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LAND ACQUISITION – FIXATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS UNDER ONE NOTIFICATION = the High Court almost on a uniform basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard notwithstanding the type of land involved. Although a distinction had been made between “chahi” lands, “pahar gair mumkin” lands and “gair mumkin” lands while assessing compensation, ultimately, a uniform rate was awarded in respect of the different types of lands which had been acquired. Different reasons have been given by the High Court in arriving at the uniform figure of Rs.235/- per sq. yard, but what is important is that ultimately by applying different methods, the compensation worked out to be same. In the said cases, the High Court had assessed the compensation payable for the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.805/- per sq. yard along with the statutory sums available under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act and solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) thereof. It was also indicated that the land owners would also be entitled to interest as provided under Section 28 of the Act. ; The general cut imposed is at a flat rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted on account of the fact that the lands in question have lost their character and potentiality as agricultural lands and have more or less been converted into lands which were ready for use for the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal’s submissions regarding the factors which determine deduction towards development cost, such as location and potentiality, into account, we are of the view that a deduction of 331/3 per cent would be reasonable on account of the passage of time and the all round development in the area which has made it impossible for the lands to retain their original character. 47. Accordingly, we direct that except where we have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of 40% had been made, the same should be altered to 331/3 per cent and the compensation awarded is to be modified accordingly.; the Collector had awarded compensation at a uniform rate of Rs. 1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory benefits. The Reference Court determined the compensation at the uniform rate of Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The High Court modified the said award and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 260/- per sq. yard for the land acquired up to the depth of 100 meters abutting National Highway No. 10. The value of the rest of the acquired land was maintained at Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The area in question being already developed to some extent, a cut of 50% on the value is, in our view, excessive. We agree with Mr. Swarup that resorting to the belting system by the High Court was improper and that at best a standard cut of 1/3rd would have been sufficient to balance the smallness of the exhibits produced. It has been pointed out by Mr. Swarup that on a comparative basis, the price of lands in the area in 1991 was on an average of about Rs. 420/- per sq. yard. Given the sharp rise in land prices, the value, according to Mr. Swarup, would have doubled to about Rs. 800/- per sq. yard by 1993. Even if we have to apply the formula of 12% increase, the valuation of the lands in question in 1993 would be approximately Rs. 527/- per sq. yard. Imposing a deduction of 1/3rd, valuation comes to about Rs. 350/- per sq. yard, which, in our view, would be the proper compensation for the lands covered in the case of Mukesh (supra) and other connected matters.

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3279-3287 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007] Ashrafi and Ors. …Appellants Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. …Respondents WITH C.A.Nos.3288-3299/2013@SLP(C)Nos.13415-13426/2008, C.A.Nos.3300-3319/2013@SLP(C)Nos.12263-12282/2008, C.A.No.3320/2013@SLP(C)No.15648/2008, C.A.Nos.3321-3323/2013@SLP(C)Nos.5392-5394/2008, C.A.Nos.3324-3325/2013@SLP(C)Nos.15485-15486/2009, C.A.Nos.3326-3330/2013@SLP(C)Nos.8592-8596/2009, C.A.Nos.3331-3333/2013@SLP(C)Nos.34118-34120/2010, C.A.Nos.3334-3337/2013@SLP(C)Nos.4176-4179/2010, C.A.Nos.3338-3340/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11156-11158/2009, C.A.No.3341/2013@SLP(C)No.28895/2008, C.A.Nos.3342-3344/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14409-14411/2013 (CC 863-865/2011), C.A.No.3345/2013@SLP(C)No.33257/2010, C.A.Nos.3346-3347/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11171-11172/2009, C.A.Nos.3348-3349/2013@SLP(C)Nos.3125-3126/2011, C.A.Nos.3350-3351/2013@SLP(C)Nos.29721-29722/2009, C.A.No.3352/2013@SLP(C)No.31281/2009, C.A. No.8719 … Continue reading

