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Goa
Sec.101,102 of Evidence Act – Sec.100 of C.P.C = Suit for Declaration of title and consequential reliefs = Goa – Portuguese civil code – Suit for declaration & possession & cancellation of document = with out producing any documentary proof in respect of title – no suit be decreed on vague admission -Sec.101,102 – burden of proof & onus of proof – both are distinct – former never changes – later changes from time to time from one shoulder to other’s shoulder – first plaintiff has to prove his title – then only other things will be considered = sec.100 C.P.C. – when decree was passed on erroneous law and fact , high court can interfere in second appeal – High court rightly set aside the decree and judgement of lower courts = Sebastiao Luis Fernandes (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. … Appellants Vs. K.V.P. Shastri (Dead) Through Lrs. & Ors. … Respondents = Published in / Cited in /Reported in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41061
Sec.101,102 of Evidence Act – Sec.100 of C.P.C = Suit for Declaration of title and consequential reliefs = Goa – Portuguese civil code – Suit for declaration & possession & cancellation of document = with out producing any documentary proof in respect of title – no suit be decreed on vague admission -Sec.101,102 – burden of proof & onus … Continue reading
Land acquisition Act – Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons = when acquisition was not for house sites, no deduction can be done for amenities = claimants are entitled interest on solatium also = Since claimed less amount , the apex court fixed compensation as prayed by claimant= Himmat Singh and others ….Appellants versus State of M.P. and another ….Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41038
Land acquisition Act – Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons = when acquisition was not for house sites, no deduction can be done … Continue reading
Whether the offence falls under Section 304 Part II IPC and not Section 302 IPC = the manner in which the deceased was assaulted and the brutality of the assault shows that the accused formed an unlawful assembly with the object of killing the deceased. The blow landed on the deceased by Perumal had brought the deceased to the ground whereupon the accused continued brutalising the deceased with the help of stones, in the process crushing his head and squeezing his testicles. We have no manner of doubt that the nature of injuries caused to the deceased were clearly indicative of the accused having had the intention of killing him. The use of the words “with that he must go” by appellant No.2 is only a manifestation of that intention. 18. There is, therefore, no room for altering the conviction from Section 302 to Section 304 Part II, IPC as argued by the learned counsel. 19. In the result this appeal fails and is hereby dismissed.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40749 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1623 OF 2009 Shanmugam and Anr. …Appellants Versus State Rep. by Inspector of Police, T. Nadu …Respondent J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. This appeal arises out of a judgment and order dated … Continue reading
Fate of the students already admitted in Medical college after quashing of NEET notification = Apex court held that before quashing NEET Notifications, it saved the admission already made and as such they should not be asked to leave the course= whether the petitioners have any right to continue or the respondents who have been admitted under the Rules have the right of admission.= After the judgment was pronounced, some kind of infantile wisdom which may, in different terminology, be called depraved sense of egocentric knowledge, the Additional Secretary (Health) had conveyed the Government’s decision dated 25.7.2013 which is as under: – “The Dean Goa Medical College, Bambolim-Goa Sub: Decision of the Government regarding Admission to Post Graduate Degree/Diploma Cources at GMC. I am directed to refer to your letter No. Acad/175/G.M.C./2013/441 dt. 23.7.2013 on the subject cited above and to convey the decision of the Government to admit the students for Post Graduate Degree/Diploma based on aggregate MBBS marks, as per existing rules as notified in the Official Gazette Series I No. 50 and Series I No. 51, Notification No. I/B/2033-II/PHD. Provisional admissions given on the basis of the NEET merit earlier thus stands cancelled.”- The candidates, who had qualified in the NEET examination and had been admitted, were compelled to leave the college and the students who had qualified under the Rules were admitted. – This Court in the final judgment had not invalidated the actions taken under the amended regulations and it included the admissions already given on the basis of the NEET conducted by the Medical Council of India. Therefore, there could not have been any scintilla of doubt in any one’s mind that the admissions given on the basis of NEET examination had been protected by this Court and hence, their admissions could not have been cancelled by the State Government.- But, unfortunately, here the authorities of the State Government have felt courageous enough to play possum and proceeded to crucify the fate of the candidates who had been protected by the verdict of this Court. Such an action is absolutely impermissible. Thus analysed the letter dated 25.7.2013 deserves to be lancinated and we so do. The writ petitioners, who have been admitted on the basis of the NEET examination, shall be allowed to prosecute their studies.