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Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad agricultural lands not included = The appellants contended that under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad where the lands were situated, the Ist respondent being the widow of deceesed Ramshetti, was not entitled to a share in the joint family agricultural lands. Agricultural lands are excluded from the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. This contention has been negatived by the High Court. Hence the present appeal has been filed by the heirs of Veerappa.= It was submitted that prior to the enactment of the Hyderabad Hindu Women’s Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Lands) Act, 1954, the Hindu women’s Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952 would not apply to agricultural land. The High Court has rightly negatived this contention. A subsequent Act cannot be used to interpret the provisions of an earlier enactment in this fashion. The language of the earlier Act is wide enough to cover agricultural land also. In the entire Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, there is nothing which would indicate that the Act does not apply to agricultural land. The word ‘property’ is a general term which covers all kinds of property, including agricultural land. A restricted interpretation was given to thee original Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 enacted by the then Central Legislature, entirely because of the legislative entries in the Government of India Act, 1935, which excluded the legislative competence of the Central Legislature over agricultural lands. Such is not the case in respect of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property act, 1937, as enacted by the State Legislature of the State of Hyderabad. The ratio of the Federal Court judgment, therefore, would not apply. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the subsequent Act of 1954 restricted the application of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 brought into force by the earlier Hyderabad Act of 1952. As is pointed out by the High Court, the Act of 1954 was enacted by way of abundant caution, to make sure that the agricultural lands were not considered as excluded from the scope of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952. The second Act is, therefore, clarificatory. The High Court has dealt at length with various decisions of this Court and other Court on thee question of interpretation of the said statute. Since we are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court, we are not again examining the cases referred to by the High Court. We, therefore, affirm the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court and dismiss this appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=12909 PETITIONER: VAIJANATH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: GURAMMA & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/1998 BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, & G.B. PATTANAIK.   ACT:   HEADNOTE:   JUDGMENT: ORDER The application to bring on record Respondent No.2 also as legal representative of deceased Respondent No. 1 is allowed. The Ist respondent was the widow of … Continue reading

whether reservation was inapplicable to specialty and super-specialty faculty posts in the All India Institute of Medical Sciences, hereinafter referred to as “AIIMS”.= While on Article 335, we are of the opinion that there are certain services and positions where either on account of the nature of duties attached to them or the level (in the hierarchy) at which they obtain, merit as explained hereinabove, alone counts. In such situations, it may not be advisable to provide for reservations. For example, technical posts in research and development organisations/departments/ institutions, in specialities and super-specialities in medicine, engineering and other such courses in physical sciences and mathematics, in defence services and in the establishments connected therewith. Similarly, in the case of posts at the higher echelons e.g., Professors (in Education), Pilots in Indian Airlines and Air India, Scientists and Technicians in nuclear and space application, provision for reservation would not be advisable.” the Nine-Judge Bench while discussing the provisions of Article 335 also observed that there were certain services and posts where either on account of the nature of duties attached to them or the level in the hierarchy at which they stood, merit alone counts. In such situations, it cannot be advised to provide for reservations. In the paragraph following, the position was made even more clear when Their Lordships observed that they were of the opinion that in certain services in respect of certain posts, application of rule of reservation may not be advisable in regard to various technical posts including posts in super specialty in medicine, engineering and other scientific and technical posts. 19. We cannot take a different view, even though it has been suggested that such an observation was not binding, being obiter in nature. We cannot ascribe to such a view since the very concept of reservation implies mediocrity and we will have to take note of the caution indicated in Indra Sawhney’s case. While reiterating the views expressed by the Nine-Judge Bench in Indra Sawhney’s case, we dispose of the two Civil Appeals in the light of the said views, which were also expressed in Dr. Jagadish Saran’s case, Dr. Pradeep Jain’s case, Dr. Preeti Srivastava’s case. We impress upon the Central and State Governments to take appropriate steps in accordance with the views expressed in Indra Sawhney’s case and in this case, as also the other decisions referred to above, keeping in mind the provisions of Article 335 of the Constitution. 20. There will be no order as to costs.

