HinduSuccession Act

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Will-Propounder taking prominent part, in execution of and receiving benefit under-Principles regarding scrutiny of evidence of execution and sound disposing state of mind of testator. HEADNOTE: One V lost his father when he was only 10 years old and. thereafter lived along with his mother, in the- house of the first defendant who was his maternal uncle. The first defendant had considerable influence over V as he was slow witted and below the average level of intelligence and, understanding. V died when he was 24 years old. A few. days before his death he executed a will by which he bequeathed his entire property to the first defendant absolutely with a direction that his mother should be maintained, and that, even if his mother lived separately from the first defendant, she was to have only a life interest in certain items which were also to be taken absolutely by the first defendant after her death. At the time of the execution of the -will V was physically in a weak condition. The first defendant took a prominent part in summoning the attesting witnesses and the scribe and in Procuring, writing materials for the execution of the will. Evidence was given on behalf the first defendant that though V was delirious on the day previous to the execution of the will and also subsequent to that date, V was in a normal condition on the date of the execution of the will. On the question of the validity of the will, HELD : The will was not executed in a sound disposing state of mind and was therefore not legally valid. [480,A-B] In a case in which a will is prepared under circumstance which raise the suspicion of the court that it does not express the mind of the testator it is for those who -propound the will to remove that suspicion. What are suspicious circumstances must be judged on the facts and circumstances of each particular case. If, however, the Propounder takes a prominent part in the execution of the will which confers substantial benefits on him that itself is a suspicious circumstance attending the execution of the will and in appreciating the evidence in -such a case the court should proceed in a vigilant and cautious, manner. [477 R; 478 A-B] Barry v. Butlin, (1838) 2 Moo. P.C. 480, 482, Fulton v. Andrew, (1875) L.R. 7 H.L. 448, Tyrrell v. Painton, (1894) P. 151, 157, 159 and Sarat Kumari Bibi v. Sakhi Chand & Ors., 56 I.A. 62, applied.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=2120 PETITIONER: GORANTLA THATAIAH Vs. RESPONDENT: THOTAKURA VENKATA SUBBAIAH & ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 19/03/1968 BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. BENCH: RAMASWAMI, V. SHAH, J.C. MITTER, G.K. CITATION: 1968 AIR 1332 1968 SCR (3) 473 ACT: Will-Propounder taking prominent part, in execution of and receiving benefit under-Principles regarding scrutiny of evidence of execution and sound … Continue reading

Both suits are remanded due to contradictory recordings for clubbing and disposal = We may have remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeals filed by the appellant and respondent No. 2 but keeping in view the fact that the findings recorded in the two suits regarding Item No. 5 of Schedule `B’ properties specified in the plaint of O.S. No. 4528 of 1980 are contradictory and substantial portion of the judgment of O.S. No. 4528 of 1980 is based on surmises and conjectures, we feel that ends of justice would be met by setting aside the impugned judgment and remitting the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the suits filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The judgments of the trial Court in O.S. Nos. 4528 of 1980 and 2062 of 1981 are also set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the suits. With a view to avoid the possibility of conflicting findings regarding Item No.5 of Schedule `B’ properties specified in the plaint of O.S. No.4528 of 1980, we direct the trial Court to club the two suits and dispose of 3 the same by one judgment. The parties shall be free to file applications for additional evidence and bring on record the orders passed by the Land Tribunal and the High Court in relation to Item Nos. 1 to 4 of Schedule `B’ appended to the plaint of O.S. No.4528 of 1980.

published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx NON REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6714-6715 OF 2002 Y. Nagaraj ……..Appellant   Versus   Smt. Jalajakshi and others …….Respondents     J U D G M E N T   G. S. Singhvi, J.   1. These appeals … Continue reading