=We are absolutely conscious of the said position. However, regard being had to the special features of the case and the litigations that have cropped up and the mistake that the State Government has committed, we are inclined to direct that 21 seats transferred to the State quota shall be filled up from among the students who had taken admissions under the 2004 Rules. It needs no special emphasis to state that the admissions and the allocations of the stream shall be on their inter se merit as per the Rules. We may hasten to clarify that none of these candidates shall be allowed to encroach upon the streams that have already been allotted to the petitioners who were admitted having been qualified in the NEET examination. We have been further apprised at the Bar that there are some unfilled seats as some students have left the College. If the vacancies have occurred, the same can also be filled up regard being had to the merit as stipulated under the Rules.- the effect that there should be increase of the seats for the academic year 2013-14 and the students should be adjusted. = Be it noted, an application was filed by the College for enhancement of seats for 2014-15 and during the pendency of this petition there has been a request to the Medical Council of India to prepone it for the year 2013-14. Enhancement of seats requires inspection and is controlled by a set of Regulations and, in any case, the application for 2014-15 cannot be directed to be processed in the current year.; whether the students who cannot be adjusted in the seats of All India quota that have been transferred to the State quota of this year can be adjusted next year. = We are bound by the said precedents. In certain individual cases where there is defective counselling and merit has become a casualty, this Court has directed for adjustment in the next academic session but in the case at hand, it is not exactly so. Though we are at pains, yet we must express that it will not be appropriate to issue directions to adjust them in respect of the subsequent academic year, for taking recourse to the same would affect the other meritorious candidates who would be aspirant to get admissions next year. For doing equity to some in presenti we cannot afford to do injustice to others in future. Therefore, the submission stands repelled.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40709 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 598 OF 2013 Aneesh D. Lawande & others … Petitioners Versus The State of Goa and others … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak … Continue reading
Whether a Village Panchayat established under Section 3 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short, ‘the Act’) or any other statutory dispensation existing prior to the enactment of the Act has the locus to file a petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution for setting aside an order passed by the designated officer exercising the power of an appellate authority qua the action/decision/resolution of the Village Panchayat is the question which arises for consideration in these appeals filed against order dated 18.08.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Goa Bench in Writ Petition Nos. 16 and 312 of 2010. “ordinarily” the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest : it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases, as the expression “ordinarily” indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable.” 26. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgments to the facts of these cases, we hold that the writ petitions filed by the appellant were maintainable and the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed grave error by summarily dismissing the same. We also declare that the contrary view expressed by the High Court in other judgments does not represent the correct legal position. 27. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the writ petitions filed by appellant are restored to their original numbers. The High Court shall now issue notice to the respondents and decide the writ petitions on merits. 28. It will be open to the appellant to apply for interim relief. If any such application is filed, then the High Court shall decide the same on its own merits.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4832 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1758 of 2011) Village Panchayat, Calangute … Appellant Versus The Additional Director of Panchayat-II and Others … Respondents with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4833 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10569 of 2011) … Continue reading
RTI Act =On September 21, 2007, Mr. Manohar Parrikar, the Leader of Opposition (respondent no.1), made an application to the Public Information Officer (for short “the PIO”) in the Secretariat of the Governor of Goa, asking for a copy of the report sent by the Governor of Goa to the Union Home Minister regarding the political situation in Goa during the period from 24th July 2007 to 14th August 2007. By a letter dated 22nd December 2007, the PIO in the Secretariat of the Governor of Goa declined to furnish the copy and wrote: “I am to inform that these communications are highly sensitive, and secret in nature. It is regretted that the same cannot be supplied in accordance with the exemption allowed under the Right to Information Act, 2005”.?
