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Scope of Sec.120 B of I.P.C. = what will be the effect of acquittal of co-accused Nos.1 and 2 on the case of accused No.3. According to the appellant if co-accused No.1 is acquitted and in view of acquittal of co- accused No.2 no charge under Sections 409, 411 and 477-A substantiate against accused No.3 and he cannot be punished with the aid of Section 120-B IPC.= However, in view of the acquittal of accused Nos.1 and 2, the order of conviction of accused No.3 under Section 477-A is set aside. The judgment dated 6th September, 2001 passed by the learned Special Judge is affirmed with modification as mentioned above. The appeal (Criminal Appeal No.1226 of 2001) filed by the appellant-Hiten P. Dalal is dismissed. The bail bonds of the appellant – Hiten P. Dalal, if he is on bail, shall stand cancelled and he is directed to be taken into custody to serve out the remainder of the sentence.

‘  published in http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1001 OF 2001 B. RAGHUVIR ACHARYA … APPELLANT VERUS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION … RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1226 OF 2001 HITEN P. DALAL … APPELLANT VERUS CENTRAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T … Continue reading

claim of the assessee for depreciation under Section 32 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 (for short “the Act”).The assessee is a public limited company, classified by the Reserve Bank of India (RBI) as a non-banking finance company. It is engaged in the business of hire purchase, leasing and real estate etc. The vehicles, on which depreciation was claimed, are stated to have been purchased by the assessee against direct payment to the manufacturers. The assessee, as a part of its business, leased out these vehicles to its customers and thereafter, had no physical affiliation with the vehicles. In fact, lessees were registered as the owners of the vehicles, in the certificate of registration issued under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the MV Act”). = where the business of the assessee consists of hiring out machinery and/ or where the income derived by the assessee from the hiring of such machinery is business income, the assessee must be considered as having used the machinery for the purpose of business. 40. In the present case, the business of the assessee consists of hiring out machinery and trucks where the income derived by the assessee from hiring of such machinery is business income. Therefore, the assessee- appellant viz. ICDS should be considered as having used the trucks for the purpose of business. 41. It was further brought to our notice that the Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in its judgment in ITRC No. 789 of 1998 for the asst. year 1986- 87 in the case of the assessee- appellant itself (viz. ICDS) has already decided the issue in question in favour of the assessee, confirming the decision of the CIT (A) and the ITAT holding that the assessee company is entitled to the investment allowance and additional depreciation. In this judgment of the Karnataka High Court the decision of the Supreme Court reported in 231 ITR 308 was relied upon. Therefore we have no hesitation to hold that the appellant- company is entitled to a higher rate of depreciation at 50% on the trucks leased out by it. We therefore, reverse the orders of the CIT (Appeals) on this issue.” 32. For the foregoing reasons, in our opinion, the High Court erred in law in reversing the decision of the Tribunal. Consequently, the appeals are allowed; the impugned judgments are set aside and the substantial questions of law framed by the High Court, extracted in para 6 (supra), are answered in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE |IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA | |CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION | |CIVIL APPEAL NO.3282 OF 2008 | | | |M/S I.C.D.S. LTD. |— |APPELLANT | |VERSUS | |COMMISSIONER OF INCOME TAX, MYSORE |— |RESPONDENTS | |& ANR. | | | WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.3286 OF 2008, CIVIL APPEAL NO.3287 OF 2008, CIVIL APPEAL NO.3288 … Continue reading

Section 4 of the Gratuity Act, that an employee has the right to make a choice of being governed by some alternative provision/instrument, other than the Gratuity Act, for drawing the benefit of gratuity. If an employee makes such a choice, he is provided with a statutory protection, namely, that the concerned employee would be entitled to receive better terms of gratuity under the said provision/instrument, in comparison to his entitlement under the Gratuity Act. This protection has been provided through Section 4 (5) of the Gratuity Act. Furthermore, from the mandate of Section 14 of the Gratuity Act, it is imperative to further conclude, that the provisions of the Gratuity Act would have overriding effect, with reference to any inconsistency therewith in any other provision or instrument. Thus viewed, even if the provisions of the 1995, Regulations, had debarred payment of interest on account of delayed payment of gratuity, the same would have been inconsequential. The benefit of interest enuring to an employee, as has been contemplated under section 7(3A) of the Gratuity Act, cannot be denied to an employee, whose gratuity is regulated by some provision/instrument other than the Gratuity Act. This is so because, the terms of payment of gratuity under the alternative instrument has to ensure better terms, than the ones provided under the Gratuity Act. The effect would be the same, when the concerned provision is silent on the issue. This is so, because the instant situation is not worse than the one discussed above, where there is a provision expressly debarring payment of interest in the manner contemplated under Section 7(3A) of the Gratuity Act. Therefore, even though the 1995, Regulations, are silent on the issue of payment of interest, the appellant would still be entitled to the benefit of Section 7(3A) of the Gratuity Act. If such benefit is not extended to the appellant, the protection contemplated under section 4(5) of the Gratuity Act would stand defeated. Likewise, even the mandate contained in section 14 of the Gratuity Act, deliberated in detail hereinabove, would stand negated. We, therefore, have no hesitation in concluding, that even though the provisions of the 1995, Regulations, are silent on the issue of payment of interest, the least that the appellant would be entitled to, are terms equal to the benefits envisaged under the Gratuity Act. Under the Gratuity Act, the appellant would be entitled to interest, on account of delayed payment of gratuity (as has already been concluded above). We therefore hold, that the appellant herein is entitled to interest on account of delayed payment, in consonance with sub-Section (3A) of Section 7 of the Gratuity Act. We, accordingly, direct the PNB to pay to the appellant, interest at “…the rate notified by the Central Government for repayment of long term deposits…”. In case no such notification has been issued, we are of the view, that the appellant would be entitled to interest, as was awarded to him by the learned Single Judge of the High Court vide order dated 4.5.2011, i.e., interest at the rate of 8%. The PNB is directed, to pay the aforesaid interest to the appellant, within one month of the appellant’s furnishing to the PNB a certified copy of the instant order. The appellant shall also be entitled to costs quantified at Rs.50,000/-, for having had to incur expenses before the Writ Court, before the Division Bench, and finally before this Court. The aforesaid costs shall also be disbursed to the appellant within the time indicated hereinabove.

“REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.9087 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.14570 of 2012) Y.K. Singla …. Appellant Versus Punjab National Bank & Ors. …. Respondents O R D E R JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant was inducted into the service … Continue reading

INCOME TAX ACT, 1961: Capital receipt -Assessment year 1997-98 -Payment received under an agreement not to compete (negative covenant) -Held: Compensation attributable to a negative/restrictive covenant during the relevant assessment year was a capital receipt not taxable under the Act -It became taxable only w.e.f. 1.4.2003 -A liability cannot be created restrospectively-s.28 (va) is a mandatory and not clarificatory. During the assessment year 1997-1998, the assessee received Rs. 50 lakhs as non-competition fee in consideration of an agreement that contained prohibitive/restrictive covenant. The assessee agreed to transfer its trade marks to transferee company and in consideration of such transfer on the terms and conditions appearing in the agreement, the assessee agreed that it would not carry on directly or directly business that was being carried on by it till that time. The Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) while overruling the decision of the AO held that the amount received by the assessee from transferee company was a capital receipt not taxable under the Income Tax Act, 1961. The decision was affirmed by the Tribunal. The High Court reversed the judgment of the Tribunal. In the appeal filed by the Revenue, the question for consideration before the Court was: whether a payment under an agreement not to compete (negative covenant agreement) is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The position in law is clear and well settled. There is a dichotomy between receipt of compensation by an assessee for the loss of agency and receipt of compensation attributable to the negative/restrictive covenant. The compensation received for the loss of agency is a revenue receipt whereas the compensation attributable to a negative/restrictive covenant is a capital receipt. [Para 5] [903-D-E] Gillanders Arbuthnot and Co. Ltd. v. CIT, Calcutta 53 ITR 283 – relied on. 1.2. The High Court has misinterpreted the judgment of this Court in Gillanders’ case. In the instant case, the Department has not impugned the genuineness of the transaction. The High Court has erred in interfering with the concurrent findings of fact recorded by the CIT (A) and the Tribunal. [Para 7] [904-D-E] 1.3. One more aspect needs to be highlighted. Payment received as non- competition fee under a negative covenant was always treated as a capital receipt till the assessment year 2003-04. In order to put an end to such litigations, Parliament stepped in to specifically tax such receipts under non-competition agreement with effect from 1.4.2003. It is only by Finance Act, 2002 with effect from 1.4.2003 that the said capital receipt is now made taxable [Section 28(va)]. The Finance Act, 2002 itself indicates that during the relevant assessment year compensation received by the assessee under non-competition agreement was a capital receipt, not taxable under the 1961 Act. It became taxable only with effect from 1.4.2003. It is well settled that a liability cannot be created retrospectively. In the instant case, compensation received under Non-Competition Agreement became taxable as a capital receipt and not as a revenue receipt by specific legislative mandate by s. 28(va) and that too with effect from 1.4.2003. Therefore, the said s. 28(va) is amendatory and not clarificatory. [Para 7] [904-E-H] Commissioner of Income-Tax, Nagpur v. Rai Bahadur Jairam Valji, 35 ITR 148 -referred to. 1.4. The impugned judgment of the High Court is set aside and the order of the Tribunal restored. [Para 8] [905-D] Case Law Reference: 53 ITR 283 approved para 4 35 ITR 148 referred to para 7 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2522 of 2011 From the Judgment & Order dated 29.10.2009 of the High Court of Karnataka, Circuit Bench at Dharwad in ITA No. 985 of 2006. B. Bhattacharya, ASG, Porus, F. Kaka, R.P. Bhatt, Manish Kanth, Rustom B. Hathikhanawala, Fuzail Ahmad Ayyubi, Naresh Kaushik, Arijit Prasad, Ajay Singh, B.V. Balram Das, Ajay Singh, K. Sampath and Rani Chhabra for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2522 OF 2011 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 6081 of 2010) Guffic Chem P. Ltd. … Appellant(s) versus C.I.T., Belgaum & Anr. … Respondent(s) WITH Civil Appeal No.2523 of 2011 (arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 222 of 2011) J U D … Continue reading

since introduced Section 145-A to the Income Tax Act. Clause(b) thereof provides that notwithstanding anything contained in Section 145 of the Income Tax Act, interest received by an assessee on compensation or on enhanced compensation, as the case may be, shall be deemed to be the income of the year in which it is received.

