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Gram Panchayat

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Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.6 – Suit filed by landlord under s.6 against trespasser when tenant in exclusive possession of suit property is dispossessed forcibly by a trespasser/third party – Maintainability of – Held: Maintainable – Non-impleadment of tenant is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit as tenant is not necessary party in such suit. Words and phrases: Word `dispossessed’ – Meaning of – In the context of s.6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The questions which arose for consideration in the present appeal were whether landlord can maintain suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 against a trespasser for immediate possession where a tenant in exclusive possession was dispossessed forcibly by the trespasser and whether tenant is a necessary party in such suit.- Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The key words in Section 6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 are “dispossessed” and “he or any person claiming through him”. A person is said to have been dispossessed when he has been deprived of his possession; such deprivation may be of actual possession or legal possession. Possession in law follows right to possession. The right to possession, though distinct from possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself for certain purposes. A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is dispossession of the landlord. The word “dispossessed” in Section 6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly, the expression “any person claiming through him” would bring within its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law. What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. [Paras 16 and 19] [1082-f-h; 1084-c- d] Veeraswami Mudali v. P.R. Venkatachala Mudali and others AIR 1926 Madras 18; Ramchandra v. Sambashiv AIR 1928 Nagpur 313; (Kanneganti) Ramamanemma v. (Kanneganti) Basavayya AIR 1934 Madras 558, overruled. Nobin Das v. Kailash Chandra Dey (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924; Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai and Mohideen avuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1898) 21 Madras 288; Sailesh Kumar and ANOTHER v. Rama Devi AIR (1952) Patna 339; Gobind Ram Jamna Dass v. Mst. Mewa w/o Parbhati AIR (1953) Pepsu 188, approved. Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai (1898) 21 Madras 288; Mohideen Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1921) 44 Madras 937, referred to. Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition, page 617), referred to. 1.2. Section 6 of the Act provides that suit to recover possession under the said provision could be filed by the person who is dispossessed or any person claiming through him. The tenant having lost the possession though without his consent to a third party, may not be interested in recovery of possession. He may not be available. He may not like to involve himself in litigation. In such circumstances, if a landlord brings the suit to recover possession against trespasser under Section 6, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that tenant must necessarily be impleaded as party to such suit. It may be desirable that a landlord in a suit under Section 6 of the Act against a trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant, impleads the tenant, but his non-impleadment is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit. [Para 20] [1085-c-g] Case Law Reference: AIR 1926 Madras 18 overruled Para 7 (1898) 21 Madrass 288 referred to Para 7 (1921) 44 Madras 937 referred to Para 7 AIR 1928 Nagpur 313 overruled Para 8 AIR 1934 Madras 558 overruled Para 9 (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924 approved Para 11 (1898) 21 Madras 288 approved Para 12 AIR (1952) Patna 339 approved Para 13 AIR (1953) Pepsu 188 approved Para 14 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1930 of 2010. From the Judgment AND Order dated 28.3.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application No. 1235 of 2001. Amol Chitale, Abhijat P. Medh for the Appellants. Sushil Karanjka, Vishal A. Patil, K.N. Rai for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1930 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No. 10418 of 2008] Sadashiv Shyama Sawant [D] …. Appellants Through L.Rs., & Ors. Vs. Anita Anant Sawant ….Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA,J. Leave granted. 2. The main question for consideration in this appeal by … Continue reading

Section 10 of the Tenancy Act, observing that the expression ‘any person’, contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the parties that the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin with such admission by them. 18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There is no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all norms of interpretation which requires that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provision otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme contingent. 19. Thus, in view thereof, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court impugned before us. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850 OF 2003 Tara Chand & Ors. …Appellants Versus Gram Panchayat Jhupa Khurd & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the judgments and orders dated 18.9.2002, … Continue reading

the expression ‘any person’, contained in Section 8, does not include a joint-owner (hisedar). It has been admitted by the parties that the appellants and their ancestors were hisedars/joint owners/co-sharers in the shamilat deh from a period prior to even 1935-36. The pleadings of the appellants, in fact, begin with such admission by them. 18. Provisions of Section 10 of the Tenancy Act put a complete embargo on a hisedar/joint-owner to claim occupancy rights. There is no agreement between the appellants and Gram Panchyat creating any tenancy in their favour. Granting the relief to the appellants would amount to ignoring the existence of Section 10 itself and it would be against all norms of interpretation which requires that statutory provisions must be interpreted in such a manner as not to render any of its provision otiose unless there are compelling reasons for the court to resort to that extreme contingent. 19. Thus, in view thereof, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the well-reasoned judgment of the High Court impugned before us. The appeals lack merit and are dismissed accordingly. However, in the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 8845-8850  OF 2003 Tara Chand & Ors. …Appellants Versus Gram Panchayat Jhupa Khurd & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J. 1.      These appeals have been preferred against  the  judgments  and orders … Continue reading

