high court of karnataka

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Board not liable to pay any amount to the Bank towards subsidy amount as the Borrower committed default =The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and as per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured the Bank that by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to the Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount by the Borrower.= the Board has been wrongly saddled with the liability of paying Rs.75,213/-.= The question only is with regard to the liability of the Board. The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. = The Commission and the Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or revised rate of interest to be borne by the borrowers for which interest subsidy eligibility certificate has been issued by the Commission. Its liability shall be restricted only to the extent of payment of interest subsidy as per scheme. The Commission would be liable to pay interest subsidy as per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by the Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the defaulted period 87-88.”= In other words, upon default committed by the Borrower, the Board was absolved of its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable assets of the borrower in favour of the Bank. 10. In spite of the aforestated facts, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and payable by the Borrower. In our opinion, the said finding of the trial court is not correct. Even the High Court’s view of confirming the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment of the appellate court as well as the decree passed by the trial court so far as it makes the Board liable to pay the interest on behalf of the Borrower. In view of the contents of the aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board shall surrender its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible. 11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs. Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40772 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8182 OF 2003 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 12161 of 2006)   Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT   VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS   1 J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

Entrusting the investigation to the CBI = the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 7623 of 2012 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate into the broadcasting of certain news items by certain television channels on 02.03.2012 regarding scuffle between advocates, police and media persons in the premises of the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore.= a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal and Others vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Others, (2010) 3 SCC 571 has laid down certain principles. Though the CBI has issued various principles/suggestions for endorsing the matter to CBI in para 68, it is worthwhile to refer the conclusion in paras 69 & 70. “69. In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly. 70. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations.” Keeping the above principles in mind, considering the series of unfortunate incidents which occurred within the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore on 02.03.2012 involving members of the bar, police personnel, journalists and media persons and in spite of the specific direction by the High Court as early as on 16.05.2012, subsequent order of this Court dated 19.10.2012, and also of the fact that the composition of SIT itself has not been finalized, we feel that the present case falls within the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench and we are satisfied that CBI inquiry is necessitated in the matter in issue. 12) In the light of what is stated above, while setting aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 16.05.2012 and in modification of earlier order of this Court dated 19.10.2012, we entrust the entire investigation of the incident to the CBI. Accordingly, we direct the CBI to carry out the investigation and submit a report before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction at Bangalore within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. We further direct the State/SIT to immediately hand over all the records pertaining to the said investigation to the CBI. 13) The appeal is allowed on the above terms. In view of the above direction, no separate order is required in I.A. No. 8 of 2013, accordingly, the same is also disposed of.

   published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40700                                     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO.7159 OF 2013 2 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22604 of 2012) WITH 3 I.A. NO. 8 IN … Continue reading

M.V. ACT – WORKMEN’S COMPENSATION ACT= whether the appellant/insurance company was liable to pay the entire amount of compensation awarded to the claimants or its liability was restricted to that which was prescribed under the Workmen’s Compensation Act. = the liability to pay compensation in respect of death or bodily injury to an employee should not be restricted to that under the Workmen’s Compensation Act but should be more or unlimited. However, the determination would depend whether a policy has been taken by the vehicle owner by making payment of extra premium and whether the policy also contains a clause to that effect.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8725 OF 2012   RAMCHANDRA ..Appellant Versus REGIONAL MANAGER UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO. LTD. ..Respondent   J U D G M E N T GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. The judgment and order dated 17.4.2007 passed by the High Court of Karnataka at … Continue reading