THE HON’BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SHRI MADAN B. LOKUR AND THE HON’BLE SHRI JUSTICE SANJAY KUMAR W.P. No.6425 of 2012                                                   DATED:09-03-2012 Between: Sannapureddy Pakkeera Reddy                         …  Petitioner   And   The Special Deputy Collector, Telugu Ganga Project, Unit – I (L.A.), Kadapa and another.             … Respondents                     … Continue reading

406. Punishment for criminal breach of trust.- Whoever commits criminal breach of trust shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years, or with fine, or with both. 409. Criminal breach of trust by public servant, or by banker, merchant or agent.- Whoever, being in any manner entrusted with property, or with any dominion over property in his capacity of a public servant or in the way of his business as a banker, merchant, factor, broker, attorney or agent, commits criminal breach of trust in respect of that property, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.” Section 409 enables the Court to award imprisonment for life or imprisonment up to ten years alongwith fine. Considering the fact that the appellant was awarded imprisonment for 6 months alongwith a fine of Rs. 1,000/- only, we feel that the same is not excessive. On the other hand, we are of the view that persons dealing with the property of the Government and entrusted with the task of distribution under FFWS, it is but proper on their part to maintain true accounts, handover coupons to the Mandal Revenue Office and to execute the same fully and without any lapse. Such recourse has not been followed by the appellant. The courts cannot take lenient view in awarding sentence on the ground of sympathy or delay, particularly, if it relates to distribution of essential commodities under any Scheme of the Government intended to benefit the public at large. Accordingly, while rejecting the request of the learned senior counsel for the appellant, we hold that there is no ground for reduction of sentence. 12) Under these circumstances, we find no merit in the appeal. Consequently, the same is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the order granting exemption from surrender is revoked and the appellant has to surrender within four weeks and serve out the remaining period of sentence.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1159 OF 2012 3 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 7526 of 2011     Sadhupati Nageswara Rao …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Andhra Pradesh …. Respondent(s)   J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) … Continue reading

Constitution of India-Articles 73 and 265-Income Tax Act, 1961- Sections 4, 5 & 90-Indo-Mauritius Direct Tax Avoidance Convention (DTAC) dated 1.4.1983–Articles 3, 4 and 13(4)–Exemption to assessees under DTAC on capital gains on sale of shares of Indian companies- Power of Central Government to grant exemption-Validity of-Held, valid DTAC notified under Section 90 of the Income Tax Act-It can override the provisions of the Income Tax Act and hence, the principle of piercing the corporate veil cannot be applied-DTAC cannot be held ultra vires on susceptibility of `treaty shopping’ by third party countries- Income Tax Act, 1922-Section 49A. Section 90-CBDT Circular No. 789 dated 13.4.2000 issuing instructions to Revenue to treat an assessee with a `Certificate of Residence’ issued by Mauritius authorities as `resident’ of Mauritius-Validity of- Held, valid even if inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act for implementation of DTAC-Circular does not amount to impermissible delegation of power. Section 119-CBDT Circular No. 789 dated 13.4.2000-Validity of- Held, valid- Non-indication of the source of power does not render the Circular ultra vires-Circular intended to avoid wastage of time and energy of the assessing officers and not issued to crib, cabin or confine the powers of the assessing officer in particular assessment. Income Tax Act, 1961-Liability to taxation-Grant to exemption under the Mauritius Income Tax Act, 1995-Entitlement of benefit under DTAC-Held, they are `liable to tax’ under the latter Act even though granted exemption- Hence, they are entitled to benefit under DTAC being liable to tax. under the former Act-Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act, 1992 (MOBA)- Sections 26 & 27. `Treaty Shopping’-Etitlement of third party nation taking the benefit of DTAC-Held, is entitled since there are no disabling or disentitling conditions under the DTAC-Motive of taking benefit under the DTAC is irrelevant. Doctrine of stare decisis-Applicability of. The Government of India and the Government of Mauritius entered into a Double Taxation Avoidance Convention (DTAC) on 1.4.1983 for the avoidance of double taxation and prevention of fiscal evasion with respect to taxes on income and capital gains and for the encouragement of mutual trade and investment. The DTAC was notified under Section 90 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 on 6.12.1983. According to Article 13(4) of the DTAC, the capital gains derived by a `resident’ of a Contractng State from the alienation of any property other than those mentioned in Article 13(1), (2) and (3) shall be taxable only in that State. The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) issued a Circular No. 682 dated 30th March, 1994 clarifying Article 13(4) of the DTAC that the income derived by a `resident’ of Mauritius by alienation of shares of India companies will be liable to capital gains tax only in Mauritius as per Mauritius tax law and will not have any tax liability under the Indian Income Tax Act. Relying on the Circular, a large number of assessees, mainly Foreign Institutional Investors (FIIs) and claiming to be `residents’ of Mauritius, invested huge capital in the shares of Indian companies with a view to make profits without attracting capital gains tax in India. The Revenue issued show cause notices to some FIIs functioning in India for taxing profits and dividends accrued to them by sale/ holding of shares under the Income Tax Act holding that the FIIs are not eligible for the benefits under the DTAC since they are not true `residents’ of Mauritius and are `shell companies’ incorporated in Mauritius, controlled and managed by third party countries. The show cause notices issued by the Revenue created panic in the Indian stock market and consequent hasty withdrawal of funds by the FIIs. CBDT issued Circular No. 789 dated 13.4.2000 clarifying to the assessing officers that wherever a `Certificate of Residence’ is issued to an assessee by the Mauritius Authorities, such assessee can claim to be a `resident’ of Mauritius and avail the benefits under the DTAC. Two Writ Petitions, by way of Public Interest Litigation, were filed. d before High Court of quashing the CBDT Circular No. 789 (impugned circular), as being ultra vires under the Income Tax Act, 196.. Besides, appropriate directions were also sought for to revise, modify or terminate the terms of the DTAC to prevent the FIIs and NRIs to maraud the