advocatemmmohan
just another law knowledge bank
Hyderabad India
Though the appellant is eligible for consideration of the selection in to IAS – she was denied as she was a junior officer – not correct approach and against the rules and guidelines – B. Amrutha Lakshmi … Appellant Versus State of Andhra Pradesh and Ors. … Respondents= judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40890
Though the appellant is eligible for consideration of the selection in to IAS – she was denied as she was a junior officer – not correct approach and against the rules and guidelines = Apex court held wrong but due to lapse of time the apex court granted damages instead of disturbing processes already taken over long … Continue reading
Death due to accidental fall from upstairs – No proof – claim repudiated= Life Insurance Corporation of India Branch Manager Naidupetta Branch Nellore District Petitioner Through Assistant Secretary Northern Zonal Office Jeevan Bharti, Cannaught Circus New Delhi Versus N Shanker Reddy Son of Late Sarasamma Resident of Malakalapudi Village Respondent Chittamuru Mandal District Nellore, Andhra Pradesh- published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00131011133657827RP38692008html1.htm
Death due to accidental fall from upstairs – No proof claim repudiated = Death due to accidental fall from upstairs – no medical report, no police report and to say negative the report submitted does not belong to deceased as evidenced by reply of M.R.O. – No supporting affidavit who witnessed the incident filed – District consumer … Continue reading
Vehicle theft – premium paid through cheque for renewal of policy was bounced due to bank fault – Refusal of granting insurance claim – not tenable = In the meanwhile, the vehicle, in question, was stolen on the mid-night of 09.07.2004. The complainant lodged an FIR with the Police and also informed OP No. 2 Insurance Company regarding the theft and requested for payment of insurance claim. However, the said claim was rejected by OP No. 2 and they informed the complainant that his cheque bearing number 282302 dated 16.06.2004 for Rs.9,623/- had been dishonoured by OP No.1 and hence the insurance policy could not be renewed. The complainant then contacted OP No. 1 bank, where it was found that there was sufficient balance in the account of the complainant. The bank authorities vide their letter dated 13.07.2004 sent to the OP No. 2 insurance company stated that their counter clerk / officer had inadvertently returned the cheque issued by the complainant by oversight on 18.06.2004 and there was sufficient balance in savings account no. 6148 of the complainant. They also issued a banker’s cheque dated 13.07.2004 for Rs.9623/- in favour of OP No. 2 but the OP No. 2 rejected the said request and also rejected the claim filed by the complainant as the vehicle had already been stolen by that time. It is further borne out from record that after receiving the cheque of Rs.9,623/-, the Insurance Company did issue policy in favour of the complainant which was valid for a period of one year till 15.06.2005 but the said policy was cancelled by the Company after the cheque was dishonoured by the Bank. In the said insurance policy the total Insured Declared Value (IDV) of the vehicle has been shown to be Rs.2,62,000/-. The complainant in his complaint and further in written submissions has stated that since the vehicle was purchased for a sum of Rs.3,45,959.40 and it was only 16 months old, when it was stolen. The complainant has demanded a sum of Rs.4 lakh as compensation for the value of the vehicle. However, from the IDV mentioned in the Policy issued by the insurance company, it can be safely presumed that the complainant is not entitled to get more than Rs.2,62,000/- for loss of the vehicle. However, looking at the negligence shown by the complainant in not pursuing this case after submitting cheque for the premium amount he needs to be penalised also to some extent. It is felt, therefore, that a sum of Rs.1,50,000/- as already allowed by the State Commission seems to be a reasonable amount for awarding compensation to the complainant for loss of the vehicle.
