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Gujarat High Court

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M.V. ACT = WONDERFUL JUDGEMENT VVV IMPORTANT = Apex court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 16 lakhs – just compensation even though there is no prayer in the claim petition to that extent as they filed application claiming compensation under Section 166 of the M.V. Act.= loss of care and guidance for minor children & loss of consortium = Rs.1,00,000/- must be added under the head of loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 under the head of loss of care and guidance for minor children. Further, it was held by this Court in the case referred to supra that Rs.25,000/- must be awarded for funeral expenses as this Court has made observations in the case referred to supra that the tribunals have been frugal in awarding the compensation under the head ‘funeral expenses’ and hence, we award Rs.25,000 under the head of funeral expenses to the claimants/legal representatives .; Increase of income for private employees ranging from 30% to 50% = an addition of 30% increase must be applied for increase in total income of the deceased over a period of time if he had been alive. Further, in the recent decision in Rajesh & Ors. V. Rajbir Singh[6], this Court while referring to the case of Santosh Devi (supra) held that in the case of self-employed persons or persons with fixed wages, in case the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects of the deceased. ; How to determine the income of deceased = The State Government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 must issue a notification for fixing the wages of a polisher. Even in the absence of such a notification, both the Tribunal as well as the High Court should have at least taken the income of the deceased as Rs.40,000/- per annum as per the table provided in the IInd Schedule to Section 163-A of the M.V. Act for the purpose of determining just, fair and reasonable compensation under the heading loss of dependency of the appellants, though the said amount is applicable only to the claims under no fault liability. ; Therefore, this Court has awarded just and reasonable compensation in favour of the appellants as they filed application claiming compensation under Section 166 of the M.V. Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid relevant facts and legal evidence on record and in the absence of rebuttal evidence adduced by the respondent, we determine just and reasonable compensation by awarding a total sum of Rs. 16,96,000/- with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing the claim petition till the date payment is made to the appellants. “There is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is — it should be “just” compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the MV Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.”= Accordingly, the appeal is allowed on the above said terms. The respondent is directed to pay the enhanced compensation in this appeal with interest awarded, in favour of the appellants in the following ratio. 75% of the awarded amount shall be paid equally in favour of appellant Nos. 1 to 3 and the remaining 25% must be in the name of appellant Nos. 4 and 5 in equal proportion with proportionate interest. Out of the 75%, each of appellant Nos. 1 to 3 will get 25% and further, 10% of the share of appellant No.2 and 10% of the share of appellant No.3 must be deposited with proportional interest payable to each one of them in any Nationalized Bank of their choice and the rest 15% of each of their award amounts, with proportionate interest to be paid to them. The appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are at liberty to move the Tribunal to release the money so deposited for their welfare and developmental purpose. The above said direction regarding the payment and deposit shall be made within six weeks by depositing it in the Bank and disburse the amount by way of demand draft drawn in the name of each one of them as directed above. There will be no order as to costs.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40844   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8251 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 36602 of 2012) SANOBANU NAZIRBHAI MIRZA & ORS. … APPELLANTS VS. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT SERVICE … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Change report in respect of six churches amalgamation of person and property = was set aside and the same was confirmed by Apex court- Change Reports were filed by First District Church of the Brethren (hereinafter referred to as ‘the FDCB’) a registered religious society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SR Act’) bearing Registration No. 1202/44 and later registered as public trust in Gujarat bearing No.E- 643/Bharuch, after the enactment of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BPTA’) property of which is vested with its ‘Property Committee’ and the Church of North India (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CNI’), Gujarat Diocese. The CNI is a public trust registered by an application accepted on May 12, 1970 with effect of registration being given from 1971 and the trust being formed on November 29, 1970 with Registration No. D-17/Ahmedabad. 3. These Change Reports were filed to give effect to the unification of six churches which included the FDCB, an offshoot of the ‘Brethren Church’ of USA (other Churches being The Council of the Baptist Churches in North India, The Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church (British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church in Southern Asia and The United Church of Northern India) into a single entity, ‘The Church of North India’ (with the Gujarat Chapter being managed by the Church of North India, Gujarat, Diocese).= scope of inquiry of the Charity Commissioner under Section 22 of the Act, this Court in Church of North India (supra) very aptly provided a bird’s eye view of Section 22 which is provided as under : “….Section 22 provides for the change which may occur in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17 to make an appropriate application within 90 days from the date of the occurrence of such change. Sub-section (1A) of Section 22 reads thus: “(1A) Where the change to be reported under sub- section (1) relates to any immovable property, the trustee shall, alongwith the report, furnish a memorandum in the prescribed form containing the particulars (including the name and description of the public trust) relating to any change in the immovable property of such public trust, for forwarding it to the sub-registrar referred to in sub- section (7) of section 18.” 31. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 empowers a Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold an inquiry for the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register kept under Section 17 or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded therein. In the event, a change is found to have occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is required to record a finding with the reasons therefore to that effect. Such an order is appealable to the Charity Commissioner. By reason of changes which have been found to have occurred, the entries in the register are required to be amended. Such amendment on the occurrence of change is final and conclusive.” = it is the duty of the society to take steps in accordance with Section 13 of the SR Act for its dissolution. We have further noted that unless the properties vested in the Trust are divested in accordance with the provisions of the SR Act and in accordance with the BPTA, merely by filing the Change Report/s, CNI cannot claim a merger of churches and thereby claim that the properties vested in the Trust would vest in them. In our opinion, it would only be evident from the steps taken that the passing of resolutions is nothing but an indication to show the intention to merge and nothing else. In fact, the City Civil Court has correctly held, in our opinion, which has been affirmed by the High Court, that there was no dissolution of the society and further merger was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of law. In these circumstances, we hold that the society and the Trust being creatures of statute, have to resort to the modes provided by the statute for its amalgamation and the so-called merger cannot be treated or can give effect to the dissolution of the Trust. In the matrix of the facts, we hold that without taking any steps in accordance with the provisions of law, the effect of the resolutions or deliberations is not acceptable in the domain of law. The question of estoppel also cannot stand in the way as the High Court has correctly pointed out that the freedom guaranteed under the Constitution with regard to the faith and religion, cannot take away the right in changing the faith and religion after giving a fresh look and thinking at any time and thereby cannot be bound by any rules of estoppel. Therefore, the resolution only resolved to accept the recommendation of joint unification but does not refer to dissolution. 26. Having analysed the facts and the law in the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the City Civil Court have rightly adjudicated on the matter in question and correctly set aside the order passed by the Charity Commissioner. 27. Accordingly, we affirm the order passed by the High Court. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in the present appeals and the same are dismissed accordingly.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40842     Reportable   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8800-8801 /2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 16575-16576 of 2012)       Vinodkumar M. Malavia etc. … Appellants   Vs.   Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti & Ors. … Respondents       J … Continue reading

