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Himachal Pradesh

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Himachala Pradesh state amendment is with the view to provide impediment free reservation in promotion to the Scheduled-Castes and Scheduled-Tribes and to bring certainty and clarity in the matter. Furthermore, the aforesaid proposed amendment is to be introduced with retrospective effect from 17th June, 1995. = “‘Due Consideration’ is totally different from collecting quantifiable data. This exercise has to be conducted and no reservation in promotion can be made without conducting such an exercise. Therefore, the State cannot be permitted to make reservations till such exercise is carried out and clear-cut quantifiable data is collected on the lines indicated in M.Nagaraj’s case. We may also point out that other than making vague reference to “due consideration” having been done, till date the State has not produced before us any clear-cut quantifiable data which could establish the need for reservation. Merely because the amended provision of the Constitution enable the State to make reservation is no ground not to collect data. Therefore, the instructions have to be struck down as being violate of the law laid down in M. Nagaraj’s case by the Apex Court.”= We, therefore, allow this Interlocutory Application and direct the State of Himachal Pradesh to take a final decision on the issue either on the basis of the data already submitted to the Cabinet Sub-Committee on 25th April, 2011 or on the basis of the data reflecting the position as on 30th June, 2011, within a period of three months from today. Till a final decision is taken, the direction restraining the State of Himachal Pradesh from making any promotion shall continue H.P. Scheduled Tribes Employees Federation & Anr. … Appellants Versus Himachal Pradesh S.V.K.K. & Ors. …Respondents.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40773 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION INTERLOCUTORY APPLICATION NO.6 OF 2012 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C.) No. 30143 OF 2009 H.P. Scheduled Tribes Employees Federation & Anr. … Appellants Versus Himachal Pradesh S.V.K.K. & Ors. …Respondents With CONTEMPT PETITION (C.) NO. 91 OF 2013 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C.) … Continue reading

Hindu succession Act – scope of sec. 6 and sec. 8 = a suit for declaration that sale deed dated 19.6.1993 executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 is illegal, void, without jurisdiction and inoperative on the rights of the appellant with consequential relief of possession and permanent prohibitory injunction. = 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the property in dispute has devolved upon the heirs of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi under proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. 2. Whether in view of the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act the succession of property of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi on his heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act will change the nature and nomenclature of property from ancestral/coparcenary property to that of self acquired property. = “6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left his surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I. – For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.” The interest of Nanak Chand shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. In view of Explanation I of Sec. 6, Nanak Chand would have got 1/5th interest on partition between him and his wife and three sons. If once the interest of Nanak Chand is determined to be 1/5th before his death, his interest would devolve upon his widow, three sons and three daughters equally and thus the share of each one of them would be 1/5 x 1/7, that is, 1/35th each. The claim of these heirs cannot be denied merely because some of them have not advanced the claim. When the question of determination of share among the heirs crops up before the Court, the Court has to see that every heir gets his due. Shri Itorora appearing for the respondents could not successfully meet the point raised on behalf of the appellant.” = The bare perusal of Section 6 of the Act makes it clear that in this situation the estate of Baba Surinder Singh would devolve under Section 8 and not under Section 6 of the Act. In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, respondent No.2 would inherit his share in the estate of late Baba Surinder Singh in his individual capacity and not alongwith his son appellant. Once this is the position then the appellant has no right to assail the sale dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1.

published in http://164.100.138.36/casest/generatenew.php?path=data/judgment/2013old/&fname=RSA4822000.pdf&smflag=N IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA R.S.A.No. 482 of 2000. Judgment reserved on : 6.5.2010 Date of decision : 14.6. 2010. Capt. Arminder Singh Bedi (Amninder Singh Bedi) ..Appellant. Versus Guru Nanak Dev University and another . ..Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting ?1 … Continue reading

