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Section 367(5) reads= Death and if not life, death or life, life and if not death, is the swinging progression of the criminal jurisprudence in India as far as capital punishment is concerned. The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898, under Section 367(5) reads: “If the accused is convicted of an offence punishable with death, and the Court sentences him to any punishment other than death, the Court shall in its judgment state the reason why sentence of death was not passed.”= In the above facts and circumstances of the case, while upholding the conviction of the appellant under Section 302 and Section 307 of IPC, we modify the sentence as follows: a) For offence under Section 302 of IPC, the appellant is sentenced to life imprisonment. b) For offence under Section 307 of IPC, the appellant is convicted to imprisonment for a period of seven years. 28. Imprisonment for life of a convict is till the end of his biological life as held by the Constitution Bench in Gopal Vinayak Godse vs. The State of Maharashtra and Others[37] case (supra). Hence, there is no point in saying that the sentences would run consecutively. However, we make it clear that in case the sentence of imprisonment for life is remitted or commuted to any specified period (in any case, not less than fourteen years in view of Section 433A of the Cr.PC.), the sentence of imprisonment under Section 307 of IPC shall commence thereafter. 29. The appeals are allowed as above.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40743 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 165-166 OF 2011 Sunil Damodar Gaikwad … Appellant (s) Versus State of Maharashtra … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.:   1. Death and if not life, death or life, life and if not death, … Continue reading

for conviction under Section 304B of IPC, it is obligatory on the part of the prosecution to establish that the death occurred within seven years of marriage. Sans the requirement of seven years, in this case, the offence would fall only under Section 498A of IPC. And for that matter, sans any of the five ingredients discussed at Paragraph 6 above herein, the offence will fall out of Section 304B of IPC. It has to be noted that the deceased had two children, the son had died earlier and there is a surviving daughter who is stated to be around seven years. Whether the said age of the daughter is at the time of evidence or at the time of the death of the deceased, is not clear. Neither PW-1, father of the deceased nor PW- 2 Sarpanch or any other witness has given any evidence with regard to the date of marriage. No document whatsoever has been produced with regard to the marriage. There is no evidence even with regard to the date of birth of the children. Also, according to PW-1 father of the deceased, the marriage had taken place five to seven years back. It has to be noted that DW-1 elder devrani/sister-in-law of the deceased had stated in her evidence that the marriage had taken place around eleven years back. Nobody has even spoken on the exact date of marriage. The death reportedly took place on 06.04.1990. The evidence was recorded in 1996. The High Court counted the eleven years from the date of recording of the evidence. However, on going through the evidence, it is not at all clear as to whether the same is with respect to the date of tendering evidence or with respect to the date of the incident. Hence, we set aside the conviction of the appellant under Section 304B of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860). The conviction under Section 498A of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860) is confirmed. However, taking note of the late evening age of the appellant, the substantive sentence is limited to the period undergone by him during the investigation/trial.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40720 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1308 OF 2013 Gurdip Singh … Appellant (s) Versus State of Punjab … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.:   1. Close to be called a centenarian, the appellant is before us challenging the conviction … Continue reading

M. Padmanabhacharlu – Great Father

Passing Night  Relieved the life from Great Journey of 85 years  My Father’s soul rest in Great Peace with out bedridden Great Personality stands for his words and Deeds – Great Father  My father left behind him adorable Works & adoptable Life Style Work till last breathe ; Never be burden for yourself ; Save your health & … Continue reading

Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad agricultural lands not included = The appellants contended that under the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as applied in the erstwhile State of Hyderabad where the lands were situated, the Ist respondent being the widow of deceesed Ramshetti, was not entitled to a share in the joint family agricultural lands. Agricultural lands are excluded from the provisions of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937. This contention has been negatived by the High Court. Hence the present appeal has been filed by the heirs of Veerappa.= It was submitted that prior to the enactment of the Hyderabad Hindu Women’s Right to Property (Extension to Agricultural Lands) Act, 1954, the Hindu women’s Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952 would not apply to agricultural land. The High Court has rightly negatived this contention. A subsequent Act cannot be used to interpret the provisions of an earlier enactment in this fashion. The language of the earlier Act is wide enough to cover agricultural land also. In the entire Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937, there is nothing which would indicate that the Act does not apply to agricultural land. The word ‘property’ is a general term which covers all kinds of property, including agricultural land. A restricted interpretation was given to thee original Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 enacted by the then Central Legislature, entirely because of the legislative entries in the Government of India Act, 1935, which excluded the legislative competence of the Central Legislature over agricultural lands. Such is not the case in respect of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property act, 1937, as enacted by the State Legislature of the State of Hyderabad. The ratio of the Federal Court judgment, therefore, would not apply. There is, therefore, no substance in the contention that the subsequent Act of 1954 restricted the application of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act, 1937 brought into force by the earlier Hyderabad Act of 1952. As is pointed out by the High Court, the Act of 1954 was enacted by way of abundant caution, to make sure that the agricultural lands were not considered as excluded from the scope of the Hindu Women’s Right to Property Act as enacted in 1952. The second Act is, therefore, clarificatory. The High Court has dealt at length with various decisions of this Court and other Court on thee question of interpretation of the said statute. Since we are in agreement with the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court, we are not again examining the cases referred to by the High Court. We, therefore, affirm the reasoning and conclusion arrived at by the High Court and dismiss this appeal. There will, however, be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=12909 PETITIONER: VAIJANATH & ORS. Vs. RESPONDENT: GURAMMA & ANR. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 18/11/1998 BENCH: SUJATA V. MANOHAR, & G.B. PATTANAIK.   ACT:   HEADNOTE:   JUDGMENT: ORDER The application to bring on record Respondent No.2 also as legal representative of deceased Respondent No. 1 is allowed. The Ist respondent was the widow of … Continue reading

transfer of case at fag end not maintainable = In order to substantiate the contention relating to bias, namely, the Presiding Judge would be influenced by his brother-in-law or even by his sister or Mr. P.K. Shahi to go against the interest of the appellant, Mr. Ram Jethmalani, learned senior counsel, placed some photographs taken on 13.01.2013 during the visit of Hon’ble the Chief Minister of Bihar Shri Nitish Kumar to the ancestral house of Shri P.K. Shahi along with the entire Shahi family at House No. 147 Village Angota Block, Nautan P.S., District Sivan. By showing these photographs, it is argued that there is a reasonable apprehension of real likelihood of bias on the part of the Presiding Judge. Apart from the relationship, as mentioned by the appellant, we were also shown the genealogical table. In our opinion, merely because some of the distantly related members were in the midst of the present Chief Minister, it cannot be presumed that the Presiding Judge would conclude against the appellant. Admittedly, the above criminal proceedings were heard by the very same Judge from November, 2011. After examination of witnesses and after hearing the arguments on both the sides, it is not clear how the appellant has such an apprehension at this stage. If the appellant really had any apprehension in his mind, this could have been raised at the earliest point of time and not after the conclusion of evidence and arguments, particularly, on the eve of pronouncement of judgment. As observed earlier, inconvenience, if any, can be set at right by granting further time for arguments. Accordingly, the claim of the appellant for transfer of the entire case from the file of the Special Judge to any other competent court cannot be entertained. We have already highlighted that the prosecution was initiated as early as in 1997 and after prolonged trial, the matter has reached final stage, namely, pronouncement of the decision. In our view, in a matter of this nature, it is not at all desirable to shift the case to some other court at the last hour.

 published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40636   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1166 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 5513 of 2013) Lalu Prasad @ Lalu Prasad Yadav …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Jharkhand …. Respondent(s) 2 3     J U D G M E N … Continue reading