3 contradictory Dying declarations not proved free and fair , not proved the contents were read over and explained , not proved who recorded the translated version from Telugu to Kannada =- ends in acquittal =. Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying declaration. But before it can be acted upon, the same must be held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully. Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor for placing full reliance thereupon. In this case, the deceased herself had taken contradictory and inconsistent stand in different dying declarations. They, therefore, should not be accepted on their face value. Caution, in this behalf, is required to be applied.” In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12), she (deceased) stated that her husband instigated her to pour kerosene on her body, therefore, she poured the kerosene on her body and her husband further poured kerosene on her and put on fire using a match box. In the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22), she (deceased) stated that her husband along with Laxmi poured kerosene on her body and put on fire by using match stick. In the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29), she (deceased) stated that her husband poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the match stick and thrown upon her body. Apart from the contradictions, the credibility of three dying declarations (Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29) is to be doubted. In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12) dated 14th January, 2000 the thumb impression of victim has been shown. Whereas in the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22) taken on the same day, i.e, 14th January, 2000 and the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29) given on the next day, i.e., 15th January, 2000, the victim had stated that she had not given her signatures since her hand was completely burnt. Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22), who signed the Ex.P.22, in his cross-examination stated that he was not aware whether Neelamma (deceased) was talking in Telugu. Dr. Dhanjaya Kumar (PW-20), who signed Ex.P.12, in his cross-examination specifically stated that he can understand Kannada but does not know Telugu language and that Neelamma was talking in Telugu language. Padmavathi (PW-8), mother of the deceased, in her crossexamination stated that Neelamma (deceased) was not knowing the correct writing the Telugu. But she was writing some Telugu. The prosecution has failed to state as to why three dying declarations were recorded in Kannada, if the deceased, Neelamma was talking in Telugu. It has also not made clear as to who amongst the Tehisldar, PSI or SI or the Doctors who has signed in Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29 had knowledge of Telugu and translated the same in Kannada for writing dying declarations in those exhibits and that in the bottom of three dying declarations it has not been mentioned that they were read over in Kannada and explained in Telugu that the deceased understood the contents of the same. The above mentioned facts create doubt in our mind as to the truthfulness of the contents of the dying declarations as the possibility of she being influenced by somebody in making the dying declarations cannot be ruled out. On careful perusal of the materials on record, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the prosecution in this case has established its case beyond reasonable doubt to base a conviction on the appellant. Hence, we are of the opinion that both the courts below have erred in coming to the contra conclusion. 28. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and the judgment and conviction recorded by the courts below are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant, who is in jail, is directed to be released forthwith.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40519 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 175 OF 2007 KASHI VISHWANATH … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. The appellant, who is accused No.1, by this appeal has challenged the judgment … Continue reading

When the prosecution failed to prove the basic case of harassment or demand of dowry , it was not open to convict the accused on presumption referring to sec.113 A or 113 B of the Evidence Act = We find that there are contradictory statements which cannot be stated to be a minor contradiction as was suggested by the learned Addl.SSP before the Appellate Court. The improvement in the statements of PW.1 and 12 is clear. The allegation about the demand of dowry of Rs.1,50,000/­ and 800 gms. of gold ornaments and harassment and torture made by accused No.1 on deceased was not disclosed and mentioned in the First Information Report or before the Tahsildar(PW.21) who recorded the initial evidence. In Ex.P.2 and complaint Ex.P.3 absolutely there is no evidence to show that Rs.25, 000/­ was demanded and Rs.10,000/­ was given to accused No.1 either at Benali or at Mysore. Further, payment of Rs.50,000/­ and 500 gms. of gold to accused No.1 as dowry was also not established beyond reasonable doubt. Once the prosecution failed to prove the basic ingredients of harassment or demand of dowry and the evidence brought on record were doubted by the trial court, it was not open to the High Court to convict accused No.1 on presumption referring to Section 113­A or 113­B of the Evidence Act. The presumption of innocence of the accused being primary factor, in absence of exceptional compelling circumstances and perversity of the judgment, it was not open to the High Court to interfere with the judgment of the trial court in a routine manner. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned judgment dated 4th January, 2006 in Criminal Appeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the High Court, allow the appeal by restoring the judgment dated 2nd August, 1999 of the trial court. The appellant is on bail, his bail bonds stand discharged.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40515 Page 11REPORTABLEIN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIACRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTIONCRIMINAL APPEAL NO.937 OF 2006S. ANIL KUMAR @ ANIL KUMAR GANNA  … APPELLANTVERUSSTATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENTJ U D G M E N TSUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.This   appeal   has   been   preferred   by   the   appellantagainst   the   judgment   dated   4th  January,   2006   in   CriminalAppeal No.1042 of 1999 passed by the learned Single Judgeof the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore, whereby thelearned   Single   Judge   reversed   the   judgment   of   acquittaldated 2nd  August, 1999 passed by the Xth Additional CitySessions Judge at Bangalore in S.C.No.86 /96 and convictedand sentenced the appellant for the offences under Section304­B and Section 498­A of the IPC.Page 22The   Appellate   Court   imposed … Continue reading