resources of the country; to declare and delimit the powers of the Central Government under Section 90 of the Income Tax Act in entering into agreements with the Government of any country; and to declare and delimit the powers of the CBDT in issuance of instructions to the statutory authorities under the Income Tax Act which are beneficial to certain individual tax payers and injurious to Public Interest. The petitioners further sought appropriate directions to the Central Government to take all remedial actions to undo the actions done to the prejudice of the Revenue in pursuance of the impugned Circular. High Court allowed the Writ Petitions and quashed the impugned Circular holding it ultra vires on the grounds that it does not specify that the same was issued under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act and hence is not legally binding on the Revenue; that the CBDT cannot issue a Circular ultravires the provisions of the Act; that it curtails the quasi-judicial function of the Revenue to lift the corporate veil of the assessee contrary to the Act; that the `Certificate of Residence’ is not contemplated under the DTAC or the Act; that it encourages “Treaty Shopping” whereby a resident of a third country taking advantage of the DTAC which is illegal and must be forbidden; that the essential legislative function cannot be delegated to CBDT for issuance of the Circular under Section 119 of the Act; that political expediency cannot be a ground for not fulfilling the constitutional obligations inherent in the Constitution of India; and that it enables the assessee not liable to tax in both the countries. In appeal to this Court, the Union of India contended that several tax treaties with similar terms entered into with various foreign Governments and notified under the Income Tax Act and since different High Courts interpreted the terms of the agreements in a uniform manner, by application of the doctrine of stare decisis, no interference is warranted. The respondents contended that DTAC, being a fiscal treaty, is governed by Article 265 of the Constitution of India and hence, it cannot be contrary to the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961; that the Central Government, being delegatee of legislative power under Section 90 of the Act, cannot grant exemption in contravention of the Income Tax Act; that the DTAC is ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under Section 90 of the Act since it encourages `treaty shopping’, which is unethical and illegal and amounts to a fraud on the DTAC; that the assessees are granted exemption under the Mauritius Income Tax Act, 1995 and are not liable to tax under the Mauritius Act and hence they should be made liable to tax under the Indian Income Tax Act 1961; that the avoidance of double taxation can arise only when tax is actually paid in one of the Contracting States; that the assessees, incorporated and registered under the Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act, 1992 (MOBA), are not `liable to taxation’ in Mauritius and hence are not `residents’ of Mauritius under the DTAC; that the assessees, incorporated under the Mauritius laws, are `shell’ companies, a `sham’ or a `device’ incorporated only with the motive of taking undue advantage of the DTAC; and that the DTAC is for the benefit of the Contracting States and hence, the Central Government cannot claim the absence of anti-abuse provisions by the third party countries in the DTAC. The Union of India contended that the exemption to assessees from income tax on capital gains on alienation of shares does not mean that they are not `liable to tax’ under the Mauritius Income Tax Act, 1995 and, hence, not `resident’ in Mauritius; that by grant of exemption under the Mauritius Income Tax Act, it cannot be said that the assessees are not entitled to benefits of the DTAC; that there are no disabling or disentitling conditions in the DTAC prohibiting the resident of a third nation from deriving benefits thereunder; and that the motives with which the residents had been incorporated in Mauritius are wholly irrelevant and could not affect the legality of the transactions. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD : 1.1. A special procedure was evolved by enacting Section 90 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 to avoid time consuming and cumbersome procedure of translating the double taxation avoidance treaties into an Act of Parliament. Section 90 of the Act is specifically intended to enable and empower the Central Government to issue a notification for implementation of the terms of a double taxation avoidance agreement. The provisions of such an agreement with respect to cases to which they apply, would operate even if inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. If it was not the intention of the legislature to make a departure from the general principle of chargeability to tax under Section 4 and the general principle of ascertainment of total income under section 5 of the Act, then there was no purpose in making those Sections “subject to the provisions of the Act”. The very object of grafting the said two sections with the said clause is to enable the Central Government to issue a notification under Section 90 of the Act towards implementation of the terms of the DTACs which would automatically override the provisions of the Income Tax Act in the matter of ascertainment of chargeability to income tax and ascertainment of total income, to the extent of inconsistency with the terms of DTAC. [250-C-F] 1.2. Section 90 of the Act was enacted precisely to enable the Executive to negotiate a DTAC and quickly implement it. The powers exercised by the Central Government under Section 90 of the Act are delegated powers of legislation. A delegate of legislative power has power to grant exemption. There are provisions galore in statutes made by Parliament and State legislatures wherein the power of conditional or unconditional exemption from the provisions of the statutes are expressly delegated to the Executive. [251-E-F] 1.3. Section 90 of the Act, which delegates power to the Central Government, has not been challenged. Section 90 enables the Central Government to enter into a DTAC with a foreign Government. When the requisite notification has been issued thereunder, the provisions of sub- section (2) of Section 90 spring into operation and an assessee, who is covered by the provisions of the DTAC, is entitled to seek benefits thereunder, even if the provisions of the DTAC are inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act, 1961. [252-C-D] Maganbhai Ishwarbhai Patel & Ors, v. Union of India & Anr., (1970) 3 SCC 400, referred to. Commissioner of Income Tax v. Visakhapatnam Port Trust, (1983) 144 ITR 146 AP; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Davy Ashmore India Ltd., (1991) 190 ITR 626 (Cal.); Leonhardt Andhra Und Partner, Gmbh v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (2001) 249 ITR 418 (Cal.); Commissioner of Income Tax v. R.M. Muthaiah, (1993) 202 ITR 508 (Ker.) and Arabian Express Line Ltd. of United Kindom & Ors. v. Union of India, (1995) 212 ITR 31 (Guj.), approved. 