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high court of karnataka

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Apex court acquitted the accused -The High Court appears to have interfered with the judgment of acquittal only on the basis that `there was a possibility of another view’. The prosecution must prove its case beyond any reasonable doubt. Such is not the burden on the accused. The High Court has acted on certain legal and factual presumptions which cannot be sustained on the basis of the record before us and the principle of laws afore-noticed. The case of the prosecution, thus, suffers 45 from proven improbabilities, infirmities, contradictions and the statement of the sole witness, the Police Officer, PW1, is not reliable and worthy of credence.

1   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 984 OF 2007   Govindaraju @ Govinda … Appellant Versus State by Sriramapuram P.S. & Anr. … Respondents     J U D G M E N T   Swatanter Kumar, J.   1. The present appeal is directed against … Continue reading

The Corporation is having its duty free shops at all major International Airports in India. At the said duty free shops, the appellant sells several articles including liquor to foreigners and also to Indians, who are going abroad or coming to India by air. We are concerned with a duty free shops situated at an International Airport at Bengaluru. The appellant is registered as a dealer under the Act as well as under the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (hereinafter referred to as `the Central Act’). In the return filed under the Act as well as under the Central Act for the relevant period, the appellant had stated that though liquor, cigarettes, perfumes and food articles were sold at the duty free shops at the Bengaluru International Airport, no tax was payable by the appellant as the goods which had been sold at the duty free shops were sold directly to the passengers and even the delivery of goods at the duty free shops was made before importing the goods or before the goods had crossed the customs frontiers of India.=Transfer of documents of title to the goods is one of the methods whereby delivery of the goods is effected. Delivery may be physical also. =In our opinion, submissions with regard to sale not taking effect by transfer of documents of title to the goods are absolutely irrelevant. Transfer of documents of title to the goods is one of the methods whereby delivery of the goods is effected. Delivery may be physical also. In the instant case, at the duty free shops, which are admittedly outside the customs frontiers of our country, the goods had been sold to the customers by giving physical delivery. It is not disputed that the goods were sold by giving physical possession at the duty free shops to the customers. Simply because the sales had not been effected by transfer of documents of title to the goods and the sales were effected by giving physical possession of the goods to the customers, it would not mean that the sales were taxable under the Act. Thus, we do not agree with the aforestated submissions made by the learned counsel appearing for the Revenue. 32. Looking to the aforestated clear and settled legal position, we allow the appeal and quash the order of assessment so far as the transactions which are the subject matter of this litigation are concerned. There shall be no order as to cost.

1   REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2560 OF 2010   M/S HOTEL ASHOKA …APPELLANT (INDIAN TOUR.DEV.COR.LTD.) VERSUS ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER OF COMMERCIAL TAXES & ANR. ….RESPONDENTS   WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 10404-10412 OF 2010     J U D G M E N T     … Continue reading

when the parties are capable to handle their compensation amount and when they are in dire need of the compensation amount, entire amount should be released with out insisting for fixed deposites==It was pointed out that if the money was locked up in a nationalised bank, only the bank would be benefited by the deposit as they give a paltry interest which could not be equated to the costs of materials which were ever increasing. It was further stated that the delay in payment of compensation amount exposed the appellants to serious prejudice and economic ruin.=The prayer in the application of the appellants for release of the 8 amount invested in long term deposits stands allowed. The entire amount of compensation shall be withdrawn and paid to the appellants without any further delay.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1095 OF 2012 [arising out of SLP (C) No. 22521 of 2008]   A.V. Padma & Ors. … Appellants Versus   R. Venugopal & Ors. … Respondents     J U D G M E N T   CYRIAC JOSEPH, J.   … Continue reading

cheque bouns case =As of today, the appellant has undergone the sentence for a period of about 2= months before she was released on bail. Considering the fact that the appellant has deposited the amount of compensation i.e. Rs.2,20,000/- and the fact 5 that the appellant is a widow and is the only earning member in the family and considering the fact that though served with notice the respondent has not cared to appear in this Court, we are of the opinion that sentence already undergone by her should be treated as a sentence for the offence under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. Order accordingly. The appellant is on bail. Her bail bond stands discharged. Needless to say that this order is passed in the peculiar facts and circumstances of the case. 8. Appeal is disposed of in the aforestated terms.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 181 OF 2012 [ARISING OUT OF SLP (CRL.) NO. 10537 OF 2010]     B. CHANDRAMATHI … APPELLANT Versus N. PRAKASH … RESPONDENT   O R D E R   1. Leave granted.   2. This appeal, by grant of special leave, … Continue reading