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT – KARNATAKA AMENDMENT IN RESPECT OF DAUGHTERS SHARE ON PAR WITH SONS = it was open to the appellant to claim enhancement of her share in the joint family properties because she had not married till the enforcement of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994.= if law governing the parties is amended before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party benefited by such amendment can make a request to the court to take cognizance of the amendment and give effect to the same. If the rights of the parties to the suit change due to other reasons, the court seized with the final decree proceedings is not only entitled but is duty-bound to take notice of such change and pass appropriate order.- the Act was amended by the State Legislature and Sections 6-A to 6-C were inserted for achieving the goal of equality set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. In terms of Section 2 of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994, Section 6-A came into force on 30-7-1994 i.e. the date on which the amendment was published. As on that day, the final decree proceedings were pending. Therefore, the appellant had every right to seek enlargement of her share by pointing out that the discrimination practised against the unmarried daughter had been removed by the legislative intervention and there is no reason why the court should hesitate in giving effect to an amendment made by the State Legislature in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 15(3) of the Constitution.”

‘     ITEM NO.4 COURT NO.3 SECTION IVA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)……/2013 CC 9253-9255/2013 (From the judgement and order dated 11/01/2010 in RFA No.935/2003,RFA No.1012/2003 dated 06/01/2012 in RP … Continue reading

appointment to the post of Lokayukta or Upa Lokayukta – whether the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka has got primacy while making appointment to the post of Lokayukta or Upa Lokayukta by the Governor of Karnataka in exercise of powers conferred on him under Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’).- The doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’ = Merely because a wrong has been committed several times in the past does not mean that it should be allowed to persist, otherwise it will never be corrected. The doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’ has no application since there is no overwhelming reason to save the appointment of the Upa-lokayukta from attack. As already held, in the absence of any consultation with the Chief Justice, the appointment of Justice Chandrashekharaiah as an Upa-lokayukta is void ab initio. However, this will not affect any other appointment already made since no such appointment is under challenge before us. 82. It was also contended that the High Court ought not to have laid down any procedure for the appointment of the Upa-lokayukta. In the view that I have taken, it is not necessary to comment on the procedure proposed by the High Court. Conclusion: 83. The appointment of Justice Chandrashekharaiah as the Upa-lokayukta is held void ab initio. Since some of the contentions urged by the appellants are accepted, the appeals are partly allowed to that extent only.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs.197-199 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) NOs.15658-15660 OF 2012] Mr. Justice Chandrashekaraiah (Retd.) .. Appellant Versus Janekere C. Krishna & Ors. etc. .. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 200-202 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.16512-16514 OF 2012]   J … Continue reading

the High Court has reversed the order of acquittal of accused Nos. A1, A15, A16, A21 and confirmed the order of conviction of accused Nos. A13 and A14 passed by the Sessions Judge, Bijapur, in Sessions Case No. 82 of 2002. The appellants are convicted under Section 302/149 IPC and sentenced to imprisonment for life.- Section 149 IPC creates a constructive or vicarious liability of the members of the unlawful assembly for the unlawful acts committed pursuant to the common object by any other member of that assembly.- accused- A1, A15, A16 and A21 were members of the same assembly which has caused the murder of the deceased, in terms of Section 149 IPC, as they had dragged the deceased after first assault and contributed in preventing the deceased from escaping the assault of A13 and A14. Therefore, accused A1, A15, A16, A21 are guilty of murder along with A13 and A14 under Section 302 read with Section 149 IPC. Moreover, the delay in registering FIR is justified as the complainant had to travel 30 kms on a mud road to reach the Police Station from the scene of crime. Also, the absence of S.I. in the Police Station further contributed in delay in registering the FIR.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 984 OF 2010 Krishnappa & Ors. ………….. Appellants Versus State of Karnataka by Babaleshwara Police Station …………..Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1147 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P.(Crl.) No. 5830 of 2012) (CRL.M.P.No.23190 of 2011) Tippanna Ningappa Kundargi and Anr. ………….. Appellants … Continue reading

