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Haryana

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Dental college renewal of permission = For granting renewal of permission for the aforesaid 2 specialties i.e. Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery and Orthodontics and Dentofacial Orthopedics with three seats each for the academic session 2013-14, the DCI conducted the inspection of the petitioner-college on 8.12.2012 and 9.12.2012. – According to the petitioner, though it was not supplied the copy of the report dated 18.2.2013 but could procure the same and on coming to know of the aforesaid negative recommendation dated 28.2.2013 of the DCI impressing upon Respondent No.1 not to accord permission in these two specialties for the current academic session, the petitioner made a representation to Respondent No.1 and along with the said report it also submitted a comparative statement of the deficiencies. The petitioner also requested for personal hearing. However, without affording any hearing, a decision was taken by the Central Government vide letter dated 30th March 2013, addressed to the petitioner, whereby the permission was declined for renewal of the second year MDS course in the two specialties mentioned above.= Section 10A (4) of the Act, as below: (a) Section 10A applies to the cases of renewal of permission as well; (b) It contemplates grant of opportunity of being heard at two stages. First stage would be at the level of DCI after the scheme is submitted to DCI under sub-section (2) of Section 10A of the Act. Once it is found by the DCI that all the parameters for granting permission are met, it recommends the grant of approval of the scheme to the Central Government. In case Scheme it is found to be deficient, sub-section (3) (a) of Section 10A of the Act casts an obligation on the part of the DCI to give a reasonable opportunity for making a written representation and also to rectify the deficiencies, if any, specified by the DCI. Second stage of adherence to the principles of natural justice is provided at the level of Central Government at the time when it has to take final decision, after the receipt of the recommendation sent by the DCI. This requirement of hearing is stipulated in proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 10A, in the event the Central Government is proposing to disapprove the scheme. (c) The expression “opportunity of being heard” occurring in this proviso would mean that the material that goes against the applicant and is to be taken into consideration, is to be supplied to the applicant within an opportunity to make representation. For this purpose either the report of the DCI itself can be supplied or atleast the deficiencies pointed out in the report have to be communicated by the Central Government to the applicant with an opportunity to furnish its comments thereupon. At that stage while giving its reply, if the applicant claims personal hearing, such a personal heaing should also be accorded. 27. As in the present case, since no such opportunity of being heard the requirement of proviso to sub-section (4) of Section 10A of the Act was not afforded to the petitioner, the decision dated 30th March 2013 of the Central Government warrants to be set aside on this ground alone. 28. Notwithstanding the aforesaid discussion clarifying the position in law on this aspect which goes in favour of the petitioner, other circumstances appearing in this case desist us from giving the relief to the petitioner that is claimed by it in so far academic session 2013-2014 is concerned. The effect of the aforesaid view taken by us would be to set aside the orders dated 30th March 2013 passed by the Central Government rejecting the request of renewal. However, from that it would not automatically follow that direction can be issued to the Central Government to accord such a permission. This Court could only remit the case to the Central Government to pass appropriate orders after giving hearing to the petitioner. However, it is too late for the Central Government to re-examine the issue for the current academic session. Fact remains that as per the report of the DCI, there are deficiencies. Deficiencies are not limited to the number of minor and major surgeries which are required to be performed by a College for second renewal. = we are of the view that in so far as the academic session 2013-14 is concerned, it is not possible to put the clock back. Thus, while setting aside the impugned orders and remitting the case back to the Central Government for taking fresh decision, we make it clear that it would not relate to the academic session 2013-14. However, the case can be considered for renewal of permission for the next academic session on the basis of existing material. For this, hearing should be given to the petitioner to demonstrate that they have overcome the deficiencies and they no longer exist. If the Central Government is satisfied on these aspects it may grant renewal permission for the next academic session 2014-15. In case the renewal of permission is rejected, the petitioner will have to undergo the process of seeking fresh permission for next academic session i.e. 2014-15 by submitting fresh scheme/proposal to the DCI for that year, as per the procedure prescribed in the Act & Regulations. 31. The Special Leave Petition is disposed of in the above terms. No costs.

