is understood when used in the similar context If an expression has acquired a special connotation in law, dictionary or general meaning ceases to be helpful in interpreting such a word. Such an expression must be given its legal sense and no other. If the expression “undischarged insolvent” has acquired a special meaning under the law of insolvency, the court must understand that that is the meaning that is sought to be attributed to the expression used in Article 191(1) (C) of the Constitution. [434-F-H] State of Madras v. Gannon Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd., [1959] SCR 379, relied on. 8. The reference made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is to reduce the rigour of the disqualification in the event the adjudication is annulled or if an insolvent obtains a discharge with the certificate that it was caused by misfortune and not by misconduct. Merely because the suggestion made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is not accepted by the Constituent Assembly it does not mean that the expression used in Article 191(l)(c) as to “undischarged insolvent” will be different from what is contained under the insolvency enactment. The reference to Section 73 of the Insolvency Act made by Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar is in the background stated above and, therefore, has no effect on the interpretation of the meaning of the expression “undischarged insolvent”. [433-D-E] 9. Under the Sale of Goods Act, a special definition of the expression `insolvent’ had to be given to the effect that a person is said to be `insolvent’ who has ceased to pay his debts in the ordinary course of business, or cannot pay his debts as they become due, whether he has committed an act of insolvency or not, and the definition is declaratory in character. Question of insolvency of a buyer is of considerable importance in the context of the seller’s lien. It is in special context a meaning is given to the expression `insolvent’ even though a person had not been adjudged an insolvent in the Insolvency Act to be insolvent for the purposes of the Act. That definition cannot be imported into the R.P. Act. [434-B-C] 10. In the absence of examination of the employee of the Military Canteen the evidence adduced is vague and not clear and definite much less reliable and, therefore, the High Court rightly held that there is no acceptable evidence which can bring the case against the appellant within the expression of “bribery” under Section 123 of the R.P. Act. The other acts of undue influence or that the returned candidate has made an appeal in the name of religion or that he has made any statement with a false reference to the personal character and conduct of the candidate were not established. [436-B-C] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION: Civil Appeal Nos. 7395-96 of 1997.

PETITIONER: THAMPANOOR RAVI Vs. RESPONDENT: CHARUPARA RAVI & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/1999 BENCH: S.R.Babu, R.C.Lahoti JUDGMENT: RAJENDRA BABU, J. : Civil Appeal Nos. 7395-7396 of 1997 The appellant in these appeals was declared elected to the Kerala Legislative Assembly from No. 139, Neyyattinkara constituency in an election held on April 27, 1996. Two election … Continue reading

a person, who seeks cancellation of a registered document, has two remedies available under law viz., (1) to seek invalidation of the registered sale deed by approaching the competent Court under Section 31 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; or (2) to seek cancellation of the registered document by following the procedure prescribed under Rule 26 (k) (i) of the Rules framed by the State of Andhra Pradesh under the Act. It was further held that except these two remedies, no person or authority has the right to unilaterally invalidate a registered sale deed on any ground. On the above premises, the Writ Petition was allowed by setting aside the Order of unilateral annulment of registered sale deeds, however, with liberty to the respondents to initiate appropriate action, in accordance with law, for annulment of the registered sale deeds.

The Hon’ble Mr Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy Contempt Case No.369 of 2011 01-07-2011 Maradani Srinivasa Prabhu and another 1.A.Vani Prasad, IAS,District Collector, West Godavari District and 4 others Counsel for the Petitioners: Sri S.Srinivas Reddy Counsel for respondents: Sri M.Sudhir,SC for APSCEF Corporation :Order: This Contempt Case is filed alleging willful disobedience of Order, dated 28-10-2010, … Continue reading

contempt of court =in this suo motu proceeding, the High Court has not made out a case to punish all the appellants under “criminal contempt” in terms of Section 2 (c) read with Section 12 of the Act. =A Committee was constituted by some local persons, who were active in public life, along with lawyers at Jalpaiguri named “Circuit Bench `O’ Sarbik Unnayan Dabi Adyay Samannya Committee, Jalpaiguri” (hereinafter referred to as “the Committee”). The Committee had passed a resolution for the formation of a High Court Circuit Bench at Jalpaiguri and in order to achieve the said purpose to stage Satyagrah in front of the District Court at Jalpaiguri. The Members of the Committee put theirresolution into action on 15.12.2006 and started agitation outside the main gate of the District Court premises and put up a rostrum there on which a number of 2

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 339 OF 2007 Anup Bhushan Vohra …. Appellant(s) Versus The Registrar General, High Court of Judicature at Calcutta …. Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOs. 340, 345, 346, 358, 362, 388, 390, 391, 392, 393, 394, 395, 396, 397, 398, 399 and 400 … Continue reading