1.4. The validity and the vires of the legislation, primary or delegated, has to be tested on the anvil of the law making power. If an authority lacks the power, then the legislation is bad. On the contrary, if the authority is clothed with the requisite power, then irrespective of whether the legislation fails in its object or not, the vires of the legislation is not liable to be questioned. Hence, it cannot be said that the DTAC is ultra vires the powers of the Central Government under Section 90 of the Act on account of its susceptibility to `treaty shopping’ on behalf of the residents of third countries. [261-F-H] 1.5. The Courts are empowered to lift the veil of the incorporation while applying the domestic law. In the situation where the terms of the DTAC have been made applicable by reason of Section 90 of the Income Tax Act, 1961, even if they derogate from the provisions of the Income Tax Act, it is not possible to say that this principle of lifting the veil of incorporation should be applied by the Court. The whole purpose of the DTAC is to ensure that the benefits are available even if they are inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act. The principle of piercing the veil of incorporation can hardly apply to a situation in this case. [279-G- H, 280-A] Re F.G. Films Ltd. (53) 1 WLR 483, referred to. 2. The impugned circular is a circular within the meaning of Section 90 of the Act. Therefore, it mast have the legal consequences contemplated by sub-section (2) of Section 90 of the Act. In other words, the circular shall prevail even if inconsistent with the provisions of the Income Tax Act in so far as the provisions of the DTAC are concerned. The impugned Circular does not amount to impermissible delegation of legislative power. Maharashtra State Board of Secondary and Higher Secondary Education & Am. v. Paritosh Bhupesh Kumar Sheth & Ors., [1984] 4 SCC 27, relied on. Harishankar Bagla & Anr: v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, [1955] 1 SCR 380 (CB) and Kishan Prakash Sharma & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [2001] 5 SCC 212 (CB), referred to. 3.1. The CBDT under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act is empowered to issue orders, instructions and directions to other income tax authorities. The circulars and instructions issued by the CBDT under the Section are binding on the tax authorities and are also in the nature of contemporanea expositio furnishing legitimate aid to the construction of the Act. It is trite law that as long as an authority has power, which is traceable to a source, the mere fact that sourceof the power is not indicated in impugned Circular does not render the Circular invalid. As long as the Circular emanates from the CBDT and contains orders, instructions or directions pertaining to proper administration of the Act, it is relatable to the source of power under Section 119 of the Act irrespective of its nomenclature. The High Court was not justified in reading the Circular as not complying with the provisions of the Act. The Circular falls within the parameters of the powers exercisable by the CBDT under Section 119 of the Act. [256-G, 257-A] 3.2. The CBDT Circular No. 682 dated 30.4.1994 was a clear enunciation of the porvisions contained in the DTAC, which would have overriding effect over the provisions of Section 4 and 5 of the Income Tax Act by virtue of Section 90(1) of the Act. If, in the teeth of this clarification, the assessing officers chose to ignore the guidelines and spent their time, talent and energy on inconsequential matters, the CBDT is justified in issuing `appropriate’ directions vide Circular No. 789 under its powers under Section 119 to set things on course by eliminating avoidable wastage of time, talent and energy of the assessing officers discharging the onerous public duty of collection of revenue. The impugned Circular does not, in any way, crib, cabin or confine the powers of the assessing officer with regard to any particular assessment. It merely formulates broad guidelines to be applied in the matter of assessment of assessees covered by the provisions of the DTAC. The impugned Circular does not in any way take away or curtail the jurisdiction of the assessing officer to assess income of the assessees before him. It is erroneous to say the impugned Circular is ultra vires the provisions of Section 119 of the Act. The powers conferred upon the CBDT, by sub-sections (1) and (2) of Section 119 of the Act are wide enough to accommodate such a Circular. [259-D, E] Navnit Lal C. Javeri v. K.K. Sen, (1965) 56 ITR 198 CB; Afzal Ullah v. State of U.P., [1964] 4 SCR 991 CB; K.P. Varghese v. Income Tax Officer, Ernakulam & Anr:. (1981) 131 ITR 597 SC; Deshbandlni Gupta & Company & Ors. v. Delhi Stock Exchange Association Ltd., [1979] 4 SCC 565; Ellerman Lines Ltd. v. CIT, WB-I, (1971) 82 ITR 913 SC; UCO Bank v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1999) 237 ITR 889 SC; Commissioner of Income Tax v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala & Ors., (2001) 252 ITR 1 SC; Collector of Central Excise Vadodra v. Dhiren Chemical Industries, [2002] 2 SCC 127; State of Sikkim v. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia & Ors., [1991] 4 SCC 243; N.B. Sanjana, Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Bombay & Ors. v. Elphinstone Spinning and Weaving Mills Co. Ltd., [1971] 1 SCC 337 and P. Balakotaiah v. Union of India & Ors., [1958] SCR 1052; AIR (1958) SC 232, referred to. Baleshwar Bagarti v. Bhagirathi Dass, (1908) ILR 35 Cal. 701, referred to. Crawfrod on Statutory Construction (1940 Ed.) referred to. 4.1. A perusal of the provisions of the Mauritius Income Tax Act, 1995 does not lead to the conclusion that tax incentive companies are not liable to taxation although they have been granted exemption from income tax in respect of a specified head of income, namely, gains from transactions in shares and securities. Merely because exemption has been granted in respect of taxability of a particular source of income under the Mauritius Income Tax Act, 1995, it cannot be postulated that the entity is not `liable to tax’ under the Act. [266-H, 267-A, D] K. V. AL. M. Ramanathan Chettiar v. Commissioner of Income Tax Madras (1973) 88 ITR 169 SC; Wallace Flour Mills Co. Ltd. v. Collector of Central Excise, Bombay Division III, [1989] 4 SCC 592; Kasinka Trading & Anr. v. Union of India & Anr:, [1995] 1 SCC 274, referred to. Tamil Nadu (Madras State) Handloom Weavers Co-operative Society Ltd. v. Assistant Collector of Central Excise, Erode, (1978) ELT J57 Mad., referred to. Ingemar Johansson et. al. v. United States of America, 336F.2d 809, referred to. Jean Marie Riviler, Cahiers De Droit Fiscal International Vol. LXXIIa, referred to. 4.2. `Liability to taxation’ is a legal situation and `payment of tax’ is a fiscal act. For the purpose of Article 4 of the DTAC, the legal situation, namely the liability to taxation is relevant and not the fiscal act of actual payment of tax. If this were not so, the DTAC would not have used the words `liable to taxation’ but would have used some appropriate words like `pays tax’. On the language of the DTAC, it cannot be said that offshore companies incorporated and registered under Mauritius Offshore Business Activity Act, 1992 are neither `liable to taxation’ under the Mauritius Income Tax Act nor that such companies would not be `resident’ in Mauritius within the meaning of Article 3 read with Article 4 of the DTAC. [270-H, 271-A-B] 4.3. The expression `resident’ is employed in DTAC as a term of limitation. Otherwise, a person who may not be `liable to tax’ in a Contracting State by reason of domicile, residence, place of management or any other criterion of a similar nature may also claim the benefit of the DTAC. Since the purpose of the DTAC is to eliminate double taxation, the treaty takes into account only persons who are `liable to taxation’ in the Contracting States. Consequently, the benefits thereunder are not available to persons who are not liable to taxation and the words `liable to taxation’ are intended to act as words of limitation. The contention of the respondents that avoidance of double taxation can arise only when tax is actually paid in one of the Contracting States is not accepted. [272-E-G, 275-B, C] Commissioner of Income Tax, Nagpur v. Sutlej Cotton Mills Supply Agency Limited, (1975) 100 ITR 706 CB; Mohsinally Alimohammed Rafik, In re. (1994) 213 ITR 317 (A.A.R.) ; Cyril Eugene Pereira, In re. (1999) 239 ITR 650 (A.A.R.), referred to. John N. Gladden v. Her Majesty the Queen, (85 DTC 5188); Commissioner of Taxation v. Lamesa Holdings, (1997) 785 FCA; Chong v. Commissioner of Taxation. (2000) FCA 635; The Estate of Michel Hausmann v. Her Majesty The Queen, (1998) Can. Tax Ct. LEXIS 1140, referred to. A Manual on the OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and on Capital: Klaus Vogel, Double Taxation Convention (3rd Ed.), referred to. 5.1. If it was intended that a national of a third State should be precluded from the benefits of the DTAC, then a suitable term of limitation to the effect should have been incorporated therein. In the absence of a limitation clause, there are no disabling or disentitling conditions under the Indo-Mauritius Treaty prohibiting the resident of third nation from deriving benefits thereunder. The motive, with which the residents have been incorporated in Mauritius, are wholly irrelevant and cannot in any way affect the legality of the transaction. There is nothing like equity in a fiscal statute. Either the statute applies proprio vigore, or it does not. There is no question of applying a fiscal statute by intendment, if the expressed words do not apply. [279-B, D, E] Indo-US Double Taxation Avoidance Convention (Article 24), referred to. Lord McNair, The Law of Treaties (Oxford, at the Calendran Press, 1961), referred to. 5.2. It is an accademic approach to the problem as to how a State should modulate its laws or incorporate suitable terms in tax conventions to which it is party so that the possibility of a resident of third State deriving benefits thereunder is totally eliminated. The maxim “Judicis est jus dicere, non dare:” pithily expounds the duty of the Court. It is to decide what the law is and apply it and not to make it. The various reports are about what the law ought to be and pointers to the Parliament and the Executive for incorporating suitable limitation provisions in the treaty itself or by domestic legislation. This per se does not render an attempt by resident of a third party to take advantage of the existing provisions of the DTAC illegal. It is neither possible for the Court to say that the DTAC or the impugned circular are contrary to law nor possible to interfere with either of them on the basis of the Reports. [280-G, 281-A] Report of the Working Group on Non-Resident Taxation dated 3.1.2003; Joint Parliament Committee Report on the Stock Market Scam and Matters Relating thereto dated 19.12.2002, referred to. Vienna Convention on the Laws of Treaties, 1969, referred to. L. Oppenheim, Oppenheim’s International Law, Article 626 (9th Ed.); Philip Baker, Double Taxation Convention and International Law, (1994 2nd Ed.), referred to. 5.3. The principles adopted in interpretation of treaties are not the same as those in interpretation of statutory legislation. An important principle in the interpretation of the provisions of an international treaty, including one for double taxation relief, is that treaties are negotiated and entered into at a political level and have several considerations as their bases. The `treaty shopping’ may have been intended at the time when DTAC was entered into. Whether it should continue, and, if so, for how long, is a matter which is best left to the discretion of the executive as it is independent upon several economic and political considerations. This Court cannot judge the legality of treaty shopping merely because one section of thought considers it improper. A holistic view has to be taken to adjudge what is perhaps regarded in contemporary thinking as a necessary evil in a developing economy. [284-A, F, 286-F-G] Francis Bennion, Statutory Interpretation (Butterworths 1992 (2nd Ed.); David R. Davis, Principles of International Double Taxation Relief (London Sweet & Maxwell, 1985); Roy Rohtagi, Basic International Taxation (Kluwer Law International), referred to. 5.4. The words `sham’ and `device’, which were loosely used in connection with the incorporation under the Mauritian law, are not intended to be used as magic mantras or catchall phrases to defeat or nullify the effect of a legal situation. If the Court finds that notwithstanding a series of legal steps taken by an assessee, the intended legal result has not been achieved, the Court might be justified in overlooking the intermediate steps, but it would not be permissible for the Court to treat the intervening legal steps as non-est based upon some hypothetical assessment of the `real motive’ of the assessee. The Court must deal with what is tangible in an objective manner and cannot afford to chase a will-o’-the- wisp. This court is unable to agree with the submission that an act, which is otherwise valid in law, can be treated as no-est merely on the basis of some underlying motive supposedly resulting in some economic detriment or prejudice to the national interests. [297-E, F, 299-A-B, F] Mcdowell and Company Ltd. v. Commercial Tax Officer, (1985) 154 ITR 148 CB; Mathuram Agrawal. v. State of Madhya Pradesh, [1999] 8 SCC 667 CB; Waman Rao & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., [1981] 2 SCR 1 ; Minerva Mills Ltd. & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., ]1981] 1 SCR 206; CIT, Gujarat v. A. Raman and Co., (1968) 67 ITR 11 SC; Commissioner of Wealth Tax-II, Ahmedabad v. Arvind Narottam, (1988) 173 ITR 479 SC; M. V. Valliappan & Ors. v. ITO & Ors., (1988) 170 ITR 238 Mad.; Banyan and Berry v. Commissioner of Income Tax, (1996) 222 ITR 831 Guj and Bank of Chettinad Ltd. v. CIT, (1940) 8 ITR 522 PC, referred to. IRC v. Fisher’s Executors, (1926) AC 395 HL; IRC v. Duke of Westminster, (1936) AC 1; 19 TC 490; W.T. Ramsay Ltd. v. IRC, (1982) AC 