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Dowry law in India
Sec.304 B, 306 498 A I.P.C. and sec.3 &4 of Prohibition of Dowry Act – Mere demand of dowry in absence of cruelty can not fasten any liability = All family members are not liable for Dowry death case under sec.304 B I.P.C. r/w sec.113 B of Evidence Act, Unless it is proved their active role or passive connivance in committing the offence , no presumption could be drawn automatically against all = Bhola Ram …..Appellant Versus State of Punjab …..Respondent = Published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40958
Sec.304 B, 306 498 A I.P.C. and sec.3 &4 of Prohibition of Dowry Act – Mere demand of dowry in absence of cruelty can not fasten any liability = All family members are not liable for Dowry death case under sec.304 B I.P.C. r/w sec.113 B of Evidence Act, Unless it is proved their … Continue reading
Sec.306 of I.P.C. but not under sec.304 B I.P.C. – suicide of wife = STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. GIRIDHARI LAL Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40859
When there is no evidence that the suicide was committed due to curelty and harassment by her husband for dowry soon before her death, Accused is liable to be punished only under sec.306 of I.P.C. but not under sec.304 B I.P.C. = whether Babita’s death is an instance of dowry … Continue reading
Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.= where some part of evidence is not believable, it does not mean that entire case is false, court can take aid of sec.106 of Indian Evidence Act to do justice = “The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. This maxim has not received general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for replacing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence 2 (2003) 7 SCC 643 does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.” – while dealing with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, this Court observed as under: “A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as to the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilized. Section 106 however is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” – PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have reached the liver and kidney. He has added that if poison is administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state there is a possibility that it would reach the stomach and intestine. = A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased and when she became unconscious in order to create evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide, he administered poison to her. It reached her stomach and intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she died. When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison did not pass on to the liver and kidney. The High Court has rightly observed that this is the reason why there is no evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased and no bruises were found on her lips. The trial court has convicted A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury. The High Court has concurred with the trial court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1- Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the sentence imposed on A1- Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We find from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore that A2-Pappathi has already undergone one year and four months sentence. In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the conviction and sentence of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. However, we quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of A2- Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC. There is, therefore, no question of her surrendering to the Court. As per order passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail. Her bail bond shall stand discharged. As per the order of this Court dated 8/10/2007, A1-Babu is also on bail. Since we have confirmed his conviction and sentence, we direct that he should surrender before the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bond shall stand cancelled. Needless to say that A1-Babu’s sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40478 Page 1 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1738 OF 2007 BABU @ BALASUBRAMANIAM AND ANR. …Appellants Versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …Respondent J U D G M E N T (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. The appellants (A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi respectively, for convenience) … Continue reading