Reported in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40578 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4500 of 2002   1 2 FACULTY ASSOCIATION OF AIIMS … APPELLANT   VS.   2 UNION OF INDIA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS   WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5119 OF 2002       J U D G … Continue reading

Periyar river – Environmental protection = “Doctrine of the Public Trust”. It was founded on the premise that certain common properties such as air, sea, water and forests are of immense importance to the people in general and they must be held by the Government as a trustee for the free and unimpeded use by the general public and it would be wholly unjustified to make them a subject of private ownership. The doctrine enjoins upon the Government to protect the resources for the enjoyment of the general public rather than to permit their use for private ownership or commercial exploitation to satisfy the greed of few. = In 2005, Aluva Municipality reclaimed a part of Periyar river within its jurisdiction and the District Tourism Promotion Council, Ernakulam decided to construct a restaurant on the reclaimed land by citing convenience of the public coming on Sivarathri festival as the cause. – When the District Promotion Council started construction of the building on the reclaimed land, the appellant filed Writ Petition (C) No.436/2006 and prayed that the respondents be restrained from continuing with the construction of building on the banks of river Periyar and to remove the construction already made. These prayers were founded on the following assertions: a) Periyar river is a holy river called “Dakshin Ganga”, on the banks of which famous Sivarathri festival is conducted. 8 b) The river provides water to lakhs of people residing within the jurisdiction of 44 local bodies on its either side. c) In 1989, a study was conducted by an expert body and Periyar Action Plan was submitted to the Government for protecting the river but the latter has not taken any action. d) In December, 2005, Aluva Municipality reclaimed the land which formed part of the river and in the guise of promotion of tourism, efforts are being made to construct a hotel. e) The construction of hotel will adversely affect the flow of water as well as the river bed. f) The construction of the building will adversely affect Marthanda Varma Bridge. g) The respondents have undertaken construction without conducting any environmental impact assessment and in violation of the provisions of Kerala Protection of River Banks and Regulation of Removal of Sand Act, 2001. h) The construction of hotel building is ultra vires the provisions of notification dated 13.1.1978 issued by the State Government, which mandates assessment of environmental impact as a condition precedent for execution of any project costing more than Rs.10,00,000/-. The Division Bench of the High Court took cognizance of the sanction accorded by the State Government vide order dated 20.5.2005 for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park and dismissed the writ petition by simply observing that only a restaurant is being constructed and not a hotel, as claimed by the appellant. The cryptic reasons recorded by the High Court for dismissing the writ petition are extracted below: 10 “From the facts as gathered above, it transpires that no hotel at all is being constructed in the river belt. The petitioner does not appear to have ascertained the correct facts before filing the present petition. Main allegation by the petitioner that a hotel is being constructed on the banks of Periyar river is found to be incorrect. There is no merit in this writ petition. It is hereby dismissed.” = We reiterate that natural resources including forests, water bodies, rivers, seashores, etc. are held by the State as a trustee on behalf of the people and especially the future generations. These constitute common properties and people are entitled to uninterrupted use thereof. The State cannot transfer public trust properties to a private party, if such a transfer interferes with the right of the public and the court can invoke the public trust doctrine and take affirmative action for protecting the right of people to have access to light, air and water and also for protecting rivers, sea, tanks, trees, forests and associated natural ecosystems.”= There is nothing in the language of G.O. dated 20.5.2005 from which it can be inferred that while approving the proposal forwarded by the Director, Department of Tourism for renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park at an estimated cost of Rs.55,72,432/-, the State Government had amended G.O. dated 13.1.1978 or otherwise relaxed the conditions embodied therein. The record also does not show that the Department of Tourism had furnished a detailed comprehensive environmental impact statement for the project so as to enable the Committee to make appropriate review and assessment. Therefore, it must be held that the execution of the project including construction of restaurant is ex facie contrary to the mandate of G.O. dated 13.1.1978, which was issued by the State in discharge of its Constitutional obligation under Article 48-A. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court ignored this crucial issue and casually dismissed the writ petition without examining the serious implications of the construction of a restaurant on the land reclaimed by Aluva Municipality from the river. G.O. dated 13.1.1978 is illustrative of the State Government’s commitment to protect and improve the environment as envisaged under Article 48A. The object of this G.O. is to ensure that no project costing more than Rs.10 lakhs should be executed and implemented without a comprehensive evaluation by an expert body which can assess possible impact of the project on the environment and ecology of the area including water bodies, i.e., rivers, lakes etc. If the project had been referred to the Environmental Planning and Co-ordination Committee for review and assessment of environmental implications then it would have certainly examined the issue relating to desirability and feasibility of constructing a restaurant, the possible impact of such construction on the river bed and the nearby bridge as also its impact on the people of the area. By omitting to refer the project to the Committee, the District Tourism Promotion Council and the Department of Tourism conveniently avoided scrutiny of the project in the light of the parameters required to be kept in view for protection of environment of the area and the river. The subterfuge employed by the District Promotion Council and the Department of Tourism has certainly resulted in violation of the fundamental right to life guaranteed to the people of the area under Article 21 of the Constitution and we do not find any justification to condone violation of the mandate of order dated 13.1.1978. In the result, the appeal is allowed and the impugned order is set aside. As a sequel to this, the writ petition filed by the appellant is allowed and the respondents are directed to demolish the structure raised for establishing a restaurant as part of renovation and beautification of Manalpuram Park at Aluva. The needful be done within a period of three months from today.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40498 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4941 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 18837 of 2006) Association for Environment Protection ….Appellant versus State of Kerala and others ….Respondents J U D G M E N T G.S. SINGHVI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Since time … Continue reading