criminal contempt -when the coordinate Bench on earlier occasion, that is, on 09.06.2006, based on the acceptable materials prima facie concluded that charges have to be framed, it is but proper by the present Bench to arrive and take a final decision in the light of the materials formulated by the earlier Bench.

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 158 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 72 of 2009)     C. Shakunthala & Ors. …. Appellant(s)   Versus   H.P. Udayakumar & Anr. …. Respondent(s)     J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) … Continue reading

The domestic enquiry found the delinquent employee guilty of all the charges. The enquiry report was accepted by the Disciplinary Authority and there is no grievance on behalf of the respondent-workman that statutory provisions/principles of natural justice have not been observed while conducting the enquiry. The Disciplinary Authority imposed the punishment of dismissal from service which cannot be held to be disproportionate or non-commensurate to the delinquency. The Labour Court after reconsidering the whole case came to the conclusion that the enquiry has been conducted strictly in accordance with law in a fair manner and charges have rightly been proved against the delinquent 1

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 9933 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.7083 of 2010) The Divisional Controller, KSRTC …. Appellant Versus M.G. Vittal Rao …. Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been … Continue reading

Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 – ss. 7, 9, 17 and 12 – Interim custody of minor Muslim children – Death of mother of minor children, girl aged 13 years and boy aged 5 years – Re-marriage of father – Application by maternal relatives for appointment as guardian and interim custody of minor children till disposal of application u/ss. 7, 9 and 17 – Family court granting interim injunction against father restraining him from interfering with the custody – Vacation of interim order – Set aside by High Court – Interim custody granted to maternal relatives till the disposal of the proceedings – On appeal, held: Custody is distinct from guardianship – In matters of custody, welfare of children is the sole consideration – Personal law governing custody of minor girl dictates that her maternal relatives, especially maternal aunt, shall be given preference, thus, no reason to override the rule of Mohammedan Law – Prima facie case and balance of convenience in favour of granting custody to maternal relatives – Children would suffer irreparable injury if they are uprooted from their present settings against their will – Thus, order of High Court modified to the extent of visitation rights granted to father – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – O. 39 r.1 and 2 – Child welfare – Mohammedan Law. Appellant married the daughter of respondent no. 1, as per the Islamic rites and customs. Two children were born out of the wedlock. Appellant’s wife died after thirteen years of marriage and within a year he married again. Respondent no.1- maternal grandfather, respondent nos. 2, 3 and 4- maternal aunt and uncles of the minor children, girl aged 13 years and boy aged 5 years, initiated proceedings u/ss. 7, 9 and 17 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 for appointment as guardians. They also filed application u/s. 12 of the Act r/w Or. 39 r. 1 and 2 CPC praying for interim protection of the persons and properties of the minor children and also for an injunction order restraining the appellant from interfering or disturbing the custody of the minor children. Family Court passed an interim order restraining the appellant from interfering with the custody of the children with the respondent. Appellant challenged the order. Family court vacated the interim order of injunction. High Court set aside the said order and passed certain directions. Hence the present appeal. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. Section 12 of the Guardian and Wards Act, 1890 empowers courts to “make such order for the temporary custody and protection of the person or property of the minor as it thinks proper.” In matters of custody, welfare of the children is the sole and single yardstick by which the Court shall assess the comparative merit of the parties contesting for custody. Therefore, while deciding the question of interim custody, the court must be guided by the welfare of the children since s. 12 empowers the Court to make any order as it deems proper. [Para 32] [65-E-F] 1.2 With regard to guardianship, the prima facie case lies in favour of the father as u/s. 19 of the Act, unless the father is not fit to be a guardian, the Court has no jurisdiction to appoint another guardian. Respondents, despite the voluminous allegations leveled against the appellant have not been able to prove that he is not fit to take care of the minor children, nor has the Family Court or the High Court found him so. However, the question of custody is different from the question of guardianship. Father can continue to be the natural guardian of the children; however, the considerations pertaining to the welfare of the child may indicate lawful custody with another friend or relative as serving his/her interest better. The question of guardianship can be independent of and distinct from that of custody in facts and circumstances of each case. [Paras 33 and 35] [65-G-H; 66-A-B; 67-B] Rosy Jacob v. Jacob A.Chakramakkal (1973) 3 S.C.R. 918; Mt. Siddiqunnisa Bibi v. Nizamuddin Khan and Ors. AIR 1932 All 215, referred to. 1.3. The Court shall determine whether, in proceedings relating to interim custody, there are sufficient and compelling reasons to persuade the Court to change the custody of the minor children with immediate effect. Stability and consistency in the affairs and routines of children is also an important consideration. [Paras 37 and 38] [68-B-C] R.V. Srinath Prasad v. Nandamuri Jayakrishna AIR 2001 SC 1056; Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli AIR 2008 SC 2262, referred to. 2.1. Keeping in mind the paramount consideration of welfare of the children, the custody of the children which currently rests with their maternal relatives is not disturbed as the scope of this order is limited to determining with which of the contesting parties the minors should stay till the disposal of the application for guardianship. [Para 36] [67-B-C] 2.2. The children have been in the lawful custody of the respondents from October, 2007. It has the sanction of the order of the High Court granting interim custody of the children in their favour. Hence, the consideration that the custody of the children should not undergo an immediate change prevails. The question with whom they remained during the period from the death of their mother till the institution of present proceedings is a matter of dispute between the parties and a conclusion on the same cannot be reached without going into the merits of the matter. At any rate, the children are happy and are presumably taken care of with love and affection by the respondents, judging from the reluctance on part of the girl child to go with her father. She might attain puberty at any time. High Court rightly observed, that it may not be in the interests of the children to separate them from each other. Hence, the status quo is not disturbed as the only concern is with the question of interim custody at this stage. [Para 40] [68-G-H; 69-A-E] 2.3. Regarding the matters of custody, the Court is not bound by the bar envisaged u/s. 19 of the Act. The personal law governing the minor girl dictates her maternal relatives, especially her maternal aunt, shall be given reference. As such regarding the interim custody, there is no reason to override the rule of Mohammedan Law and, hence, a prima facie case is found in favour of the respondents. The balance of convenience lies in favour of granting custody to the maternal grandfather, aunt and uncle. In matters of custody of children, their welfare shall be the focal point. Once the focus is shifted from the rights of the contesting relatives to the welfare of the minor children, the considerations in determining the question of balance of convenience also differ. Respondent no.3 stated that she has no intention to get married and her plea that she had resigned from her job as a technical writer to take care of the children remains uncontroverted. Hence, the respondents will be in a position to provide sufficient love and care for the children until the disposal of the guardianship application. The second marriage of the appellant, though a factor that cannot disentitle him to the custody of the children, yet is an important factor to be taken into account. It may not be appropriate to place the children in a predicament where they have to adjust with their step-mother, with whom admittedly they had not spent much time as the marriage took