Gauhati High Court

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By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a suit governed by Articles 142 and 144 of the Limitation Act, 1908, that he was in possession within 12 years preceding the filing of the suit. On the contrary, it would be for the defendant so to prove if he wants to defeat the plaintiff’s claim to establish his title by adverse possession. =Md. Mohammad Ali (Dead) By LRs. RESPONDENT: Sri Jagadish Kalita & Ors. = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=19379

By reason of the Limitation Act, 1963 the legal position as was obtaining under the old Act underwent a change. In a suit governed by Article 65 of the 1963 Limitation Act, the plaintiff will succeed if he proves his title and it would no longer be necessary for him to prove, unlike in a … Continue reading

Cancellation of Railway tender on technical point is not illegal nor arbitrary to interfere by courts – Apex court confirm the judgement of division bench = Maa Binda Express Carrier and Anr. …Appellants Versus Northeast Frontier Railway and Ors. …Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41031

Cancellation of Railway tender on technical point is not illegal nor arbitrary to interfere by     courts – Apex court confirm the judgement of division bench =       invited tenders for the grant of a three year lease of  23   tonnes of space in VPH (Parcel Van) on train No.15960/15959 Kamrup  Express.   Among those who … Continue reading

Death certificate -Where funeral was conducted – that local authority can also issue a death certificate = refusing to register the death of his wife, Mrs.Pankajam in Chennai, as per the provisions of the Registration of Births and Deaths Act, 1969 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) and consequently, sought for a direction to the respondents to issue the death certificate of late Mrs.Pankajam.= Rule 7 of the said Rules deals with notification and form of Certificate under section 10 and it reads as follows: ” (1) The certificate as to the cause of death required under sub-section (3) of section 10 shall be issued in Form No.5 or 5-A and the Registrar shall, after making necessary entries in the Register of Births and deaths, forward all such certificates to the Chief Registrar or the Officer specified by him in this behalf by the 10th of the month immediately following the month to which the certificate relates. (2) Any person who performs the funeral ceremonies of a person dying in a local area within the jurisdiction of a municipality, panchayat or other local authority or any other area, shall whenever required furnish to the Registrar such information as he possesses regarding the particulars required for registration”= The words “and shall also” take steps to inform himself employed in Section 7(2) of the Act, has to be read disjunctively and not conjunctively. Whenever, an intimation is given by the persons authorised under Sections 8 and 9 or Rule 6 of the Rules made thereunder, the Registrar has to enter the particulars in the register maintained for the purpose and if any information is received by the Registrar, either through the abovesaid persons or others, he may either orally or in writing, require any person to furnish any particulars, within his knowledge in connection with the Birth or Death in the locality, within which, such person resides and after ascertaining the correctness of the particulars furnished, register the same under the Act.- In view of the above, the contention that the respondents have no statutory duty to register the death of the petitioner’s wife, within the State of Tamil Nadu, as the death had occurred in a moving train between New Delhi and Kanpur, is untenable. 39. In the light of the above discussion and following the judgments stated supra and of the factual admission on the part of the respondents in the counter affidavit the dead body of the petitioner’s wife had been brought to Chennai and cremated within the jurisdiction of the first respondent, the impugned communications are set aside and there shall be a direction to the respondents to register the death of the petitioner’s wife to issue the death certificate of late Mrs.Pankajam, wife of the petitioner, after obtaining a declaration from him for registration, to the effect that the particulars sought to be registered are true and correct and that the particulars have not been registered anywhere else in India and also that the same does not run in conflict with particulars registered by any other authority outside India. 40. In the result, the Writ Petition is allowed. No costs. Consequently, connected Miscellaneous Petition is also closed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_chennai/qrydisp.aspx?filename=38256 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 10.12.2010 CORAM THE HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.MANIKUMAR W.P.No.18187 of 2010 M.P.Nos.1 and 2 of 2010 N.Vedantam … Petitioner vs 1. The Executive Officer, Town Panchayat, Perungalathur, Chennai 600 063. 2. The Director, Directorate of Public Health and Preventive Medicine, 359, Anna Salai, Chennai-6. … … Continue reading

motive is not a very strong one= The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to commit a particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the same way, even if there may not be an apparent motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.”