M/s. Bellary Iron Ore Pvt. Ltd., M/s. Mahabaleswarapa & Sons, M/s. Ananthapur Mining Corporation and M/s. Obulapuram Mining Company Pvt. Ltd.= The “Category-A” comprises of (a) working leases wherein no illegality/marginal illegality have been found and (b) non working leases wherein no marginal/illegalities have been found. The number of such leases comes to 21 & 24 respectively. 29. “Category-B” comprises of (a) mining leases wherein illegal mining by way of (i) mining pits outside the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be up to 10% of the lease areas and/ or (ii) over burden/waste dumps outside the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be up to 15% of the lease areas and (b) leases falling on interstate boundary between Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh and for which survey sketches have not been finalized. For specific reasons as mentioned in the statement of “Category-B” leases, M/s. S.B. Minerals (ML No. 2515), M/s. Shantalaxmi Jayram (ML No. 2553), M/s. Gavisiddeshwar Enterprises (ML No. 80) and M/s. Vibhutigudda Mines (Pvt.) Ltd. (ML No. 2469) have been assigned in “Category-B”. The numbers of such leases in “Category-B” comes to 72. 30. The “Category-C” comprises of leases wherein (i) the illegal mining by way of (a) mining pits outside the sanctioned lease area have been found to be more than 10% of the lease area and/or (b) over burden/waste dumps outside the sanctioned lease areas have been found to be more than 15% of the lease areas and/or (ii) the leases found to be involved in flagrant violation of the Forest (Conservation) Act and/or found to be involved in illegal mining in other lease areas. The number of such leases comes to 49.= We, therefore, order for the complete closure of the Category ‘C’ mines and for necessary follow up action in terms of the recommendations of the CEC in this regard, details of which have already been extracted in an earlier part of this order. – The operation of the 7 leases placed in “B” category situated on or nearby the KarnatakaAndhra Pradesh inter-State boundary will remain suspended until finalisation of the inter-State boundary dispute whereupon the question of commencement of operations in respect of the aforesaid 7 leases will be examined afresh by the CEC. -(12) The recommendations made in paragraph XI (grant of fresh leases) and paragraph XII (in respect of pending applications for grant of mining leases) of the CEC’s Report dated 3.2.2012 (Pg. 59) are not accepted. In view of the discussions and conclusions in para 44 of the present order, this Court’s order dated 02.11.2012 placing an embargo on grant of fresh mining leases need not be continued any further. Grant of fresh mining leases and consideration of pending applications be dealt with in accordance with law, the directions contained in the present order as well as the spirit thereof. (13) . Determination of the inter-State boundary between Karnataka and Andhra Pradesh in so far as the same is relevant to the present proceedings, as agreed upon by the two States, be made through the intervention of the office of Surveyor General of India.We also direct that all consequential action in terms of the present order be completed with the utmost expedition. The writ application filed by Samaj Parivartan Samudaya and IAs shall stand disposed of in terms of our abovestated conclusions.

