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high court of punjab and haryana

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mere non-joining of an independent witness – not fatal to the prosecution = Therefore, mere non-joining of an independent witness where the evidence of the prosecution witnesses may be found to be cogent, convincing, creditworthy and reliable, cannot cast doubt on the version forwarded by the prosecution if there seems to be no reason on record to falsely implicate the appellants.= In the instant case at the time of incident some villagers had gathered there. The Investigating Officer in his cross-examination has made it clear that in spite of his best persuasion, none of them were willing to become a witness. Therefore, he could not examine any independent witness. – Section 114 of the Act 1872 gives rise to the presumption that every official act done by the police was regularly performed and such presumption requires rebuttal. The legal maxim omnia praesumuntur rite it dowee probetur in contrarium solenniter esse acta i.e., all the acts are presumed to have been done rightly and regularly, applies. When acts are of official nature and went through the process of scrutiny by official persons, a presumption arises that the said acts have regularly been performed.

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40594 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2302 of 2010   Gian Chand & Ors. …Appellants Versus   State of Haryana …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. Chauhan, J.   1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order … Continue reading

without framing substantial question of law , no second appeal is to be decided. in a specific performance suit, when a lower court order for refund of the earnest money, the appellant court set aside the lower court decree and order for specific performance of the sale agreement. which was reversed by the High court in a second appeal with out framing any substantial question of law- which was set aside by the apex court by this judgement and further strongly retreated that no court should go liberally interfering the appellant court judgement in second appeal with out framing a substantial question of law.

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2870 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 15574 of 2011)   Hardeep Kaur …. Appellant Vs. Malkiat Kaur …. Respondent       JUDGMENT     R.M. Lodha, J.     Leave granted.   2. The defendant is in … Continue reading

Civil Writ Petition No. 2416 of 2002 and R.A. No.134 of 2002 filed by the appellant seeking refund of Rs.10 lakhs deposited towards security pursuant to the order passed by the High Court has been dismissed. – the respondent-Corporation’s right to forfeit the security amount or to recover the extra expenditure incurred in getting the work executed from alternative agency was not disputed by him. 12

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS.8569-8570 of 2003   Krishan Lal …Appellant   Versus   Food Corporation of India & Ors. …Respondents   O R D E R   T.S. THAKUR, J.   1. These appeals by special leave arise out of an order passed … Continue reading

provisions of Section 482 Cr.P.C can be invoked in stead of filing of second revision petition, in case, there is apparent injustice. Thus, the facts of the present case do not warrant any interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C being a second revision under the garb of Section 482 Cr.P.C. If it was CRM No. M 37269 of 2010 11 permitted, then every petition facing the bar under Section 397(3) could be challenged under Section 482 Cr.P.C. Thus, the present petition is neither maintainable nor is there any merit in the same. Accordingly, the present petition is dismissed on both counts i.e. on the question of maintainability as well as on merits.

CRMNo. M 37269 of 2010 1 IN THE HIGH COURT OF PUNJAB AND HARYANA AT CHANDIGARH — CRM No. M 37269 of 2010 Date of decision: 25.05.2011 Maghar Singh and another …….. Petitioners Versus State of Punjab and others …….Respondent(s) Coram: Hon’ble Ms Justice Nirmaljit Kaur -.- Present: Mr. T S Sangha, Senior Advocate with … Continue reading

whether the High Court can pass an order on an application entertained after final disposal of the criminal appeal or even suo motu particularly, in view of the provisions of Section 362 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter called Cr.P.C.) and as to whether in exercise of its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. the High Court can ask a particular investigating agency to investigate a case following a particular procedure through an exceptionally unusual method which is not in consonance with the statutory provisions of Cr.P.C. =The error in the impugned orders of the High Court transgresses judicious discretion. The process adopted by the High Court led to greater injustice than securing the ends of justice. The path charted by the High Court inevitably reflects a biased approach. It was a 6

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 753-755 of 2009 State of Punjab …Appellant Versus Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar & Ors. etc. …Respondents   With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2258-2264 of 2011 (Arising out of SLP(Crl.) Nos. 6503-6509 of 2011) Sumedh Singh Saini …Appellant Versus   Davinder Pal Singh Bhullar … Continue reading

This Court declares that Section 27(3) of Arms Act, 1959 is ultra vires the Constitution and is declared void.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.117 OF 2006 State of Punjab …..Appellant(s) – Versus – Dalbir Singh ….Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. This appeal at the instance of the State has been preferred from the judgment of the Division Bench of … Continue reading

