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Government of India

This tag is associated with 37 posts

Service matter – Caste certificate – Schedule Tribe Halba – the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled Tribes, De-notified Tribes, (Vimukta Jatis) Nomadic Tribes, Other Backward Classes and Special Backward Category (Regulation of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act, 2000 (for short, ‘2000 Act’) – Termination of service – Tribunal reinstated as they shall not get any benefit of reservation after 28.11.2000 as per Act but not retrospective – single judged confirmed the same – D.B bench negatived the same basing on Dattatreya 3 bench judge of Apex court – Apex court held that since Dattatreya not overruled the number of judgments of two benches of Apex court who order for reinstatement when there was no fraud on the employee in getting job on reservation and obtaining caste certificate – and as the Dattaterya case was based only on the fraud played by employee in obtaining caste certificate – Apex court set aside the D.B. bench high court judgment and order for reinstatement with a clause that she will not get any promotions on the base of reservation as mentioned in Maharashtra Act 2000 = Shalini …..Appellant Versus New English High Sch. Assn. & Ors. …..Respondents = published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41077

Service matter – Caste certificate – Schedule Tribe Halba –   the Maharashtra Scheduled Castes, Scheduled  Tribes, De-notified  Tribes,  (Vimukta  Jatis)  Nomadic  Tribes,   Other   Backward Classes and Special Backward  Category  (Regulation  of Issuance and Verification of) Caste Certificate Act,  2000  (for short, ‘2000 Act’) – Termination of service – Tribunal reinstated as they shall not get any benefit … Continue reading

Deaf & Dumb persons – transport allowance on par with other Blind & Orthopedically handicapped government employees – writ for directions to Governments of central and state – Apex court allowed the same = Deaf Employees Welfare Association & Another .. Petitioners Versus Union of India & Others .. Respondents = Published in / Cited in / Report in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41072

Deaf & Dumb persons – transport allowance on par with other Blind & Orthopedically handicapped government employees – writ for directions to Governments of central and state – Apex court allowed the same =      This  Writ  Petition  has  been   preferred   by   two   Associations representing the Deaf and Dumb persons … Continue reading

RED LIGHT ON VEHICLES – only dignitaries as specified by central and state as per proviso (iii) to Rule 108(1) of the 1989 Rules and as prescribed in clauses ‘c’ and ‘d’ of Notifications dated 11.1.2002 and 28.7.2005 issued by the Central Government. – ambulance services, fire services, emergency maintenance etc, and police vehicles used as escorts or pilots or for law and order duties shall not be entitled to have red lights but lights of other colours, e.g., blue, white, multicoloured etc. – Clause 51 of the Motor Vehicles (Amendment) Bill, 2012 contains a provision for imposition of enhanced penalty. – misuse of the provisions of the 1989 Act and the 1989 Rules generally and the provisions of Rules 108 and 119 in particular. = Abhay Singh ….PETITIONER versus State of Uttar Pradesh and others …RESPONDENTS = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41060

RED LIGHT ON VEHICLES – only dignitaries as specified by central and state  as     per proviso (iii) to Rule  108(1)  of  the  1989 Rules and as prescribed in clauses ‘c’ and ‘d’ of Notifications dated 11.1.2002 and 28.7.2005 issued by the Central  Government. – ambulance services, fire services,  emergency maintenance etc, and police vehicles used as escorts or pilots or … Continue reading

RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT – In order to promote transparency and accountability in the working of every public authority Stop giving Oral instructions or directions by the administrative superiors, political executive etc.& directions to the Union State Governments and Union Territories to issue appropriate directions to secure providing of minimum tenure of service to various civil servants, within a period of three months. = T.S.R. Subramanian & Ors. … Petitioners Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40943

RIGHT TO INFORMATION ACT – In order  to  promote  transparency  and  accountability  in  the working of every public authority  Stop giving Oral instructions or directions by the administrative superiors, political executive etc.  & directions to  the  Union  State  Governments   and   Union Territories to issue appropriate directions to secure providing  of  minimum tenure of service to various  civil  servants, … Continue reading