sec. 302, 498 A = Non – Explanation of LIGATURE MARK by Accused while joining his wife in the Hospital = There was 10 cm long ligature mark of dark brown colour extending from left sternocleide mastoid to the right sternocleide mastoid below cricoids cartilage, reddish brown in colour, abrasion to be on the right side. Ligature mark encircles the neck only on front side. No encircling of the neck on the back and away from sternecleid mastoid. There was ligature of 1.5 cm wide or less than it at places (ligature used was not presented by the police at the time of postmortem examination). It was not with the body either. No abrasion/brusises on the mouth, nose, cheeks, forehead. Lips were blue. Tongue was in drawn, plinching of teeth, on opening base of tongue swollen. No injury to tough, clinching of hands present.= High Court at Shimla, acquitted the accused­respondent by allowing the appeal and set aside the order of conviction under Section 302 IPC and Section 498­A IPC with sentence thereunder, passed by the Sessions Judge, Hamirpur, HP on 13th June, 2002. = Post mortem report(PW­10/A) prepared by Dr. K.C. Chopra(PW­10) shows that there was ligature mark on the neck of the deceased. – the ligature mark of 10cm long and 1.5 cm. wide in horizontal position cannot be caused by hanging but could have been caused by strangulation. Medical evidence, therefore, completely falsify the case of accused no. 1(respondent herein). The conduct of the accused no. 1 was also not natural. When he found his wife hanging, he neither made hue and cry nor called the villagers nearby. He along with others brought down the body of the deceased. He, even thereafter, did not report the matter immediately on his own to police.= Therefore, we find that all the findings by the Division Bench of the High Court, rejecting the evidence of Dr. K.C. Chopra (PW­10) and other material witnesses including Kartar Chand (PW­3) and Prem Chand (PW­5) are clearly unsustainable, whereas those given by the Trial Court accepting the evidence of these witnesses were weighty and sound. Hence, we allow the appeal and set aside the impugned order of acquittal passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Himachal Pradesh on 16th November, 2004 and convict the accused­respondent under Section 302 IPC for the murder of his wife, Vidhya Devi and sentence him to imprisonment for life. We, thereby restore the order of conviction passed against the accused­respondent by the Trial Court. The accused­respondent shall surrender immediately to serve out the remainder of the sentence.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40517 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 269 OF 2007 STATE OF HIMACHAL PRADESH  … APPELLANT VERUS JAI CHAND  … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. This appeal is preferred by the State of Himachal Pradesh against   the   judgment   dated   16th  November,   2004     in   Criminal Appeal No. 392 of 2002. By the impugned judgment the Division Bench of the Himachal Pradesh High Court at Shimla, acquitted the accused­respondent  by  allowing  the  appeal    and  set  aside the order of conviction under Section 302 IPC and Section 498­A IPC with  sentence  thereunder,    passed  by  the  Sessions  Judge, Hamirpur, HP on 13th June, 2002. … Continue reading

sec.376 I.P.C. and Juvenile Justice (Care and Protection of Children) Act, 2000= whether the conviction recorded by the High Court was justified on merits and, if it was, whether we ought to refer the appellant to the Juvenile Justice Board at this stage. Our answer is in the affirmative qua the first part and negative qua the second. The High Court has, in our opinion, properly appreciated the evidence on record especially the deposition of the prosecutrix, her companion PW-2 and her aunt Piar Devi-PW-3 as also her parents. The High Court has also correctly appreciated the medical evidence available on record especially the deposition and the report of PW-8-Dr. Suresh Bansal, the relevant portion of whose report reads as under: “…On examination I found that the female child had not started menstruating. There was painful separation of thighs. No marks of violence were present. Clotted blood was present on labia majora and on thighs. Secondary sexual characters were developed. Breasts were developed according to age. Pubic and axillary hairs were present but were scanty. Hymen was freshly fractured. Posterior fourchette was torn. The chid admitted one little finger with pain. The vagina was congested….. Injury mentioned in MLC Ext. PW-8/C appeared on the prosecutrix was subject to sexual intercourse…” 19. The prosecutrix was between 9 to 12 years according to the deposition of PW-9-Dr. D.C. Negi and deposition of PW- 13 who proved her date of birth to be 13th April, 1982. The presence of human blood on the cap with which the appellant appears to have wiped the blood after the sexual assault is also an incriminating circumstance which the High Court has rightly taken into consideration while finding the appellant guilty. We, therefore, see no reason to interfere with the order of conviction as recorded by High Court on merits. 20. Coming then to the question of reference to the Juvenile Justice Board, we are of the view that such a reference is unnecessary at this distant point of time. The appellant is nearly 36 years old by now and a father of three children. He has already undergone nearly three years of imprisonment awarded to him by the High Court. In the circumstances, reference to the Juvenile Justice Board at this stage of his life would, in our opinion, serve no purpose. The only option available is to direct his release from custody. 21. In the result, we dismiss criminal appeal arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.5059 of 2012 directed against the order of the High Court dated 8th April, 2010 and uphold the conviction of the appellant for the offence under Section 376 IPC.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 628-629 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P (Crl.) Nos.5059-60 of 2012) Bharat Bhushan …Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …Respondent J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. These … Continue reading