Penal Code, 1860 – s.304B: Offence of Dowry death – Ingredients required to be proved by the prosecution – Stated. Dowry – Meaning of – Held: For purposes of s.304B IPC, `dowry’ has the same meaning as in s.2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act – Mere demand for `dowry’ before marriage, at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage is an offence – The term `dowry’ is defined comprehensively to include properties of all sorts as it takes within its fold `any property or valuable security’ given or agreed to be given in connection with marriage either directly or indirectly – If a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, has a nexus with marriage, such demand would constitute `demand for dowry’; the cause or reason for such demand being immaterial – Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – s.2 Dowry death – Wife of appellant no.2 died within 3 months of her marriage – She was found dead by hanging from a ceiling fan in the appellants’ house – Allegation that deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by appellant no.1 (mother-in-law) and appellant no.2 in connection with demand of motorcycle – Conviction of the appellants u/s.304-B IPC – Challenge to – Held: That the deceased was subjected to harassment and ill-treatment by the appellants after PW-8 (father of the deceased) refused to accede to their demand for purchase of motorcycle is established by the evidence of PW-8 and PW-9 – Then there is evidence of PW-10 that PW-8 had called him and DW-1 to his house where appellant no.1 had made demand of motorcycle – PW-10 stated that he sought to reason to appellant no.1 about inability of PW-8 to give motorcycle at which appellant no.1 got angry and warned that the deceased would not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial home – It was established that unlawful demand of motorcycle was made by the appellants from PW-8 and the deceased was harassed on account of his failure to provide the motorcycle and that led the deceased to commit suicide by hanging – The demand of motorcycle by appellant no.1 from PW-8 was for the appellant no.2 and when PW-8 showed his inability to meet that demand, the appellant no.2 started harassing and ill-treating the deceased – In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was no demand by the appellant no.2 – No merit in the contention of the appellants that the demand of motorcycle does not qualify as a `demand for dowry’ – All the essential ingredients to bring home the guilt under s.304B IPC were established against the appellants by the prosecution evidence -Presumption under s.113B of the Evidence Act was fully attracted – The appellants failed to rebut such presumption – Evidence Act, 1872 – s.113B. Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 – Enactment of – Purpose stated. The wife of appellant no.2/(A-2) died within 3 months of her marriage. She was found dead by hanging from a ceiling fan in the appellants’ house. PW-8, the father of the deceased, is a Rikshawpuller. The trial court held that the prosecution was able to establish that the death was within seven years of her marriage and otherwise than under normal circumstances; that before her death, the deceased was subjected to cruelty and harassment by appellant no.1/(A-1) (mother-in-law) and appellant no.2 in connection with the demand of motorcycle and that the appellants were guilty of causing dowry death. The appellants were convicted by the trial court under Section 304-B IPC and sentenced to suffer seven years’ rigorous imprisonment. The High Court affirmed the conviction and sentence. In the instant appeal, the appellants submitted that it was highly improbable that a demand for a motorcycle would be made from PW-8 knowing well that it could not be fulfilled by him as he was a Rikshawpuller earning Rs. 20/- per day. The appellants contended that the evidence let in by the prosecution was not trustworthy at all and the demand for dowry is not established. They submitted that the only independent witness of demand was DW-1 but he was not examined by the prosecution, though, DW-1 was examined in defence and he has denied that any demand was made by appellant no.1 in his presence. The appellants argued that there was no evidence of demand of motorcycle by the appellant no.2 and further that in any case the demand of motorcycle for the purposes of the business does not qualify as a `demand for dowry’ and, therefore, no offence under Section 304-B IPC can be said to have been made out against the appellants. =Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD:1.1. Section 304B was inserted in IPC with effect from November 19, 1986 by the Dowry Prohibition (Amendment) Act, 1986. Thereby substantive offence relating to `dowry death’ was introduced in the IPC. For making out an offence of `dowry death’ under Section 304B, the following ingredients have to be proved by the prosecution: (a) death of a woman must have been caused by any burns or bodily injury or her death must have occurred otherwise than under normal circumstances; (b) such death must have occurred within seven years of her marriage; (c) soon before her death, she must have been subjected to cruelty or harassment by her husband or any relative of her husband; and (d) such cruelty or harassment must be in connection with the demand for dowry. Pertinently, for the purposes of Section 304B IPC, `dowry’ has the same meaning as in Section 2 of the Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961. [Paras 11, 12, 13 and 14] [635-E-F; 636-B-F] 1.2. The Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961 was enacted to prohibit the giving or taking of `dowry’ and for the protection of married woman against cruelty and violence in the matrimonial home by the husband and in-laws. The mere demand for `dowry’ before marriage, at the time of marriage or any time after the marriage is an offence. The definition of `dowry’ show that the term is defined comprehensively to include properties of all sorts as it takes within its fold `any property or valuable security’ given or agreed to be given in connection with marriage either directly or indirectly. If a demand for property or valuable security, directly or indirectly, has a nexus with marriage, such demand would constitute `demand for dowry’; the cause or reason for such demand being immaterial. [Paras 15, 17] [637-D-F; 640-C-D] Appasaheb & Anr. v. State of Maharashtra. (2007) 9 SCC 721; S. Gopal Reddy v. State of A.P. (1996) 4 SCC 596; Panjiyar @ Kamlesh Panjiyar v. State of Bihar (2005) 2 SCC 388 – referred to. 2. In the facts of the case, it is clearly established that the deceased died otherwise than under normal circumstances. There is no dispute of fact that death occurred within seven years of her marriage. That the deceased was subjected to harassment and ill-treatment by the appellants after PW-8 refused to accede to their demand for purchase of motorcycle is established by the evidence of PW-8 and PW-9. Then there is evidence of PW-10 that PW-8 had called him and DW-1 to his house where A-1 had made demand of motorcycle. PW-10 stated that he sought to reason to A-1 about inability of PW-8 to give motorcycle at which A-1 got angry and warned that the deceased would not be allowed to stay in her matrimonial home. It is true that the appellants produced DW-1 in defence and he did state in his examination-in- chief that he did not meet A-1 at the house of PW-8 but in cross- examination when he was confronted with his statement under Section 161 Cr.P.C. where it was recorded that he and PW-10 had gone to the house of PW-8 and both of them (PW-10 and DW-1) counselled A-1 to desist from demanding motorcycle but she stuck to her demand, DW-1 had no explanation to offer. The evidence of DW-1 is, therefore, liable to be discarded. In light of the evidence let in by the prosecution, the trial court cannot be said to have erred in holding that it was established that unlawful demand of motorcycle was made by A-1 and A-2 from PW-8 and the decesded was harassed on account of his failure to provide the motorcycle and that led the deceased to commit suicide by hanging. Pertinently, the demand of motorcycle by A-1 from PW-8 was for A-2 and when PW-8 showed his inability to meet that demand, A-2 started harassing and ill-treating the deceased. In this view of the matter, it cannot be said that there was no demand by A-2. [Para 18] [640-D-H; 641-A-C] 3. The High Court has also examined the matter thoroughly and reached the finding that A-1 and A-2 had raised a demand for purchase of motorcycle from PW-8; this demand was made within two months of the marriage and was a demand towards `dowry’ and when this demand was not met, the deceased was maltreated and harassed continuously which led her to take extreme step of finishing her life. The above view of the High Court is acceptable. There is no merit in the contention of the appellants that the demand of motorcycle does not qualify as a `demand for dowry’. All the essential ingredients to bring home the guilt under Section 304B IPC are established against the appellants by the prosecution evidence. As a matter of law, the presumption under Section 113B of the Evidence Act, 1872 is fully attracted in the facts and circumstances of the present case. The appellants have failed to rebut the presumption under Section 113B. [Para 19] [641-D-F] Case Law Reference: (2007) 9 SCC 721 referred to Para 9 (1996) 4 SCC 596 referred to Para 15 (2005) 2 SCC 388 referred to Para 16 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 831 of 2006. From the Judgment & Order date 16.12.2004 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Criminal Appeal No. 113-S.B. of 1991. V. Madhukar, Paritosh Anil (for Hemantikar Wahi) for the Appellants. Kamal Mohan Gupta, Gaurav Teotia, Sanjeev Kumar for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 831 OF 2006 Bachni Devi & Anr. …Appellants Versus State of Haryana Through Secretary, Home Department …Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA, J. The mother (A-1) and son (A-2) are in appeal as both of them have been convicted by the Additional Sessions Judge … Continue reading