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40455 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1130 of 2010 Birendra Das & Anr. … Appellants Versus State of Assam …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated … Continue reading

JUDICIAL INDISCIPLINE and disregard =The judge clearly ignored that the law declared by this Court is binding on all courts within the territory of India under Article 141 of the Constitution of India, and judicial discipline required him to follow the mandate of the Constitution. He entered into an impermissible exercise, and deleted the votes received by the appellant which he considered to be tainted votes. It is quite shocking to see that the learned judge has proceeded to delete the votes of the appellant from 8 polling stations, although the grievance was only about Ruhi and Roing polling stations. By making these deductions, he came to the conclusion that the respondent No. 1 had received 826 votes more. As can be seen from paragraph 28 of the judgment, rendered in Civil Appeal No. 1539 of 2012, that at best the case of the first respondent was that there were double entries of voters in 1304 names. The allegation was only with respect to two polling stations. In those polling stations, the appellant had received 1873 votes. Even if these 1304 votes were to be deleted, it would not affect the result materially since the appellant had won with a margin of 2713 votes. The learned judge, therefore, ignored that even if the ground of improper reception of votes under section 100(1)(d)(iii) was to be taken, the respondent no.1 had failed to establish that the result of the election of the appellant had been materially affected by such improper reception of votes. The decision of the learned judge was therefore clearly flawed and untenable. – Thus, the learned judge went into the counterfoils of the voters inspite of the fact that this court had already ruled in the judgment in C.A. 1539 of 2010, that in the facts of the present case, no case was made out for calling of the counterfoils. – Thereafter, however he proceeded to act exactly contrary to the direction emanating from the dismissal of M.C. (EP) No. 5 (AP) of 2010, which amounts to nothing but judicial indiscipline and disregard to the mandate of Article 141 of the Constitution of India. This is shocking, to say the least, and most unbecoming of a judge holding a high position such as that of a High Court Judge. We fail to see as to what made the judge act in such a manner, though we refrain from going into that aspect. = it is unfortunate that such acts of judicial impropriety are repeated inspite of clear judgments of this court on the significance of Article 141 of the Constitution. Thus, in a judgment by a bench of three judges in Dwarikesh Sugar Industries Ltd. v. Prem Heavy Engineering Works (P) Ltd. and Anr., reported in (1997) 6 SCC 450, this court observed, “32. When a position, in law, is well settled as a result of judicial pronouncement of this Court, it would amount to judicial impropriety to say the least, for the subordinate courts including the High Courts to ignore the settled decisions and then to pass a judicial order which is clearly contrary to the settled legal position. Such judicial adventurism cannot be permitted and we strongly deprecate the tendency of the subordinate courts in not applying the settled principles and in passing whimsical orders which necessarily has the effect of granting wrongful and unwarranted relief to one of the parties. It is time that this tendency stops.” We may as well refer to Para 28 of the State of West Bengal & Ors. v. Shivanand Pathak and Ors., reported in (1998) 5 SCC 513, wherein this court observed, “If a judgment is overruled by the higher court, the judicial discipline requires that the judge whose judgment is overruled must submit to the judgment. He cannot, in the same proceedings or in collateral proceedings between the same parties, rewrite the overruled judgment…” 28. In the circumstances, we have no option but to allow this appeal and set aside the impugned judgment and order rendered by the learned judge of Gauhati High Court dated 12.11.2012. The Election Petition filed by the respondent no. 1, bearing Election Petition No. 1(AP) of 2009, renumbered as Election Petition No. 1 (AP) of 2012, shall stand dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.

Page 1     Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No. 8260 OF 2012 Markio Tado … Appellant Versus Takam Sorang … Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. This statutory appeal under Section 116A of the Representation of the People’s Act, 1951, seeks … Continue reading

non-consideration of his case for promotion= The High Court, by impugned order dated 27.04.2010, allowed the petition and set aside the order passed by the Tribunal and directed the appellants herein to issue appropriate order in favour of the respondent herein for promotion with all consequential benefits. f) Challenging the said order, the Union of India has filed this appeal by way of special leave. It is further seen that up to 21.04.2003, the date on which the respondent’s batch mates were promoted to IRAS, neither any criminal proceedings was initiated against him nor any departmental enquiry was initiated, nor any charge sheet was served upon him and nor he was placed under suspension. We have carefully gone through the factual position and the ultimate ratio laid down by this Court in R.S. Sharma’s case (surpa). Even though in the said decision, this Court has distinguished the decision in Jankiraman’s case (supra) and held that the same is not applicable to its case, in the light of the conditions mentioned in para 2 as well as para 7 of the office memorandum dated 14.09.1992 and of the categorical finding that none of the conditions mentioned therein has been fulfilled, we are of the view that the decision in R.S. Sharma’s case (supra) is not helpful to the case of the appellant. In the light of the above discussion and in view of factual position as highlighted in the earlier paras, we hold that the ratio laid down in Jankiraman’s case (supra) are fully applicable to the case on hand, hence we are in agreement with the ultimate decision of the High Court. Consequently, the appeal filed by the Union of India fails and the same is dismissed. However, there will be no order as to costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2537 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.1933 of 2011) The Union of India & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus Anil Kumar Sarkar …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Delay condoned. 2) Leave … Continue reading