Section 14(3)(c) does not require that the building plans should have been duly sanctioned by the local authorities as a condition precedent to the entitlement of the landlord for eviction of the tenant. = availability of building plans duly sanctioned by the local authorities is not an ingredient of Section 14(3)(c) of the Act and, therefore, could not be a condition precedent to the entitlement of the landlord for eviction of the tenant, but depending on the facts and circumstances of each case, the Court may look into the availability of building plans duly sanctioned by the local authorities for the purpose of determining the bonafides of the landlord. once the High Court maintained the order of eviction passed by the Controller under Section 14(4) of the Act, the tenants were obliged to give vacant possession of the building to the landlord and could only ask for reasonable time to deliver vacant possession of the building to the landlord and hence the direction of the High Court that the order of eviction could only be executed on the revised plan of the building being approved was clearly contrary to the provisions of Section 14(4) of the Act and the proviso thereto. We accordingly allow the appeals, set aside the directions in Para 27 of the impugned judgment of the High Court, but grant time to the respondents to vacate the building within three months from today. We make it clear that it will be open for the respondents to apply for re-entry into the building in accordance with the proviso to clause (c) of Section 14(3) of the Act introduced by the Amendment Act, 2009. Considering, however, the peculiar facts and circumstances of the cases, there shall be no order as to costs.

Page 1     Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 4127 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 30 of 2012) Hari Dass Sharma … Appellant Versus Vikas Sood & Ors. … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL No. 4128 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.776 of 2012) … Continue reading

Section 292 read with Section 34 of the IPC and Section 7 of Cinematograph Act. = benefit of Section 4 of the Probation of Offenders Act. The Court rejecting the submission observed: “There are certain exceptions to this section with which we are not concerned. This section was amended by Act XXXVI when apart from enlarging the scope of the exceptions, the penalty was enhanced which was earlier up to three months or with fine or with both. By the amendment a dichotomy of penal treatment was introduced for dealing with the first offenders and the subsequent offenders. In the case of even a first conviction the accused shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to two years and with fine which may extend to two thousand rupees. The intention of the legislature is, therefore, made clear by the amendment in 1969 in dealing with this type of offences which corrupt the minds of people to whom these objectionable things can easily reach and it needs not be emphasized that the corrupting influence of these pictures is more likely to be upon the younger generation who has got to be protected from being easy prey to these libidinous appeals upon which this illicit trade is based. We are, therefore, not prepared to accept the submission of the learned counsel to deal with the accused leniently in this case.” – Punjab and Haryana High Court in the case of Bharat Bhushan vs. State of Punjab reported in 1999 (2) RCR (Criminal) 148 refusing to give benefit of probation for exhibiting blue film punishable under Sections 292 and 293 of the IPC. The Court held that: “exhibiting blue film in which man and woman were shown in the act of sexual intercourse to young boys would definitely deprave and corrupt their morals. Their minds are impressionable. On their impressionable minds anything can be imprinted. Things would have been different if that blue film had been exhibited to mature minds. Showing a man and a woman in the act of sexual intercourse tends to appealing to the carnal side of the human nature. Petitioner is the first offender and is a petty shopkeeper, maintaining a family and as such the High Court feel that he should be dealt with leniently in the matter of sentence. He cannot be released on probation of good conduct as the act imputed to him tended to corrupt and deprave the minds of immature and adolescent boys.” 11. In the facts and circumstances of the case and also considering the nature of the activities and the offence committed by the appellants, we are unable to show any leniency and to modify the sentence any further. 12. For the aforesaid reasons, we do not find any merit in the appeal which is accordingly dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 227 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.) No.2537/2012) Gita Ram & Anr. …………Appellant(s) Vs. State of H.P. ………..Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T M.Y.EQBAL,J. Leave granted. 2. This appeal by special leave arises out of the … Continue reading

…it is fundamental that compulsory taking of a man’s property is a serious matter and the smaller the man the more serious the matter. Hearing him before depriving him is both reasonable and pre-emptive of arbitrariness, and denial of this administrative fairness is constitutional anathema except for good reasons.” Section 5-A is undoubtedly a condition precedent to a valid declaration, for, there can be no valid acquisition under the Act unless the Government is satisfied that the land to be acquired is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. But there is nothing in sub-section (1) which requires that such satisfaction need be stated in the declaration. The only declaration as required by sub-section 1 is that the land to be acquired is needed for a public purpose or for a Company. Sub-section (2) makes this clear, for it clearly provides that the declaration “shall state” where such land is situate, “the purpose for which it is needed”, its approximate area and the place. Where its plan, if made, can be inspected. It is such a declaration made under sub-section (1) and published under sub-section (2) which becomes conclusive evidence that the particular land is needed for a public purpose or for a Company as the case may be. The contention therefore that it is imperative that the satisfaction must be expressed in the declaration or that otherwise the notification would not be in accord with Section 6 is not correct.”- In view of the findings recorded on the three main questions, we do not consider it necessary to deal with and decide other questions including the one that the purpose specified in the notifications issued under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) was not a bona fide public purpose and that in the garb of acquiring land for IT Park etc., the Chandigarh Administration wanted to favour the private developers. 65. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and Notifications dated 26.6.2006, 2.8.2006 and 28.2.2007 issued by the Chandigarh Administration under Sections 4(1) and 6(1) of the Act are quashed. The parties are left to bear their own costs.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7454-7459 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 12877-12882/2011) Surinder Singh Brar and others etc.etc. Appellants versus Union of India and others Respondents with CIVIL APPEAL NOS.7460-7463 of 2012 (Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 13518-13521/2011) CIVIL APPEAL NO.7464 of 2012 (Arising out of … Continue reading