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973; Ss. 188, 468, 470, 473 & 482/Penal Code, 1860; Ss. 406 and 498A/Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961; Ss. 4 & 6: Matrimonial offences-Court’s power to take cognizance beyond period of limitation-Quashing of proceedings before Magistrate on ground of limitation-Held: In the interest of justice, court could take cognizance of an offence after expiry of limitation period by liberally exercising power u/s.473 Cr.P.C.-High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with investigation/trial of criminal cases-It could exercise inherent powers u/s.482 Cr.P.C. only when it is satisfied that FIR does not disclose commission of cognizable offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or to prevent abuse of process of the Court or continuation of proceeding of the criminal case would result in failure of justice-Magistrate took cognizance of offence after lapse of three years-A co-ordinate Bench of High Court quashed the proceeding qua the parents of appellants on the ground that Magistrate could not have taken cognizance of offence after three years-Appellants do not appear to have drawn attention of Single Judge of the High Court about quashing of the said proceedings-In such peculiar facts of the case, continuation of the proceedings would amount to abuse of process of the Court-Hence, the proceedings as against accused, pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, quashed-Limitation-Courts power to relax. Appellant No.1, an engineer working in USA, married the eldest daughter of respondent no. 2. Before marriage, the appellant and their parents demanded certain amount of cash and jewellery as dowry. They also demanded transfer of certain property belonging to the parents of the girl in favour of the parents of appellant No.1. Appellant No.1 and his parents accepted the proposal and performed betrothal. Later, they demanded Zen car and threatened to cancel the engagement unless the car was given. The demand was fulfilled by the parents of the girl by raising loan. After marriage, when she went to USA along with the parents of the appellants, she stayed at New Jersey in U.S.A. from 1.11.1998 to 2.12.1998. During this period, she was allegedly subjected to cruelty and harassment by the appellants and their parents for demand of more and more dowry. She left her matrimonial home and stayed with her relatives. Later, appellant No.1 instituted divorce petition in Superior Court at New Jersey and an ex parte decree was passed in his favour. In the meanwhile, the victim informed to her parents about the ill-treatment meted out to her by her husband and his parents. Thereupon, respondent no. 2-mother of the victim, filed a complaint in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate. The Magistrate referred the complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. After investigation, the Inspector of Police, Women Protection Cell, C.I.D., submitted the final report with the suggestion to close the case. The Investigating Officer also made a reference to the direction given by Additional Director General of Police, CID to close the case due to lack of evidence. The Magistrate rejected the final report and directed the police to make further investigation. The police conducted further investigation and a Notice was also issued to the victim to appear before CID Police. Respondent no. 2 filed a Criminal Petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. for quashing the notice for appearance of her daughter. The same was disposed of by the Single Judge with liberty to the petitioner to approach the investigating agency/Court and inform it about the efforts being made by her daughter to come to India. Respondent no. 2 also filed a Writ Petition for issuance of a direction to the Regional Passport Officer to impound the passport of appellant no. 1. That petition was allowed by the Single Judge of the High Court. The victim obtained duplicate passport and visa and came to India. She appeared before the Investigating Officer and gave statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. The police filed a charge-sheet under Sections 498A and 406 IPC read with Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Act. The Magistrate took cognizance of the case and issued summons to the appellants and their parents. The parents of the appellants challenged the proceedings in the Criminal Petition filed by the parents of the victim under Section 482 Cr.P.C. The Single Judge quashed the proceedings. The appellant also filed a petition for quashing the proceedings against him. However, the Single Judge of the High Court held that the proceedings in Criminal Petition cannot be quashed against him as the Magistrate had taken cognizance within three years. Hence the present appeal. Appellants contended that the Single Judge of the High Court committed an error by refusing to quash the proceedings in the Criminal Petition filed by the parents of the victim ignoring the fact that the Magistrate had taken cognizance after almost four years of the last act of alleged cruelty committed against the victim; that after dissolution of the marriage, the victim had taken back the Gold and Silver jewellery and then contracted marriage with another person and this fact ought to have been considered by the Single Judge of the High Court while examining the appellants’ pleas that the proceedings of criminal case instituted against them amounts to an abuse of the process of law; and that in exercise of the power under Section 482 Cr.P.C., the High Court is duty bound to quash the proceedings which are barred by time and protect the appellants against unwarranted persecution. Respondent No.2 submitted that Single Judge of the High Court rightly declined to quash the proceedings in the criminal petition filed by her because the offences committed by the appellants were continuing in nature; that even though as on the date of taking cognizance of offences by the Magistrate, a period of more than three years had elapsed, the proceedings in the Criminal Petition cannot be declared as barred by limitation because the appellants were not in India and the period of their absence is liable to be excluded in terms of Section 470(4) Cr.P.C.; that offences of cruelty and criminal breach of trust are continuing offences and prosecution launched against the appellants cannot be treated as barred by time; that the Magistrate could also exercise power under Section 473 Cr.P.C. for extending the period of limitation because the appellants and their parents did not co-operate in the investigation and also prevented the victim from coming to India to give her statement; and that the proceedings of the criminal case cannot be quashed only on the ground of lack of sanction under Section 188 Cr. P.C. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. While considering the applicability of Section 468 Cr.P.C. to the complaints made by the victims of matrimonial offences, the court can invoke Section 473 Cr.P.C. and can take cognizance of an offence after expiry of the period of limitation keeping in view the nature of allegations, the time taken by the police in investigation and the fact that the offence of cruelty is a continuing offence and affects the society at large. To put it differently, in cases involving matrimonial offences the court should not adopt a narrow and pedantic approach and should, in the interest of justice, liberally exercise power under Section 473 for extending the period of limitation. [Para 23] [496-F, G; 497-A] State of Punjab v. Sarwan Singh, [1981] 3 SCC 34; Venka Radhamanohari v. Vanka Venkata Reddy, [1993] 3 SCC 4; Arun Vyas v. Anita Vyas, [1999] 4 SCC 690; State of Himachal Pradesh v. Tara Dutt [2000] 1 SCC 230 and Ramesh v. State of Tamil Nadu, [2005] 3 SCC 507, relied on. 2.1. The High Court should be extremely cautious and slow to interfere with the investigation and/or trial of criminal cases and should not stall the investigation and/or prosecution except when it is convinced beyond any manner of doubt that the FIR does not disclose commission of any offence or that the allegations contained in the FIR do not constitute any cognizable offence or that the prosecution is barred by law or the High Court is convinced that it is necessary to interfere to prevent abuse of the process of the court. In dealing with such cases, the High Court has to bear in mind that judicial intervention at the threshold of the legal process initiated against a person accused of committing offence is highly detrimental to the larger public and societal interest. [Para 30] [501-E, F, G] R.P. Kapur v. State of Punjab, AIR (1960) SC 866; State of Haryana v. Bhajanlal, [1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335; State of Bihar v. J.A.C. Saldanha, [1980] 1 SCC 554 and State of West Bengal v. Swapan Kumar Guha, [1982] 1 SCC 561 and M/s Zandu Pharmaceutical Works Ltd. v. Mohd. Sharaful Haque, [2005] 7 SCC 254, referred to. 2.2. The people and the society have a legitimate expectation that those committing offences either against an individual or the society are expeditiously brought to trial and, if found guilty, adequately punished. Therefore, while deciding a petition filed for quashing the FIR or complaint or restraining the competent authority from investigating the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint or for stalling the trial of the case, the High Court should be extremely careful and circumspect. If the allegations contained in the FIR or complaint discloses commission of some crime, then the High Court must keep its hands off and allow the investigating agency to complete the investigation without any fetter and also refrain from passing order which may impede the trial. [Para 30] [501-H; 502-A, B] 2.3. The High Court should not go into the merits and demerits of the allegations simply because the petitioner alleges malus animus against the author of the FIR or the complainant. The High Court must also refrain from making imaginary journey in the realm of possible harassment which may be caused to the petitioner on account of investigation of the FIR or complaint. Such a course will result in miscarriage of justice and would encourage those accused of committing crimes to repeat the same. However, if the High Court is satisfied that the complaint does not disclose commission of any offence or prosecution is barred by limitation or that the proceedings of criminal case would result in failure of justice, then it may exercise inherent power under Section 482 Cr.P.C. [Para 30] [502-C, D, E] 3.1. In the instant case, although the Single Judge of High Court dealt with various points raised by the appellants and negatived the same by recording the detailed order, his attention does not appear to have been drawn to the order dated 24.10.2006 passed by the Co-Ordinate Bench in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003 whereby the proceedings of CC No.240/2002 were quashed qua the parents of the appellants on the ground that the Magistrate could not have taken cognizance after three years. Respondent No.2 is not shown to have challenged the order, therefore, that order will be deemed to have become final. If attention of the Single Judge who decided Criminal Petition filed by the appellants had been drawn to the order passed by another Single Judge in Criminal Petition No.1302/2003, he may have, by taking note of the fact that