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the jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. = whether the Court within the jurisdiction whereof, the complainant had presented the dishonoured cheque (issued by an accused), had the jurisdiction to entertain a petition filed under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. = “14. The offence under Section 138 of the Act can be completed only with the concatenation of a number of acts. Following are the acts which are components of the said offence: (1) Drawing of the cheque, (2) Presentation of the cheque to the bank, (3) Returning the cheque unpaid by the drawee bank, (4) Giving notice in writing to the drawer of the cheque demanding payment of the cheque amount, (5) failure of the drawer to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of the notice. 15. It is not necessary that all the above five acts should have been perpetrated at the same locality. It is possible that each of those five acts could be done at 5 different localities. But concatenation of all the above five is a sine qua non for the completion of the offence under Section 138 of the Code. In this context a reference to Section 178(d) of the Code is useful. It is extracted below: “Where the offence consists of several acts done in different local areas, it may be inquired into or tried by a Court having jurisdiction over any of such local areas.” 16. Thus it is clear, if the five different acts were done in five different localities any one of the courts exercising jurisdiction in one of the five local areas can become the place of trial for the offence under Section 138 of the Act. In other words, the complainant can choose any one of those courts having jurisdiction over any one of the local areas within the territorial limits of which any one of those five acts was done. As the amplitude stands so widened and so expansive it is an idle exercise to raise jurisdictional question regarding the offence under Section 138 of the Act.”= We have perused the aforesaid decision of this Court in Harman Electronics Private Limited (Supra) and we find on a reading of paragraphs 11 and 12 of the judgment in the aforesaid case that in that case the issue was as to whether sending of a notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action for taking cognizance of a case under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act when the parties had been carrying on business at Chandigarh, the Head Office of the respondent-complainant was at Delhi but it had a branch at Chandigarh and all the transactions were carried out only from Chandigarh. On these facts, this Court held that Delhi from where the notice under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act was issued by the respondent would not have had jurisdiction to entertain the complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. This question does not arise in the facts of the present case. 7. For the aforesaid reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remand the matter to the Chief Judicial Magistrate, Sopore for decision in accordance with law.” (emphasis is ours) 7. In view of the above, having taken into consideration the factual position noticed by the High Court in paragraph 13 of the impugned judgment, we are of the view, that the High Court erred in concluding that the courts at Delhi, did not have the jurisdiction to try the petition filed by the appellant under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. The impugned order dated 27.4.2012 passed by the High Court is accordingly liable to be set aside. The same is, therefore, hereby set aside.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40783 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1457 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Criminal) No. 7325 of 2012) M/s. Escorts Limited … Appellant Versus Rama Mukherjee … Respondent J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. 1. This Court on 21.2.2013 directed that … Continue reading

whether the Court, where a cheque is deposited for collection, would have territorial jurisdiction to try the accused for an offence punishable under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 (in short “the N.I.Act”) or would it be only the Court exercising territorial jurisdiction over the drawee bank or the bank on which the cheque is drawn? = whether the sending of notice from Delhi itself would give rise to a cause of action in taking cognizance under the N.I. Act. In such circumstances, we are of the view that Harman Electronics (supra) is only an authority on the question where a court will have jurisdiction because only notice is issued from the place which falls within its jurisdiction and it does not deviate from the other principles laid down in K. Bhaskaran (supra). This Court has accepted that the place where the cheque was presented and dishonoured has jurisdiction to try the complaint. In this way, this Court concluded that issuance of notice would not by itself give rise to a cause of action but communication of the notice would. In other words, the court clarified only on the service in such notice and failure on the part of the accused to pay the demanded amount within a period of 15 days, thereafter, the commission of an offence completes. We are of the view that this Court in Harman Electronics (supra) affirmed what it had said in K. Bhaskaran (supra) that court within whose jurisdiction the cheque is presented and in whose jurisdiction there is failure to make payment within 15 days of the receipt of notice can have jurisdiction to try the offence under Section 138 of the N.I. Act. It is also relevant to point out that while holding that the Chandigarh Court has jurisdiction, this Court in Harman Electronics (supra) observed that in the case before it, the complaint was silent as to whether the said cheque was presented at Delhi. In the case on hand, it is categorically stated that the cheque was presented at Bhiwani whereas in Harman Electronics (supra) the dishonour had taken place at Chandigarh and this fact was taken into account while holding that Chandigarh court has jurisdiction. In the complaint in question, it is specifically stated that the dishonour took place at Bhiwani. We are also satisfied that nothing said in Harman Electronics (supra) had adverse impact on the complainant’s case in the present case. we must note that in K. Bhaskaran (supra), this Court has held that Section 178 of the Code has widened the scope of jurisdiction of a criminal court and Section 179 of the Code has stretched it to still a wider horizon. Further, for the sake of repetition, we reiterate that the judgment in Ishar Alloy (supra) does not affect the ratio in K. Bhaskaran (supra) which provides jurisdiction at the place of residence of the payer and the payee. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances and even on merits, the High Court rightly refused to exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction under Section 482 of the Code and dismissed the petition filed by the appellantaccused. In the light of the above discussion, we hold that the ratio laid down in K.Bhaskaran (supra) squarely applies to the case on hand. The said principle was correctly applied by the learned Sessions Judge as well as the High Court. Consequently, the appeal fails and the same is dismissed. In view of the dismissal of the appeal, the interim order granted by this Court on 09.12.2011 shall stand vacated.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40477 Page 1 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 808 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9434 of 2011) Nishant Aggarwal …. Appellant(s) Versus Kailash Kumar Sharma …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave granted. 2) The question … Continue reading