Page 1     1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL /APPELLATE JURISDICTION & CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 562 of 2009 Samaj Parivartana Samudaya & Ors. … Petitioner (s) Versus State of Karanataka & Ors. … Respondent(s) WITH SLP (C) Nos.7366-7367 of 2010, SLP (C) Nos.32690- 32691 of 2010, WP … Continue reading

Application for Intervention is allowed. 1. We have been called upon to decide the necessity of a second home for Asiatic Lion (Panthera leo persica), an endangered species, for its long term survival and to protect the species from extinction as issue rooted on eco-centrism, which supports the protection of all wildlife forms, not just those which are of instrumental value to humans but those which have intrinsic worth.= Cheetah to Kuno- We notice that while the matter was being heard, a decision has been made by MoEF to import African Cheetahs from Namibia to India and to introduce the same at Kuno. Amicus Curiae filed I.A. No. 3452 of 2012. This Court granted a stay on 8.5.2012 of the decision of MoEF to import the Cheetahs from Namibia to India for introducing them to Kuno. Serious objections have been raised by the Amicus Curiae Shri P.S. Narasimha against the introduction of foreign species at Kuno. Learned Amicus Curiae pointed out that the decision to introduce African Cheetahs into the same proposed habitat chosen for re-introduction of Asiatic lion has not been either placed before the Standing Committee of NBWL, nor has there been a consistent decision. Learned Amicus Curiae pointed out that IUCN Guidelines on translocation clearly differentiated between introduction and re-introduction.= We may indicate that our top priority is to protect Asiatic lions, an endangered species and to provide a second home. Various steps have been taken for the last few decades, but nothing transpired so far. Crores of rupees have been spent by the Government of India and the State of Madhya Pradesh for re- introduction of Asiatic lion to Kuno. At this stage, in our view, the decision taken by MoEF for introduction of African cheetahs first to Kuno and then Asiatic lion, is arbitrary an illegal and clear violation of the statutory requirements provided under the Wildlife Protection Act. The order of MoEF to introduce African Cheetahs into Kuno cannot stand in the eye of Law and the same is quashed. – MoEF’s decision for re-introduction of Asiatic lion from Gir to Kuno is that of utmost importance so as to preserve the Asiatic lion, an endangered species which cannot be delayed. Reintroduction of Asiatic lion, needless to say, should be in accordance with the guidelines issued by IUCN and with the active participation of experts in the field of re-introduction of endangered species. MoEF is therefore directed to take urgent steps for re-introduction of Asiatic lion from Gir forests to Kuno. MoEF has to constitute an Expert Committee consisting of senior officials of MoEF, Chief Wildlife Wardens of the States of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. Technical experts should also be the members of the Committee, which will include the Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of WWF. Dr. Y.S. Jhala, senior scientist with Wildlife Institute of India, Dr. Ravi Chellam, senior scientist, Dr. A.J.T. Johnsingh, since all of them had done lot of research in that area and have national and international exposure. Any other expert can also be co-opted as the members of the Committee. Needless to say, the number of lions to be re-introduced would depend upon the density of prey base and other related factors, which the Committee will assess. I.A. is allowed as mentioned above. The order be carried out in its letter and spirit and within a period of 6 months from today. We record our deep appreciation for the assistance rendered by all the senior counsel and learned amicus curiae Shri P.S. Narasimha and also Dr. Ravi Chellam who was present in the Court throughout and made valuable suggestions with regard to the various environmental and scientific issues. We are also inclined to highlight the necessity of an exclusive parliamentary legislation for the preservation and protection of endangered species so as to carry out the recovery programmes before many of the species become extinct and to give the following directions: (a) NWAP (2002-2016) has already identified species like the Great Indian Bustard, Bengal Florican, Dugong, the Manipur Brow Antlered Deer, over and above Asiatic Lion and Wild Buffalo as endangered species and hence we are, therefore, inclined to give a direction to the Government of India and the MoEF to take urgent steps for the preservation of those endangered species as well as to initiate recovery programmes. (b) The Government of India and the MoEF are directed to identify, as already highlighted by NWAP, all endangered species of flora and fauna, study their needs and survey their environs and habitats to establish the current level of security and the nature of threats. They should also conduct periodic reviews of flora and fauna species status, and correlate the same with the IUCN Red Data List every three years. (c) Courts and environmentalists should pay more attention for implementing the recovery programmes and the same be carried out with imagination and commitment