judicial service= the petitioner was wrongly denied promotion in July 2003 although his juniors were accorded promotion,the petitioner has been made to retire on December 31, 2006 on attaining the age of 58 years although the superannuation age stood enhanced to 60 years. – promotion, superannuation age of 60 years is to be considered is rejected=A bare perusal of the Clause (B) of amended Rule 20 leaves no manner of doubt that the High Court is empowered to assess and evaluate the record of a judicial officer for continued utility in service upto 60 years. Clause (B) has overriding effect over Clause (A) of Rule 20. This is clear from the expression “Notwithstanding anything contained in Clause (A)” with which Clause (B) begins. The mode and manner of assessment and evaluation of the potential of continued utility is prescribed in Rule 20(B)(I) of the 2003 Rules. No legal flaw has been pointed out to the exercise undertaken by the High Court in respect of the assessment and evaluation of the petitioner’s 7 service for continued utility in service upto 60 years.

1   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO(s). 31 OF 2004   N.C. DAS Petitioner(s) VERSUS GAUHATI HIGH COURT THR. REGISTRAR Respondent(s) & ORS. J U D G M E N T R.M. LODHA, J. The petitioner on the date of filing the Writ Petition under Article … Continue reading

NASA= The Appeal must, therefore, succeed. The impugned order of detention dated 31st January, 2011, passed by the District Magistrate, Imphal