1 WP 478/2008 abs IN THE HIGH COURT OF BOMBAY AT GOA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION NO. 478 OF 2008 1. Public Information Officer Joint Secretary to the Governor Raj Bhavan, Donapaula, Goa 2. Secretary to Governor First Appellate Authority, Raj Bhavan, Donapaula, Goa .. Petitioners V/s 1. Shri Manohar Parrikar Leader of Opposition, … Continue reading
land acquisition act =acquired tenancy land =Having regard to section 2 of the Land Use Act, whether the acquired land should be valued only as agricultural land or whether it could be valued as land with development potential for being used as building sites?= It is not the case of the respondent that the land has been converted to non-agricultural use under sections 30 and 32 of the Land Revenue Code. In fact, before the issue of a purchase certificate on 6.5.1993, it may not be possible for a tenant-purchaser to apply for conversion to non- agricultural use. It is, thus, clear that the land in question was agricultural land as on the date when the Land Use Act came into force and when the land was acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. Therefore, the contention that it was not agricultural land, is rejected. 26. Consequently we allow the appeal filed by the Board and reduce the compensation awarded for land from Rs.100/- per sq.m. to Rs.55 per sq.m. The respondent will be entitled to all statutory benefits as awarded by the
1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8540 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP [C] No.149/2009] Goa Housing Board … Appellant Vs. Rameshchandra Govind Pawaskar & Anr. … Respondents With CA No. 8541 of 2011 (Arising out of SLP [C] No.9591/2009) and CA No. 8542 of 2011 (Arising … Continue reading
the rules framed by maharastra state bar council , imposing to pay subscription for exercising the right of vote and making compulsory casting vote for at least 10 preferrences to make the vote valid – the rules are un constitutional as the state bar council has no power to frame those rules and as the indian bar council also cannot approve the same
Non-reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos. 18386-18387 of 2007 The Bar Council of Maharashtra & Goa … Petitioners Versus Manubhai Paragji Vashi & Ors. … Respondents WITH SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NOs.18388-18389 OF 2007 Patil Rajiv Laxmna … Petitioner Versus Manubhai Paragji Vashi & Ors. … Respondents … Continue reading
Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The High Court rightly held that the Rules of Business of the Government of Goa framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution of India, including Rules 3, 6, 7 and 9 thereof, are mandatory and not directory, and any decision taken by any individual Minister in violation thereof cannot be termed as the decision of the State Government. The said Rules must be strictly adhered to. Any decision by the Government in breach of these Rules will be a nullity in the eyes of law. The decisions of the State Government have to be in conformity with the mandate of Articles 154 and 166 of the Constitution as also the Rules framed thereunder, otherwise they would not have the form of a Government decision and will be a nullity. The Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution are for convenient transaction of the business of the Government, which has to be carried out in a just and fit manner in keeping with the Business Rules and as per the requirement of Articles 154 and 166 of the Constitution. [Para 54, 62-63] [1133-G-H; 1134-A; 1139-E-H; 1140-H; 1141-A] State of Kerala vs. A. Lakshmikutty (1987) 1SCR136= (1986) 4 SCC 632; CBI vs. Ravi Shankar Srivastava, (2006) 4 Suppl. SCR450 = (2006) 7 SCC 188; Punjab State Industrial Development Corpn. Ltd. vs. PNFC Karamchari Sangh 2006 (3 ) SCR751 = (2006) 4 SCC 367; State of Bihar vs. Kripalu Shankar, (1987) 3 SCR 1= (1987) 3 SCC 34; Haridwar Singh vs. Bagun Sumbrui, (1973) 3 SCC 889; Gulabrao Keshavrao Patil vs. State of Gujarat, (1995) 6 Suppl. SCR 97= (1996) 2 SCC 26; K.K. Bhalla vs. State of M.P. 2006 (3) SCC 581 and State of U.P. vs. Neeraj Avasthi (2005) 5 Suppl. SCR 906 = 2006 (1) SCC 667, relied on. R. Chitralekha vs. State of Mysore (1964) 6 SCR 368, held inapplicable. Dattatraya Moreshwar vs. State of Bombay (1952) SCR 612; Bachhittar Singh vs. State of Punjab (1962) Supp 3 SCR 713 and State of Sikkim vs. Dorjee Tshering Bhutia (1991) 3 SCR 633= (1991) 4 SCC 243, referred to. Bannari Amman Sugars Ltd. vs. Commercial Tax Office (2004) 6 Suppl. SCR 264 = (2005) 1 SCC 625; and State of U.P. vs. Om Prakash Gupta (1969) 3 SCC 775, cited. Montreal Street Rely Co. vs. Normandin – 1917 A.C. 170; R v Immigration