filing of the second FIR and fresh charge sheet is violative of fundamental rights under Article 14, 20 and 21 of the Constitution since the same relate to alleged offence in respect of which an FIR had already been filed and the court has taken cognizance. This Court categorically accepted the CBI’s plea that killing of Tulsiram Prajapati is a part of the same series of cognizable offence forming part of the first FIR and in spite of the fact that this Court directed the CBI to “take over” the investigation and did not grant the relief as prayed, namely, registration of fresh FIR, the present action of CBI filing fresh FIR is contrary to various judicial pronouncements which is demonstrated in the earlier part of our judgment. – In view of the above discussion and conclusion, the second FIR dated 29.04.2011 being RC No. 3(S)/2011/Mumbai filed by the CBI is contrary to the directions issued in judgment and order dated 08.04.2011 by this Court in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 115 of 2009 and accordingly the same is quashed. As a consequence, the charge sheet filed on 04.09.2012, in pursuance of the second FIR, be treated as a supplementary charge sheet in the first FIR. It is made clear that we have not gone into the merits of the claim of both the parties and it is for the trial Court to decide the same in accordance with law. Consequently, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 149 of 2012 is allowed. Since the said relief is applicable to all the persons arrayed as accused in the second FIR, no further direction is required in Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 5 of 2013.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 149 OF 2012 Amitbhai Anilchandra Shah …. Petitioner(s) Versus The Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 5 OF 2013 J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Amitbhai Anilchandra … Continue reading

the High Court has granted the Writ of Mandamus directing the Indian Oil Company to allot the dealership of the site located at Thane Belapur Road, Village Mahape, Navi Mumbai, Maharashtra to Shri Ashok Shankarlal Gwalani (hereinafter referred to as the “respondent”) we have no other option but to set aside the order of the High Court. Accordingly, the order and judgment dated 29.9.2010 passed by the High Court of Bombay is set aside with a liberty to the Competent Authority to re-advertise the petrol/diesel retail outlets in question and to make a fresh selection in accordance with law. The appeal is allowed with aforesaid observation and directions. There shall be no order as to costs.


awarding life imprisonment to the appellant Rampal Singh for an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘the Code’).- “Thus, in our opinion, the offence committed by the appellant was only culpable homicide not amounting to murder. Under these circumstances, we are inclined to bring down the offence from first degree murder to culpable homicide not amounting to murder, punishable under the second part of Section 304 IPC.” 30. The above case is quite close on facts and law to the case in hand, except to the extent thatthe appellant was a person from the armed forces and knew the consequences of using a rifle. He had not fired indiscriminately but took a clear aim at his brother. Thus, the present is not a case of knowledge simplicitor but that of intention ex facie. In the case of Aradadi Ramudu @ Aggiramudu vs. State, through Inspector of Police [(2012) 5 SCC 134], this Court also took the view that for modification of sentence from Section 302 of the Code to Part II of Section 304 of the Code, not only should there be an absence of the intention to cause death but also an absence of intention to cause such bodily injury that in the ordinary course of things is likely to cause death. – alter the offence that the appellant has been held guilty of, from that under Section 302 of the Code to the one under Section 304 Part I of the Code. Having held that the accused is guilty of the offence under Section 304 Part I, we award a sentence of ten years rigorous imprisonment and a fine of Rs.10,000/-, in default to undergo simple imprisonment for one month. The judgment under appeal is modified in the above terms. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2114 of 2009 Rampal Singh … Appellant Versus State of UP … Respondent J U D G M E N T Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of a Division Bench of the High Court of … Continue reading

In matters such as this we are dealing with the vague and indefinite impressions of the great mass of the public who neither are required nor desire to refine upon distinctions of this sort. To them it is shown that the name “Walt Disney” summons up a picture of “Mickey Mouse” and the picture of Mickey Mouse reminds them of “Walt Disney”. The foundation of this is authorship no doubt. But somehow or other, how, it is fruitless to inquire, they connect the appearance on an article of the name or form of “Mickey Mouse” with “Walt Disney”. This being so, it is, I think, impossible for the appellant to negative all likelihood of confusion. It is no part of our duty to state in definite terms precisely how the public will be misled or what kind of connection they will impute. Confusion involves indefiniteness of ideas. It is likely, in my consideration, that many people would be caused to wonder at a connection between the goods of the applicant sold under the opposed trade mark and those of the opponent sold under its similar trade mark although that wonderment might not persist to the point of sale. In any event, the opponent’s goods bearing the Polo One and Polo Two trade marks are sold through 80 independent boutiques where signage bearing the opponent’s house marks may not be so obvious (as contrasted with retail environments within the opponent’s shops and ‘shops within shops’). In independent retail outlets both deception and confusion arising from the reputation of the opponent’s trade marks are, in my consideration, inevitable. It follows that the opponent has established its opposition in terms of section 60 of the Act. I add that, should I have been wrong in my assessment of the honest concurrent user of the opposed trade mark in terms of subsection 44(3), my finding in terms of section 60 corrects that possible defect. In McCormick Kenny J observed at [96]: Whilst I accept, as counsel for Mary McCormick contends, that the doctrine of honest concurrent user is derived from the common law and pre-dates trade mark legislation, I am of the view that s 44(3) of the Act does not provide an exception to s 60. Decison Section 55 of the Act relevantly provides: 55 Decision (1) Unless the proceedings are discontinued or dismissed, the Registrar must, at the end, decide: (a) to refuse to register the trade mark; or (b) to register the trade mark (with or without conditions or limitations) in respect of the goods and/or services then specified in the application; having regard to the extent (if any) to which any ground on which the application was opposed has been established. Note: For limitations see section 6. I refuse to register application 1269272.