Hindu succession Act – scope of sec. 6 and sec. 8 = a suit for declaration that sale deed dated 19.6.1993 executed by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1 is illegal, void, without jurisdiction and inoperative on the rights of the appellant with consequential relief of possession and permanent prohibitory injunction. = 1. Whether in the facts and circumstances of the case the property in dispute has devolved upon the heirs of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi under proviso to Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act. 2. Whether in view of the proviso of Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act the succession of property of Baba Surinder Singh Bedi on his heirs under Section 8 of the Hindu Succession Act will change the nature and nomenclature of property from ancestral/coparcenary property to that of self acquired property. = “6. When a male Hindu dies after the commencement of this Act, having at the time of his death an interest in a Mitakshara coparcenary property, his interest in the property shall devolve by survivorship upon the surviving members of the coparcenary and not in accordance with this Act: Provided that, if the deceased had left his surviving a female relative specified in Class I of the Schedule or a male relative, specified in that class who claims, through such female relative, the interest of the deceased in the Mitakshara coparcenary property shall devolve by testamentary or intestate succession, as the case may be, under this Act and not by survivorship. Explanation I. – For the purposes of this section, the interest of a Hindu Mitakshara coparcener shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death, irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not.” The interest of Nanak Chand shall be deemed to be the share in the property that would have been allotted to him if a partition of the property had taken place immediately before his death irrespective of whether he was entitled to claim partition or not. In view of Explanation I of Sec. 6, Nanak Chand would have got 1/5th interest on partition between him and his wife and three sons. If once the interest of Nanak Chand is determined to be 1/5th before his death, his interest would devolve upon his widow, three sons and three daughters equally and thus the share of each one of them would be 1/5 x 1/7, that is, 1/35th each. The claim of these heirs cannot be denied merely because some of them have not advanced the claim. When the question of determination of share among the heirs crops up before the Court, the Court has to see that every heir gets his due. Shri Itorora appearing for the respondents could not successfully meet the point raised on behalf of the appellant.” = The bare perusal of Section 6 of the Act makes it clear that in this situation the estate of Baba Surinder Singh would devolve under Section 8 and not under Section 6 of the Act. In view of law laid down by the Supreme Court in the aforesaid judgments, respondent No.2 would inherit his share in the estate of late Baba Surinder Singh in his individual capacity and not alongwith his son appellant. Once this is the position then the appellant has no right to assail the sale dated 19.6.1993 made by respondent No.2 in favour of respondent No.1.

published in IN THE HIGH COURT OF HIMACHAL PRADESH, SHIMLA R.S.A.No. 482 of 2000. Judgment reserved on : 6.5.2010 Date of decision : 14.6. 2010. Capt. Arminder Singh Bedi (Amninder Singh Bedi) ..Appellant. Versus Guru Nanak Dev University and another . ..Respondents. Coram The Hon’ble Mr. Justice Kuldip Singh, Judge. Whether approved for reporting ?1 … Continue reading

Hindu succession Act sec. 8 order of succession = In the personal/ self acquired property of Grand father, No Grand son can file a suit for partition against his father as the property fell to the father is his personal property and as the grand son is not the class I heir = A serious objection to the maintainability of the suit has been filed by the grandchildren of late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri in the life time of their father.= The present suit has been filed by Gaurav Sikri and Khushal Sikri, who are both minor sons of the defendant No.2. The suit has been filed through their mother Smt. Neha Sikri.= as per the averments made in the plaint late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri was the owner of the suit properties- on the death of late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri his heirs succeeded to the same as per the law of succession. In view of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs would not fall in the category of Class I heirs and only their father (defendant No.2) would be entitled to inherit CS(OS)944/2004 Page No.3 of 8along with his brothers, sister and mother. = In view of the preamble to the Act, i.e., that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in class I and only includes son and does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. – late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri was the owner of the suit properties and that upon his death the same were inherited by his legal heirs. That being the case, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wealth Tax Commissioner v. Chander Sen (supra) would be clearly applicable and, therefore, the plaintiffs being the grandsons would not have any share in the property left by late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri during the life time of the defendant No.2 (Rajesh Sikri). Consequently, the plaint, on the basis of the averments made therein, does not disclose any cause of action and the same is accordingly rejected.