Appeal Tribunal Ex parte Jeyeanthan 1999 (3) AER 231; Attorney General’s Reference (No 3 of 1999), 2001(1) AER 577 and R v Sekhon and others, 2003(3) AER 508, referred to. Halsbury’s Laws of England, 4th Edition Re issue Vol. 44(1), referred to. 1.2. Clause (1) of Article 166 of the Constitution says that whenever an executive action is to be taken by way of an order or instrument, it shall be expressed to be taken in the name of the Governor in whom the executive power of the State is vested. Under Clause (2), the orders and instruments made and executed in the name of the Governor shall be authenticated in the manner specified in the rules. All matters, excepting those in which the Governor is required to act in his discretion, have to be allocated to one or the other of the Ministers on the advice of the Chief Minister. [para 52] [1131-C-E] 1.3. Any decision taken by the State Government reflects the collective responsibility of the Council of Ministers and their participation in such decision making process. The Chief Minister as the Head of the Council of Ministers is answerable not only to the Legislature but also to the Governor of the State, who, as the Head of the State, acts with the aid and advice of the Council of Ministers headed by the Chief Minister. The Rules framed under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution are in aid to fulfill the constitutional mandate embodied in Chapter II of Part VI of the Constitution. The decision of the State Government must meet the requirement of these Rules also. Therefore, if the Council of Ministers or Chief Minister has not been a party to a decision taken by an individual Minister, that decision cannot be the decision of the State Government and it would be non-est and void ab initio. [para 61 and 62] [1139-A-C, G-H; 1140-A] 1.4. A decision to be the decision of the Government must satisfy the requirements of the Business Rules framed by the State Government under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution. In the case on hand, the decisions leading to the notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 do not comply with the requirements of Business Rules framed by the Government under the provisions of Article 166(3) of the Constitution, and the Notifications are the result of the decision taken by the Power Minister at his level. The decision of the individual Minister cannot be treated as the decision of the State Government and the Notifications issued as a result of such a decision, are in violation of the Business Rules and void ab initio; and all actions consequent thereto are null and void. The fact that the decisions taken by the Minister alone were acted upon by issuance of Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 will not render them decisions of the State Government even if it chose to remain silent for a sufficient period of time or the Secretary concerned did not take any action under Rule 46 of the Business Rules. [para 53 and 68] [1133-D-E; 1147-A-D] 1.5. Rule 7 (2) of the Business Rules states that a proposal which requires previous concurrence of Finance Department under the said Rule, but in which Finance Department has not concurred, may not be proceeded with, unless the Council of Ministers has taken a decision to that effect. From a combined reading of the provisions of Rules 7, 3 and 6 of the Business Rules, the conclusion would be irresistible that any proposal which is likely to be converted into a decision of the State Government involving expenditure or abandonment of revenue for which there is no provision made in the Appropriation Act or an issue which involves concession or otherwise has a financial implication on the State, is required to be processed only after the concurrence of the Finance Department and cannot be finalized merely at the level of the Minister in charge. The procedure or process does not stop at this. After the concurrence of the Finance Department the proposal has to be placed before the Council of Ministers and/or the Chief Minister and only after a decision is taken in this regard, it will result in the decision of the State Government. [para 53] [1131-G-H; 1132-A, F-H; 1133-A-B] 1.6. In the instant case, the decisions impugned involve and concern not only the Department of Power but also the Departments of Industries and Finance and in view of the provisions of Rule 20, the decisions by Minister of Power to finalize the Notifications at his level without placing the proposal before the Chief Minister or the Council of Ministers fell out side the purview of the Power Minister. When the rescinding Notification dated 31.03.1995 was issued, the rebate of 25% was available only to Low Tension and High Tension