Whether a Village Panchayat established under Section 3 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short, ‘the Act’) or any other statutory dispensation existing prior to the enactment of the Act has the locus to file a petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution for setting aside an order passed by the designated officer exercising the power of an appellate authority qua the action/decision/resolution of the Village Panchayat is the question which arises for consideration in these appeals filed against order dated 18.08.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Goa Bench in Writ Petition Nos. 16 and 312 of 2010. “ordinarily” the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest : it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases, as the expression “ordinarily” indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable.” 26. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgments to the facts of these cases, we hold that the writ petitions filed by the appellant were maintainable and the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed grave error by summarily dismissing the same. We also declare that the contrary view expressed by the High Court in other judgments does not represent the correct legal position. 27. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the writ petitions filed by appellant are restored to their original numbers. The High Court shall now issue notice to the respondents and decide the writ petitions on merits. 28. It will be open to the appellant to apply for interim relief. If any such application is filed, then the High Court shall decide the same on its own merits.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4832 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1758 of 2011) Village Panchayat, Calangute … Appellant Versus The Additional Director of Panchayat-II and Others … Respondents with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4833 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10569 of 2011) … Continue reading

The first respondent, filed an Election Petition under Section 31 read with Section 34 of the Gram Panchayat Act, 1964 (for the sake of convenience it is called “the Act”), on the ground that the appellant herein was not eligible to contest the election in view of Section 11(b) of the Act which declares that no member of `Gram Sasan’ (a defined expression under Section 2(h) of the ActI) shall be eligible to contest for the post of Sarpanch if he has not attained the age of 21 years.= It was held in Robins Vs. National Trust & Co. Ltd., 1927 A.C. 515 – “To assert that a man who is alive was born requires no proof. The onus is not on the person making an assertion, because it is self-evident that he had been born. But to assert that he had been born on a certain date, if the date is material, requires proof; the onus is on the person making the assertion.” Since the first respondent failed to discharge the burden cast upon him, the election petition must fail.=An admission must be clear and unambiguous in order that such an admission should relieve the opponent of the burden of proof of the fact said to have been admitted.=It can be seen from the above-extracted portion of the evidence of the appellant that the appellant stated that she was 13 year old when she took admission in the High School (obviously Basudev High School) and the admission, as we have already noticed from the evidence of PW.2, was on 11.7.1998. Deducting 13 years from that date would place the year of birth of the appellant in 1985. It is not clear as to the material on the basis of which the Division Bench recorded that the admission of the appellant in the Panchayat Upper Primary School was on 10.1.1996. We assume for the sake of argument that there is some basis on record for the finding that the appellant took admission in the Upper Primary School on 10.1.1996. On her own admission she was 10 years old on that date. Then there is an 9

Reportable     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1191 OF 2012 [Arising out of SLP(C) No. 15174 of 2011]     Joshna Gouda …….Appellant Versus Brundaban Gouda & Anr. ……Respondents     J U D G M E N T   Chelameswar, J.   Leave granted.   2. This … Continue reading

M/s Larsen & Toubro Ltd. till date of its demerger in 2004 and thereafter to M/s. Ultra Tech Cement Ltd.) obtained a mining lease for limestone from the Government of Maharashtra, as per lease deed dated 12.2.1980. Under the terms of the said lease, the appellant as lessee was required to pay dead rent as per clause V(1) and (2), royalty in terms of clause V(3) and surface rent, water rate and cesses in terms of clauses V(4) of the lease deed. In response to a notice served by the Collector on the appellant demanding payment of surface rent (equal to non-agricultural assessment) and the Zilla Parishad Cess (for short = (i) Whether the appellant is liable to pay ZP Cess? (ii) Whether the appellant is liable to pay GP Cess? =In view of the above, we accept the contention of the appellant that it is not liable to pay ZP cess or CP cess to the State Government under the lease deed. It is however made clear that if the said cesses (ZP cess and CP cess) become payable by the appellant by virtue of any amendment to the provisions of the respective enactments under which such cesses are leviable, then the appellant may have to pay the same. Be that as it may.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.864 OF 2005 Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. … Appellant (earlier Ultratech Cemco Ltd.) Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr. … Respondents J U G D M E N T R. V. Raveendran J. The appellant (the term `appellant’ refers to M/s Larsen & … Continue reading

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