The Polo/Lauren Company LP v Megan Philip and Rowena Sylvester [2012] ATMO 45 (8 May 2012) Last Updated: 14 June 2012 TRADE MARKS ACT 1995 DECISION OF A DELEGATE OF THE REGISTRAR OF TRADE MARKS WITH REASONS   Re: Opposition by The Polo/Lauren Company LP to registration of trade mark application 1269272(25) – CP & POLO … Continue reading

GOVT. WORKS CONTRACT BIDS – VALIDITY – This appeal arises out of an order passed by the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Indore whereby Writ Petition No.3427 of 2011 filed by the appellant was dismissed and the allotment of the project work involving design, construction and commissioning of a single integrated water supply at Sendhwa (Madhya Pradesh) in favour of M/s P.C. Snehal Construction Company-respondent No.2 upheld. The High Court has, while examining the question of eligibility of respondent No.2 by reference to the execution of the single integrated water supply scheme, recorded a finding that the nature of the work executed by respondent No.2 for Upleta satisfied the requirement of the tender notice. That finding, in our view, is in no way irrational or absurd. We say so because the certificate relied upon by respondent No.2 sufficiently demonstrates that respondent No.2 had designed, and executed an integrated water supply scheme for Upleta which included raw water transmission from intake wells and transmission of treated clear water from WTP including providing, supplying and laying of pipelines, construction of E.S.R.s, Sumps, Pump houses and providing erecting pumping machinery. 19. It is also noteworthy that in the matter of evaluation of the bids and determination of the eligibility of the bidders Municipal Council had the advantage of the aid & advice of an empanelled consultant, a technical hand, who could well appreciate the significance of the tender condition regarding the bidder executing the single integrated water supply scheme and fulfilling that condition of tender by reference to the work undertaken by them. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the view taken by the High Court of the allotment of work made in favour of respondent No.2. 20. We may while parting point out that out of a total of Rs.19.5 crores representing the estimated value of the contract, respondent No.2 is certified to have already executed work worth Rs.11.50 crores and received a sum of Rs.8.79 crores towards the said work. More importantly the work in question relates to a drinking water supply scheme for the residents of a scarcity stricken municipality. The project is sponsored with the Central Government assistance under its urban infrastructure scheme for small and middle towns. The completion target of the scheme is September 2012. Any interference with the award of the contract at this stage is bound to delay the execution of the work and put the inhabitants of the municipal area to further hardship. Interference with the on-going work is, therefore, not conducive to public interest which can be served only if the scheme is completed as expeditiously as possible giving relief to the thirsting residents of Sendhwa. This is particularly so when the allotment of work in favour of respondent No.2 does not involve any extra cost in comparison to the cost that may be incurred if the contract was allotted to the appellant-company. 21. In the light of the above settled legal position and in the absence of any mala fide or arbitrariness in the process of evaluation of bids and the determination of the eligibility of the bidders, we do not consider the present to be a fit case for interference of this Court. This appeal accordingly fails and is hereby dismissed with cost assessed at Rs.25,000/- .

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4195 of 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.16175 of 2011   Tejas Constructions & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. …Appellant   Versus Municipal Council, Sendhwa & Anr. …Respondents         J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. … Continue reading