Himachala Pradesh state amendment is with the view to provide impediment free reservation in promotion to the Scheduled-Castes and Scheduled-Tribes and to bring certainty and clarity in the matter. Furthermore, the aforesaid proposed amendment is to be introduced with retrospective effect from 17th June, 1995. = “‘Due Consideration’ is totally different from collecting quantifiable data. This exercise has to be conducted and no reservation in promotion can be made without conducting such an exercise. Therefore, the State cannot be permitted to make reservations till such exercise is carried out and clear-cut quantifiable data is collected on the lines indicated in M.Nagaraj’s case. We may also point out that other than making vague reference to “due consideration” having been done, till date the State has not produced before us any clear-cut quantifiable data which could establish the need for reservation. Merely because the amended provision of the Constitution enable the State to make reservation is no ground not to collect data. Therefore, the instructions have to be struck down as being violate of the law laid down in M. Nagaraj’s case by the Apex Court.”= We, therefore, allow this Interlocutory Application and direct the State of Himachal Pradesh to take a final decision on the issue either on the basis of the data already submitted to the Cabinet Sub-Committee on 25th April, 2011 or on the basis of the data reflecting the position as on 30th June, 2011, within a period of three months from today. Till a final decision is taken, the direction restraining the State of Himachal Pradesh from making any promotion shall continue H.P. Scheduled Tribes Employees Federation & Anr. … Appellants Versus Himachal Pradesh S.V.K.K. & Ors. …Respondents.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40773 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.6 OF 2012 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C.) No. 30143 OF 2009 H.P. Scheduled Tribes Employees Federation & Anr. … Appellants Versus Himachal Pradesh S.V.K.K. & Ors. …Respondents With CONTEMPT PETITION (C.) NO. 91 OF 2013 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C.) … Continue reading

Medical college permission – Writ to quash the letter dated 13.07.2013 issued by the Medical Council of India by which the permission granted for renewal of admission for additional intake of students for the academic session 2013-2014 was revoked.= The Medical Council Act, 1956, especially Section 10A, mandates that when a new medical college is to be established or the number of seats to be increased, the permission of the Central Government is a pre-requisite. Section 19A obliges the MCI to prescribe minimum required standards for medical education and the recommendation made by MCI to the Central Government carry considerable weight, it being an Expert Body. MCI had prescribed the regulation – “Minimum Standard Requirements for the Medical College for 100 Admissions Annually Regulations, 1999” which is germane for our case, was published in the Gazette of India dated 29.1.2000. In order to verify the minimum requirements, MCI gets the inspection conducted by Inspectors, who are experts, submit their reports on the availability of the staff – teaching and residents – and other infrastructural facilities, clinical availability, etc. as per the regulations.= “The Prohibition of Unfair Practices in Technical Educational Institutions, Medical Educational Institutions and University Bill, 2010” has already been presented to both the Houses of Parliament. It is reported that the States have welcomed such a legislation, but no further follow up action has been taken. We are confident, earnest efforts would be made to bring in proper legislation, so that unethical and unfair practices prevalent in higher technical and medical institutions can be effectively curbed in the larger public interest. 43. We, therefore, find no good reason to invoke Article 32 of the Constitution of India and none of the fundamental rights guaranteed to the petitioners stand violated. The Petition, therefore, lacks merits and is dismissed.

  published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40735   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO.585 OF 2013     Rohilkhand Medical College & Hospital, Bareilly …. Petitioner Versus Medical Council of India & Another … Respondents       J U D G M E N T     K.S. Radhakrishnan, … Continue reading

grant of study leave = whether the appellant-institute is justified, in directing the respondent to refund the entire amount of Rs.12,32,126/- paid to him towards salary and other allowances for pursuing Ph.D studies at IIT, Kanpur, on failure to produce the certificate of obtaining the Ph.D, for which study leave was granted.= A Government servant or person like the respondent is given study leave with salary and allowances etc. so as to enable him to complete the course of study and to furnish the certificate of his successful completion, so that the institute which has sanctioned the study leave would achieve the purpose and object for granting such study leave. The purpose of granting study leave with salary and other benefits is for the interest of the Institution and also the person concerned so that once he comes back and joins the institute the students will be benefited by the knowledge and expertise acquired by the person at the expense of the institute. A candidate who avails of leave but takes no interest to complete the course and does not furnish the certificate to that effect is doing a disservice to the institute as well as the students of the institute. In other words, such a person only enjoys the period of study leave without doing any work at the institute and, at the same time, enjoys the salary and other benefits, which is evidentially not in public interest. Public money cannot be spent unless there is mutual benefit. Further, if the period of study leave was not extended or no decision was taken on his representation, he could have raised his grievances at the appropriate forum. 16. We notice that the appellant-institute has already recovered an amount of Rs.6.5 lacs as monthly installments from the salary of the respondent and the appellant-institute has also recovered an amount of Rs.1,75,000/- from the salary of the respondent and Rs.4,75,000/- from the arrears of revised scales admissible to the respondent with effect from 01.01.2006 and as such approximately Rs.6,50,000/- has been recovered from the respondent. Now the appellant-institute claims balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/-. 17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the bond executed by the respondent is found to be vague, we find no reason for the appellant-institute to recover the balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/- from the respondent but the amount already recovered be not refunded, since public interest has definitely suffered due to non- obtaining of Ph.D by the respondent after availing of the entire salary and other benefits. We do so taking into consideration all aspects of the matter and to do complete justice between the parties. 18. Appeal is allowed to the above extent and the judgment of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench is modified accordingly and no further amount be recovered by the appellant-institute from the respondent.

reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40583       Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5828 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.39067 of 2012) Sant Longowal Instt. of Engg. & Tech. & Anr. Appellant(s) Versus Suresh Chandra Verma Respondent(s)   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, … Continue reading

Preventive detention order passed under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, hereinafter referred to as “the COFEPOSA Act, 1974″= whether a detention order passed under the provisions of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974, hereinafter referred to as “the COFEPOSA Act, 1974”, could be challenged at the pre-execution stage only on any of the five exceptions carved out by this Court in Addl. Secretary, Govt. of India vs. Alka Subhash Gadia [(1992) Supp. (1) SCC 496], or whether such challenge could be maintained on other grounds as well. = (i) That, the detention orders passed in respect of the several proposed detenues were challenged at the pre-detention stage, on grounds other than those indicated in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case (supra), and that the five exceptions carved out in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case were illustrative and not exhaustive. (ii) Whether any live link could be said to exist between the order of detention and the object sought to be achieved by treating the detention order as valid after the passage of several years ranging from three to sixteen years, during which period there is no record of the proposed detenue having undertaken any activities similar to the ones indicated in the detention order? In the absence of any live link, can the detention order survive? (iii) Whether having absconded or evaded the execution of the detention order, the proposed detenue could take advantage of such fact and challenge the detention order, which remains unexecuted? (iv) Once the Settlement Commission under the Customs Act accepts a settlement and provides complete immunity from prosecution under Section 127H of the Customs Act, could the detention order be passed or proceeded with? (v) Whether, when the ordinary law of the land is available, orders of preventive detention can be passed? (vi) Whether the provisions of Section 7 of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974, and Section 7 of the National Security Act, 1980, can be made the basis for making an order of preventive detention? = whether the order of preventive detention should at all be executed in the absence of any information that the proposed detenue had continued with unlawful activities. When the object of a preventive detention order is to prevent the proposed detenue from committing any offence, which is either against the national interest or the interest of society in the future and there is nothing on record to indicate that the proposed detenue had indulged in any such activity after the order of preventive detention was passed, it would, in my view, be illogical to pursue the execution of the detention order as the arrest and detention of the proposed detenue would become irrelevant and would not achieve the object for which it had been passed. The concept of a person being prevented from taking advantage of his own wrong cannot, in my view, be applied in the case of a detention order where the object of passing such an order is quite different from proceeding against a person charged with having committed a criminal offence. In my view, the continued validity of a detention order would depend on whether the proposed detenue was in the record books of the authorities as a person habitually indulging in activities which were against the national interest and society in general and that it was, therefore, necessary in the public interest to detain him for a period of one year to prevent him from continuing with such activities and not to punish him as such. = I am inclined to hold that not only is a proposed detenue entitled to challenge the detention order at the pre-execution stage, but he is also entitled to do so after several years had elapsed after the passing of the detention order on grounds other than the five grounds enumerated in Alka Subhash Gadia’s case(supra). I am also inclined to hold that orders of detention must not, as a matter of course, be read as an alternative to the ordinary laws of the land to avoid the rigours of investigation in order to make out a case for prosecution against the proposed detenue. I also hold that if a dispute leading to the issuance of the detention order is settled on the basis of a statutory provision such as Chapter XIVA of the Customs Act, 1962 and in terms of the Statute immunity from prosecution under Section 127H of the Act is given, the continuance of the order of detention would be completely illogical and even redundant. Accordingly, in such cases, the orders of preventive detention are liable to be quashed along with the Warrants of Arrest and Proclamation and Attachment issued under Sections 82 and 83 of the Code of Criminal Procedure.- In the light of the views expressed by me hereinbefore, the matters indicated hereinbelow are allowed and the orders of detention challenged therein are quashed on the ground that the said orders had become stale and the live link between the orders of detention and the object sought to be achieved by the said orders, stood snapped. Some of the orders had been made thirteen years ago and the very purpose of such detention orders had been rendered meaningless in the absence of any material that the proposed detenues had continued to indulge in activities which form the basis of the preventive detention orders. = The question whether the five circumstances specified in Alka Subhash Gadia case (supra) are exhaustive of the grounds on which a pre-execution scrutiny of the legality of preventive detention order can be undertaken was considered by us earlier in the instant case. We held that the grounds are not exhaustive.[4] But that does not persuade me to hold that such a scrutiny ought to be undertaken with reference to the cases of those who evaded the process of law. 28. For all the above mentioned reasons, I regret my inability to agree with the opinion delivered by Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India. I dismiss all the matters.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40586  ALTAMAS KABIR, GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. CHELAMESWAR |REPORTABLE | IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION WRIT PETITION (CRL) NO.137 OF 2011 1 2 SUBHASH POPATLAL DAVE … PETITIONER VS.   2 UNION OF INDIA & ANR. … RESPONDENTS WITH W.P. (CRL) NOS.35, 138, 220 & 249 OF 2011 AND W.P. … Continue reading

Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar Sarovar =Aggrieved by the meager allocation of water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch they approached the Gujarat High Court in a public interest litigation inter alia praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent, the State of Gujarat and its functionaries to allocate more water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch. By the impugned order the prayer made by the appellants has been rejected and against the dismissal of the writ petition they are before us with the leave of the Court.= “We are of the opinion that the prayer for allocation of adequate water in Kuchchh district is not one which can be a matter of judicial review. It is for the executive authorities to look into this matter= The complaint of the appellants of non-adherence to the mandate of Article 38(2) of the Constitution is also misconceived. The State, in our opinion, is to strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing in different parts or engaged in different vocations. But this does not mean that for achieving that the State Government has to apply it on the basis of the number of people residing in different parts only. Other factors just cannot be forgotten. We are in total agreement with the conclusion and reasoning given by the High Court and we reiterate that there being no judicially manageable standards for allocation of water, any interference by this Court would mean interference with the day-to-day functioning of the State Government. In view of separation of powers, this Court cannot charter the said path. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40555       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2957 OF 2013 KACHCHH JAL SANKAT NIVARAN SAMITI & ORS. ..APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENTS   JUDGMENT   CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant no. 1, Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti, claims to be a … Continue reading

Payment of family pension to the widowed/divorced daughter, irrespective whether she became widowed/divorced daughter either before or after the retirement of employee, provided the spouse predeceases the pensioner and sons/daughters become ineligible for the Family Pension; and Smt. Sajida Bano, who has been settled and paid family pension, as she is rightly entitled to be paid the same. Unfortunately, Smt Sajida Bano died on 06.03.2012. Hence, the question of payment of family pension to any other member in the family would not simply arise. Family pension, to my mind, is liable to be paid either to the spouse of the deceased pensioner, provided such a spouse is surviving, or to any other eligible family members organized to fall in category I and category II of G.O.Ms.No.315. For others to secure eligibility for sanction of family pension, the spouse must pre-decease the pensioner but not otherwise. In the instant case, the spouse of the pensioner Smt. Sajida Bano survived him and hence, the petitioner is not eligible to be granted family pension and the fact that the Corporation rejected her candidature on some other that ground is of not much of a legal significance for her claim to be upheld.

reported in / published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9882 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE NOOTY RAMAMOHANA RAO WRIT PETITION No.13243 of 2013 29-04-2013 MISS MEHER BANO .. PETITIONER GOVERNMENT OF ANDHRA PRADESH REP BY ITS PRINICIPAL SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT ENERGY DEPARTMENT, A.P. SECRETARIAT, HYDERABAD AND OTHERS .. RESPONDENTS Counsel for the petitioner : Sri Syed Mushtaq Ahmed Counsel for the … Continue reading

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