Hindu succession Act sec. 8 order of succession = In the personal/ self acquired property of Grand father, No Grand son can file a suit for partition against his father as the property fell to the father is his personal property and as the grand son is not the class I heir = A serious objection to the maintainability of the suit has been filed by the grandchildren of late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri in the life time of their father.= The present suit has been filed by Gaurav Sikri and Khushal Sikri, who are both minor sons of the defendant No.2. The suit has been filed through their mother Smt. Neha Sikri.= as per the averments made in the plaint late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri was the owner of the suit properties- on the death of late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri his heirs succeeded to the same as per the law of succession. In view of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs would not fall in the category of Class I heirs and only their father (defendant No.2) would be entitled to inherit CS(OS)944/2004 Page No.3 of 8along with his brothers, sister and mother. = In view of the preamble to the Act, i.e., that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in class I and only includes son and does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. – late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri was the owner of the suit properties and that upon his death the same were inherited by his legal heirs. That being the case, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wealth Tax Commissioner v. Chander Sen (supra) would be clearly applicable and, therefore, the plaintiffs being the grandsons would not have any share in the property left by late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri during the life time of the defendant No.2 (Rajesh Sikri). Consequently, the plaint, on the basis of the averments made therein, does not disclose any cause of action and the same is accordingly rejected.

published in http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/BDA/judgement/07-11-2007/BDA24092007S9442004.pdf THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Judgment delivered on : 24.09.2007 CS(OS) 944/2004 MASTER GAURAV SIKRI & ANR. …….Plaintiffs – versus – SMT. KAUSHALYA SIKRI & ORS. ……..Defendants Advocates who appeared in this case: For the Plaintiffs : Mr Viraj R. Datar with Mr Aditya Jhanji For the Defendants : Mr … Continue reading