Constitution of India, 1950: Article 191(1)(c). Election- “Undischarged insolvent”-Disqualification-For election as MLA- Determination of-Held: Cannot be determined by High Court trying an election petition-A person has to be adjudged as insolvent under the Insolvency Act before attracting disqualification under Art. 191(1)(c)- Insolvency Act is a complete code and court constituted under that Act alone is competent to decide that question and not any court or authority- Dictionary or general meaning of “insolvency” has no relevance-The special meaning of “undischarged insolvent” under the law of insolvency is only applicable-The meaning of `insolvent’ under the Sale of Goods Act, 1930 irrelevant-Representation of the People Act, 1951, S.100. Article 191-Disqualification-Conditions for-Election as MLA-Held: Cannot be enlarged by importing any meaning other than permissible on a strict interpretation of the expressions used therein. Representation of the People Act, 1951: Section 100-Election-Election petition-Trial-High Court- Jurisdiction of- Held : Is limited to the extent conferred by the Act- Constitution of India, 1950, Art. 329(b). Election-Voting, electing and contesting-Rights of-Held: These are statutory rights circumscribed by limitation contained therein-Therefore, if the statutes clearly indicate the policy of law, it is not open to the court to interpret such statutes to find out the legislative intent of the provisions. Section 123-Election-Corrupt practices-Bribery-Allegation that the returned candidate using his position and status secured several bottles of rum from Military Canteen and supplied them in his constituency-Witnesses did not have any personal knowledge and came to know about the matter from the employee of the Military Canteen who was not examined-Held: In the absence of examination of the said employee, evidence is vague, not clear and definite much less reliable-Hence, High Court rightly held there was no acceptable evidence which could bring the case within the expression of “bribery” under S.123-Other allegations of corrupt practices also not established. Interpretation of Statutes: External aids-Dictionary meaning-Relevancy of- Held: If an expression has acquired a special connotation in law, it must be assumed that the legislature has used it in a legal sense, not according to dictionary or general meaning. External aids-Constituent Assembly Debates-Discussion in- Reference to- Implication of-Stated. Words and Phrases : “Undischarged insolvent”-Meaning of-In the context of Art. 191(1)(c) of the Constitution of India, 1950. Insolvent”-Meaning of-In the context of S. 2(8) of the Sale of Goods Act, 1930. “Bribery”-Meaning of-In the context of S.123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The appellant was declared elected to State Legislative Assembly. The respondent, the defeated candidate, filed an election petition challenging the election of the appellant on the grounds that he was disqualified from being chosen as a MLA since he was an undischarged insolvent within the meaning of Article 191(l)(c) of the Constitution and that he had indulged in corrupt practices within the meaning of Section 123 of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. The respondent alleged that the appellant using his position and status secured several bottles of rum from a Military Canteen and supplied them in his constituency. The witnesses had no personal knowledge of the bottles being carried but they came to know about the matter from the employee of the Military Canteen who was not examined. The High Court held that the expression “undischarged insolvent” which was not defined in the Provincial Insolvency Act, 1920 should be given its natural meaning, instead of a technical meaning given in the Insolvency Act so that the disqualification applied to any person who was shown to be unable to pay his debts on the relevant date. The High Court referring to the Debates in the Constituent Assembly and to the suggestion of Sir Alladi Krishnaswamy Ayyar that the expression “if he is an undischarged insolvent” should be in terms of Section 73 of the Insolvency Act which was not accepted by the Constituent Assembly and held that the framers of the Constitution did not want to confine the operation of the disqualification only to cases where a person was adjudged insolvent under the Insolvency Act. The High Court, therefore, accepted the submission that pre- adjudication by an insolvency court is not required and observed that a candidate who was found to be an insolvent by the Court trying the election petition and a candidate who had already been adjudicated insolvent by the Insolvency Court but who had not obtained an order for discharge were both covered by Article 191(l)(c) of the Constitution. The High Court declared the appellant as an “undischarged insolvent” and held his election as void. The High Court, however, decided against the respondent-Election Petitioner-on the allegation of corrupt practices. Hence this appeal. On behalf of the appellant it was contended that the High Court could not in deciding an election petition under the R.P. Act examine the question whether the appellant was an undischarged insolvent.

