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Land acquisition Act – Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons = when acquisition was not for house sites, no deduction can be done for amenities = claimants are entitled interest on solatium also = Since claimed less amount , the apex court fixed compensation as prayed by claimant= Himmat Singh and others ….Appellants versus State of M.P. and another ….Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41038

Land acquisition Act –  Under sec.51 A no court can discard the comparable registered sale deed merely because no one belongs to the sale deed not examined = ] Court should considered the highest sale value if not discard for any reasons =  when acquisition was  not for house sites, no deduction can be done … Continue reading

M.V. ACT = WONDERFUL JUDGEMENT VVV IMPORTANT = Apex court enhanced the compensation to Rs. 16 lakhs – just compensation even though there is no prayer in the claim petition to that extent as they filed application claiming compensation under Section 166 of the M.V. Act.= loss of care and guidance for minor children & loss of consortium = Rs.1,00,000/- must be added under the head of loss of consortium and Rs.1,00,000 under the head of loss of care and guidance for minor children. Further, it was held by this Court in the case referred to supra that Rs.25,000/- must be awarded for funeral expenses as this Court has made observations in the case referred to supra that the tribunals have been frugal in awarding the compensation under the head ‘funeral expenses’ and hence, we award Rs.25,000 under the head of funeral expenses to the claimants/legal representatives .; Increase of income for private employees ranging from 30% to 50% = an addition of 30% increase must be applied for increase in total income of the deceased over a period of time if he had been alive. Further, in the recent decision in Rajesh & Ors. V. Rajbir Singh[6], this Court while referring to the case of Santosh Devi (supra) held that in the case of self-employed persons or persons with fixed wages, in case the deceased victim was below 40 years, there must be an addition of 50% to the actual income of the deceased while computing future prospects of the deceased. ; How to determine the income of deceased = The State Government in exercise of its statutory power under Section 3 of the Minimum Wages Act, 1948 must issue a notification for fixing the wages of a polisher. Even in the absence of such a notification, both the Tribunal as well as the High Court should have at least taken the income of the deceased as Rs.40,000/- per annum as per the table provided in the IInd Schedule to Section 163-A of the M.V. Act for the purpose of determining just, fair and reasonable compensation under the heading loss of dependency of the appellants, though the said amount is applicable only to the claims under no fault liability. ; Therefore, this Court has awarded just and reasonable compensation in favour of the appellants as they filed application claiming compensation under Section 166 of the M.V. Act. Keeping in view the aforesaid relevant facts and legal evidence on record and in the absence of rebuttal evidence adduced by the respondent, we determine just and reasonable compensation by awarding a total sum of Rs. 16,96,000/- with interest @ 7.5% from the date of filing the claim petition till the date payment is made to the appellants. “There is no restriction that compensation could be awarded only up to the amount claimed by the claimant. In an appropriate case, where from the evidence brought on record if the Tribunal/court considers that the claimant is entitled to get more compensation than claimed, the Tribunal may pass such award. The only embargo is — it should be “just” compensation, that is to say, it should be neither arbitrary, fanciful nor unjustifiable from the evidence. This would be clear by reference to the relevant provisions of the MV Act. Section 166 provides that an application for compensation arising out of an accident involving the death of, or bodily injury to, persons arising out of the use of motor vehicles, or damages to any property of a third party so arising, or both, could be made (a) by the person who has sustained the injury; or (b) by the owner of the property; or (c) where death has resulted from the accident, by all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased; or (d) by any agent duly authorised by the person injured or all or any of the legal representatives of the deceased, as the case may be.”= Accordingly, the appeal is allowed on the above said terms. The respondent is directed to pay the enhanced compensation in this appeal with interest awarded, in favour of the appellants in the following ratio. 75% of the awarded amount shall be paid equally in favour of appellant Nos. 1 to 3 and the remaining 25% must be in the name of appellant Nos. 4 and 5 in equal proportion with proportionate interest. Out of the 75%, each of appellant Nos. 1 to 3 will get 25% and further, 10% of the share of appellant No.2 and 10% of the share of appellant No.3 must be deposited with proportional interest payable to each one of them in any Nationalized Bank of their choice and the rest 15% of each of their award amounts, with proportionate interest to be paid to them. The appellant Nos. 2 and 3 are at liberty to move the Tribunal to release the money so deposited for their welfare and developmental purpose. The above said direction regarding the payment and deposit shall be made within six weeks by depositing it in the Bank and disburse the amount by way of demand draft drawn in the name of each one of them as directed above. There will be no order as to costs.