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION=there is adequate credible evidence on record that the Respondent’s husband was suffering from tuberculosis and that he had suppressed this material fact. This has been established by the medical certificate of the District Tuberculosis Officer which we note, was supplied by the Respondent herself to the Petitioner/Insurance Company. Further, it is also on record and not disputed that the insuree had taken medical leave for long periods for his treatment of tuberculosis. Since, an insurance is a contract entered between the parties in “utmost good faith”, suppression of any material facts by the insuree(as was done in this case), entitled the Petitioner/Insurance Company to repudiate the claim as per the terms and conditions of the policy.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 3050 of 2007 (Against order dated 07.05.2007 in Appeal No.295/2006 of the State Commission, H.P.) LIC of India & Ors.                                                        ……..Petitioners   Vs. Smt.Shakuntala Devi & Anr.                                       …….. Respondents  BEFORE:              HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHAN, PRESIDENT           HON’BLE MRS. VINEETA RAI, MEMBER For the Petitioners                 :        Mr. Ashok Kashyap, Advocate For the Respondents             :        NEMO. Pronounced on 15th  November, 2011 … Continue reading

Murder case – dying declaration of victim -The fact that the incident occurred on 28.7.2003 and Kamini Verma eventually died on 1.8.2003, i.e., 4 days after the recording of the dying declaration also shows that she could certainly have been fit to make her dying declaration on 28.7.2003. Her fitness was actually recorded on the dying declaration by Dr. D.P. Dogra PW11. A number of prosecution witnesses reveal

1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2423 OF 2009 Deepak Verma …. Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …. Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.157 OF 2010 Dheeraj Verma …. Appellant Versus State of Himachal Pradesh …. Respondent J U D G M E N T JAGDISH SINGH KHEHAR, … Continue reading

This dispute between the State of Himachal Pradesh (Plaintiff), on the one hand, and the Union of India (defendant No.1), State of Punjab (defendant No.2), State of Haryana (defendant No.3), State of Rajasthan (defendant No.4) and Union Territory of Chandigarh (defendant No.5), on the other hand, under Article 131 of the Constitution of India relates to the power generated in the Bhakra-Nangal and Beas Projects.= Whether the State of Himachal Pradesh is entitled to an allocation of 7.19% in addition to 12% free power as claimed above, of the total power generated in Bhakra-Nangal & Beas Projects from the date of commissioning of the Projects or the appointed date (01.11.1966)? (Plaintiff) 10. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a decree for a sum of Rs.2199.77 crores against the defendants jointly and severally, as compensation/reimbursement for their failure to supply to the plaintiff 12% and 7.19% shares (on account of distress caused/surrender of rights to generate power and on account of transfer of population to the plaintiff State respectively in the power generated in these projects upto the date of the filing of the present suit and such further sums as may be determined, as entitlement of the plaintiff for the period subsequent to the filing of the suit? (Plaintiff) 11. Whether the Plaintiff-State is entitled to the award of any interest on the amounts determined as its entitlement? (Plaintiff)” =It is hereby declared that the Plaintiff-State is entitled to 7.19% of the power of the composite State of Punjab from the Bhakra-Nangal Project with effect from 01.11.1966 and from Beas Project with effect from the dates of production in Unit I and Unit II. (iii) It is ordered that Defendant No.1 will work out the details of the claim of the Plaintiff-State on the basis of such entitlements of the Plaintiff, Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 in the tables in Paragraph 77 of this judgment as well as all other rights and liabilities of the Plaintiff-State, Defendant No.2 and Defendant No.3 in accordance with the provisions of the Punjab Reorganisation Act, 1966 and file a statement in this Court within six months from today stating the amounts due to the Plaintiff-State from Defendant Nos. 3 and 4. (iv) On the amount found to be due to the Plaintiff- State for the period from 01.11.1966 in the case of Bhakra-Nangal Project and the amount found due to the Plaintiff-State for the period from the dates of production in the case of Beas Project, the Plaintiff-State would be

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA ORIGINAL JURISDICTION ORIGINAL SUIT NO. 2 OF 1996 State of Himachal Pradesh …… Plaintiff Versus Union of India & Ors. …… Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This dispute between the State of Himachal Pradesh (Plaintiff), on the one hand, and … Continue reading

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