the Magistrate did not pass an order for condonation of delay or extension of the period of limitation in terms of Section 473 Cr.P.C., quashed the proceedings of CC No.240/2002. [Para 32] [502-F, G; 503-A, B] 3.2. In the peculiar facts of this case, continuation of proceedings of CC No.240/2002 will amount to abuse of the process of the Court. It is not in dispute that after marriage, the victim lived with appellant No.1 for less than one and a half months. It is also not in dispute that their marriage was dissolved by the Superior Court at New Jersey, U.S.A. The victim is not shown to have challenged the decree of divorce. As a matter of fact, she had solemnized second marriage with another person and has two children from the second marriage. She also received all the articles of dowry (including jewellery). Almost nine years has elapsed since the marriage of appellant No.1 with the victim and seven years from her second marriage. Therefore, at this belated stage, there does not appear to be any justification for continuation of the proceedings in CC No.240/2002. Rather, it would amount to sheer harassment to the appellant and the victim who are settled in USA, if they are required to come to India for giving evidence in relation to an offence allegedly committed in 1998-99. It is also extremely doubtful whether the Government of India will, after lapse of such a long time, give sanction in terms of Section 188 Cr.P.C. Hence, the proceedings of CC No.240/2002, pending in the Court of Metropolitan Magistrate, are quashed. [Paras 33 and 34] [503-B, C, D, E, F, G] Bina Madhavan and S. Udaya Kumar Sagar (for M/s. Lawyer’s Knit & Co.) for the Appellants. I.V. Narayana, T.N. Rao, Manjeet Kirpal, Paramjeet Singh and L.D. Rajendar for the Respondents.2008 AIR 787 , 2007(13 )SCR478 , , 2007(14 )SCALE321 ,
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 1708 of 2007 PETITIONER: Sanapareddy Maheedhar and Another RESPONDENT: State of Andhra Pradesh and Another DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/12/2007 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & G.S. Singhvi JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No. 6680 OF 2006) G.S. Singhvi, J. Leave granted. This … Continue reading
Merely because Respondent 1 was an Advocate, did not justify the issuance of directions at his request without notice of the other side. Of late, we notice that the High Courts are entertaining writ petitions under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution, so also under Section 482 CrPC and passing and interfering with various orders granting or rejecting request for bail, which is the function of ordinary Criminal Court. We are of the view that the High Court has committed a grave error in not only entertaining the criminal miscellaneous application in a disposed of writ petition, but also passing an order not to arrest the 1st respondent till the conclusion of the trial. Grant of bail or not to grant, is within the powers of the regular Criminal Court and the High Court, in its inherent jurisdiction, not justified in usurping their powers. Once the criminal writ petition has been disposed of, the High Court becomes functus officio and cannot entertain review petitions or miscellaneous applications except for carrying out typographical or clerical errors. In the instant case, the High Court has entertained a petition in a disposed of criminal writ petition and granted reliefs, which is impermissible in law. 14. We are, therefore, inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned order passed by the High Court, with costs of Rs.25,000/- to be paid by 1st respondent to the appellant, within a period of two months.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1693…. OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 2575 of 2010] Nazma .. Appellant Versus Javed @ Anjum .. Respondent J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. We are, in this appeal, … Continue reading
The courts are receiving a large number of cases emanating from section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code which reads as under:- “498-A. Husband or relative of husband of a woman subjecting her to cruelty.–Whoever, being the husband or the relative of the husband of a woman, subjects such woman to cruelty shall be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine. Explanation.–For the purposes of this section, `cruelty’ means:- (a) any wilful conduct which is of such a nature as is likely to drive the woman to commit suicide or to cause grave injury or danger to life, limb or health (whether mental or physical) of the woman; or (b) harassment of the woman where such harassment is with a view to coercing her or any person related to her to meet any unlawful demand for any property or valuable security or is on account of failure by her or any person related to her to meet such demand.” 30. It is a matter of common experience that most of these complaints under section 498-A IPC are filed in the heat of the
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1512 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.4684 of 2009) Preeti Gupta & Another …Appellants Versus State of Jharkhand & Another ….Respondents J U D G M E N T Dalveer Bhandari, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been … Continue reading
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