The petitioner is a businessman engaged in the business of distribution of pre-paid virtual and tangible calling value for mobile phone subscribers and also sells new customer acquisition packs and follows it up, by collection of customer application forms and executing tele-calling, to verify customer credentials. In this Public Interest Litigation, the petitioner has attempted to highlight the grave issue of non-observance of norms/regulations/guidelines related to proper and effective subscriber verification by various service providers. In fact, according to the petitioner, there is rampant flouting of norms/regulations/guidelines relating to this subject matter and there is no proper verification of the subscribers prior to selling of the pre-paid mobile connections to them. 2. The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (for short, “TRAI”) is the regulatory body for the telecommunications sector in India and the Union of India has responsibility to issue guidelines and frame regulations and conditions of licence, in consultation with the TRAI, to ensure coordination, standardization and compliance with the regulations, as well as protecting the security interests of the country. 3. It is the averment of the petitioner that the telecom sector has witnessed the most fundamental structural and institutional reforms since 1991. This sector has grown significantly in the last few years. As per the Annual Report for 2009-2010 of the Department of Telecommunication, Ministry of Communications and IT, Government of India (for short “DoT”), as on 31st December, 2009, the Indian telecom sector had about 5622.11 million connections. The tele-density per hundred population, which is an important indicator of telecom penetration in the country, has increased from 2.32 per cent in March, 1999 to 47.88 per cent in December, 2009. The Eleventh Five Year Plan for 2007-2012 had provided a target of 600 million connections, but the industry has already provided around 700 million connections, thus far exceeding the target. Different random studies in relation to pre-paid Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) cards show widespread violation of guidelines for Know Your Customer (KYC) and even other common guidelines. The SIM cards are provided without any proper verification, which causes serious security threat as well as encourages malpractices in the telecom sector. It appears that 65 per cent of all pre-paid SIM cards issued in Jammu & Kashmir and 39 per cent of all pre-paid SIM cards in Mumbai, may have been issued without verification; which means that 1 out of every 6 pre-paid SIM cards is issued without proper verification. The averment is that such unverified SIM cards are also used in terrorist attacks. In view of our above discussion, we partially allow the writ petition. The instructions dated 14th March, 2011 issued by DoT be and hereby are accepted by the Court subject to the following conditions: (i) We hereby direct the constitution of a Joint Expert Committee consisting of two experts from TRAI and two experts from DoT to be chaired by the Secretary, Ministry of Communications and Information Technology, Government of India. (ii) This Committee shall discuss and resolve the issues on which TRAI in its affidavit has given opinion divergent to that declared by DoT in its instructions dated 14th March, 2011. Following are the points of divergence that require examination by the Joint Expert Committee : (a) Whether re-verification should be undertaken by the service provider/licensee, the DoT itself or any other central body? (b) Is there any need for enhancing the penalty for violating the instructions/guidelines including sale of pre-activated SIM cards? (c) Whether delivery of SIM cards may be made by post? Which is the best mode of delivery of SIM cards to provide due verification of identity and address of a subscriber? (d) Which of the application forms, i.e., the existing one or the one now suggested by TRAI should be adopted as universal application form for purchase of a SIM card? (e) In absence of Unique ID card, whether updating of subscriber details should be the burden of the licensee personally or could it be permitted to be carried out through an authorized representative of the licensee? (f) In the interest of national security and the public interest, whether the database of all registered subscribers should be maintained by DoT or by the licensee and how soon the same may be made accessible to the security agencies in accordance with law? (iii) The above notified Committee shall resolve the above specified issues and any other ancillary issue arising therefrom and make its recommendations known to the DoT within three months from today. (iv) The DoT shall take into consideration the recommendations of the Joint Expert Committee. The instructions issued by DoT dated 14th March, 2011 shall thereupon be amended, modified, altered, added to or substituted accordingly. They shall then become operative in law and binding upon all concerned. (v) Composite instructions, so formulated, shall positively be issued by the DoT within 15 weeks from today and report of compliance submitted to the Registry of this Court. 21. The writ petition is disposed of with the above directions. There shall be no order as to costs.

   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 285 OF 2010     Avishek Goenka … Petitioner Versus Union of India & Anr. … Respondents     J U D G M E N T   Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. The petitioner is a businessman engaged in the … Continue reading