place only in March, 2007, when the ultimate outcome of the guardianship proceedings is still uncertain. [Paras 43 and 44] [70-G-H; 71- A-E] 2.4. Till the final disposal of the application for guardianship, the interests of the children will be duly served if their current residence is not disturbed and a sudden separation from their maternal relatives does not come on their way. Irreparable injury will be caused to the children if they, against their will, are uprooted from their present settings. There is no conflict between the welfare of the children and the course of action suggested by personal law to which they are subject. [Paras 45 and 46] [72- B-C-E] Hassan Bhatt v. Ghulam Mohamad Bhat AIR 1961 J & K 5, approved. 2.5. Respondent no. 1 is an old person aged about 72 years. Respondent no. 2 is already married, living with his wife and children. Respondent no. 3 and 4 are unmarried and are of marriageable age. Respondent no. 3, the maternal aunt of the children, will go to live with her husband after marriage. Respondent no. 4 after his marriage may or may not live with his father. There is nothing on record to show that the appellant mistreated the deceased mother of minor children. No views can be expressed on the correctness of these averments. These matters must be gone into when the Family Court disposes of the application for guardianship filed by the respondents and not at this stage. [Para 47] [72-F-H; 73-A] 2.6. As far as the denial of the interim custody of children to the respondents on the ground that they had not approached the Court with clean hands, such cannot be inferred. The alleged refusal on part of the appellant to marry respondent no.3 which is said to have led the respondents to file the application for guardianship, is a question of fact which is yet to be proved. [Para 48] [73-B-D] 2.7. In the opinion of High Court, the minor girl who was then was 10 to 11 years old, was capable of making intelligent preference. It may be true that 11 years is a tender age and her preference cannot be conclusive. But as only the question of interim custody is dealt with, there is no reason why the preference of the elder child shall be overlooked. The Family Court had considered fact that the younger child had instinctively approached his father while he met him in the Court premises while vacating the interim order of injunction. The second child who is just 4 years old cannot form an intelligent opinion as to who would be the right person to look after him and, hence, weight must be given to the preference that daughter had expressed. However, the visitation rights granted to the appellant is modified. He shall be allowed to visit the children on Saturdays as well between 9 am and 5 pm. The order of the High Court is modified and the order of the Family Court vacating its injunction order is set aside. The Family Court is directed to dispose of the case relating to the guardianship of the two children after adducing evidence by both the parties (both oral and documentary) at an early date. [Paras 50, 51 and 52] [74-A-F] Gaurav Nagpal v.Sumedha Nagpal (2009) 1 SCC 42, distinguished Rafiq v. Bashiran and Ors AIR 1963 Rajasthan 239; B.N. Ganguly v. C.H. Sarkar AIR 1961 MP 173; R.V. Srinath Prasad v. Nandamuri Jayakrishna AIR 2001 SC 1056; Mausami Moitra Ganguli v. Jayant Ganguli AIR 2008 SC 2262; Bal Krishna Pandey v. Sanjeev Bajpayee AIR 2004 UTR 1; Nil Ratan Kundu and Anr. vs. Abhijit Kundu (2008) 9 SCC 413, referred to. Case Law Reference: AIR 1963 Rajasthan 239 Referred to. Para 28 AIR 1961 MP 173 Referred to. Para 29, 49 (1973) 3 S.C.R. 918 Referred to. Para 33 AIR 1932 All 215 Referred to. Para 34 AIR 2001 SC 1056 Referred to. Para 37 AIR 2008 SC 2262 Referred to. Para 38 (2009) 1 SCC 42 Distinguished. Para 40 AIR 2004 UTR 1 Referred to. Para 44 AIR 1961 J & K 5 Approved. Para 46 (2008) 9 SCC 413 Referred to. Para 48 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 11 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 8.10.2007 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 9177 of 2007. S. Balaji, B.M. Arun, Madhusmita Bora for the Appellant. Nalini Chidambaram, Sunieta Ojha, Vikas Mehta for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.11 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP ) No. 24148 of 2007) Athar Hussain. —–Appellant Versus Syed Siraj Ahmed & Ors. —-Respondents JUDGMENT TARUN CHATTERJEE, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 8th of October, … Continue reading