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40844   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8251 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 36602 of 2012) SANOBANU NAZIRBHAI MIRZA & ORS. … APPELLANTS VS. AHMEDABAD MUNICIPAL TRANSPORT SERVICE … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T V. GOPALA GOWDA, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Change report in respect of six churches amalgamation of person and property = was set aside and the same was confirmed by Apex court- Change Reports were filed by First District Church of the Brethren (hereinafter referred to as ‘the FDCB’) a registered religious society under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the SR Act’) bearing Registration No. 1202/44 and later registered as public trust in Gujarat bearing No.E- 643/Bharuch, after the enactment of the Bombay Public Trusts Act, 1950 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the BPTA’) property of which is vested with its ‘Property Committee’ and the Church of North India (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CNI’), Gujarat Diocese. The CNI is a public trust registered by an application accepted on May 12, 1970 with effect of registration being given from 1971 and the trust being formed on November 29, 1970 with Registration No. D-17/Ahmedabad. 3. These Change Reports were filed to give effect to the unification of six churches which included the FDCB, an offshoot of the ‘Brethren Church’ of USA (other Churches being The Council of the Baptist Churches in North India, The Church of India, Pakistan, Burma and Ceylon, The Methodist Church (British and Australian Conference), The Methodist Church in Southern Asia and The United Church of Northern India) into a single entity, ‘The Church of North India’ (with the Gujarat Chapter being managed by the Church of North India, Gujarat, Diocese).= scope of inquiry of the Charity Commissioner under Section 22 of the Act, this Court in Church of North India (supra) very aptly provided a bird’s eye view of Section 22 which is provided as under : “….Section 22 provides for the change which may occur in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17 to make an appropriate application within 90 days from the date of the occurrence of such change. Sub-section (1A) of Section 22 reads thus: “(1A) Where the change to be reported under sub- section (1) relates to any immovable property, the trustee shall, alongwith the report, furnish a memorandum in the prescribed form containing the particulars (including the name and description of the public trust) relating to any change in the immovable property of such public trust, for forwarding it to the sub-registrar referred to in sub- section (7) of section 18.” 31. Sub-section (2) of Section 22 empowers a Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner to hold an inquiry for the purpose of verifying the correctness of the entries in the register kept under Section 17 or ascertaining whether any change has occurred in any of the particulars recorded therein. In the event, a change is found to have occurred in any of the entries recorded in the register kept under Section 17, the Deputy or Assistant Charity Commissioner is required to record a finding with the reasons therefore to that effect. Such an order is appealable to the Charity Commissioner. By reason of changes which have been found to have occurred, the entries in the register are required to be amended. Such amendment on the occurrence of change is final and conclusive.” = it is the duty of the society to take steps in accordance with Section 13 of the SR Act for its dissolution. We have further noted that unless the properties vested in the Trust are divested in accordance with the provisions of the SR Act and in accordance with the BPTA, merely by filing the Change Report/s, CNI cannot claim a merger of churches and thereby claim that the properties vested in the Trust would vest in them. In our opinion, it would only be evident from the steps taken that the passing of resolutions is nothing but an indication to show the intention to merge and nothing else. In fact, the City Civil Court has correctly held, in our opinion, which has been affirmed by the High Court, that there was no dissolution of the society and further merger was not carried out in accordance with the provisions of law. In these circumstances, we hold that the society and the Trust being creatures of statute, have to resort to the modes provided by the statute for its amalgamation and the so-called merger cannot be treated or can give effect to the dissolution of the Trust. In the matrix of the facts, we hold that without taking any steps in accordance with the provisions of law, the effect of the resolutions or deliberations is not acceptable in the domain of law. The question of estoppel also cannot stand in the way as the High Court has correctly pointed out that the freedom guaranteed under the Constitution with regard to the faith and religion, cannot take away the right in changing the faith and religion after giving a fresh look and thinking at any time and thereby cannot be bound by any rules of estoppel. Therefore, the resolution only resolved to accept the recommendation of joint unification but does not refer to dissolution. 26. Having analysed the facts and the law in the matter, we are of the opinion that the High Court and the City Civil Court have rightly adjudicated on the matter in question and correctly set aside the order passed by the Charity Commissioner. 27. Accordingly, we affirm the order passed by the High Court. 28. For the reasons aforementioned, we do not find any merit in the present appeals and the same are dismissed accordingly.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40842     Reportable   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8800-8801 /2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) Nos. 16575-16576 of 2012)       Vinodkumar M. Malavia etc. … Appellants   Vs.   Maganlal Mangaldas Gameti & Ors. … Respondents       J … Continue reading