published in      http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40701  [REPORTABLE] IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETTIION (Civil) No. 25698 OF 2013 Swamy Devi Dayal Hospital & Dental College …Petitioner   Vs. The Union of India & Ors. … .Respondents   J U D G M E N T A.K.SIKRI,J.   1. The petitioner … Continue reading

No reduction of sentence =Rape is a non-compoundable offence and it is an offence against the society and is not a matter to be left for the parties to compromise and settle. Since the Court cannot always be assured that the consent given by the victim in compromising the case is a genuine consent, there is every chance that she might have been pressurized by the convicts or the trauma undergone by her all the years might have compelled her to opt for a compromise. In fact, accepting this proposition will put an additional burden on the victim. The accused may use all his influence to pressurize her for a compromise. So, in the interest of justice and to avoid unnecessary pressure/harassment to the victim, it would not be safe in considering the compromise arrived at between the parties in rape cases to be a ground for the Court to exercise the discretionary power under the proviso of Section 376(2) of IPC. 23) It is imperative to mention that the legislature through the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act, 2013 has deleted this proviso in the wake of increasing crimes against women. Though, the said amendment will not come in the way of exercising discretion in this case, on perusal of the above legislative provision and catena of cases on the issue, we feel that the present case fails to fall within the ambit of exceptional case where the Court shall use its extraordinary discretion to reduce the period of sentence than the minimum prescribed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40699   REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1278-1279 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 1011-1012 of 2012) Shimbhu and Anr. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana …. Respondent(s) 2   J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,CJI. 1) Leave granted. 2) … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Act = When the land is in developed area , deduction of 10 % is appropriate but the deduction of 1/3rd in market value is harsh =deduction of 1/3rd value of the land would be very harsh on the appellants because the appellants would be getting substantially less compensation on account of the said deduction. It was also submitted that the High Court had taken note of the fact that the land in question was very much within the developed area. If the land was within the developed area, the High Court should not have deducted 1/3rd of the value of the land in question.= Deduction to the extent of 1/3rd of the value of the land is definitely harsh even as per the observations made by the High Court as the land in question is very much in the developed area. The area has been developed by the HUDA and therefore, the deduction of 1/3rd of the value of the land is not justified. Upon considering all relevant facts, in our opinion, it would be absolutely just if 10% value of the land is deducted instead of 1/3rd because the land is forming part of a well developed area.= The market value of the land in question, as determined by the High Court, is Rs. 11.15 lacs per acre and instead of taking 1/3rd, we direct that 10% of the said value shall be deducted. The claimants shall be entitled to other statutory benefits like solatium, interest etc. on the enhanced compensation.

 published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40661 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6958 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 24357 of 2010) Indraj Singh (Dead) …..Appellants through LRs. & Ors. Versus State of Haryana & Anr. …..Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6959 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Actappellant- sec.4 notification, sec.6 and award can be challenged before taking possession with in reasonable time – Notice at locality is mandatory – no company and it’s site can be acquired for industrial purpose = Company itself is running an industry on the date of the notification, we are of the view that there is no justification in acquiring a running industrial unit for industrialization of the area.- In view of the above, it is clear that in spite of knowing the specific ground raised by the appellant about the non- publication of the substance of the notification as prescribed under the Act in the locality concerned, neither the State nor the Land Acquisition Collector availed the opportunity of filing reply refuting the same. In such circumstances, we have no other option except to hold that there was no publication of the substance of the notification under Section 4(1) of the Act in the locality which is held to be mandatory. It is also relevant to point out that by effecting such publication in the locality, it would be possible for the person in possession, namely, either the owner or lessee to make their representation/objection in the enquiry under Section 5A. In addition to the same, such person “owner or occupier” is entitled to file their objections within 30 days from the date of publication in the locality and by non-publication of the same in the locality as provided under the Act, the owner or occupier loses his valuable right. For these reasons also, the acquisition proceedings are liable to be quashed.= Under these circumstances, we set aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 08.07.2008 and quash the land acquisition proceedings insofar as the appellant-Company is concerned.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40657       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6792 OF 2013 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 19869 of 2008)   M/s V.K.M. Kattha Industries Pvt. Ltd. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana & Ors. …. Respondent(s)     J U … Continue reading