Supreme Court of Singapore – High Court 1 This is an appeal against an order of costs made by a District Judge in a defamation action arising from an email sent by the Appellant to two managers of the parent company of the Respondent’s employer. The District Judge had ordered that each party was to bear his own costs after dismissing the action. 33 Second, and perhaps more importantly, although the District Judge’s finding that the Email was not defamatory is not on appeal, it was at least arguable that the Email was defamatory. It is well established that the test for determining the natural and ordinary meaning of allegedly defamatory words is the meaning that the words would “convey to an ordinary reasonable person, not unduly suspicious or avid for scandal, using his general knowledge and common sense” (see Review Publishing Co Ltd and another v Lee Hsien Loong and another appeal [2010] 1 SLR 52 at [27]). In my view, the natural and ordinary meaning of the Email was that the Respondent was diverting business from DMS (his employer) to IT Wireless, a company of which he was a shadow director and from which he was receiving dividends. It is arguable that this meaning of the Email was defamatory. It is, of course, not defamatory to simply call someone a shadow director. However, the Email goes beyond that. The suggestion is that the Respondent was engaged in self-dealing. In establishing the defence of justification which the Appellant had pleaded as one of his defences, the Appellant would have to prove, inter alia, at the trial that the Respondent was indeed a shadow director of IT Wireless, the company that the Respondent was diverting business to whilst as an employee of DMS. If it was arguable that the Email was defamatory, then the Appellant’s conduct of the litigation in the proceedings below was reasonable. There was no reason therefore to depart from the general rule that costs should follow the event. 35 For the reasons above, I allow the appeal. The District Judge’s order that each party was to bear his own costs of the trial is set aside. I order the Respondent to pay the Appellant’s costs of the trial.

Low Leong Meng v Koh Poh Seng – [2012] SGHC 1 (3 January 2012) Low Leong Meng v Koh Poh Seng [2012] SGHC 1   Suit No: District Court Appeal No 31 of 2011 Decision Date: 3 January 2012 Court: High Court Coram: Chan Seng Onn J Counsel: Mr Simon Jones and Mr Jayagobi Jayaram (Grays … Continue reading

Indian Evidence Act, 1872 : S.68, proviso-Suit for partition-Defendant claiming through gift deed- Plaintiff alleging the document to have been brought fraudulently-Suit de- creed by trial court-Execution of gift deed disbelieved-Defendant’s appeal allowed-High Court dismissed plaintiff’s second appeal holding that there was no specific denial by plaintiff and the proviso to s.68 would apply- Held, High Court erred in drawing the inference-There is a clear denial by the plaintiff of execution of the document-None of attesting witness examined- Execution of gift deed not proved-In view of non-compliance of s.68, gift deed could not be tendered in evidence-Plaintiff has successfully challenged its execution-No right accrued to defendant under the said gift deed-Findings recorded by High Court to the contrary set aside. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3037 of 1991. 2000 AIR 2857, 2000( 2 )Suppl.SCR 336, 2000( 7 )SCC 189, 2000( 5 )SCALE600 , 2000( 9 )JT 240

PETITIONER: ROSAMMAL ISSETHEENAMMAL FERNANDEZ (DEAD) BY LRS. & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: JOOSA MARIYAN FERNANDEZ & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 09/08/2000 BENCH: A.P.Misra, Y.K.Sabharwal   JUDGMENT: DER Heard learned counsel for the parties. The short question raised is, whether the High Court was right to entertain Exhibit B-1 in evidence, in view of proviso to Section … Continue reading

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION Alleging deficiency in service on the part of the opposite party, the complainant has filed this complaint for recovery of a sum in Indian Rupees equivalent to 1,85,200 DM (German Currency) alongwith interest @ 21% p.a. on the said amount from August 1988 till payment of the amount besides a sum of Rs.1,00,000/- towards the expenses incurred by the complainant. – Article 11 Disclaimer for Acts of an Instructed Party Banks utilising the services of another bank or other banks for the purpose of giving effect to the instructions of the principal, do so for the account and at the risk of such principal. Banks assume no liability or responsibility should the instructions they transmit not be carried out, even if they have themselves taken the initiative in the choice of such other bank(s). A party instructing another party to perform such services shall be bound by and liable to indemnify the instructed party against all obligations and responsibilities imposed by foreign laws and usages”. Having considered the matter in its entirety and viewed from any angle, we have no hesitation to hold that the complainant has failed to establish any act of negligence amounting to deficiency on the part of the opposite party-bank in the entire transaction. Infact what appears to us is that the complainant having failed to pursue its remedy against the foreign bank, bonded ware house and the insurance company, has found in the opposite party-bank, a soft target to vindicate its grievance which he actually had against the foreign bank owner of the bonded warehouse and the insurance company

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 110  OF 1993    M.O.H. Leathers                                         …      Complainant (s) Represented by its Managing Partner Zeenath Iqbal having office at 576, Anna Salai, Madras-600 006 Versus United Commercial Bank                              …     Opposite Party (ies) Represented by its Chief Manager Having its office at No.168 Thambu Chetty Street Madras – 600 001 BEFORE :             HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE R.C.JAIN, PRESIDING MEMBER           HON’BLE MR. … Continue reading

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