National Security Act, 1980 – s.3(2) – Preventive detention – Legality – Editor of a Daily evening paper detained under the National Security Act – Detention order – Challenge to – Held: There was no reasonable basis for the detention order, and there was no material to support the same – None of the documents relied on by the detaining Authority in passing the detention order could be deemed to be pertinent – Delay in forwarding the representation of the detenu to Central Government also remained unexplained – Sufficient ground made out for quashing the order of preventive detention – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 22(5) – Judicial review – Purpose of – Delay Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s.161 – Statements under – Held: Cannot be taken as sufficient grounds in the absence of any supportive or corroborating grounds – S.161 statements are not considered substantive evidence, but can only be used to contradict the witness in the course of a trial – Evidence. The husband of the appellant was the Editor of a Manipuri Daily evening paper. He was detained under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980 on the allegation that he was involved in extorting money from contractors and engineers of Public Health Engineering Department and Forest Department of Manipur Government by delivering demand letters which he printed in his own press; and that this extortion resulted in a terror wave in the general public which was prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. The appellant filed a habeas corpus petition before the High Court questioning the detention on various grounds viz.: (1) that the allegations made in the detention order were vague and irrelevant and not sufficient to deprive the detenu of his fundamental rights guaranteed under Art. 22(5) of the Constitution; (2) that there were no cogent materials upon which the subjective satisfaction of the detaining Authority that the detenu was likely to be released on bail was arrived at; (3) that there was a delay in forwarding the representation to the Central government; (4) that all the procedural requirements of Article 22 are mandatory in character and even if one of the procedural requirements is not complied with, the order of detention would be rendered illegal. The High Court dismissed the petition. In the instant appeal, the question arising for consideration was whether, in the fact and circumstances of the case, a prima facie case for release of the detenu was made out. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. Individual liberty is a cherished right, one of the most valuable Fundamental Rights guaranteed by the Constitution to the citizens of this Country. The Constitution of India protects the liberty of an individual. Article 21 of the Constitution provides that no person shall be deprived of his life and personal liberty except according to procedure established by law. In matters of preventive detention such as this, as there is deprivation of liberty without trial, subsequent safeguards are provided in Article 22 of the Constitution. They are, when any person is detained pursuant to an order made under any law providing for preventive detention, the authority making the order is required to communicate the grounds on the basis of which, the order has been made and give him an opportunity to make a representation against the order as soon as possible. [Para 4] 2. In matters of this nature, this Court normally will not go into the correctness of the decision as such but will only look into decision making process. Judicial review is not an appeal from a decision but review of the manner in which the decision was made. The purpose of review is to ensure that the individual receives a fair treatment. The fact that the grounds stated in the order of detention are sufficient or not, is not within the ambit of the discretion of the court and it is the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority which is implied. However, if one of the grounds or reasons which lead to the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority under the National Security Act, is non-existent or misconceived or irrelevant, the order of detention would be invalid. [Paras 15 and 22] 3. There must be a reasonable basis for the detention order, and there must be material to support the same. The Court is entitled to scrutinize the material relied upon by the Authority in coming to its conclusion, and accordingly determine if there is an objective basis for the subjective satisfaction. The subjective satisfaction must be two fold. The detaining authority must be satisfied that the person to be detained is likely to act in any manner prejudicial to the security of the State or from acting in any manner prejudicial to the maintenance of the public order and the authority must be further satisfied that it is necessary to detain the said person in order to prevent from so acting. [Para 20] Fazal Ghosi v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (1987) 3 SCC 502; Shafiq Ahmed v. District Magistrate, Meerut, (1989) 4 SCC 556; State of Punjab v. Sukhpal Singh, (1990) 1 SCC 35 and State of Rajasthan v. Talib Khan, (1996) 11 SCC 393, relied on. 4. Under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, a detenu has two rights (1) to be informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds on which his detention is based and (2) to be afforded the earliest opportunity of making a representation against his detention. The inclusion of an irrelevant or non-existent ground among other relevant grounds is an infringement of the first right and the inclusion of an obscure or vague ground among other clear and definite grounds is an infringement of the second right. No distinction can be made between introductory facts, background facts and `grounds’ as such; if the actual allegations were vague and irrelevant, detention would be rendered invalid. [Para 23] 5. In the instant case, it is clear that the grounds on which detention order was passed has no probative value and were extraneous to the scope, purpose and the object of the National Security Act. Insofar as the documents on which reliance is placed is concerned, none of these documents provide any reasonable basis for passing the detention order. The primary reliance has been on the accused’s own statement made to an Investigating Officer. This cannot be said to be sufficient to form the subjective satisfaction of the detaining Authority. Statements under Section 161, CrPC cannot be taken as sufficient grounds in the absence of any supportive or corroborating grounds. Section 161 statements are not considered substantive evidence, but can only be used to contradict the witness in the course of a trial. The same is clear from the wording of Section 162(1) of CrPC and has been so held time and again by this Court. Furthermore, none of the other documents substantiate the involvement of the detenu in unlawful activities as alleged in the detention order. Thus, it is clear that there was no pertinent or relevant material on the basis of which, the detention order could be passed. [Para 23] Mohd. Yousuf Rather Vs. State of Jammu & Kashmir and Ors. (AIR 1979 SC 1925) and Rajendra Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh, (2007) 7 SCC 378, relied on. 6. The other issue in the instant case is that of delay. There has been a delay of 7 days, i.e. from 09/10/2009 to 16/10/2009, in forwarding the representation of the detenu to the Central Government. There has been no explanation of the reasons for this delay given by the respondents. Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India mandates in preventive detention matters that the detenu should be afforded the earliest possible opportunity to make a representation against the order. The delay of 7 days may not be inordinate; however, at no stage has there been an explanation given for this delay. The State Government or Central Government has not clarified the same and thus the delay remains unexplained. [Paras 24, 25 and 27] Union of India v. Laishram Lincola Singh @ Nicolai, (2008) 5 SCC 490 and Haji Mohd. Akhlaq v. District Magistrate, 1988 Supp (1) SCC 538, relied on. 7. In light of the fact that none of the documents relied on by the detaining Authority in passing the detention order can be deemed to be pertinent, and the fact that the delay has remained unexplained, there is sufficient ground made out in order to quash the order of preventive detention made against the detenu. In the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant prima-facie had made out a case for release of the detenu. The husband of the appellant ought not to have been detained under preventive detention and have his liberty curtailed by virtue of his incarceration under Section 3(2) of the National Security Act, 1980. [Paras 2, 3 and 28] Case Law Reference: (1987) 3 SCC 502 relied on Para 16 (1989) 4 SCC 556 relied on Para 17 (1990) 1 SCC 35 relied on Para 18 (1996) 11 SCC 393 relied on Para 19 AIR (1979) SC 1925 relied on Para 23 (2007) 7 SCC 378 relied on Para 23 (2008) 5 SCC 490 relied on Para 25 1988 Supp (1) SCC 538 relied on Para 26 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1849 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 18.2.2010 of the High Court of Gauhati, Imphal Bench in Writ Petition (Crl.) No. 111 of 2009. Dolen Phurailatpam, L. Roshmani Kh., Thajamanbi Luwang, Ananga Bhattacharyya, Khwairakpam Nobin Singh, Dr. Charu Wali Khanna, Shailendra Saini, Shreekant N. Terdal for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1849 OF 2010 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 2555 of 2010) Smt. Pebam Ningol Mikoi Devi ……………Appellant Versus State of Manipur and Ors. ………..Respondents JUDGMENT H.L. Dattu, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) By our order dated 14.09.2010, after hearing the learned … Continue reading