consumers, and the Extra High Tension Consumers got deleted pursuant to the Notification dated 6.12.1993. A decision, therefore, to include a new category of consumers for grant of rebate which necessarily involved extra financial burden on the State’s finances, more so, by creation of a new category, namely, Extra High Tension Consumers retrospectively, was required to be finalized only after it was placed before the Council of Ministers or the Chief Minister in addition to obtaining the previous concurrence of the Finance and Industries Departments. [para 59-60] [1136-H; 1137-A-B, G-H; 1138-A-B] 1.7. The Notification dated 15.5.1996, which was claimed by the appellants to be only clarificatory, imposed an additional burden on the State’s Exchequer by introducing a new class of consumers for grant of rebate retrospectively and it was finalized by the Power Minister at his level. In law, the proposal for the decision leading to the Notification dated 15.5.1996 should have been placed before the Council of Ministers or the Chief Minister and since the same has not been done it is in violation of the Business Rules and hence the decision is non-est. Even assuming that the Notification dated 15.5.1996 was clarificatory in nature, the same violates Rule 19 of the Business Rules and there is nothing on record to show that the department concerned attempted to seek ratification of the decision taken by the Power Minister before the Notification dated 15.5.1996 was issued. The Notification dated 1.8.1996 also cannot be treated as mere clarificatory. It is a notification issued purportedly in terms of a Government decision. It was a decision finalized at the level of the Minister of Power alone and was taken in violation of the Rules of Business framed under Article 166(3) of the Constitution. The decision cannot be called a government decision as understood under Article 154 of the Constitution. Having regard to the figures placed on record, which the High Court has noticed in its judgment, showing the liability likely to be brought on the State by Notification dated 1.8.1996, it cannot be said that the said Notification did not create any additional financial liability on the State Government warranting approval by the Cabinet or the compliance of the Business Rules before it was brought into effect. Therefore, the Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 are unsustainable and the High Court has rightly held the same as non-est and void ab initio. [para 60, 64, 69 and 75] [1138-B-E; 1142-B-C; 1147-E-G; 1152-D-E] Royal British Bank v. Turquand, [1856] 6 E. & B. 327, referred to. 2. Suspicion of irregularity has been widely recognized as an exception to the doctrine of indoor management. The protection of the doctrine is not available where the circumstances surrounding the contract are suspicious and, therefore, invite inquiry. Applying the exception to the instant matter, there is sufficient doubt with regard to the conduct of the Minister of Power in issuing the Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 01.08.1996. Therefore, there is definite suspicion of irregularity which renders the doctrine of indoor management inapplicable to the instant case. [para 71 and 73] [1149-C-D; 1150-E-F] B. Anand Behari Lal v. Dinshaw and Co. (Bankers) Ltd, AIR 1942 Oudh 417; Abdul Rehman Khan & Anr. v. Muffasal Bank Ltd. and Ors, AIR 1926 All 497; Shrisht Dhwan(Smt.) vs. Shaw Bros. (1992) 1 SCC 534; and State of Karnataka vs. All India Manufacturer Organization and Others, (2006) 1 SCC 32, referred to. R. Chitralekha and Others vs. State of Mysore 1964 (6) SCR 368, held inapplicable. J.C Houghton& Co. v. Nothard, Lowe & Wills Ltd, [1927] 1 KB 246 (CA) – referred to. 3.1. The subject matter of earlier writ petitions was completely different and distinct from the public interest litigation filed by respondent no.1. In the earlier litigation, there was no challenge whatsoever to the Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 and the declaration sought in writ petition No. 316 of 1998 was not in issue in the earlier batch of petitions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the controversy in the earlier batch of writ petitions and the instant writ petition is the same. The issue regarding the validity or legality of the Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 was never raised in the earlier batch of writ petitions before the High Court, which never had an opportunity or occasion to look into, consider and pronounce upon the validity of the same with reference to the Business Rules framed under Article 166 (3) of the Constitution. The principles of res judicata, Doctrine of Estoppel and the principles embodied in Order II Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure pressed into service by the appellants cannot operate against the State Government merely because the State did not agitate either before the High Court or this Court the legality or validity of these notification in the earlier round of litigation when it had an occasion to do so. The State Government cannot be deemed to have accepted the legality of the Notifications and waived its objection or challenge thereto. The doctrine of estoppel, therefore, has no application at all, more so, in view of the illegality the notifications dated 15.05.1996 and 01.08.1996 suffer from in view of the non-compliance with the provisions of the Business Rules. The fact that the State Government did not raise these objections in the earlier batch of writ petitions does not disentitle it to such a stand or prevent it from raising its objections based on legal provisions. Respondent No. 1 was not a party to the earlier batch of writ petitions before the High Court or this Court. Therefore, the principles of res judicata or for that matter even the doctrine of estoppel will not apply to or operate against him. [para 24, 28, 29 and 75] [1109-G-H; 1110- A-B; 1113-A; 1114-A-C; 1151-F-H; 1152-A-D] Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma and Ors. vs. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi Pillai and Ors. (2000) 3 SCR752= (2000) 6 SCC 301, referred to. 3.2. As regards the objections raised on the basis of concept of merger, the High Court has held that though the appeals challenging the judgment of the High Court dated 21.1.1999 have been dismissed by this Court, and the findings of the High Court on the relevant issues have been impliedly confirmed, the concept of merger will not come in its way in deciding the issues involved in the instant petition for the reason that the said issues were not raised and, therefore, not required to be decided by the High Court in its earlier judgment dated 21.01.1999 inasmuch as legality of Notifications dated 15.5.1996 and 1.8.1996 was not examined therein. The principle of merger has no bearing, since, the issue that was decided by the High Court in the earlier batch of writ petitions and the issue that was raised and considered in the subsequent public interest litigation (W.P. No. 316 of 1998) are entirely different. [para 25, 27-28] [1110-C-F; 1112-F-H; 1113-A] Shankar Ramachandra Abhyankar vs. Krishnaji Dattatreya Bapat (1970) 1SCR 322= (AIR 1970 SC 1), referred to. 4. The appellants have not been able to show any infirmity or illegality in the order of the High Court warranting interference. [para 77] [1152-G-H] Case Law Reference: 1970) 1SCR 322 referred to Para 27 (2000) 3 SCR752 referred to para 28 (1952) SCR 612 referred to para 30 1995 ( 6 ) Suppl. SCR 97relied on para 31 1964 (6) SCR 368 held inapplicable para 32 (1973) 3 SCC 889 relied on para 33 1917 A.C. 170 referred to Para 34 1999 (3) AER 231 referred to Para 35 2001(1) AER 577 referred to Para 36 2003(3) AER 508 referred to Para 37 (1987) 1SCR 136 relied on para 40 (2006) 4 Suppl. SCR450 relied on para 41 2006 (3) SCR751 relied on para 42 1987 ( 3 ) SCR 1 relied on para 43 (1973) 3 S CC 889 relied on para 44 1952 SCR 612 cited para 45 (1962) Supp 3 SCR 713 referred to para 46 1991) 3 SCR 633 referred to para 47 1995 (6) Suppl. SCR97 relied on para 48 2004 (6 ) Suppl. SCR264 cited para 49 (1969) 3 SCC 775 cited para 49 2006 (3) SCC 581 relied on para 55 2005 (5 ) Suppl. SCR906 relied on para 56 (1992) 1 SCC 534 referred to para 70 AIR 1942 Oudh 417 referred to para 73 AIR 1926 All 497 referred to para 73 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4220 of 2002. From the Judgment & Order dated 19/23.04.2001 & 24.04.2001 of the High Court of Bombay at Goa in Writ Petition No. 316 of 1998. WITH C.A. Nos. 4219, 4213, 4214, 4217 & 4218 of 2002. F.S. Nariman, L.N. Rao, K.N. Bhat, Dr. Rajeev Dhawan, Shyam Diwan, Deeptakirth Verma, S. Karpe, Subash Sharma, Binu Tamta, Prashant Kumar, Triveni Poteker, I. Bimola Devi, Punit Jain, Chander Shekhar Ashri, Anu Mohla, A Subhashini, Mohit Abraham, Dhruv Mehta, T.S. Sabasish (for K.L. Mehta & Co.), Santosh Paul, M.J. Paul, K.K. Bhat, Arvind Gupta, Sriharsh N. Bundela, Kavin Gulati, Rohina Nath, Rohan Dhiman, Rashmi Singh, Sharuk Narang, Ashu Kansal, Umesh Kumar Khaitan for the appearing parties.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4220 OF 2002 M/s M.R.F. Ltd. …………Appellant Versus Manohar Parrikar and Ors. ………..Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4219 OF 2002 M/s M.R.F. Ltd. & Anr. ……….Appellants Versus The State of Goa and Anr. …………Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4213 OF 2002 Goa Glass Fibre Ltd. … Continue reading