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. No. 100 In WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 337 OF 1995 Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I .. Applicants Versus Union of India & Others .. Respondents WITH IA No.3452 in WP(C) No.202 of 1995 J U D G M E N T K. … Continue reading

environmental clearance= the appellant company applied and obtained ‘No Objection Certificate’ on 01.08.1994 from the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (forPage 2 short ‘the TNPCB’) for setting up a copper smelter plant (for short ‘the plant’) in Melavittan village, Tuticorin. On 16.01.1995, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, granted environmental clearance to the setting up of the plant of the appellants at Tuticorin subject to certain conditions including those laid down by the TNPCB and the Government of Tamil Nadu. On 17.05.1995, the Government of Tamil Nadu granted clearance subject to certain conditions and requested the TNPCB to issue consent to the proposed plant of the appellants. Accordingly, on 22.05.1995, the TNPCB granted its consent under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (for short ‘the Air Act’) and under Section 25 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short ‘the Water Act’) to the appellants to establish the plant in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Melavittan village, Tuticorin Taluk.- The environmental clearance granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, and the consent orders under the Air Act and the Water Act granted by the TNPCB were challenged before the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos.15501, 15502 and 15503 of 1996 by the National Trust for Clean Environment. = There is no doubt that there has been misrepresentation and suppression of material facts made in the special leave petition but to decline relief to the appellants in this case would mean closure of the plant of the appellants. The plant of the appellants contributes substantially to the copper production in India and copper is used in defence, electricity, automobile, construction and infrastructure etc. The plant of the appellants has about 1300 employees and it also provides employment to large number of people through contractors. A number of ancillary industries are also dependent on the plant. Through its various transactions, the plant generates a huge revenue to Central and State Governments in terms of excise, custom duties, income tax and VAT. It also contributes to 10% of the total cargo volume of Tuticorin port. For these considerations of public interest, we do not think it will be a proper exercise of our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution to refuse relief on the grounds of misrepresentation and suppression of material facts in the special leave petition. – In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned common judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellants, however, are directed to deposit within three months from today a compensation of Rs.100 crores with the Collector of Thoothukudi District, which will be kept in a fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank for a minimum of five years, renewable as and when it expires, and the interest therefrom will be spent on suitable measures for improvement of the environment, including water and soil, of the vicinity of the plant of the appellants after consultation with TNPCB and approval of the Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu. In case the Collector of Thoothukudi District, after consultation with TNPCB, finds the interest amount inadequate, he may also utilize the principal amount or part thereof for the aforesaid purpose after approval from the Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu. By this judgment, we have only set aside the directions of the High Court in the impugned common judgment and we make it clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of the TNPCB issuing directions to the appellant-company, including a direction for closure of the plant, for the protection of environment in accordance with law. We also make it clear that the award of damages of Rs. 100 Crores by this judgment against the appellant Company for the period from 1997 to 2012 will not stand in the way of any claim for damages for the aforesaid period or any other period in a civil court or any other forum in accordance with law.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2776-2783 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28116-28123 of 2010) Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. Etc. Etc. … Appellants Versus Union of India & Ors. Etc. Etc. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, … Continue reading