compassionate employment= Father of the respondent who was working as a Class III employee with the appellant Bank died on 19.4.2006 while in harness. The respondent applied for compassionate appointment on 12.5.2006. B. During the pendency of the application filed by the respondent, a new scheme dated 12.6.2006 came into force with effect from 6.10.2006. Clause 14 thereof provides that all applications pending on the date of commencement of the scheme shall be considered for grant of ex-gratia payment to the family instead of compassionate appointment.= A scheme containing an in pari materia clause, as is involved in this case was considered by this Court in State Bank of India & Anr. vs. Raj Kumar (2010) 11 SCC 661. Clause 14 of the said Scheme is verbatim to clause 14 of the scheme involved herein, which reads as under: Date of effect of the scheme and disposal of pending applications: The Scheme will come into force with effect from the date it is approved by the Board of Directors. Applications pending under the Compasionate Appointment Scheme as on the date on which this new Scheme is approved by the Board will be dealt with in accordance with Scheme for payment of ex-gratia lump sum amount provided they fulfill all the terms and conditions of this scheme.”= The Court considered various aspects of service jurisprudence and came to the conclusion that as the appointment on compassionate ground may not be claimed as a matter of right nor an applicant becomes entitled automatically for appointment, rather it depends on various other circumstances i.e. eligibility and financial conditions of the family, etc., the application has to be considered in accordance with the scheme. In case the Scheme does not create any legal right, a candidate cannot claim that his case is to be considered as per the Scheme existing on the date the cause of action had arisen i.e. death of the incumbent on the post. In State Bank of India & Anr. (supra), this Court held that in such a situation, the case under the new Scheme has to be considered. 14. In view of the above position, the reasoning given by the learned Single Judge as well as by the Division Bench is not sustainable in the eyes of law. The appeal is allowed and the impugned judgments of the High Court are set aside. 15. The respondent may apply for consideration of his case under the new Scheme and the appellant shall consider his case strictly in accordance with clause 14 of the said new Scheme within a period of three months from the date of receiving of application. With these observations, appeal stands disposed of.

 published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40634  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.6348 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C)No.13957/2010) MGB GRAMIN BANK Appellant (s) VERSUS CHAKRAWARTI SINGH Respondent(s) O R D E R 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 27.1.2010 … Continue reading

Appointment of Special police officers from ex-service men = whether this court can compel the State of Punjab to create posts and absorb the appellants into the services of the State on a permanent basis consistent with the Constitution Bench decision of this court in Umadevi’s case. = The appellants herein assert that all the appellants are ex- servicemen and registered with the employment exchange. They were recruited as Special Police Officers.[2] = i) That it will not be possible to provide police guard to banks unless the Banks were willing to pay for the same and additional force could be arranged on that basis, it was decided that police guards should be requisitioned by the Banks for their biggest branches located at the Distt. and Sub Divisional towns. They should place the requisition with the Distt. SSPs endorsing a copy of IG CID. In the requisition, they should clearly state that the costs of guard would be met by them. It will then be for the police department to get additional force sanctioned. This task should be done on a top priority. In the meantime depending upon the urgency of the need of any particular branch, police Deptt. may provide from police strength for its protection. ii) For all other branches guards will be provided by Distt. SSP after selecting suitable ex-servicemen or other able bodied persons who will be appointed as Special Police Officer in terms of Section 17 of the Police Act. Preference may be given to persons who may already be in possession of licence weapons. All persons appointed as SPO for this purpose will be given a brief training for about 7 days in the Police Lines in the handling of weapons taking suitable position for protection of branches. These SPOs will work under the discipline and control and as per Police Act, they will have the same powers, privileges and protection and shall be amenable to same penalty as an ordinary police personnel.”= The other factor which the State is required to keep in mind while creating or abolishing posts is the financial implications involved in such a decision. The creation of posts necessarily means additional financial burden on the exchequer of the State. Depending upon the priorities of the State, the allocation of the finances is no doubt exclusively within the domain of the Legislature. However in the instant case creation of new posts would not create any additional financial burden to the State as the various banks at whose disposal the services of each of the appellants is made available have agreed to bear the burden. If absorbing the appellants into the services of the State and providing benefits at par with the police officers of similar rank employed by the State results in further financial commitment it is always open for the State to demand the banks to meet such additional burden. Apparently no such demand has ever been made by the State. The result is – the various banks which avail the services of these appellants enjoy the supply of cheap labour over a period of decades. It is also pertinent to notice that these banks are public sector banks. We are of the opinion that neither the Government of Punjab nor these public sector banks can continue such a practice consistent with their obligation to function in accordance with the Constitution. Umadevi’s judgment cannot become a licence for exploitation by the State and its instrumentalities. For all the abovementioned reasons, we are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to be absorbed in the services of the State. The appeals are accordingly allowed. The judgments under appeal are set aside. We direct the State of Punjab to regularise the services of the appellants by creating necessary posts within a period of three months from today. Upon such regularisation, the appellants would be entitled to all the benefits of services attached to the post which are similar in nature already in the cadre of the police services of the State. We are of the opinion that the appellants are entitled to the costs throughout. In the circumstances, we quantify the costs to Rs.10,000/- to be paid to each of the appellants.