Cryptic orders – Remand for fresh consideration = “It was necessary for the High Court to consider whether the trial court’s assessment of the evidence and its opinion that the appellant must be convicted deserve to be confirmed. This exercise is necessary because the personal liberty of an accused is curtailed because of the conviction. The High Court must state its reasons why it is accepting the evidence on record. The High Court’s concurrence with the trial court’s view would be acceptable only if it is supported by reasons. In such appeals it is a court of first appeal. Reasons cannot be cryptic. By this, we do not mean that the High Court is expected to write an unduly long treatise. The judgment may be short but must reflect proper application of mind to vital evidence and important submissions which go to the root of the matter.” 12. Tested on the touchstone of the aforesaid principles we find that there is total lack of deliberation and proper ratiocination. There has been really no assessment of evidence on record. The credibility of the witnesses has not appositely been adjudged. Affirmative satisfaction recorded by the High Court is far from being satisfactory. We are pained to say so, as we find that the learned trial Judge has written an extremely confused judgment replete with repetitions and in such a situation it becomes absolutely obligatory on the part of the High Court to be more careful to come to a definite conclusion about the guilt of the accused persons, for their liberty is jeopardized. It may be stated at the cost of repetition that it is the sacrosanct duty of the appellate court, while sitting in appeal against the judgment of the trial Judge, to be satisfied that the guilt of the accused has been established beyond all reasonable doubt after proper re-assessment, re-appreciation and re-scrutiny of the material on record. 13. It can be stated with certitude that appreciation of evidence and proper re-assessment to arrive at the conclusion is imperative in a criminal appeal. That is the quality of exercise which is expected of the appellate court to be undertaken and when that is not done, the cause of justice is not subserved, for neither an innocent person should be sent to prison without his fault nor a guilty person should be let off despite evidence on record to assure his guilt. Ergo, the emphasis is on the duty of the appellate court. 14. Consequently, the impugned judgment and order passed in Criminal Appeal No. 531 of 2004 by the High Court is set aside and the appeal preferred by the appellants is remitted for fresh disposal. The High Court is requested to dispose of the appeal as expeditiously as possible so that the Sword of Damocles is not kept hanging on the head of the appellants. As the appellants are on bail, they shall continue to remain on bail on same terms and conditions till the disposal of the appeal by the High Court.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40689 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1517 OF 2007 Kamlesh Prabhudas Tanna & Another … Appellants Versus State of Gujarat …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Assailing the legal acceptability of the judgment and order passed by the High Court of … Continue reading

Condonation of Delay does not arise under sec.28 A of Land acquisition act = whether limitation for filing the application for re-determination of the compensation under Section 28A of the Act would commence from the date of the award or from the date of knowledge of the court’s award on the basis of which such application is being filed. 6. Though, there is nothing on record to substantiate the appellants’ claim that they could acquire the knowledge of the Court’s award only on 17.7.2006 and immediately took steps to file application for re-determination under Section 28A of the Act. 7. The issue involved herein is no more res-integra. The appellants’ case before the High Court as well as before us has been that the limitation would commence from the date of acquisition of knowledge and not from the date of award. = For the purpose of filing application under Section 28A of the Act, counsel for the appellants applied for a certified copy of the Court award on 17.5.2006, and though the copy of the said award was ready for delivery on 29.5.2006, it was obtained by learned counsel for the appellants only on 3.6.2006. Application for re-determination of the amount of compensation was filed on 18.7.2006 by the appellants, on the basis of the said Court’s award. D. The Special Land Acquisition Collector vide order dated 22.9.2008, rejected the said application on the ground that the same was filed with a delay of 4 days.= The legal maxim “dura lex sed lex” which means “the law is hard but it is the law”, stands attracted in such a situation. It has consistently been held that, “inconvenience is not” a decisive factor to be considered while interpreting a statute. “A result flowing from a statutory provision is never an evil. A Court has no power to ignore that provision to relieve what it considers a distress resulting from its operation.” (See : The Martin Burn Ltd. v. The Corporation of Calcutta, AIR 1966 SC 529; and Rohitas Kumar & Ors. v. Om Prakash Sharma & Ors., AIR 2013 SC 30) In view of the above, we are of the candid view that none of the submissions advanced on behalf of the appellants is tenable. 14. As the matters are squarely covered by the above referred to judgments, these appeals are devoid of any merit. The cases do not warrant any interference. The appeals are, accordingly, dismissed.