Section 302, read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 High court acquitted, apex court confirmed the same = (I) The first information report has not been registered at the time and in the manner as it ought to have been written. (II) The counter FIR lodged by the respondents herein was written by Munshi (dead) on the dictation given by the Inspector of Police and not in accordance with the version given by the informant-respondent. (III) The report (Ex.P-13), which ought to have been lodged at the behest of the respondents herein, revealed that the respondents herein had used the lathis and a country-made pistol in selfdefence. (IV) There had been material discrepancies/contradictions/ inconsistencies in regard to the lodging of FIR and investigation so far as the statements of Pratap Singh, Head Constable and R.D. Yadav, S.O., and the entries made in the Rojnamcha. The cumulative effect of all the same creates a doubt in the prosecution story. (V) The FIR in the instant case against the respondents herein had been lodged by Pyare Chowkidar as directed by one Bilal Miyan who had informed him that Jagan had been killed by the party of Munshi and others. The said Bilal Miyan was neither an eye-witness, nor has been examined by the prosecution. (VI) Bilal Miyan had been informed by Ram Bharose about the murder of Jagan but who had not disclosed as who had killed Jagan. Thus, it was not clear as who had killed Jagan and the prosecution could not get any support whatsoever from the FIR. (VII) The evidence led by the prosecution shows that the offence was committed inside the house. Ram Bharose, witness, had seen it from Gallery. No such Gallery had been shown in the site plan. (VIII) The evidence had been that the rifle which was allegedly used in the murder was a single barrel gun but the empty cartridges used in the shooting were not recovered from the spot. No explanation had been furnished as what had happened to those empty cartridges. (IX) As per the prosecution, 3 live cartridges and one country-made pistol were found at the spot, though as per Ram Bharose, witness, the shot was fired from a single barrel gun. (X) The aforesaid contradictions led to the inference that Jagan had been murdered at some other place and in some other manner which was not brought on record by the prosecution. 10Page 11 (XI) It was nobody’s case that Collector Singh had fired two shots upon Jagan and even according to the postmortem report, there was no injury caused by the country-made pistol. (XII) There had been material contradictions regarding locking of the place where Jagan was detained and no explanation was there as who had opened that lock. (XIII) Ram Bharose and Rameshwar had been interested witnesses and their statements were full of discrepancies and contrary to the prosecution case. In view of the fact that no eye-witness was examined, the said material contradictions become most material. (XIV)The prosecution failed to explain the grievous injuries found on the person of Gobardhan and Munshi – accused herein. = This Court has laid down sufficient guidelines for interference by the superior court against the order of acquittal. In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances to interfere and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40481 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.824 of 2007 State of U.P. …Appellant Versus Gobardhan & Ors. …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed by the State of U.P. against the judgment and order dated … Continue reading

sections 376 (2) (g) , 376, 506, 366 and 363 IPC = The trial court has examined the issue on age and after examining the school certificate (Ext. P-N), which stood duly proved by Lakhi Ram (PW-11), Science teacher, Government High Court, Badhana and Gajraj Singh, teacher, Govt. Primary School, Badhana, came to the conclusion that her date of birth as per the school register was 4.6.1987. So on the date of incident i.e. 7.3.2001, she was 13 years 9 month and 2 days old. She was a student of 6th standard ; this Court held that fact of admission of two fingers and the hymen rupture does not give a clear indication that prosecutrix is habitual to sexual intercourse. The doctor has to opine as to whether the hymen stood ruptured much earlier or carried an old tear. The factum of admission of two fingers could not be held adverse to the prosecutrix, as it would also depend upon the size of the fingers inserted. The doctor must give his clear opinion as to whether it was painful and bleeding on touch, for the reason that such conditions obviously relate to the hymen. ; “Even in cases where there is some material to show that the victim was habituated to sexual intercourse, no inference of the victim being a woman of “easy virtues” or a women of “loose moral character” can be drawn. Such a woman has a right to protect her dignity and cannot be subjected to rape only for that reason. She has a right to refuse to submit herself to sexual intercourse to anyone and everyone because she is not a vulnerable object or prey for being sexually assaulted by anyone and everyone. Merely because a woman is of easy virtue, her evidence cannot be discarded on that ground alone rather it is to be cautiously appreciated. In view of the provisions of Sections 53 and 54 of the Evidence Act, 1872, unless the character of the prosecutrix itself is in issue, her character is not a relevant factor to be taken into consideration at all”. Thus, in view of the above, undoubtedly, the two finger test and its interpretation violates the right of rape survivors to privacy, physical and mental integrity and dignity. Thus, this test, even if the report is affirmative, cannot ipso facto, be given rise to presumption of consent.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1226 OF 2011 LILLU @ RAJESH & ANR. Appellants VERSUS STATE OF HARYANA Respondent O R D E R 1. This criminal appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 20.9.2010 passed by the High Court of Punjab … Continue reading

the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 =order of detention dated 16/4/2012 issued by the detaining authority i.e. the Principal Secretary (Appeals and Security), Government of Maharashtra, Home Department under the provisions of Section 3(1) of the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (for short, “the said Act”). The order of detention directed his detention with a view to preventing him in future from smuggling goods. we hold that the order of detention dated 16/4/2012 is valid. However, on account of delay in disposal of the representation of the detenu by the State Government, the continued detention of the detenu is rendered illegal. We, therefore, direct that the detenu – Abdul Nasar Adam Ismail be released from detention forthwith if he is not already released from detention and he is not required in any other case. The appeal is disposed of accordingly.


