advocatemmmohan
just another law knowledge bank
evidence act
MAHARASHTRA SCHEDULED CASTES, SCHEDULED TRIBES, DE-NOTIFIED TRIBES, (VIMUKTA JATIS), NOMADIC TRIBES, OTHER BACKWARD CATEGORY (REGULATION OF ISSUANCE AND VERIFICATION OF) CASTE CERTIFICATE ACT, 2000: = a third party can not challenge caste certificate issued and approved long back itself to wreck his vengeance = Ayaaubkhan Noorkhan Pathan … Appellant Versus The State of Maharashtra & Ors. … Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx
MAHARASHTRA SCHEDULED CASTES, SCHEDULED TRIBES, DE-NOTIFIED TRIBES, (VIMUKTA JATIS), NOMADIC TRIBES, OTHER BACKWARD CATEGORY (REGULATION OF ISSUANCE AND VERIFICATION OF) CASTE CERTIFICATE ACT, 2000: Caste certificate – Appellant given employment on the basis of a caste certificate showing that he belonged to Bhil Tadvi (Scheduled Tribe) – Validity certificate issued by Caste Scrutinity Committee – … Continue reading
sec. 67 NDPS ACT and sec.25 of Evidence Act – whether the Officer are Police Officer and whether the officers can record a confessional statement from the Accused by force= TOFAN SINGH Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40880
sec. 67 NDPS ACT and sec.25 of Evidence Act – whether the Officer are Police Officer and whether the officers can record a confessional statement from the Accused by force – due to conflict judgments- referred to larger bench. = In our view the aforesaid discussion necessitates a re-look into the ratio … Continue reading
Death penalty to imprisonment for life; circumstantial evidence; confession before police inadmissible but recovery part is admissible = We are, therefore, convinced that the ultimate conviction of the appellant under Section 302 of IPC and the sentence of life imprisonment imposed on him by commuting the death penalty imposed by the trial Court, was perfectly justified and we do not find any good grounds to interfere with the same. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.; confessional statement= “16. A confession or an admission is evidence against the maker of it so long as its admissibility is not excluded by some provision of law. Provisions of Sections 24 to 30 of the Evidence Act and of Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure deal with confessions. By virtue of the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act, a confession made to a police officer under no circumstance is admissible in evidence against an accused. The section deals with confessions made not only when the accused was free and not in police custody but also with the one made by such a person before any investigation had begun. The expression “accused of any offence” in Section 25 would cover the case of an accused who has since been put on trial, whether or not at the time when he made the confessional statement, he was under arrest or in custody as an accused in that case or not. Inadmissibility of a confessional statement made to a police officer under Section 25 of the Evidence Act is based on the ground of public policy. Section 25 of the Evidence Act not only bars proof of admission of an offence by an accused to a police officer or made by him while in the custody of a police officer but also the admission contained in the confessional statement of all incriminating facts relating to the commission of an offence. Section 26 of the Evidence Act deals with partial ban to the admissibility of confessions made to a person other than a police officer but we are not concerned with it in this case. Section 27 of the Evidence Act is in the nature of a proviso or an exception, which partially lifts the ban imposed by Sections 25 and 26 of the Evidence Act and makes admissible so much of such information, whether it amounts to a confession or not, as relates to the fact thereby discovered, when made by a person accused of an offence while in police custody. Under Section 164 CrPC a statement or confession made in the course of an investigation, may be recorded by a Magistrate, subject to the safeguards imposed by the section itself and can be relied upon at the trial. 19. From a careful perusal of this first information report we find that it discloses the motive for the murder and the manner in which the appellant committed the six murders. The appellant produced the bloodstained sword with which according to him he committed the murders. In our opinion the first information report Ex. P-42, however is not a wholly confessional statement, but only that part of it is admissible in evidence which does not amount to a confession and is not hit by the provisions of Section 25 of the Evidence Act. The relationship of the appellant with the deceased; the motive for commission of the crime and the presence of his sister-in-law PW 11 do not amount to the confession of committing any crime. Those statements are non-confessional in nature and can be used against the appellant as evidence under Section 8 of the Evidence Act. The production and seizure of the sword by the appellant at the police station which was bloodstained, is also saved by the provisions of the Evidence Act. However, the statement that the sword had been used to commit the murders as well as the manner of committing the crime is clearly inadmissible in evidence. Thus, to the limited extent as we have noticed above and save to that extent only the other portion of the first information report Ex. P-42 must be excluded from evidence as the rest of the statement amounts to confession of committing the crime and is not admissible in evidence.”
reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40591 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1575 OF 2009 ANUJ KUMAR GUPTA @ SETHI GUPTA …APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR …RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T FAKKIR MOHAMED IBRAHIM KALIFULLA, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court … Continue reading
Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Chapter II-Sec. 45–Held, opinion of typewriter expert is admissible in evidence. Words and Phrases: “Science” “Handwriting”-Meaning of-In the context of opinion of typewriting expert-S.45 of Evidence Act. 1872. The respondent was tried in the Sessions Court, New Delhi for offences under Sections 302 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Explosive Sub-stances Act, 1908. When the prosecution wanted to examine a typewriter expert for proof of certain incriminating facts against the respondent based on the identity of a typewriter on which a material document was alleged to have been typed, an objection was taken to the admissibility of the opinion evidence of the typewriter expert under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (19952) SC 343 = [1952] SCR 1091. The trial court upheld the objection. The Revision Petition before the High Court was also dismissed. The Appellants challenged the correctness of the findings in Hanumant’s case and sought for reconsideration of the said judgment. =Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1. The observations made in the decision in Hanumant’s case on the basis of a concession does not reflect the correct position of law on this point and should, therefore, be treated as no longer good law on the point. The decision in Hanumant’s case proceeds on the concession that the evidence of a typewriter expert is not admissible in evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. The decision in Hanumant cannot be taken as deciding that point event though on the basis of that observation the evidence of typewriter expert was excluded as inadmissible. [567-E-F; 559- D-E] Hanumant v. Tlie State of M.P., AIR (1952) SC 343 = [1952] SCR 1091, overruled. 2. The opinion of the typewriter expert in the present case is admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the contrary view taken by the Trial Court and the High Court is erroneous. [567-F] 3. Irrespective of the view that the word “handwriting” in Section 45 includes typewriting the word “science” is wide enough to meet the requirement of treating the opinion of a typewriter expert as an opinion evidence coming within the ambit of Section 45 of the Evidence Act. [567-B] Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, Second edition pp. 617 to 619; ‘Question Documents, Second Edition, by Albert S. Osborn pg. 598; ‘Photographic Evidence’ by Charles C. Scott., Second Edition, Volume 1 pg. 636; ‘Law of Disputed and Forged Documents’, by J. Newton Baker pp. 451-453 and ‘Typewriting Identification (Identification System for Questioned (Typewriting)’ by Billy Prior Bates pg. 59, referred to. 4. The word “Science” occurring independently and in addition to the word “handwriting” in Section 45 of the Act of 1872, is sufficient to indicate that the opinion of a person specially skilled in the use of typewriters and having the scientific knowledge of typewriters would be an expert in this science and his opinion about the identity of typewriting for the purpose of identifying the particular typewriter on which the writing is typed is a relevant fact under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. [561-E-F] The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary; the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2; Collins Dictionary of the English Language, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 461 of 1987. =1996 AIR 1491, 1996( 2 )SCR 556, 1996( 2 )SCC 428, 1996( 2 )SCALE37 , 1996( 2 )JT 186
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 461 of 1987 PETITIONER: STATE (THROUGH CBI/NEW DELHI) RESPONDENT: S.J.CHOUDHARY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/02/1996 BENCH: JAGDISH SARAN VERMA & G.N.RAY & N.P.SINGH & FAIZAN UDDIN & G.T.NANAVATI JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT Delivered By: JAGDISH SARAN VERMA J.S VERMA. J. The reference made in this appeal to the Constitution Bench is for deciding the … Continue reading
Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 112-Presumption of law-Conclusive proof of legitimacy-Birth during lawful wedlock. =The presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is a conclusive presumption of law which can be displaced only by non-access between the parties to the marriage at a time when according to the ordinary course of nature the husband could have been the father of the child. Access and non-access connote existence and non- existence of opportunities for marital intercourse. Karapaya v. Mayandy referred to. Non-access can be proved by evidence direct or circumstantial though the proof of non-access must be clear and satisfactory as the presumption of legitimacy is highly favoured by law. The principle of English common law according to which neither a husband nor a wife is permitted to give evidence of non-access after marriage to bastardize a child born in lawful wedlock, does not apply to legitimacy proceedings in India as no such rule is to be found anywhere in the Indian Evidence Act and the old common law doctrine itself has been abrogated in England by the provisions of section 7 of the Matrimonial Cause Act, 1950. That by the evidence on the record the defendant No. 1 (husband) did not succeed in proving that there was no opportunity for intercourse between him and defendant No. 2 (his wife) at the time when the infant plaintiff was conceived and the High Court erred in holding that there was no opportunity for access between the parties at the material period.
PETITIONER: CHILUKURI VENKATESWARLU Vs. RESPONDENT: CHILUKURI VENKATANARAYANA. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/12/1953 BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. JAGANNADHADAS, B. CITATION: 1954 AIR 176 1954 SCR 424 CITATOR INFO : R 1971 SC2352 (13) ACT: Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 112-Presumption of law-Conclusive proof of legitimacy-Birth during lawful wedlock. HEADNOTE: The … Continue reading
advocatemmmohan 