Non examination of the evidence and documents exparte decree was passed in a stereo type manner and as such the exparte decree is liable to be set aside=apex court upheld the high court order in remanding the suit for fresh trial after filing written statement, with out distrubing the possession of half share obtained under the exparte decree, subject to the result of the suit. in addition apex court awarded a costs of Rs.25,000/- payable by defendant to the plaintiff before commencing trial.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEAL JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO._3710 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) 33361/2010) C.N. RAMAPPA GOWDA ..Appellant Verus C.C. CHANDREGOWDA (DEAD) BY LRs. & ANR. ..Respondents J U D G E M E N T GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. The impugned order dated 05.10.2010 passed by the … Continue reading

Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881: ss. 139 and 138 – Presumption in favour of holder – Manner of rebuttal of statutory presumption – Held: Presumption mandated by s. 139 includes existence of legally enforceable debt or liability – It is in nature of rebuttable presumption – Accused can raise a defence wherein existence of legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested – However, initial presumption favours the complainant – Reverse onus clause is included and the same is guided by the test of proportionality – Accused cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard of proof – Standard of proof for rebutting presumption is of `preponderance of probabilities’ – If accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of legally enforceable debt or liability, prosecution can fail – On facts, dishonour of cheque on account of `stop payment’ instructions sent by accused – Complaint u/s. 138 – Acquittal by trial court in view of discrepancies in the complainant’s version – Conviction by High Court since accused did not raise a probable defence to rebut the statutory presumption, does not call for interference – Complaint disclosed prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability – Accused failed to reply to the statutory notice u/s.138. s. 138 – Applicability of – Held: s. 138 is applicable when cheque is dishonoured on account of `stop payment’ instructions sent by accused to his bank in respect of post-dated cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds. The appellant engaged the services of the respondent-engineer for supervising the construction of his house. The appellant requested the respondent for a hand loan to meet the construction expenses. In view of the acquaintance, the respondent paid the same by way of cash. The appellant issued a cheque for repayment of the said amount. The respondent presented the cheque for encashment. The bank issued a return memo stating that the payment had been stopped by the drawer. Thereafter, the appellant did not honour the cheque within the statutorily prescribed period and also did not reply to the notice u/s. 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881. The respondent filed a complaint against the appellant for offence punishable u/s.138 of the Act. The trial court acquitted the appellant u/s.138 in view of some discrepancies in the complainant’s version. The High Court holding that the appellant did not raise a probable defence to rebut the statutory presumption, convicted the appellant for commission of offence u/s. 138 of the Act and directed to pay fine of Rs. 75,000/-. Hence the present appeal. Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Ordinarily in cheque bouncing cases, what the courts have to consider is whether the ingredients of the offence enumerated in s.138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 have been met and if so, whether the accused was able to rebut the statutory presumption contemplated by s.139 of the Act. With respect to the facts of the instant case, it must be clarified that contrary to the trial court’s finding, s.138 of the Act can indeed be attracted when a cheque is dishonoured on account of `stop payment’ instructions sent by the accused to his bank in respect of a post- dated cheque, irrespective of insufficiency of funds in the account. [Para 9] [518-D-F] Goa Plast (Pvt.) Ltd. v. Chico Ursula D’Souza (2003) 3 SCC 232, referred to. 2.1. The presumption mandated by s.139 of the Act does indeed include the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. This is in the nature of a rebuttable presumption and it is open to the accused to raise a defence wherein the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability can be contested. However, there can be no doubt that there is an initial presumption which favours the