PETITIONER: THAMPANOOR RAVI Vs. RESPONDENT: CHARUPARA RAVI & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 15/09/1999 BENCH: S.R.Babu, R.C.Lahoti JUDGMENT: RAJENDRA BABU, J. : Civil Appeal Nos. 7395-7396 of 1997 The appellant in these appeals was declared elected to the Kerala Legislative Assembly from No. 139, Neyyattinkara constituency in an election held on April 27, 1996. Two election … Continue reading

Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The Supreme Court over 50 years has been consistently observing that limited jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 227 of the Constitution of India cannot be exercised by interfering with the findings of fact and setting aside the judgments of the courts below on merits. The High Court, in the impugned judgment, has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact of the authorities below under its limited jurisdiction under Article 227 of the Constitution. [Para 29 and 35] [185- G; 187-E] Nagendra Nath Bora and Another v. Commissioner of Hills Division and Appeals, Assam & Others 1958 SCR1240=AIR 1958 SC 398; Nibaran Chandra Bag v. Mahendra Nath Ghughu 1963 Suppl. SCR570= AIR 1963 SC 1895; Mohd. Yunus v. Mohd. Mustaqim & Others 1984 (1) SCR 211= (1983) 4 SCC 566; Laxmikant Revchand Bhojwani & Another v. Pratapsing Mohansingh Pardeshi (1995) 6 SCC 576; Rena Drego (Mrs.) v. Lalchand Soni & Others1998 (2) SCR 197=(1998) 3 SCC 341; Virendra Kashinath Ravat & Another v. Vinayak N. Joshi & Others 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR643= (1999) 1 SCC 47, relied on. 2.1. The High Court erroneously observed that “the authenticity of the decree passed by the court cannot be questioned. Therefore, the genuineness of the sale price has to be presumed.” This finding of the High Court cannot be sustained. It would have far reaching ramifications and consequences. If the genuineness of the sale price entered into by the buyer and the seller cannot be questioned, then in majority of the cases it is unlikely that the State would ever receive the stamp duty according to the circle rate or the collector rate. The approach of the High Court is totally unrealistic. [Para 36] [187-G-H; 188-A] 2.2. In order to ensure that there is no evasion of stamp duty, circle rates are fixed from time to time and the notification issued to that effect. The issuance of such notification has become imperative to arrest the tendency of evading the payment of actual stamp duty. It is a matter of common knowledge that usually the circle rate or the collector rate is lower than the prevalent actual market rate but to ensure registration of sale deeds at least at the circle rates or the collector rates such notifications are issued from time to time. [Para 39] [188-E, F] 2.3 It is not disputed that in the instant case the commercial plot of 788 sq. yards was valued by the circle rate at Rs.4,200 per sq. yard fixed by the Collector, meaning thereby that after the notification, no sale deed could be registered for an amount lesser than Rs.4,200/- per sq.yard. The High Court has not properly construed the observations of the District Collector to the effect that the suit was filed in the civil court with the intention to avoid tax and stamp duty inasmuch as the value of the property as per the circle rate was Rs.33,09,600, on which stamp duty to be paid was Rs.5,13,050/- whereas the stamp duty actually paid was only Rs.31,000/-, therefore stamp duty to the tune of Rs.4,82,050 was payable. This order was upheld by the Commissioner. The High Court while exercising its jurisdiction under Article 227 has set aside the orders passed by the authorities below without any basis or rationale. Apart from the jurisdiction, even what is factually stated in the order of the District Collector as upheld by the Commissioner, is unexceptionable and any interference was totally unwarranted. [Para 40-41] [189-B-C; D-E] 2.4. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained and is accordingly set aside, and the order passed by the District Collector, as upheld by the Commissioner, is restored. The respondent is directed to pay the balance stamp duty. [Para 42] [189-F, G] State of Punjab & Others v. Mohabir Singh etc.etc. 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR520= (1996) 1 SCC 609; R. Sai Bharathi v. J. Jayalalitha & Others 2003 (6) Suppl.SCR85= (2004) 2 SCC 9, cited. Case Law Reference: 1958 SCR1240 relied on para 23 1963 Suppl. SCR570 relied on para 24 1984 (1) SCR211 relied on para 25 (1995) 6 SCC 576 relied on para 26 1998 (2) SCR197 relied on para 27 1998 (2) Suppl. SCR643 relied on para 28 1995 (5) Suppl. SCR520 cited para 32 2003 (6) Suppl.SCR85 cited para 33 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2226 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 4.2.2008 of the High Court of Punjab and Haryana at Chandigarh in CWP No. 12094 of 2007. Puneet Mittal, AAG, Naresh Bakshi, T.A. Mir and Ankur Aggarwal for the Appellants. Manoj Swarup, Devesh Kumar Tripathi, Ashok Anand and Ajay Kumar for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2226 OF 2010 [Arising out of Special Leave to Appeal (C) No.26684 of 2008] State of Haryana & Ors. … Appellants Versus Manoj Kumar … Respondent JUDGMENT Dalveer Bhandari, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment dated … Continue reading

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