published in http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/BDA/judgement/07-11-2007/BDA24092007S9442004.pdf THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Judgment delivered on : 24.09.2007 CS(OS) 944/2004 MASTER GAURAV SIKRI & ANR. …….Plaintiffs – versus – SMT. KAUSHALYA SIKRI & ORS. ……..Defendants Advocates who appeared in this case: For the Plaintiffs : Mr Viraj R. Datar with Mr Aditya Jhanji For the Defendants : Mr … Continue reading

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT – KARNATAKA AMENDMENT IN RESPECT OF DAUGHTERS SHARE ON PAR WITH SONS = it was open to the appellant to claim enhancement of her share in the joint family properties because she had not married till the enforcement of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994.= if law governing the parties is amended before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party benefited by such amendment can make a request to the court to take cognizance of the amendment and give effect to the same. If the rights of the parties to the suit change due to other reasons, the court seized with the final decree proceedings is not only entitled but is duty-bound to take notice of such change and pass appropriate order.- the Act was amended by the State Legislature and Sections 6-A to 6-C were inserted for achieving the goal of equality set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. In terms of Section 2 of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994, Section 6-A came into force on 30-7-1994 i.e. the date on which the amendment was published. As on that day, the final decree proceedings were pending. Therefore, the appellant had every right to seek enlargement of her share by pointing out that the discrimination practised against the unmarried daughter had been removed by the legislative intervention and there is no reason why the court should hesitate in giving effect to an amendment made by the State Legislature in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 15(3) of the Constitution.”

‘     ITEM NO.4 COURT NO.3 SECTION IVA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)……/2013 CC 9253-9255/2013 (From the judgement and order dated 11/01/2010 in RFA No.935/2003,RFA No.1012/2003 dated 06/01/2012 in RP … Continue reading

whether the suit was maintainable without seeking any consequential relief. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, (analogous to Section 34 of the Act 1963), and held, that where the defendant was not in physical possession, and not in a position to deliver possession to the plaintiff, it was not necessary for the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title to property, to claim the possession.”……It is also now evident that she was not in exclusive possession because admittedly Keshav Chandra and Jagdish Chandra were in possession. There were also other tenants in occupation. In such an event the relief of possession ought to have been asked for. The failure to do so undoubtedly bars the discretion of the Court in granting the decree for declaration.”= A mere declaratory decree remains non-executable in most cases generally. However, there is no prohibition upon a party from seeking an amendment in the plaint to include the unsought relief, provided that it is saved by limitation. However, it is obligatory on the part of the defendants to raise the issue at the earliest.= “……a declaratory decree simpliciter does not attain finality if it has to be used for obtaining any future decree like possession. In such cases, if suit for possession based on an earlier declaratory decree is filed, it is open to the defendant to establish that the declaratory decree on which the suit is based is not a lawful decree.” In view of the above, it is evident that the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was not maintainable, as they did not claim consequential relief. The respondent nos. 3 and 10 being admittedly in possession of the suit property, the appellants/plaintiffs had to necessarily claim the consequential relief of possession of the property. Such a plea was taken by the respondents/defendants while filing the written statement. The appellants/plaintiffs did not make any attempt to amend the plaint at this stage, or even at a later stage. The declaration sought by the appellants/plaintiffs was not in the nature of a relief. A worshipper may seek that a decree between the two parties is not binding on the deity, as mere declaration can protect the interest of the deity. The relief sought herein, was for the benefit of the appellants/plaintiffs themselves. As a consequence, the appeals lack merit and, are accordingly dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

‘     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 7605-7606 of 2004 Venkataraja & Ors. … Appellants Versus Vidyane Doureradjaperumal (D) Thr.Lrs. & Ors … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order … Continue reading

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