the legality of the judgment of the High Court setting aside an order dated 11.03.1999 passed by the State Bank of India dismissing the charged officer (respondent) from service in exercise of powers conferred under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.= in Lakshmi Devi Sugar Mills Ltd. v. Pt. Ram Sarup; AIR 1957 SC 82 held where a workman intentionally refuses to participate in the inquiry, cannot complain that the dismissal is against the principles of natural justice. Once the inquiry proceed ex parte, it is not necessary for the Inquiring Authority to again ask the charged officer to state his defence orally or in writing. We cannot appreciate the conduct of the charged officer in this case, who did not appear before the Inquiring Authority and offered any explanation to the charges levelled against him but approached the High Court stating that the principles of natural justice had been violated. 26. We are also conscious of the fact that even if the Inquiring Authority set the charged officer ex parte that would not absolve him from deciding that the charges levelled against him were proved or not. In other words, no punishment could be imposed without an inquiry. We notice in this case the Inquiring Authority had elaborately considered the charges levelled against the charged officer and also the materials produced by the bank because some evidence is necessary to establish the charges. In some cases, proof may only be documentary and in some cases oral. The requirement of proof depends on the facts and circumstances of each case. Appellant – Bank in this case has succeeded in establishing the charges levelled against the delinquent officer and was rightly dismissed from service which called for no interference by the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. 27. In view of the above-mentioned reasons, we find it difficult to support the judgment of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the impugned judgment is set aside with no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 263 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 34118 of 2011] State Bank of India and Ors. .. Appellant(s) Versus Narendra Kumar Pandey .. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, J.   Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (Commission)= Petitioner, Arkansas Game and Fish Commission (Commission), owns and manages the Dave Donaldson Black River Wildlife Management Area (Management Area or Area), which comprises 23,000 acres along the Black River that are forested with multiple hardwood oak species and serve as a venue for recreation and hunting. In 1948, the U. S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) constructed the Clearwater Dam (Dam) upstream from the Management Area and adopted a plan known as the Water Control Manual (Manual), which sets seasonally varying rates for the release of water from the Dam. Periodically from 1993 until 2000, the Corps, at the request of farmers, authorized deviations from the Manual that extended flooding into the Management Area’s peak timber growing season. The Commission objected to the deviations on the ground that they adversely impacted the Management Area, and opposed the Corps’ proposal to make the temporary deviations part of the Manual’s permanent water-release plan. After testing the effect of the deviations, the Corps abandoned the proposed Manual revision and ceased its temporary deviations. The Commission sued the United States, alleging that the temporary deviations constituted a taking of property that entitled the Commission to compensation. = The Commission had been deprived of the customary use of the Management Area as a forest and wildlife preserve, as the bottomland hardwood forest turned, over time, into a “headwater swamp.” 87 Fed. Cl., at 610 (internal quotation marks omitted); see supra, at 5.2 The Government, however, challenged several of the trial court’s factfindings, including those relating to causation, foreseeability, substantiality, and the amount of damages. Because the Federal Circuit rested its decision entirely on the temporary duration of the flooding, it did not address those challenges. As earlier noted, see supra, at 13, preserved issues remain open for consideration on remand. * * * The Commission is endeavoring to reclaim the land through a restoration program. The prospect of reclamation, however, does not disqualify a landowner from receipt of just compensation for a taking.

(Slip Opinion) OCTOBER TERM, 2012 1 Syllabus NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for … Continue reading

whether removing tin sheets and making cement slab amounts to permanent construction or not – the lower court correctly held that it amounts to permanent constructions , where as High court negatived the same, where as the Apex court set aside the High court order and confirm the Lower court order

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7710 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.4629 of 2008) Purushottam Das Bangur & Ors. …Appellants Versus Dayanand Gupta …Respondent J U D G M E N T 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order … Continue reading