published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40625   Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1059 OF 2005 Nihal Singh & Others …Appellants Versus State of Punjab & Others …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6315 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 12448 of 2009) Bhupinder Singh & Others …Appellants Versus … Continue reading

Service matter – whether once a charge-sheet has been issued for imposition of a major penalty under Regulation 7 of the Haryana State Electricity Board Employees (Punishment & Appeal) Regulations, 1990 [for short “the Regulations 1990”], is it obligatory on the part of the Disciplinary Authority to conduct a full fledged departmental inquiry even if, after considering the reply of the delinquent, the authority decides to impose a minor penalty, for which no departmental inquiry is provided under the Regulations.= Sub-regulation 8 of Regulation 7, which reads as follows: “7(8). Where an employee has been charge-sheeted under this regulation and the Competent Authority, on receipt of his reply to the charge sheet is of the opinion that no major punishment as laid down in Regulation-4 (vi to x) is called for, it may dispense with the holding of enquiry and inflict straight-away any of the minor penalties as laid down in Clause (i) to (v) of the ibid Regulation by a speaking order.” 12. Above referred regulations, especially Regulation 7(8) clearly indicates that the competent authority has got the power to dispense with the procedure for holding a departmental inquiry, even though it had contemplated major penalty proceedings, on being satisfied with the reply submitted by the delinquent officer. In such a case, it can always follow the procedure for imposing minor penalty. Minor penalty, as per the Regulation, can be inflicted without holding any departmental inquiry, by giving only a show-cause-notice and a reasonable opportunity to make a representation to the show-cause-notice. Personal hearing can also be afforded and also can be dispensed with by a speaking order.= The delinquent officer was given an opportunity to submit his reply to the show-cause-notice which was considered and the Board took a conscious decision to impose only a minor penalty, i.e. barring one increment without cumulative effect, for which no full-fledged departmental inquiry is contemplated. Learned District Judge as well as the High Court, in our view, has committed a grave error in interfering with the punishment imposed by the Board which, in our view, is perfectly legal, going by the regulations referred to herein before. Consequently, the appeal is allowed and the judgment of the learned District Judge as well as that of the High Court is set aside. 15. Learned counsel for the respondent submits that, by virtue of the punishment imposed, he has not been given his due promotion. We are of the view that if imposition of a minor penalty is not a bar in granting promotion to the respondent, due promotion be granted to him in accordance with the Rules and Regulations applicable to him.