A Daily worker on termination of his service not entitled for re-employment as of right as the termination is not amounts to retrenchment of an employee = whether termination of services of the respondent on the expiry of the contract period would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 (for short “the ID Act”). = Section 2(bb) says that if the termination of the service of workman is as a result of non-renewal of the contract between the employer and the workman on its expiry of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, the same would not constitute retrenchment.= Facts would clearly indicate that the respondent’s service was terminated on the expiry of the fixed periods mentioned in the office orders and that he had worked only for 54 days. The mere fact that the appointment orders used the expression “daily wages” does not make the appointment “Casual” because it is the substance that matters, not the form. The contract of appointment consciously entered into by the employer and the employee would, over and above the specific terms of the written agreement, indicates that the employment is short-lived and the same is liable to termination, on the fixed period mentioned in the contract of appointment.= “25G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. 25H. Re- employment of retrenched workmen.- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity 2[ to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re- employment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons.”= Section 25H will apply only if the respondent establishes that there had been retrenchment. Facts will clearly indicate that there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012 as well. We are sorry to note that the Labour Court, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not properly appreciated the factual and legal position in this case. When rights of parties are being adjudicated, needless to say, serious thoughts have to be bestowed by the Labour Court as well as the High Court. For the above-mentioned reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside the award passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40563 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5498 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012) Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Appellant Versus Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri Respondent with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5510 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5390 of 2012) J U D G M E N … Continue reading

Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar Sarovar =Aggrieved by the meager allocation of water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch they approached the Gujarat High Court in a public interest litigation inter alia praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent, the State of Gujarat and its functionaries to allocate more water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch. By the impugned order the prayer made by the appellants has been rejected and against the dismissal of the writ petition they are before us with the leave of the Court.= “We are of the opinion that the prayer for allocation of adequate water in Kuchchh district is not one which can be a matter of judicial review. It is for the executive authorities to look into this matter= The complaint of the appellants of non-adherence to the mandate of Article 38(2) of the Constitution is also misconceived. The State, in our opinion, is to strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing in different parts or engaged in different vocations. But this does not mean that for achieving that the State Government has to apply it on the basis of the number of people residing in different parts only. Other factors just cannot be forgotten. We are in total agreement with the conclusion and reasoning given by the High Court and we reiterate that there being no judicially manageable standards for allocation of water, any interference by this Court would mean interference with the day-to-day functioning of the State Government. In view of separation of powers, this Court cannot charter the said path. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40555       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2957 OF 2013 KACHCHH JAL SANKAT NIVARAN SAMITI & ORS. ..APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENTS   JUDGMENT   CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant no. 1, Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti, claims to be a … Continue reading

Service matter – whether in the facts and circumstances it will be desirable for the Court to direct the appellants to straightaway regularize the services of all the daily wage workers working for more than five years or the daily wage workers working for more than five years are entitled for some other relief. 25. As per scheme contained in Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 all the daily wage workers were not entitled for regularization or permanency in the services. As per the said Resolution the daily wagers are entitled to the following benefits: “(i) They are entitled to daily wages as per the prevailing Daily Wages. If there is presence of more than 240 days in first year, daily wagers are eligible for paid Sunday, medical allowance and national festival holidays. (ii) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than five years and less than 10 years are entitled for fixed monthly salary along with dearness allowance as per prevailing standard, for his working days. Such daily wagers will get two optional leave in addition to 14 misc. leave, Sunday leave and national festival holidays. Such daily wagers will also be eligible for getting medical allowance and deduction of provident fund. (iii) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than ten years but less than 15 years are entitled to get minimum pay scale at par with skilled worker along with dearness allowance as per prevailing standard, for his working days. Moreover, such daily wagers will get two optional leave in addition to 14 misc. leave, Sunday leave and national festival holidays. He/she will be eligible for getting medical allowance and deduction of provident fund. (iv) Daily wagers and semi skilled workers who has service of more than 15 years will be considered as permanent worker and such semi skilled workers will get current pay scale of skilled worker along with dearness allowance, local city allowance and house rent allowance. They will get benefit as per the prevailing rules of gratuity, retired salary, general provident fund. Moreover, they will get two optional leave in addition to 14 misc. leave, 30 days earned leave, 20 days half pay leave, Sunday leave and national festival holidays. The daily wage workers and semi skilled who have completed more than 15 years of their service will get one increment, two increments for 20 years service and three increments for 25 years in the current pay scale of skilled workers and their salary will be fixed accordingly.” Considering, the facts and circumstances of the case, the finding of Gujarat High Court dated 29th October, 2010 in SCA No.8647/2008 and connected matters and the fact that the said judgment is binding between the parties, we are of the view that the appellants should be directed to grant the benefit of the scheme as contained in the Resolution dated 17th October, 1988 to all the daily wage workers of the Forest and Environment Department working for more than five years, providing them the benefits as per our finding at Paragraph 25 above. The appellants are directed accordingly. The judgment and order passed by the learned Single Judge dated 29th October, 2010 as affirmed by the Division Bench by its order dated 28th February, 2012 stands modified to the extent above. The benefit should be granted to the eligible daily wage workers of the Forest and Environment Department working for more than five years including those who are performing work other than building maintenance and repairing but they will be entitled for the consequential benefit w.e.f. 29th October, 2010 or subsequent date from which they are so eligible within four months from the date of receipt/production of the copy of this order. The appeals stand disposed of with the aforesaid observation and directions to the appellant- State and its authorities. There shall be no separate orders as to costs.