300; (1981) 2 WLR 449 HL; IRC v. Burmah Oil Company Ltd., (1982) Simon’s Tax Cases 30; Furniss v. Dawson, (1984) 1 All ER. 530; 2 WLR 226 HL; Craven v. White, (1983) 3 All ER .495; MacNiven (Inspector of Taxes) v. Westmoreland Investments Ltd., (2001) 1 All ER 865; IRC v. Challenge Corporation Ltd., [1987] 2 WLR 24 (PC); Russell v. Scott., (1948) 2 All ER 15; Ingemar Johanson et al. v. United States of America, (336F. 2d. 809); Gregory v. Helvering 293 US 465; 55 S.Ct. 226 L.ed. 566; 97 ALR 1335; Helvering v. St. Louis Trust Company 296 US 48; 56 S. Ct. 78; Becker v. St. Louis Union Trust Company 296 US 48; 56 S .Ct. 78 80L; Perry R. Bas v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (108) US 50 TC 595; Barber-Greene Americas Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue (1960) 35 TC 365; Snook v. London and West Riding Investments Ltd., (1967) All ER 518, referred to. American Jurisprudence (1973) 2nd Ed. Vol. 71, referred to. 6. Different High Courts have consistently taken an uniform view on Section 90 of the Act. Hence, by adopting the doctrine of Stare decisis, it would be worthwhile to let the matter rest since large number of parties have modulated their legal relationship based on this settled position on law. [253-B, C] Muktul v. Mst. Manbhari & Ors., [1959] SCR 1099; Mishri Lal (Dd) by Lrs. v. Dhirendra Nath (Dead) by Lrs. & Ors., [1999] 4 SCC 11, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 8161-8162 of 2003. From the Judgment and Order dated 31.5.2002 of the Delhi High Court in C.W.P. Nos. 2802 and 5646 of 2000. WITH C.A. Nos. 8163-8164 of 2003. 2004 AIR 1107, 2003(4 )Suppl.SCR222 , 2004(10 )SCC1 , 2003(8 )SCALE287 , 2003(2 )Suppl.JT205

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 8161-8162 of 2003 Appeal (civil) 8163-8164 of 2003 PETITIONER: Union of India and Anr. RESPONDENT: Azadi Bachao Andolan and Anr. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 07/10/2003 BENCH: Ruma Pal & B.N. Srikrishna. JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of S.L.P.(C) Nos.20192-20193 of 2002) (@ S.L..P.(C) Nos. 22521-22522 of … Continue reading

After about 12 years of issuance of the policies, it was intimated by the petitioner that during an audit conducted in the office of the petitioner Corporation, it was found that the premium on the two policies in question should have been paid half yearly by the respondent but because of a typographical error, the premium payable was inadvertently mentioned as annual because of which, the respondent kept on paying the premium on the two policies annually. This had resulted in short recovery of premium on the two policies and hence the petitioner informed the respondent vide its letter dated 20.5.2006 about the typographical error and requested him to make payment of the 12 year difference of Rs.14,796/- and Rs.33,732/- on account of the premium while the petitioner waived the late fee keeping in view the circumstances of the case. Undoubtedly, the contract of insurance is one of utmost good faith but there is no allegation of suppression, misstatement or misrepresentation on the part of the complainant/respondent while submitting his proposal for consideration and approval of the petitioner Corporation. Perusal of the policy documents indicates that there was no ambiguity about the mode of payment of premium under the two policies. In such a situation, even if there was a typographical mistake as claimed by the petitioner Corporation, the same was committed by the employees of the petitioner Corporation and it cannot be used to the disadvantage of the respondent / complainant by unilaterally changing the terms of the contract after a gap of 12 years. Undoubtedly, the petitioner Corporation is likely to suffer some under-recovery but in all fairness, the petitioner Corporation must bear it accepting the responsibility for mistake of its employees. Para 12 of Asha Goel’s case cited by counsel for the respondent reads as under:- “Mere inaccuracy or falsity in respect of some recitals or items in the proposal is not sufficient. The burden of proof is on the insurer to establish these circumstances and unless the insurer is able to do so there is no question of the policy being avoided on ground of misstatement of facts. The contracts of insurance including the contract of life assurance are contracts uberrima fides and every fact of material (sic material fact) must be disclosed, otherwise, there is good ground for rescission of the contract. The duty to disclose material facts continues right up to the conclusion of the contract and also implies any material alteration in the character of the risk which may take place between the proposal and its acceptance.” 7. Keeping in view the essence of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in Asha Goel’s case as also the peculiar facts the circumstances of this case, we do not find any illegality, material irregularity or jurisdictional error in the concurrent orders of the Fora below. The revision petition devoid of any substance stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION No. 2099 OF 2009 (From the Order dated 09.03.2009 in Appeal No. 1372/2008 of M.P. State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bhopal) The Branch Manager                                                              Petitioner Life Insurance Corporation Civil Lines, Narsinghpur Gadarwara, Madhya Pradesh   Through its Regional Office Jeevan Bharati Building 1, Connaught Place New Delhi-110001   Versus   Sunil Kumar  Paliwal                                                            Respondent … Continue reading

Act: Constitution of India, 1950 : Articles 226 and 227-Order of Debt Recovery Tribunal-Remedy of appeal available u/s 20 of Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993-Exercise of jurisdiction by High Court under Articles 226/227.-Decree passed by Debt Recovery Tribunal-Direction given to Recovery Officer to proceed to realise the amount by sale of plant and machinery and mortgaged property-Order challenged by guarantor whose property was mortgaged before High Court under Article 227-High Court allowing the petition- Citation: 2001 AIR 3208,2001(1 )Suppl.SCR466 ,2001(6 )SCC569 ,2001(5 )SCALE196 ,2001(6 )JT408Held, order of Tribunal was appealable u/s. 20-High Court ought hot to have exercised jurisdiction under Article 227-The Act has been enacted with a view to provide a special procedure for recovery of debts due to bank and financial institutions-There is hierarchy of appeal provided in the Act and this fast track procedure cannot be allowed to be derailed either by taking recourse to proceedings under Articles 226 and-227 or by filing a civil suit-When there is an alternative remedy courts should refrain from exercising jurisdiction under constitutional provisions- Filing of a civil suit is expressly barred-Alternative remedy-Recovery of Debts Due to Banks and Financial Institutions Act, 1993-ss.18 and 20. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5287 of 2001. From the Judgment and Order dated 6.6.2000 of the Calcutta High Court in Co. No. 1305/97. Mr. Dhruv Mehta, Ms. Shobha, Ms. Anu Mehta, Mr. Saptrishi Ghosh and Mr. S.K. Mehta for the Appellant. Mr. V.J. Francis for the Respondents.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 2 CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5287 of 2001 PETITIONER: PUNJAB NATIONAL BANK RESPONDENT: O.C. KRISHNAN AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/08/2001 BENCH: B.N. KIRPAL & N. SANTOSH HEGDE JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 2001 Supp(1) SCR 466 The following Order of the Court was delivered : Special leave granted. In … Continue reading