complainant. Section 139 of the Act is an example of a reverse onus clause that has been included in furtherance of the legislative objective of improving the credibility of negotiable instruments. While s.138 of the Act specifies a strong criminal remedy in relation to the dishonour of cheques, the rebuttable presumption u/s. 139 is a device to prevent undue delay in the course of litigation. However, it must be remembered that the offence made punishable by s.138 can be better described as a regulatory offence since the bouncing of a cheque is largely in the nature of a civil wrong whose impact is usually confined to the private parties involved in commercial transactions. In such a scenario, the test of proportionality should guide the construction and interpretation of reverse onus clauses and the accused/defendant cannot be expected to discharge an unduly high standard or proof. In the absence of compelling justifications, reverse onus clauses usually impose an evidentiary burden and not a persuasive burden. When an accused has to rebut the presumption under s.139, the standard of proof for doing so is that of `preponderance of probabilities’. Therefore, if the accused is able to raise a probable defence which creates doubts about the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability, the prosecution can fail. The accused can rely on the materials submitted by the complainant in order to raise such a defence and it is conceivable that in some cases the accused may not need to adduce evidence of his/her own. [Para 14] [525-G; 526-A-G] 2.2. The High Court’s view that the accused did not raise a probable defence is accepted. The defence of the loss of a blank cheque was taken up belatedly and the accused had mentioned a different date in the `stop payment’ instructions to his bank. The instructions to `stop payment’ had not even mentioned that the cheque had been lost. A perusal of the trial record also shows that the accused appeared to be aware of the fact that the cheque was with the complainant. Furthermore, the very fact that the accused had failed to reply to the statutory notice u/s.138 of the Act leads to the inference that there was merit in the complainant’s version. Apart from not raising a probable defence, the appellant-accused was not able to contest the existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability. The fact that the accused had made regular payments to the complainant in relation to the construction of his house does not preclude the possibility of the complainant having spent his own money for the same purpose. As per the record of the case, there was a slight discrepancy in the complainant’s version, in so far as it was not clear whether the accused had asked for a hand loan to meet the construction-related expenses or whether the complainant had incurred the said expenditure over a period of time. Either way, the complaint discloses the prima facie existence of a legally enforceable debt or liability since the complainant has maintained that his money was used for the construction-expenses. Since the accused did admit that the signature on the cheque was his, the statutory presumption comes into play and the same has not been rebutted even with regard to the materials submitted by the complainant. Thus, there is no reason to interfere with the final order of the High Court which recorded a finding of conviction against the appellant. [Paras 15 and 16] [526-H; 257-A-G] Krishna Janardhan Bhat v. Dattatraya G. Hegde (2008) 4 SCC 54; Hiten P. Dalal v. Bratindranath Banerjee (2001) 6 SCC 16; Mallavarapu Kasivisweswara Rao v. Thadikonda Ramulu Firm and Ors. 2008 (8) SCALE 680; Bharat Barrel & Drum Manufacturing Company v. Amin Chand Pyarelal (1993) 3 SCC 35; M.M.T.C. Ltd. and Anr. v. Medchl Chemicals & Pharma (P) Ltd. (2002) 1 SCC 234, referred to. Case Law Reference: 2003 (3) SCC 232 Referred to. Para 9 (2008) 4 SCC 54 Referred to. Para 10 (2001) 6 SCC 16 Referred to. Para 11 2008 (8) SCALE 680 Referred to. Para 12 1993 (3) SCC 35 Referred to. Para 12 (2002) 1 SCC 234 Referred to. Para 13 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1020 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 26.10.2005 of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No. 1367 of 2005. Girish Ananthamurthy, P.P. Singh for the Appellant. Basava Prabhu S. Patil, B. Subrahmanya Prasad, V.N. Raghupathy for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1020 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 407 of 2006] Rangappa … Appellant Versus Sri Mohan … Respondent   JUDGMENT K.G. Balakrishnan, C.J.I. 1. Leave granted. 2. In the present case, the trial court had acquitted the appellant-accused in a … Continue reading

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