Motor Vehicles Act, 1988: s.166 – Compensation – Future loss of earning – Claimant aged 50 years working as mason – In motor accident, suffered multiple fractures resulting in shortening of right leg by 3.5 cms – Tribunal assessed disability at 20% and awarded compensation of Rs.1.55 lacs – High Court enhanced compensation by Rs.34000 – On appeal, held: Appellant had suffered an irreversible damage to his right leg posing difficulties for him in carrying out his avocation as a mason – High Court while making observation that the Tribunal’s compensation under the heads “loss of amenities and enjoyment of life and loss of earnings during laid up period” was on the lower side, did not make its own assessment under these heads – These areas needed proper introspection and a more sensitive approach as the appellant represented weaker section of the community – Matter remitted to High Court for consideration afresh. The appellant aged 50 years was working as a mason. On the fateful day, while he was crossing the road, a motorcycle hit him resulting in bone fractures, head and other injuries all over the body. He was hospitalized for about 2 weeks and was under medical treatment for about 6 months after discharge from hospital. MACT awarded him a compensation of Rs.1.55 lacs. Dissatisfied with the quantum of compensation, appellant filed appeal before High Court. High Court enhanced the compensation only by Rs.34,000/-. Hence the appeal. =Allowing the appeal and remitting the matter to High Court, the Court HELD: 1.1. The High Court did no consider the appellant’s case properly. It accepted the Tribunal’s assessment of the body disability at 20% and observed that the Tribunal has paid compensation under the heads “loss of amenities and enjoyment of life and loss of earnings during laid up period” on the lower side. However, it awarded an additional compensation only for future medical expenditures and did not deal with the aspect of future loss of earnings at all, which was not a correct approach. The incapacity or disability to earn livelihood should be viewed not only in praesenti but in futuro on reasonable expectancies and taking into account deprival of earnings of a conceivable period. [Paras 9, 10] [662-c-f] Ramesh Chandra v. Randhir Singh and others (1990) 3 SCC 723, relied on. 1.2. As per the evidence of PW-2, the doctor who supervised the appellant’s injuries and administered treatment in the Hospital, it was proved that the appellant sustained compound fractures in the tibia and fibula bone of the right leg. He also suffered bruises and cuts on his face and some parts of the body. He was operated. Even after his discharge, he was advised follow up treatments and physiotherapy and also exercise for better movement of his leg. In his affidavit before the Tribunal, PW2 stated that the appellant’s right leg was shortened as a result of which he had to walk with a limp. The appellant was advised to use footwear with a raised sole and to continue with the exercises. The Tribunal noted that the shortening of the leg was by 3.5 cms. The Tribunal however, in accepting the disability of the appellant at 48%, refused to accept the assessment of the doctor that the future loss of earning would also be at 48%. It opined that construction work involves many people and the doctor was not right in concluding that due to the disability on the right leg, the appellant would not be able to do construction work. The future loss of earning was assessed at a much lesser 20%. Since there was no specific evidence regarding his income, the multiplier method was used for assessing the compensation. [Paras 11-14] [662-F-H; 663-A-C; 663-E-G] 1.3. Although the Tribunal concluded by holding that the assessment of future loss of earnings should be made only at 20%, the High Court, while making the observation that the Tribunal’s compensation under the heads “loss of amenities and enjoyment of life and loss of earnings during laid up period” was on the lower side, should have given reasons and made its own assessment under these heads, since High Court, as the first appellate authority, is an authority both on facts and law. The High Court’s orders starkly lacked in any details on assessment of compensation under these heads. These areas needed proper introspection and a more sensitive approach as the appellant being a mason and a workman represented the weaker section of the community. The appellant had suffered an irreversible damage to his right leg which would pose difficulties for him in carrying out his avocation as a mason. [Para 15] [663-G-H; 664-A-C] M/s. Concord of India Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Smt. Nirmala Devi & others (1979) 4 SCC 365; Divisional Controller, KSRTC v. Mahadeva Shetty & another (2003) 7 SCC 197, relied on. 2. Long expectation of life is connected with earning capacity. If earning capacity is reduced, that impacts life expectancy as well. No amount of compensation can restore the physical frame of the appellant. Whenever any amount is determined as the compensation payable for any injury suffered during an accident, the object is to compensate such injury so far as money can compensate because it is not possible to equate the money with the human sufferings or personal deprivations. Money cannot renew a broken and shattered physical frame. In its very nature whenever a tribunal or a court is required to fix the amount of compensation in cases of accident, it involves some guesswork, some hypothetical consideration, some amount of sympathy linked with the nature of the disability caused. [Paras 17-19] [664-H; 665-B-C; 665-D-E] Case Law Reference: (1990) 3 SCC 723 relied on Para 10 (1979) 4 SCC 365 relied on