REVIEW PETITION-Scope of Error Apparent-Civil Procedure Code-Section 114, Order XLVII Rule 1 and Order II Rule 2-Review of the decision rendered by High Court in Second Appeal-Parameters required for review-Owner of suit property orally agreeing to sell suit property to appellant-Possession of property delivered to appellant on his making part payment-Appellant filing Suit No. 201/85 for protection of his possession of suit property-Appellant filing another Suit No. 1 of 1986 for specific performance of agreement for sale-During pendency of this suit, Owner executing a sale deed in favour of respondent-Appellant filing Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 for cancellation of said sale deed-Trial Court decreeing this suit and High Court upholding the decree-Subsequently, High Court entertaining and allowing a review application-Held, High Court erred in accepting the prayer for review as the question whether 1985 suit was hit by O II R 2 is not relevant to the 1987 suit-High Court has erroneously held about infraction of O II R 2-No mistake or error apparent on record found to justify entertaining review petition. The owner of the suit property entered into an oral agreement in 1982 with appellant for sale of suit property. Appellant paid part of the sale consideration. Possession of the suit property was handed over to the appellant with a promise that a sale deed would be executed in his favour within three years. Appellant paid the balance consideration and asked the owner to execute the registered sale deed in his favour. In view of threatened dispossession, the appellant with a view to protect his possession, filed Title Suit No. 201/1985. In this plaint, he exclusively reserved his right to file another suit for specific performance of sale agreement. He filed another suit No. 1 of 1986 praying for execution of sale deed in his favour. During pendency of this suit, the owner executed a sale deed in favour of respondent. Appellant filed Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 for cancellation of said sale deed. The said suit was decreed. Appeal filed against the said decree was allowed. The High Court allowed the second appeal restoring decree of lower Court. Respondent filed a review petition which was allowed. Appellant came in appeal to this Court. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1. A perusal of Order XLVII, Rule 1 shows that review of a judgment or an order could be sought : (a) from the discovery of new and important matters or evidence which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the applicant; (b) such important matter or evidence could not be produced by the applicant at the time when the decree was passed or order made; and (c) on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of record or any other sufficient reason. The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict. Where the order in question is appealable the aggrieved party has adequate and efficacious remedy and the Court should exercise the power to review its order with the greatest circumspection. [94-b-c; 92-f-g, h] M/s Thungabhadra Industries Ltd. v. The Government of Andhra Pradesh, AIR (1964) SC 1372; Meera Bhanja v. Smt. Nirmala Kumari Choudhary, AIR (1995) SC 455; Aribam Tuleshwar Sharma v. Aribam Pishak Sharma, AIR (1979) SC 1047; Shivdeo Singh v. State of Punjab, AIR (1963) SC 1908; Satyanarayan Laxminarayan Hegde v. Mallikarjun Bhavanappa Triuymale, AIR (1960) SC 137 and Parsion Devi v. Sumiri Devi, [1997] 8 SCC 715, relied upon. Panduranga Dhondi Chougule v. Maruti Hari Jadhav, AIR (1966) SC 153, referred to. 2. The High Court had clearly fallen in error in accepting the prayer for review. First, the crucial question which according to the High Court was necessary to be adjudicated was question whether the Title Suit No. 201 of 1985 was barred by the provisions of Order II Rule 2 CPC. This question arose in Title Suit No. 1 of 1986 and was irrelevant so far as Title Suit No. 2 of 1987 is concerned. Additionally, the High Court erred in holding that no prayer for leave under Order II Rule 2 CPC was made in the plaint in Title Suit No. 201 of 1985. The claim of oral agreement dated 19.08.1982 is mentioned in para 7 of the plaint, and at the end of the plaint it has been noted that right to institute suit for specific performance was reserved. That being so the High Court has erroneously held about infraction of order II Rule 2 CPC. This was not a case where Order II of Rule 2 CPC has any application. [96-b-d] A.K. Ganguli, Ms. B. Basak and Chanchal Kumar Ganguli for the Appellant. Shib Shankar Sirkar, P.K. Chakravarty and Apu Banik In-Person (on behalf of Mrs. Usha Rani Banik) for the Respondents.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 7948 of 2004 PETITIONER: Haridas Das RESPONDENT: Smt. Usha Rani Banik & Ors. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/03/2006 BENCH: ARIJIT PASAYAT & TARUN CHATTERJEE JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T ARIJIT PASAYAT, J. Challenge in this appeal is to the order passed by a learned Single Judge of the … Continue reading

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