Act: Income Tax Act, 1961: s.36(1)(vii), Explanation – Deduction under s.36(1)(vii) – Held: With effect from April 1, 1989, mere provision for bad debt would not be entitled to deduction under s.36(1)(vii) – For availing benefit of the deduction, assessee has to write off the debt by debiting the Profit and Loss Account to the extent of provision for bad debt and simultaneously reducing corresponding amount from loans and advances/debtOTHERS from the asset side of Balance Sheet – It is not imperative for assessee to close the individual account of each of its debtOTHERS in the books. The question which arose for consideration in these appeals was whether it was imperative for the assessee-Bank to close the individual account of each of it’s debtOTHERS in it’s books or a mere reduction in the Loans and Advances or DebtOTHERS on the asset side of its Balance Sheet to the extent of the provision for bad debt would be sufficient to constitute a write off. Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. Prior to April 1, 1989, the law, as it then stood, was that even in cases in which the assessee made only a provision in its accounts for bad debts and interest thereon and even though the amount was not actually written off by debiting the profit and loss account of the assessee and crediting the amount to the account of the debtor, the assessee was still entitled to deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. However, by insertion (with effect from April 1, 1989) of a new Explanation in Section 36(1)(vii), it was clarified that any bad debt written off as irrecoverable in the account of the assessee would not include any provision for bad and doubtful debt made in the accounts of the assessee. Consequently, after April 1, 1989, a mere provision for bad debt would not be entitled to deduction under Section 36(1)(vii). [Paras 6] [727-G-H; 728- A-B] Southern Technologies Limited v. Joint Commissioner of Income Tax (2010) 320 ITR 577, relied on. Vithaldas H. Dhanjibhai Bardanwala vs. CIT (1981) 130 ITR 95 (Guj), referred to. 1.2. In the instant case, besides debiting the Profit and Loss Account and creating a provision for bad and doubtful debt, the assessee-Bank had correspondingly/simultaneously obliterated the said provision from its accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from Loans and Advances/debtOTHERS on the asset side of the Balance Sheet and, consequently, at the end of the year, the figure in the loans and advances or the debtOTHERS on the asset side of the Balance Sheet was shown as net of the provision “for impugned bad debt”. After the Explanation, the assessee is required not only to debit the Profit and Loss Account but simultaneously also reduce loans and advances or the debtOTHERS from the asset side of the Balance Sheet to the extent of the corresponding amount so that, at the end of the year, the amount of loans and advances/debtOTHERS is shown as net of provisions for impugned bad debt. In the circumstances, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act as there was an actual write off by the assessee in it’s Books. [Para 7] [729-D-H; 730-A-B] 1.3. Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act applies both to Banking and Non-Banking businesses. The assessee-Bank has not only been debiting the Profit and Loss Account to the extent of the impugned bad debt, it is simultaneously reducing the amount of loans and advances or the debtOTHERS at the year-end. In other words, the amount of loans and advances or the debtOTHERS at the year-end in the balance-sheet is shown as net of the provisions for impugned debt. However, what is being insisted upon by the Assessing Officer is that mere reduction of the amount of loans and advances or the debtOTHERS at the year-end would not suffice and, in the interest of transparency, it would be desirable for the assessee-Bank to close each and every individual account of loans and advances or debtOTHERS as a pre- condition for claiming deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act. This view has been taken by the Assessing Officer because he apprehended that the assessee-Bank might be taking the benefit of deduction under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act, twice over. There is no finding of the Assessing Officer that the assessee had unauthorisedly claimed the benefit of deduction under Section 36(1)(vii), twice over. The Order of the Assessing Officer is based on an apprehension that, if the assessee fails to close each and every individual account of it’s debtor, it may result in assessee claiming deduction twice over. The matter cannot decide on the basis of apprehensions/desirability. It is always open to the Assessing Officer to call for details of individual debtor’s account if the Assessing Officer has reasonable grounds to believe that assessee has claimed deduction, twice over. [Para 8] [730-B-H; 731-A-B] 2. Section 41(4) of 1961 Act, lays down that, where a deduction has been allowed in respect of a bad debt or a part thereof under Section 36(1)(vii) of 1961 Act, then, if the amount subsequently recovered on any such debt is greater than the difference between the debt and the amount so allowed, the excess shall be deemed to be profits and gains of business and, accordingly, chargeable to income tax as the income of the previous year in which it is recovered. In the circumstances, the Assessing Officer is sufficiently empowered to tax such subsequent repayments under Section 41(4) of 1961 Act and, consequently, there is no merit in the contention that, if the assessee succeeds, then it would result in escapement of income from assessment. [Para 9] [732-A-D] Case Law Reference: CIT (1981) 130 ITR 95 (Guj) referred to Para 4 (2010) 320 ITR 577 relied on Para 5 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 3286-3287 of 2010. From the Judgment AND Order dated 2.4.2009 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, in Income Tax Appeal Nos. 54 and 55 of 2004. G. Sarangan, Sanjay Kunur and R.N. Keshwani for the Appellant. Bishwajit Bhattacharya, ASG, Arijit Prasad, C.V. Subba Rao, Debashis Mukherjee, Ajay Singh and B.V. Balaram Das for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3286-3287 OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos.21568-21569 of 2009) M/s. Vijaya Bank …Appellant(s) Versus Commissioner of Income Tax & Anr. …Respondent(s) J U D G E M E N T S.H. KAPADIA,J. Leave granted. Whether it is imperative for the assessee-Bank … Continue reading

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