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40538   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5321-5322 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) 13619-13620 OF 2012) STATE OF GUJARAT & ORS. … APPELLANTS VERUS PWD EMPLOYEES UNION & ORS. ETC. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave … Continue reading

The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, etc.) Act, 1995 = a teacher with mental illness failed to attend her duties and as such she was removed from service due to lack of reply from her. after 3 she filed a complaint before commissioner for reinstatement as she was dismissed when she was under mental distress = For about three years, no action was taken by appellant. In the year 2007 she filed an application before the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act. The said application was registered as Case No. 253/2007. In the said application, the appellant took plea that the order of dismissal passed by the authorities while she was suffering from mental illness was in violation of Section 47(1) of the Act. The appellant requested for her reinstatement with full back­wages.= whether the Commissioner under Section 62 of the Act can look into the legality of the order of dismissal from service of a disabled person, if it comes to his notice that the said person with disabilities has been deprived of his rights. whether the appellant was entitled for benefits under Section 47(1) of the Act. 13. The Persons with Disabilities (Equal Opportunities, Protection of Rights and Full Participation) Act was enacted in 1995 pursuant to meet the following object and reasons: (i) to spell out the responsibility of the State towards the prevention of disabilities, protection of rights, provision of medical care, education, training, employment and rehabilitation of persons with disabilities; (ii) to create barrier free environment for persons with disabilities; (iii)to remove any discrimination against persons with disabilities in the sharing of development benefits, vis­à­vis non­ disabled persons; (iv)to counteract any situation of the abuse and the exploitation of persons with disabilities; (v)to lay down a strategy for comprehensive development of programmes and services and equalization of opportunities for persons with disabilities; and (vi)to make special provision of the integration of persons with disabilities into the social mainstream. “47 ­ Non ­discrimination in Government employments ­ (1) No establishment shall dispense with, or reduce in rank, an employee who acquires a disability during his service: Provided that, if an employee, after acquiring disability is not suitable for the post he was holding, could be shifted to some other post with the same pay scale and service benefits: Provided further that if it is not possible to adjust the employee against any post, he may be kept on a supernumerary post until a suitable post is available or he attains the age of superannuation, whichever is earlier. (2) No promotion shall be denied to a person merely on the ground of his disability: Provided that the appropriate Government may, having regard to the type of work carried on in any establishment, by notification and subject to such conditions, if any, as may be specified in such notification, exempt any establishment from the provisions of this section.”= Learned Single Judge by interim order dated 11th January, 2008 directed the respondent to reinstate the appellant and to pay her regular salary w.e.f 1.2.2008 on the following terms: “8. RULE (a)By interim order, there shall be stay against the impugned order of the Commissioner to the extent that the petitioner shall not be required to pay any backwages to the respondent, but the petitioner shall reinstate the respondent in service by paying regular salary to her from 1.2.2008. (b)It is further observed that directed that the petitioner shall get respondent examined through a Government Doctor of their choice and if it is so opined by the doctor, such duty may be assigned to the respondent at a place or a nearby place, where she can comfortably and conveniently, in a safe atmosphere, discharge duty.”- Inspite of the same, the respondent authority have neither reinstated the appellant nor paid salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008. So, they cannot take advantage of their own wrong and, thereby, cannot deny the benefit of wages to which the appellant was entitled pursuant to the order passed by the High Court on 11th January, 2008. -There is nothing on the record to suggest that the respondent authority got the appellant examined by a Government Doctor to determine the duty to be assigned to her. In view of her reinstatement, now the respondent authority may get opinion of the doctor for assigning her duty. In case the appellant is not in a position to perform the normal duty because of her mental condition, the competent authority will apply Proviso to Section 47(1) of the said Act. Having regard to the fact that we have upheld the order passed by the Commissioner, we direct the authorities to reinstate the appellant in service immediately and to pay her regular salary every month. The appellant shall be entitled to arrears of salary w.e.f. 1.2.2008 which the respondent shall pay within three months, else the appellant shall become entitled to interest at the rate of 6% per annum with effect from 1.2.2008 till the actual payment. The appeal is allowed in the manner indicated above and the orders passed by the learned Single Judge and the Division Bench of the High Court are set aside. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40492 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9324 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.7647 of 2011) GEETABEN  RATILAL PATEL          … APPELLANT VERSUS DISTRICT PRIMARY EDUCATION OFFICER          … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This appeal is directed against the order dated 4th November, 2009 passed by the Division Bench of Gujarat High Court in L.P.A.No. 1988 of 2009 whereby the Division Bench dismissed the said Letters Patent Appeal   preferred   by  the  appellant  and  affirmed   the order   dated   10th  December,   2008   passed   by   learned Single   Judge   in   Writ   Petition­Special   … Continue reading