The policy of allocation of natural resources for public good can be defined by the legislature, as has been discussed in the foregoing paragraphs. Likewise, policy for allocation of natural resources may also be determined by the executive. The parameters for determining the legality and constitutionality of the two are exactly the same. In the aforesaid view of the matter, there can be no doubt about the conclusion recorded in the “main opinion” that auction which is just one of the several price recovery mechanisms, cannot be held to be the only constitutionally recognized method for alienation of natural resources. That should not be understood to mean, that it can never be a valid method for disposal of natural resources (refer to paragraphs 10 to 12 of my instant opinion). I would therefore conclude by stating that no part of the natural resource can be dissipated as a matter of largess, charity, donation or endowment, for private exploitation. Each bit of natural resource expended must bring back a reciprocal consideration. The consideration may be in the nature of earning revenue or may be to “best subserve the common good”. It may well be the amalgam of the two. There cannot be a dissipation of material resources free of cost or at a consideration lower than their actual worth. One set of citizens cannot prosper at the cost of another set of citizens, for that would not be fair or reasonable.NOW THEREFORE, in exercise of powers conferred upon me by clause (1) of Article 143 of the Constitution of India, I, Pratibha Devisingh Patil, President of India, hereby refer the following questions to the Supreme Court of India for consideration and report thereon, namely: Q.1 Whether the only permissible method for disposal of all natural resources across all sectors and in all circumstances is by the conduct of auctions? Q.2 Whether a broad proposition of law that only the route of auctions can be resorted to for disposal of natural resources does not run contrary to several judgments of the Supreme Court including those of Larger Benches? Q.3 Whether the enunciation of a broad principle, even though expressed as a matter of constitutional law, does not really amount to formulation of a policy and has the effect of unsettling policy decisions formulated and approaches taken by various successive governments over the years for valid considerations, including lack of public resources and the need to resort to innovative and different approaches for the development of various sectors of the economy? Q.4 What is the permissible scope for interference by courts with policy making by the Government including methods for disposal of natural resources? Q.5 Whether, if the court holds, within the permissible scope of judicial review, that a policy is flawed, is the court not obliged to take into account investments made under the said policy including investments made by foreign investors under multilateral/bilateral agreements? Q.6 If the answers to the aforesaid questions lead to an affirmation of the judgment dated 02.02.2012 then the following questions may arise, viz. (i) whether the judgment is required to be given retrospective effect so as to unsettle all licences issued and 2G spectrum (800, 900, and 1800 MHz bands) allocated in and after 1994 and prior to 10.01.2008? (ii) whether the allocation of 2G spectrum in all circumstances and in all specific cases for different policy considerations would nevertheless have to be undone? And specifically iii) Whether the telecom licences granted in 1994 would be affected? iv) Whether the Telecom licences granted by way of basic licences in 2001 and licences granted between the period 2003-2007 would be affected? v) Whether it is open to the Government of India to take any action to alter the terms of any licence to ensure a level playing field among all existing licensees? vi) Whether dual technology licences granted in 2007 and 2008 would be affected? vii) Whether it is necessary or obligatory for the Government of India to withdraw the Spectrum allocated to all existing licensees or to charge for the same with retrospective effect and if so on what basis and from what date? Q.7 Whether, while taking action for conduct of auction in accordance with the orders of the Supreme Court, it would remain permissible for the Government to: (i) Make provision for allotment of Spectrum from time to time at the auction discovered price and in accordance with laid down criteria during the period of validity of the auction determined price? (ii) Impose a ceiling on the acquisition of Spectrum with the aim of avoiding the emergence of dominance in the market by any licensee/applicant duly taking into consideration TRAI recommendations in this regard? iii) Make provision for allocation of Spectrum at auction related prices in accordance with laid down criteria in bands where there may be inadequate or no competition (for e.g. there is expected to be a low level of competition for CDMA in 800 MHz band and TRAI has recommended an equivalence ratio of 1.5 or 1.3X1.5 for 800 MHz and 900 MHz bands depending upon the quantum of spectrum held by the licensee that can be applied to auction price in 1800 MHz band in the absence of a specific price for these bands)? Q.8 What is the effect of the judgment on 3G Spectrum acquired by entities by auction whose licences have been quashed by the said judgment? NEW DELHI; DATED: 12 April 2012 PRESIDENT OF INDIA”

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ADVISORY JURISDICTION RE: SPECIAL REFERENCE NO.1 OF 2012 [Under Article 143(1) of the Constitution of India]   O P I N I O N   D.K. JAIN, J. [FOR S.H. KAPADIA, CJ, HIMSELF, DIPAK MISRA & RANJAN GOGOI, JJ.]   In exercise of powers conferred under Article 143(1) … Continue reading

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