Para 15 (2003) 7 SCC 197 relied on Para 16 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 4027 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 20.7.2009 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in MFA No. 259 of 2008. V.N. Raghupathy for the Appellant. A.K. De, Rajesh Kumar, Udit Kumar, Debasis Misra for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4027 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No.4649 of 2010) Sri B.T. Krishnappa ..Appellant(s) Versus The Divisional Manager, United ..Respondent(s) Insurance Company Ltd. and another J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1.Leave granted 2.This Appeal impugns the order … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Impleadment of Pendente lite purchaser and direction to work out equity in his favour – Propriety of – Suit for partition – Pendentelite purchase of a portion of suit property – Impleadment of purchasers at appellate stage – Suit decreed as per terms of compromise – High Court at the instance of purchasers directing the trial court to work out equity in their favour by allotting them the suit property and paying compensation to the vendor and the co-sharers who were not party to the sale-deed – Held: Propriety of impleadment order cannot be disturbed – However, direction to work out equity not sustainable – Purchasers were since impleaded during pendency of final decree proceedings, all the issues relegated in pending final decree proceedings – Courts are not supposed to encourage pendentelite transactions and regularize such conduct by sharing equity in favour of such purchaser – Equity. In a suit for partition, preliminary decree was granted. The same was challenged in appeal. During pendency thereof, respondents 8 and 9 (pendentelite purchasers of suit item No. 9), were impleaded as respondents in the appeal. The issue in suit was closed by recording compromise between the parties before High Court whereby the parties agreed to the partition. Thereafter, on the application by the purchasers-respondents, High Court directed trial court to work out equity in favour of the purchasers by allotting them suit item No. 9 in their favour and to compensate the plaintiffs and other sharers who were not parties to the sale-deed in the final decree proceedings. In appeal to this court, the questions for consideration were: (1) whether High Court was justified in impleading the purchasers pendentelite as party respondents in the appeal, and (2) whether High Court was justified in issuing direction for allotment of suit item No. 9 in favour of purchasers and for payment of compensation to other sharers. =Partly allowing the appeal, the Court HELD:1. In view of the fact that respondent-purchasers purchased item No.9 of the suit property from respondent No. 1 and others who are sharers, the order of the High Court impleading them as respondents in the proceedings cannot be disturbed. [Para 8] [495-G-H; 496-A] 2. However, direction for payment of compensation to the plaintiff and others and working out equity are set aside. When the purchasers approached the High Court for their impleadment and for directions, final decree proceeding was pending before the trial Court. Respondent-purchasers purchased item No.9 from the first respondent pendente lite. In fact, the courts are not supposed to encourage pendente lite transactions and regularize their conduct by showing equity in their favour. In such circumstances, it is proper to relegate all the issues in the final decree proceedings which is pending before the trial Court. [Paras 8 and 9] [496- C-E] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 2138 of 2009. From the Judgment & Order dated 15.06.2006 and the subsequent order dated 17.6.2006 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Regular First Appeal No.207 of 2003. Naveen R. Nath, Lalit Mohan Bhat, Hetu Arora and A. Dashrath, for the Appellants. Krishna Mani, B. Vishwanath Bhandarkar, V.N. Raghupathy, M.N. Uma Shankar and B.S. Sharma for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. OF 2009 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 20131 of 2006) Marirudraiah & Ors. …. Appellant(s) Versus B. Sarojamma & Ors. …. Respondent(s) JUDGMENT P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and orders dated … Continue reading

The apex court set aside the high court orders which directed that the matter should be decided by civil court in respect of overlapping of lease=to avoid delay, the apex court granted directions in sundur mining lease(1) The Secretary, Department of Industries and Commerce, Government of Karnataka, shall constitute a Committee of officers for conduct of the demarcation and identification of the boundaries of the area leased to the appellant in terms of Mining Lease No.2622. The Committee so constituted shall include the Deputy Commissioner of the District concerned, the Chief Conservator of Forests or his nominee who shall be an officer not below the rank of Assistant Conservator of Forests, the Director of Survey and a Senior Officer of the Mines Department to be nominated by the Secretary. The Secretary shall be free to nominate any other official or officials whom he considers suitable for 25

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICITION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8819 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.35213 of 2010) Ashok Kumar Lingala …Appellant Versus State of Karnataka & Ors. …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8820 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 200 of 2011) L.V. Ashok Kumar Lingala … Continue reading

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