Sections 304B, 498A or 306, IPC.= mere ‘demand of dowry’ without proof of ‘cruelty’ or ‘harassment’ caused to the deceased by the appellants cannot make the appellants liable for the offences under Sections 304B, 498A or 306, IPC. 7. To establish the offence of dowry death under Section 304B, IPC the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the husband or his relative has subjected the deceased to cruelty or harassment in connection with demand of dowry soon before her death. Similarly, to establish the offence under Section 498A, IPC the prosecution has to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the husband or his relative has subjected the victim to cruelty as defined in Clauses (a) and (b) of the Explanation to Section 498A, IPC. In the present case, the prosecution has not been able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the appellants have subjected the deceased to any cruelty or harassment. Further, we have noticed from Ext. 31 written by PW 3 to the deceased on 25-04-2004 that after talking to the deceased on telephone, he was satisfied that she was living happily and was not being misbehaved with. No other material having come in evidence to establish that the appellants instigated the deceased to commit suicide, it is difficult for the Court to hold that the appellants had in any way abetted the suicide by the deceased on 18-05-2004. 8. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court as well as the judgment of the Trial Court and allow the appeal. The appellants are on bail and their bail bonds are discharged.

Page 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL 613 OF 2007 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 613 OF 2007 INDRAJIT SURESHPRASAD BIND & ORS. Appellant (s) VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT Respondent(s) JUDGMENT A.K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 04- 12-2006 of the Gujarat High Court in … Continue reading

The Government of Gujarat, in exercise of its power under the Act of 1957 and the Rules, 1982 appointed appellant no.2 as the President of the Gujarat Revenue Tribunal vide order dated 16.4.1988. His appointment was challenged by the respondents herein, on the ground that the office of the Chairman, being a “judicial office” could not be usurped by a person who had been an Administrative Officer all his life. The validity of Sections 4 and 20 of the Act 1957 and Rule 3(1)(iii)(a) of the Rules 1982 was challenged the High Court committed an error by striking down the aforesaid rule, holding that the Secretary to the Government of Gujarat cannot be appointed as President of the Tribunal. It erred in holding that the Tribunal was a court and only a “Judicial Officer”, i.e., a Judicial Officer holding such equivalent post as is referred to in Rule 3(iii) of the Rules 1982 can be appointed as President of the said Tribunal.In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to take a view contrary to the view taken by the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and is, therefore, accordingly dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREMECOURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7208 OF 2012 State of Gujarat & Anr. … Appellants Versus Gujarat Revenue Tribunal Bar Association & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.: 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order … Continue reading

what would be the status of a person, one of whose parents belongs to the scheduled castes/scheduled tribes and the other comes from the upper castes, or more precisely does not come from scheduled castes/scheduled tribes – whether the appellant was, in fact, brought up as a tribal and, consequently, shared all the indignities and handicaps and deprivations normally suffered by the tribal communities.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 654 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P (CIVIL) NO.4282 of 2010)   Rameshbhai Dabhai Naika … Appellant   versus   State of Gujarat & Others … Respondents     J U D G M E N T   Aftab Alam,J.   1. … Continue reading

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