CONDONATION OF DELAY= In the facts of this case it is clear that of all the three ladies, who were the appellants, one of them was pursuing the case and she fell sick. Therefore, she was not in a position to pursue the legal remedy with due diligence as a result of which the appeal was filed with a delay of 63 days. The delay of 63 days is not a delay for a long period and there has been some explanation for the delay. The High Court should have, before passing the impugned judgment, considered the explanation for the delay along with the facts of the case, the position of the parties, the nature of the litigation and the period of delay. The High Court should also have considered that it has been settled by a catena of cases that, unless the delay is gross, an explanation for the same should be liberally construed. It appears that the High Court has not been able to consider all these relevant facts in their correct perspective before passing the impugned order. 8

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.9059 OF 2011 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (C) No.18191/2009) Poonam & others …Appellant(s) – Versus – Harish Kumar and another …Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This civil appeal is directed against … Continue reading

Dying declaration = when her statement was shrouded by suspicious circumstances and contrary to the claim of the prosecution. Particularly, when she was alleged to have 97% burns and being under constant sedatives first at Civil Hospital, Naraingarh and then at PGI, Chandigarh, in such a situation she could not be expected to make a statement at a stretch without asking any questions. Admittedly, the Executive Magistrate, PW-2 did not put any question and recorded her answers. 14) Another important aspect relating to failure on the part of prosecution is that on the date of the incident, the deceased had two children aged about six and four years respectively and both of them were present there, admittedly, the I.O. has not enquired them about the genuineness of the incident. Though, there are number of immediate neighbours/co- 19

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 328 OF 2004 Surinder Kumar …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Haryana …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 19.12.2003 passed by the High Court … Continue reading

alteration of sentence =incident took place because of a sudden fight. The nature of the injuries inflicted, the absence of any criminal antecedents of the 4

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICITION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1878 OF 2011 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.2626 of 2011) Baljinder Singh @ Bittu …Appellant Versus State of Punjab …Respondent O R D E R T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal arises out of an order dated 5th … Continue reading

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