Rape of a child of 3 years & murder =WHEN INCRIMINATING CIRCUMSTANCE NOT PUT TO THE ACCUSED AT 313 EXAMINATION , IT CAN NOT BE CONSIDERED AS PROVED EVIDENCE , WITHOUT EXPLANATION FROM THE ACCUSED = convicting the appellant under Sections 376(2)(f) and 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as `the IPC’), sentencing him to death. =The appellant’s conduct in absconding was also relied upon. Now, mere absconding by itself does not necessarily lead to a firm conclusion of guilty mind. Even an innocent man may feel panicky and try to evade arrest when wrongly suspected of a grave crime such is the instinct of self-preservation. The act of absconding is no doubt relevant piece of evidence to be considered along with other evidence but its value would always depend on the circumstances of each case. Normally the courts are disinclined to attach much importance to the act of absconding, treating it as a very small item in the evidence for sustaining conviction. = Undoubtedly, the FIR lodged has disclosed the previous statement of the informant which can only be used to other corroborate or contradict the maker of such statement. However, in the event that the informant is a person who claims to know the facts, and is also closely related to the victim, it is expected that he would have certainly mentioned in the FIR, all such relevant facts. The omission of important facts affecting the probability of the case, is a relevant factor under Section 11 of the Evidence Act to judge the veracity of the case of the prosecution. (Vide: Ram Kumar Pandey v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1975 SC 1026). = An adverse inference can be drawn against the accused only and only if the incriminating material stands fully established, and the accused is not able to furnish any explanation for the same. However, the accused has the right to remain silent, as he cannot be forced to become a witness against himself. – The instant is one of circumstantial evidence, and only two circumstances have appeared against the appellant, namely, I. That he had been able to point out the place where Sima Khatoon was lying, after his demand for Rs.20/- had been accepted; and II. That subsequently, he had left the said place and boarded a bus immediately. The aforesaid circumstances in isolation, point out conclusively, that the appellant has in fact committed the said offence. Furthermore, the most material piece of evidence which could have been used against the appellant was that the blood stains found on his underwear matched the blood group of Sima Khatoon. However, the said circumstance was not put to the appellant while he was being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. by the trial court, and in view thereof, the same cannot be taken into consideration. Hence, even by a stretch of the imagination, it cannot be held that the aforementioned circumstances clearly point towards the guilt of the appellant, and in light of such a fact situation, the burden lies not only on the accused to prove his innocence, but also upon the prosecution, to prove its case beyond all reasonable doubt. In a case of circumstantial evidence, the aforementioned burden of proof on the prosecution is much greater. In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgments and orders passed by the courts below impugned before us, are set aside. The appellant has been in jail for the last six years, he must be released forthwith, unless wanted in some other case. Before parting with the case, we feel that it is our duty to appreciate the services rendered by Shri Ratnakar Dash, learned senior counsel, who acted as amicus curiae.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1323 of 2011 Sujit Biswas …Appellant Versus State of Assam …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated 23.4.2010, passed by the High Court … Continue reading

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