published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40681 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 6976-6980 of 2013   Popat Bahiru Govardhane Etc. …Appellants   Versus   Special Land Acquisition Officer & Anr. …Respondents   J U D G M E N T   Dr. B. S. CHAUHAN, J.   1. These appeals have … Continue reading

When policy is only for Graduates – an 8th standard person can not apply for it – misstatement as B.Com., comes to material suppression- No claim =“Whether the insured is bound to explain the correct educational qualifications before the Insurance Company, when that insurance is meant only for Graduates?”. – yes = It is thus clear that there are two categories, one for Graduates and the other for Non-Graduates. The mis-statement made by the deceased go to the root of the case and violate the basic principle of ‘utmost faith’, which obviously forms the corner stone of any insurance contract. Due to this mis-statement, the complainant is not entitled to any claim. The Hon’ble Apex Court, in the case of Satwant Kaur Sandhu Vs. New India Assurance Co. Ltd., reported in IV (2009) CPJ 8 (SC), was pleased to hold that : “The term “material fact” is not defined in the Act and, in therefore, it has been understood and explained by the Courts in general terms to mean as any fact which would influence the judgment of a prudent insurer in fixing the premium or determining whether he would like to accept the risk. Any fact which goes to the root of the Contract of Insurance and has a bearing on the risk involved would be “material”. Nonetheless, it is a contract of insurance falling in the category of contract ‘uberrimae fidei’, meaning, ‘a contract of utmost good faith, on the part of the assured’. Thus, it needs little emphasis that when an information on a specific aspect is asked for in the proposal form, an assured is under a solemn obligation to make a true and full disclosure of the information on the subject which is within his knowledge. It is not for the proposer to determine whether the information sought for is material for the purpose of the policy or not. Of course, obligation to disclose extends only to facts which are known to the applicant and not to what he ought to have known. The obligation to disclose necessarily depends upon the knowledge one possesses. – As stated in Pollock and Mulla’s Indian Contract and Specific Relief Acts, any fact, the knowledge or ignorance of which would materially influence an insurer in making the contract or in estimating the degree and character of risks in fixing the rate of premium, is a material fact”. – In view of this discussion, we allow the revision petition, set aside the orders rendered by both the fora below and dismiss the complaint. No costs.

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130807110259672RP344212.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI     REVISION PETITION NO. 3442 OF 2012 (From the order dated 13.07.2012 in Appeal No. 911/2011  of State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, GUJARAT ) MetLife India Insurance Co. Ltd. Through its Chief Manager – Legal Brigade Seshamahal, 5-Vani Vilas Road Basavanagudi, Bengaluru – 560 004                        …Petitioner Versus … Continue reading