Code of Criminal Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act of 2007=whether the appellant could be tried by the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, for the offences punishable under Sections 408, 420, 467, 468 and 471 of the IPC notwithstanding the fact that the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 as amended by Code of Criminal Procedure (Madhya Pradesh Amendment) Act of 2007, made offences punishable under Sections 467, 468 and 471 of the Penal Code triable only by the Court of Sessions. ?- A Full Bench of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh in Re: Amendment of First Schedule of Criminal Procedure Code by Criminal Procedure Code (M. P. Amendment) Act, 2007 2008 (3) MPLJ 311, answered the reference and held that all cases pending before the Court of Judicial Magistrate First Class as on 22nd February, 2008 remained unaffected by the amendment and were triable by the Judicial Magistrate First Class as the Amendment Act did not contain a clear indication that such cases also have to be made over to the Court of Sessions. The Court further held that all such cases as were pending before the Judicial Magistrate First Class and had been committed to the Sessions Court shall be sent back to the Judicial Magistrate First Class in accordance with law. The reference was answered accordingly. = whether to a pending prosecution the provisions of the amended Code have become applicable. There is no controversy on the general principles applicable to the case. No person has a vested right in any course of procedure. He has only the right of prosecution or defence in the manner prescribed for the time being by or for the Court in which the case is pending and if by an Act of Parliament the mode of procedure is altered he has no other right than to proceed according to the altered mode. See Maxwell on Interpretation of Statutes on p. 225; The Colonial Sugar Refining Co. Ltd. v. Irving (1905) A.C. 369, 372). In other words a change in the law of procedure operates retrospectively and unlike the law relating to vested right is not only prospective.” 19. The upshot of the above discussion is that the view taken by the Full Bench holding the amended provision to be applicable to pending cases is not correct on principle. The decision rendered by the Full Bench would, therefore, stand overruled but only prospectively. – “ Prospective declaration of law is a device innovated by this Court to avoid reopening of settled issues and to prevent multiplicity of proceedings. It is also a device adopted to avoid uncertainty and avoidable litigation. By the very object of prospective declaration of law it is deemed that all actions taken contrary to the declaration of law, prior to the date of the declaration are validated. This is done in larger public interest. Therefore, the subordinate forums which are bound to apply law declared by this Court are also duty bound to apply such dictum to cases which would arise in future. Since it is indisputable that a court can overrule a decision there is no valid reason why it should not be restricted to the future and not to the past. Prospective overruling is not only a part of constitutional policy but also an extended facet of stare decisis and not judicial legislation.” – Under the doctrine of “prospective overruling” the law declared by the Court applies to the cases arising in future only and its applicability to the cases which have attained finality is saved because the repeal would otherwise work hardship to those who had trusted to its existence. Invocation of doctrine of “prospective overruling” is left to the discretion of the court to mould with the justice of the cause or the matter before the court.” – the overruling of the Full Bench decision of the Madhya Pradesh High Court will not affect cases that have already been tried or are at an advanced stage before the Magistrates in terms of the said decision

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 353 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No.5663 of 2011 Ramesh Kumar Soni …Appellant Versus State of Madhya Pradesh …Respondent J U D G M E N T T.S. THAKUR, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The short question that … Continue reading

The complainant gave intimation of theft to opposite party on 12.8.2008. Opposite Party repudiated claim on account of violation of condition = complainant’s truck was insured by OP and during subsistence of insurance, the truck was stolen on 20.5.2008 and on the very same day FIR was lodged under Section 379 IPC. Complainant has not mentioned purposely in the complaint that when intimation of theft was given to OP. But, letter dated 19.8.2008 issued by OP by which claim was repudiated reveals that by letter dated 12.8.2008, intimation of theft was given by the complainant to OP meaning thereby intimation of theft was given to the Insurance Company after 83 days of theft. As per terms and conditions of the policy it was obligatory on the part of the complainant to intimate about theft to the OP immediately.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION                                                 NEW DELHI             REVISION PETITION NO. 4762 OF 2012 (From the order dated 18.9.2012 in Appeal No.233/11 of the Haryana State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Panchkula)     Surender S/o Shri Kishan Singh, R/o Vill. Bidhal, Distt. Sonepat, Haryana                                                                                   …        Petitioner/OP   Versus   National Ins. Co. Ltd. Azadpur Branch II (Direct Agent Branch) Laxmi Tower, C-1/3, Naini Wala Bagh, Azadpur Commercial Complex, Delhi  – 110 033                                       …    Respondents/Complainant   BEFORE … Continue reading

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