   published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40611 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6150 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 5230 of 2013] D.H.B.V.N.L. Vidyut Nagar, Hisar & Others .. Appellants Versus Yashvir Singh Gulia .. Respondent J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, … Continue reading

mere non-joining of an independent witness – not fatal to the prosecution = Therefore, mere non-joining of an independent witness where the evidence of the prosecution witnesses may be found to be cogent, convincing, creditworthy and reliable, cannot cast doubt on the version forwarded by the prosecution if there seems to be no reason on record to falsely implicate the appellants.= In the instant case at the time of incident some villagers had gathered there. The Investigating Officer in his cross-examination has made it clear that in spite of his best persuasion, none of them were willing to become a witness. Therefore, he could not examine any independent witness. – Section 114 of the Act 1872 gives rise to the presumption that every official act done by the police was regularly performed and such presumption requires rebuttal. The legal maxim omnia praesumuntur rite it dowee probetur in contrarium solenniter esse acta i.e., all the acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly, applies. When acts are of official nature and went through the process of scrutiny by official persons, a presumption arises that the said acts have regularly been performed.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40594 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2302 of 2010   Gian Chand & Ors. …Appellants Versus   State of Haryana …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.   1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order … Continue reading

Land Acquisition Act = whether the officers of the Union Territory of Chandigarh other than the Administrator could issue notifications under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the 1894 Act, = Notification dated 1.10.2002 cannot be saved at this belated stage and the Competent Authority cannot issue declaration under Section 6(1) of the Act after 11 years of the issue of notification under Section 4(1). – In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 1.10.2002 and 29.9.2003 are quashed insofar as the same relate to the lands of the appellants. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

   reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40587      NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5885 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 27221 of 2011) Gurbinder Kaur Brar and another …Appellants versus Union of India and others …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO.5884 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 25387 … Continue reading

grant of study leave = whether the appellant-institute is justified, in directing the respondent to refund the entire amount of Rs.12,32,126/- paid to him towards salary and other allowances for pursuing Ph.D studies at IIT, Kanpur, on failure to produce the certificate of obtaining the Ph.D, for which study leave was granted.= A Government servant or person like the respondent is given study leave with salary and allowances etc. so as to enable him to complete the course of study and to furnish the certificate of his successful completion, so that the institute which has sanctioned the study leave would achieve the purpose and object for granting such study leave. The purpose of granting study leave with salary and other benefits is for the interest of the Institution and also the person concerned so that once he comes back and joins the institute the students will be benefited by the knowledge and expertise acquired by the person at the expense of the institute. A candidate who avails of leave but takes no interest to complete the course and does not furnish the certificate to that effect is doing a disservice to the institute as well as the students of the institute. In other words, such a person only enjoys the period of study leave without doing any work at the institute and, at the same time, enjoys the salary and other benefits, which is evidentially not in public interest. Public money cannot be spent unless there is mutual benefit. Further, if the period of study leave was not extended or no decision was taken on his representation, he could have raised his grievances at the appropriate forum. 16. We notice that the appellant-institute has already recovered an amount of Rs.6.5 lacs as monthly installments from the salary of the respondent and the appellant-institute has also recovered an amount of Rs.1,75,000/- from the salary of the respondent and Rs.4,75,000/- from the arrears of revised scales admissible to the respondent with effect from 01.01.2006 and as such approximately Rs.6,50,000/- has been recovered from the respondent. Now the appellant-institute claims balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/-. 17. Considering the facts and circumstances of the case and considering the fact that the bond executed by the respondent is found to be vague, we find no reason for the appellant-institute to recover the balance amount of Rs.6,18,000/- from the respondent but the amount already recovered be not refunded, since public interest has definitely suffered due to non- obtaining of Ph.D by the respondent after availing of the entire salary and other benefits. We do so taking into consideration all aspects of the matter and to do complete justice between the parties. 18. Appeal is allowed to the above extent and the judgment of the learned Single Judge and Division Bench is modified accordingly and no further amount be recovered by the appellant-institute from the respondent.

reported in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40583       Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5828 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.39067 of 2012) Sant Longowal Instt. of Engg. & Tech. & Anr. Appellant(s) Versus Suresh Chandra Verma Respondent(s)   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, … Continue reading

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