Fire Accident – Insurance = Surveyor’s report has significant and evidentiary value = It is well settled law that a Surveyor’s report has significant and evidentiary value unless it is proved otherwise which the complainants have failed to do so in the instant case. This view finds support from the judgment of this Commission, in D.N.Badoni Vs. Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd, 1 (2012) CPJ 272 (NC). In United India Insurance Co. Ltd., & Ors. Vs. Roshan Lal Oil Mills Ltd. & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 19, the Hon’ble Apex court was pleased to hold :- “The appellant had appointed joint surveyors in terms of Section 64-UM(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938. Their report has been placed on the record in which a detailed account of the factors on the basis of which the joint surveyors had come to the conclusion that there was no loss or damage caused on account of fire, was given and it was on this basis that the claim was not found entertainable. This is an important document which was placed before the Commission, but the Commission, curiously, has not considered the report. Since the claim of the respondent was repudiated by the appellant on the basis of the joint survey report, the Commission was not justified in awarding the insurance amount to the respondent without adverting itself to the contents of the joint survey report, specially the facts enumerated therein. In our opinion, non-consideration of this important document has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and vitiates the judgment passed by the Commission. The case has, therefore, to be sent back to the Commission, for a fresh hearing”. He has placed reliance on ‘Panchanama’, prepared at the place of incident by the independent ‘Panchas’. He stated that ‘Panchas’ and Police, have stated that damage in the sum of Rs.76,39,090/- was accrued. It is noteworthy to see that no ‘Pancha’ was produced before this Commission. No affidavit of the ‘Pancha’ saw the light of the day. The said ‘Panchanama’ has an exiguous value. Moreover, in view of the Surveyor’s Report, the ‘Panchanamas’, prepared by self-appointed ‘Panchas’, pales into insignificance. It is, therefore, ordered that rest of the amount in the sum of Rs.2,10,000/-, with interest @ 9% p.a., be paid to the complainant, M/s. Keshav Trading Co., from the date of filing of the claim, till its realization. It may be mentioned here that there is inordinate delay in settling the claim of the complainant. Even if the complainant was not available, the claim should have been settled and the amount should have been sent at the given address. Keeping in view of these facts and circumstances, we also award compensation in the sum of Rs.50,000/-, which be paid within sixty days, by the insurance company, or else, it will carry interest @ 9% p.a. The Original Petition stands disposed of, in above terms.

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130807131226383OP6405.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI            ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 64 OF 2005 Keshav Trading Company Bhilwada Circle, Talati Road Palitana, District Bhavnagar Gujarat Through Attorney, Sh.Nasruddin Bhai S/o Noor Muhammad Sneh Milan, ‘A’ Wing, Ground Floor Room No.1, Dewan Maan Vasai, Mumbai                                                                      … Complainant Versus Divisional Manager United India Insurance Co.Ltd Nava Para, … Continue reading

whether an authorised signatory of a company would be liable for prosecution under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (for brevity ‘the Act’) without the company being arraigned as an accused. -apex court held No = “141. Offences by companies. – (1) If the person committing an offence under section 138 is a company, every person who, at the time the offence was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to the company for the conduct of the business of the company, as well as the company, shall be deemed to be guilty of the offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly; Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any person liable to punishment if he proves that the offence was committed without his knowledge, or that he had exercised all due diligence to prevent the commission of such offence: Provided further that where a person is nominated as a Director of a Company by virtue of his holding any office or employment in the Central Government or State Government or a financial corporation owned or controlled by the Central Government or the State Government, as the case may be, he shall not be liable for prosecution under this Chapter. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where any offence under this Act, has been committed by a company and it is proved that the offence has been committed with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to, any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of that offence and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 16. On a reading of the said provision, it is plain as day that if a person who commits offence under Section 138 of the Act is a company, the company as well as every person in charge of and responsible to the company for the conduct of business of the company at the time of commission of offence is deemed to be guilty of the offence. The first proviso carves out under what circumstances the criminal liability would not be fastened. Sub-section (2) enlarges the criminal liability by incorporating the concepts of connivance, negligence and consent that engulfs many categories of officers. It is worth noting that in both the provisions, there is a ‘deemed’ concept of criminal liability.- Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal Nos. 838 of 2008 and 842 of 2008 are allowed and the proceedings initiated under Section 138 of the Act are quashed. 46. Presently, we shall advert to the other two appeals, i.e., Criminal Appeal Nos. 1483 of 2009 and 1484 of 2009 wherein the offence is under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the 2000 Act. In Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009, the director of the company is the appellant and in Criminal Appeal No. 1484 of 2009, the company. Both of them have called in question the legal substantiality of the same order passed by the High Court. In the said case, the High Court followed the decision in Sheoratan Agarwal (supra) and, while dealing with the application under Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure at the instance of Avnish Bajaj, the Managing Director of the company, quashed the charges under Sections 292 and 294 of the Indian Penal Code and directed the offences under Section 67 read with Section 85 of the 2000 Act to continue. It is apt to note that the learned single Judge has observed that a prima facie case for the offence under Sections 292(2)(a) and 292(2)(b) of the Indian Penal Code is also made out against the company. 47. Section 85 of the 2000 Act is as under: – “85. Offences by companies – (1) Where a person committing a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made thereunder is a company, every person who, at the time the contravention was committed, was in charge of, and was responsible to, the company for the conduct of business of the company as well as the company, shall be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly: Provided that nothing contained in this sub-section shall render any such person liable to punishment if he proves that the contravention took place without his knowledge or that he exercised all due diligence to prevent such contravention. (2) Notwithstanding anything contained in sub-section (1), where a contravention of any of the provisions of this Act or of any rule, direction or order made there under has been committed by a company and it is proved that the contravention has taken place with the consent or connivance of, or is attributable to any neglect on the part of, any director, manager, secretary or other officer of the company, such director, manager, secretary or other officer shall also be deemed to be guilty of the contravention and shall be liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.” 48. Keeping in view the anatomy of the aforesaid provision, our analysis pertaining to Section 141 of the Act would squarely apply to the 2000 enactment. Thus adjudged, the director could not have been held liable for the offence under Section 85 of the 2000 Act. Resultantly, the Criminal Appeal No. 1483 of 2009 is allowed and the proceeding against the appellant is quashed. As far as the company is concerned, it was not arraigned as an accused. Ergo, the proceeding as initiated in the existing incarnation is not maintainable either against the company or against the director. As a logical sequeter, the appeals are allowed and the proceedings initiated against Avnish Bajaj as well as the company in the present form are quashed. 49. Before we part with the case, we must record our uninhibited and unreserved appreciation for the able assistance rendered by the learned counsel for the parties and the learned amicus curiae. 50. In the ultimate analysis, all the appeals are allowed.

   published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=39265 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 838 OF 2008   Aneeta Hada …..……..Appellant Versus M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. ………Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 842 OF 2008 Anil Hada …………Appellant Versus M/s. Godfather Travels & Tours Pvt. Ltd. ………Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. … Continue reading

The Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 & the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) = whether or not the appellant, who was admittedly not a juvenile within the meaning of the Juvenile Justice Act, 1986 (for short ‘the 1986 Act’) when offences were committed but had not completed 18 years of age, on that date, will be governed by the Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000 (for short ‘the 2000 Act’) and be declared as a juvenile in relation to the offences alleged to have been committed by him. = the age of the appellant as on the date of the commission of the offence i.e. 06.05.1995 was 17 years, 11 months and 5 days and hence less than 18 years, and hence when we apply provisions of the 2000 Act, the appellant has to be treated as a juvenile, being less than 18 years of age on the date of the crime and hence entitled to get the benefit of the provisions of the 2000 Act read with Rules. 8. We are therefore inclined to affirm the order of conviction, however, the sentence awarded by the trial court and confirmed by the High Court is set aside and the matter is sent to the concerned Juvenile Justice Court for imposing adequate sentence. Appeal is allowed as above.

 reported in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40582    Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 556 OF 2004 Ketankumar Gopalbhai Tandel Appellant Versus State of Gujarat Respondent   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. The question that falls for consideration in this appeal is whether or not the … Continue reading

Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar Sarovar =Aggrieved by the meager allocation of water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch they approached the Gujarat High Court in a public interest litigation inter alia praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent, the State of Gujarat and its functionaries to allocate more water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch. By the impugned order the prayer made by the appellants has been rejected and against the dismissal of the writ petition they are before us with the leave of the Court.= “We are of the opinion that the prayer for allocation of adequate water in Kuchchh district is not one which can be a matter of judicial review. It is for the executive authorities to look into this matter= The complaint of the appellants of non-adherence to the mandate of Article 38(2) of the Constitution is also misconceived. The State, in our opinion, is to strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing in different parts or engaged in different vocations. But this does not mean that for achieving that the State Government has to apply it on the basis of the number of people residing in different parts only. Other factors just cannot be forgotten. We are in total agreement with the conclusion and reasoning given by the High Court and we reiterate that there being no judicially manageable standards for allocation of water, any interference by this Court would mean interference with the day-to-day functioning of the State Government. In view of separation of powers, this Court cannot charter the said path. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40555       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2957 OF 2013 KACHCHH JAL SANKAT NIVARAN SAMITI & ORS. ..APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENTS   JUDGMENT   CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant no. 1, Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti, claims to be a … Continue reading

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