published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130808105104311RP462109204810.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 4621 OF 2009 (From the order dated 29.10.2009 in First Appeal No. 106/2007 of Andhra Pradesh State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission) B. Shankar s/o B. Bhadru c/o B. Parasuram IInd Floor, H. No. 1-9-285/3A, Lalitha Nagar Ramnagar Gundu Hyderabad – 500 044. … Petitioner Versus 1. Union Bank of India Chikkadapally Branch, 1-8-563/2 … Continue reading
question of jurisdiction. = JURISDICTION OF CRIMINAL COURTS AND OF INVESTIGATOR IN MATRIMONIAL CASES = certain events were claimed to have taken place at Hyderabad through telephonic conversations between the petitioners and Krishna Reddy, through personal meetings between Krishna Reddy and the 1st and 2nd petitioners, through a memorandum of understanding, dated 11-05-2007 at Hyderabad, e-mails received at Hyderabad and withdrawal of Rs.8,00,000/- within the jurisdiction of the Courts at Hyderabad. Whether a part of the cause of action for prosecuting the petitioners for the offences or domestic violence alleged arose at Hyderabad or not will be a matter of conclusion at the trial and not before hand and hence, the application of Section 179 or Section 188 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 and any consequential requirement of complying with any procedural safeguards will depend upon the factual conclusions that will be arrived at during trial. REPORTED IN/ PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9000
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD Criminal Petition Nos.7063 of 2008 and 2539 of 2009 29/02/2012 A. Ashok Vardhan Reddy and others Smt. P. Savitha and another COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONERS: Sri T. Pradyumna Kumar Reddy COUNSEL FOR 1ST RESPONDENT: Sri P. Krishna Reddy ^COUNSEL FOR 2ND RESPONDENT: — Crl.P. No.2539 of 2009: A. Ashok … Continue reading
Repeated acquisition of land of the same family = whether by resorting to repeated acquisition of the properties belonging to the same person, the State is not acting contrary to the dictates of Article 14 of the Constitution. This question was answered in the affirmative.= The real question is not whether the petitioners will be left with 4 or 5 acres of land or a bit more or, that whether they are running some business or not. where there was no other possibility of providing house sites to the persons displaced in a project and the acquisition is found so inevitable, such cases may fall under exceptions, warranting acquisition of the properties belonging to the same family more than once. = The State and its Officials should display a reasonable and rational attitude in dealing with the properties of the private citizens As held by the Division Bench in K.Ramulu (cited supra), in the quest for providing house sites to one section of poor people, others cannot be ruined. The petitioners have succeeded in proving that acquisition of their lands is not inevitable in the face of availability of the land admeasuring Ac.5-20 cents comprised in Survey No.449 belonging to Mente Narayana Swamy. Such being the admitted position, I do not find any justification, whatsoever, in the action of the respondents in insisting on acquisition of the petitioners’ land.
reported in/published inhttp://164.100.12.10/hcorders/orders/2010/wp/wp_1449_2010.html * The Hon’ble Sri Justice C.V.Nagarjuna Reddy + Writ Petition No.1449 of 2010 % Date: 21-12-2011 Between: # Thumurouthu Mallikarjuna Rao and another ….. Petitioners AND $ 1.The State of Andhra Pradesh, Rep. by its Secretary, Revenue (L.A.) Secretariat, Hyderabad and 4 others. …..Respondents ^ Counsel for the Petitioners: Mr.S.Subba Reddy ! Counsel for … Continue reading
MESNE PROFITS =The Commissioner in his report under the heading observations has mentioned that most of the witnesses felt sorry for the plaintiff for receiving such low rent of Rs.36,000/-. After completion of the examination, while leaving P.W.2 informed them that he got it done another registered lease deed for Rs.65/- per sq. ft which is 100 mts away from A.2 towards suit schedule property. After completion of the examination of P.W.3 informed them that the existing market value for sq. ft is Rs.60/- and h has given for cheaper rate as the present rates are sky rocketed. After completion of the examination of P.W.4 he has requested the counsel for the defendant not to trouble the plaintiff by paying meager rent and requested him to pay the existing market value. The P.W.7 after completion of the examination while leaving the premises expressed that he is lucky enough as the present existing market value per sq. ft is on an average of Rs.45/-. Therefore, the said observations are unwarranted to be recorded by the Commissioner because whenever he wanted to record he ought to have been recorded in the evidence of the witnesses but not out of the record. The learned Commissioner has not followed proper procedure for arriving at the mesne profits. Thus, the said report of the learned Commissioner cannot be taken as basis for deciding the mesne profits. With regard to the quantum of mesne profits granted by the lower court, the lower court has granted mesne profits@ Rs.30/- per sq. feet as the plaintiff has claimed the same in the plaint. The claim made by the plaintiff in the plaint is not a basis for fixing the mesne profits. The court has to fix the mesne profits basing on the evidence and material placed before it for ascertaining the same. The lower court has observed that the Commissioner has arrived the mesne profits @ Rs.46.06 ps per sq. feet. The evidence adduced by the petitioners and documents relied upon by them would prove that the property situated in and around the suit schedule property fetch the rents more than Rs.60/- per sq. feet since the petitioners claiming Rs.30/- per sq. yard only in their plaint which was filed in the year 2005 which is not far back, the court below considered that the petitioners cannot claim more than what they pleaded in their original plaint. He further observed that the evidence of R.W.1 would show that he is getting Rs.27.50 ps per sq. yards which is situated near by the schedule property. Therefore, he accepted the evidence of R.W.1 to show that the property is situated near the suit schedule property would fetch more than Rs.30/- per sq. feet and thereby fixed the mesne profits for the suit schedule property at Rs.30/- per sq. feet. R.W.1 is not the owner of the property and according to him he has leased out the premises bearing No.483, Road No.36, Jubilee Hills to one G. M. Singh and the said property belongs to his sister K. Radha and he leased out the said premises of 2000 sq. yards for rent @ Rs.55,000/- per month. But the said R.W.1 has not produced any documents to show about the rent that he has been receiving by him for the said premises. Therefore, relying upon the evidence of R.W.1 by the lower court for arriving at the prevailing rent is without reliable evidence. Since the Commissioner has not properly enquired into the matter and the lower court has not come to the conclusion with regard to the mesne profits basing on the material placed before it, we hold it is just and proper to set the order of the lower court and remit back for making fresh enquiry with regard to the mesne profits. Hence, the order of the lower court is not just, legal and valid. In the result, both the appeals are allowed and the matter is remitted the matter back to the lower court for fresh disposal in accordance with law we made it clear that both parties are at liberty to adduce evidence on their behalf. In the circumstances, both the parties have to bear their own costs.
HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE B. PRAKASH RAO & HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE P. DURGA PRASAD C.C.C.A Nos.26 & 79 of 2008 Date: 28.02.2011 Between: M. Raja Gopala Rao and another ….Appellants. And: Sri K. Vinay Reddy …..Respondent. C.C.C.A No.79 of 2008 Between: Sri K. Vinay Reddy ….Appellant. And: M. Raja Gopala Rao and another …..Respondents. HON’BLE … Continue reading
“Under Section 16 of the Hindu Marriage Act children of void marriage are legitimate. Under the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 property of a male Hindu dying intestate devolve firstly on heirs in Clause (1) which include widow and son. Among the widow and son, they all get shares. The second wife taken by deceased Government employee during subsistence cannot be described a widow of deceased employee, their marriage void. Sons of the second wife being the legitimate sons of deceased would be entitled to the property of deceased employee in equal shares along with that of first wife and the sons born from the first marriage. That being the legal position when Hindu male dies intestate, the children of the deceased employee born out of the second wedlock would be entitled to share in the family pension and death-cum-retirement gratuity. The second wife was not entitled to anything and family pension would be admissible to minor children only till they attained majority”.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.C.BHANU CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No. 1215 OF 2008 Between : Sugunamma and others. …APPELLANTS A N D Contral Power Distribution Company of A.P. Ltd. and others. …RESPONDENTS THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE … Continue reading
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION=medical negligence = Coming finally to the assessment of the expert committee of AIIMS, we find that on the fall of the patient in the bathroom, it says— “It has been established from the record that the patient had a fall on the day 15 of the treatment, but the details of the fall, injury sustained if any, clinical condition post fall and/or CT scan are not available. There is a mention of altered sensoriumon day 16 which may be a part of Intra Cranial event (which may be a neurological manifestation) or Neutropenic shock because of infection.” 9. We have already noted the observation of the expert committee that in the absence of record of the clinical condition of the patient from 15th afternoon to 16th morning, they were not in a position to comment whether there was medical negligence or not. These observations of the expert committee of AIIMS and the records of treatment clearly show that on 15.12.2000, after deciding not to discharge the patient, respondent/NIMS has committed two serious lapses— a. While the condition of the patient warranted assessment of the effect of fall in the bathroom (whether by CT scan or any other investigation) it was not done. b. In fact there was no further investigation or treatment till the morning of the fateful day 16.12.2000. This is established by absence of record of treatment after 4 PM. Even the oral testimony of OP-3 examined above does not travel beyond 5 PM on 15.12.2000. The total gap from 5 PM on 15.12.2000 and 8 AM on 16.12.2000 has remained completely unexplained. 10. What compounds these two lapses is that the patient was running high temperature. In fact, it was serious enough for the OPs to postpone his discharge fixed for 15.12.2000. Secondly, as per their own evidence, the OPs knew that sudden deterioration in the condition of the patient was a strong possibility. Thirdly, OP-3 knew about high fever and had been telephonically informed about the fall. In our considered view, these lapses amount to deficiency of service, within the meaning of Section 2(1)(g) of the Consumer Protection Act 1986. 11. In view of the above, the appeal is partially allowed. The allegation of deficiency of service is upheld to the extent of the lapses discussed above. A lump sum compensation of Rupees three lakhs is therefore awarded, with interest at 7% from the date of the complaint. The same shall be paid to the complainants by the OPs, jointly and severally, within a period of three months. Failing this, the amount shall carry interest at 12% for the period of delay.
NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI FIRST APPEAL NO. 202 OF 2006 (Against the order dated 31/12/2005 in C.D. No.116 of 2001 of the State Commission, Andhra Pradesh) Smt. N. Shree Mani W/o late Sri N. Vinayaka Rao Aged about 42 years, Indian, Occ: Accounts Officers in Telephones N. Purnima, daughter of late No. Vinayaka Rao, Aged about 21 years, Student N. Lakshmi, … Continue reading
Penal Code, 1860 – ss. 120-B, 419, 420, 465 and 468 – Accused entering into a conspiracy with other co-accused, namely, Head Constable, Revenue Inspector and Postman, to secure passport in the assumed name to enable her to leave the country and travel abroad – Submission of false documents – Framing of charges – Plea of double jeopardy by accused that she was tried and convicted by Lisbon court for being in possession of fake passport – Conviction of accused for the offences punishable u/ss. 120-B, 419 and 420; Head Constable u/ss 120-B, 419/109, 420/109, 468 and ss. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) of the 1988 Act; Revenue Inspector u/s. 468; and Postman u/ss. 120-B, 420, 419/109, 420/109 and ss. 13(1)(d) r/w. 13(2) of the 1988 Act – High Court upholding conviction of accused persons, however modifying the sentence – On appeal, held: Same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws – Bar to punishment to the offender twice over for the same offence would arise only where the ingredients of both the offences are the same – On the basis of the judgment passed by the Constitutional Court, Lisbon and the facts of the case, plea of double jeopardy not sustainable – Accused was involved in conspiracy at both pre-passport application stage and post-passport application stage – Thus, her conviction is upheld, however sentence is reduced to the period already undergone while fine amount is maintained – Evidence on record established that the Postman participated in the conspiracy in securing the passport for accused in the assumed name; and the Head Constable submitted a false report in order to enable the accused to secure a passport for herself in the assumed name – Thus, their conviction is upheld however, the sentence is reduced while fine amount is maintained – As regards Revenue Inspector, ingredients for the offence of forgery not satisfied, thus, he is acquitted of the offence u/s. 465 – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 20(2) – Rule of double jeopardy – Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 – s.13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) – Sentence/Sentencing. Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 20(2) – Protection against a second trial and conviction for the same offence under Article 20(2) – When applicable – Explained – Rule of double jeopardy – General Clauses Act, 1897 – Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 – s. 300. Maxim – `Nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa’ – Meaning of – No one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. According to the prosecution case, `M’ (A 3) entered into a conspiracy with A 5 – Head Constable, A 7 – Revenue Inspector, Kurnool and A 8 – Postman, Head Post Office, Kurnool to secure second passport in the assumed name of `SM’ from the Regional Passport Office, Secunderabad by submitting false documents like residence certificate, educational certificate. `M’ entered Portugal with the aid of passport standing in the name of `SM’, and was prosecuted and punished by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon. In India, the charges were framed against the accused persons under various provisions of the Penal Code, 1860 and the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988. A-3 raised a plea of double jeopardy that she was tried and convicted by Lisbon court for being in possession of fake passport. The trial court convicted A 3 under sections 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC but acquitted her of the charge under Section 12 of the Passports Act, 1967. A 5 was convicted under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109, 468 IPC and Sections 13(1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, A 7 under Section 468 IPC, and A 8 under Sections 120-B, 420, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and Sections 13(1)(d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act. The High Court on re-appreciation of the evidence confirmed the conviction but modified the sentence. Therefore, the appellants filed the instant appeals. =Allowing the appeal filed by the Revenue Inspector and partly allowing the appeals filed by others, the Court HELD: 1.1 Article 20 (2) of the Constitution of India, 1950 provides that no person would be prosecuted and punished for the same offence more than once. It embodies a protection against a second trial and conviction for the same offence. The well known maxim `nemo delset bis vexari pro eadem causa’ embodies the well established common law rule that no one should be put on peril twice for the same offence. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) has its roots in common law maxim nemo debet bis vexari. If a person is charged again for the same offence, he can plead, as a complete defence, his former conviction, or as it is technically expressed, take the plea of autrefois convict. The principle has been recognized in the existing law in India and is enacted in Section 26 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973. [Paras 13, 14 and 15] [539-F-H; 540-A-E] 1.2 What is prohibited under Article 20 (2) is, the second prosecution and conviction must be for the same offence. If the offences are distinct, there is no question of the rule as to double jeopardy being applicable. The test to ascertain is whether two offences are the same, and not the identity of the allegations but the identity of the ingredients of the offences. Thus, it is clear that the same facts may give rise to different prosecutions and punishment and in such an event the protection afforded by Article 20 (2) is not available. A person can be prosecuted and punished more than once even on substantially same facts provided the ingredients of both the offences are totally different and they did not form the same offence. [Para 17] [541-D-E; 543-B-D] Maqbool Hussain vs. The State of Bombay (1953) SCR 730; S.A. Venkataraman vs. The Union of India & Anr. (1954) SCR 1150; Leo Roy Frey vs. Superintendent District Jail, Amritsar (1958) SCR 822; The State of Bombay vs. S.L. Apte (1961) 3 SCR 107; Bhagwan Swarup vs. State of Maharashtra AIR 1965 SC 682; State of Rajasthan vs. Hat Singh and Ors. (2003) 2 SCC 152- referred to. United States vs. Rabinowith (1915) 238 US 78; T.W. Morgan vs. Alfonso J. Devine @ Ollie Devine (1915) 237 U.S.1153; United States vs. Vito Lanza (1922) 260 U.S. 314 – referred to. 1.3 The submission that the facts based on which `M’ was prosecuted and punished by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon and the facts based on which prosecution was initiated resulting in conviction are the same and, therefore, the conviction of `M’ is in the teeth of Article 20 (2) of the Constitution and Section 300 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is not well founded since the same set of facts can constitute offences under two different laws. An act or an omission can amount to and constitute an offence under IPC and at the same time constitute an offence under any other law. The bar to the punishment to the offender twice over for the same offence would arise only where the ingredients of both the offences are the same. [Para 21] [545-C-E] 1.4 There is no factual foundation laid as such by `M’ taking the plea of double jeopardy before the trial court. Nothing is suggested to the Investigating Officer or to any of the witnesses that she is sought to be prosecuted and punished for the same offence for which she was charged and convicted by a competent court of jurisdiction at Lisbon. She did not even make any such statement in her examination under Section 313 Cr.P.C. The fundamental right guaranteed under Article 20 (2) of the Constitution is in the nature of an injunction against the State prohibiting it to prosecute and punish any person for the same offence more than once but the initial burden is upon the accused to take the necessary plea and establish the same. [Para 23] [545-H; 546-A-C] Halsbury’s Laws of England, 2nd Edn, Volume-IX – referred to. 1.5 Having regard to the nature of the guaranteed right, the judgment passed by the Constitutional Court, Lisbon (a typed copy) was examined and the same does not support the plea of `M’. In the light of the findings and conclusions reached by the Constitutional Court at Lisbon and on a careful consideration of the entire matter and the facts, plea of double jeopardy is wholly untenable and unsustainable. [Paras 25 and 26] [547-A-B; 549-G-H] 2. This Court in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 136 of the Constitution of India normally does not interfere with the concurrent findings of facts arrived at by the courts below on proper appreciation of evidence. It is not the function of this Court to re-appreciate the evidence and substitute the findings for that of the courts below unless it is clearly established that the findings and the conclusions so arrived at by the courts below are perverse and based on no evidence. [Para 27] [550- B-C] 3.1 There is no controversy whatsoever that `M’ travelled abroad on the strength of the passport secured by her in the assumed name. She entered Portugal with the aid of passport standing in the name of `SM’ for which she had to face the prosecution and suffer conviction and sentence in Portugal. [Para 28] [550-E-F] 3.2 It is evident from the record that the involvement of the appellants is at two stages. Stage one is where `M’ (A-3) and A-7 were involved in the pre-passport application at the threshold and even before the preparation of application seeking the passport in the assumed name. Stage two is the involvement of A-3, A-5 and A-8 after the submission of passport application before the authorities. The passport application was submitted in the assumed name of `SM’ which contained the photograph of `M’. The essential requirements for obtaining the passport are: passport application; proof of residence; and date of birth certificate as spoken to by PWs. 2, 3, 21 and 31. The evidence of number of witnesses which remained unimpeached brought on record as to how these documents were obtained for the benefit of `M’. [Para 29] [550-F-H; 551-A-B] 3.3 A-7, Mandal Revenue Inspector verified the residence particulars of `SM’ on the instructions of PW-5, Mandal Revenue Officer, Kurnool and submitted a false verification report based on which residence certificate was issued by PW-5. PW-37, Investigating Officer and PW-17 issued certificate to the effect that no person by name `SM’ resided in the house as earlier submitted by A-7. It is based on the said evidence, the trial court and appellate court came to the right conclusion that the prosecution established its case that A-7 gave false verification based on which residence certificate was issued by PW-5 in the name of `SM’. The trial court convicted A-7 for the offence under Section 468 IPC. The High Court held that in submitting the false verification report in respect of residence of `SM’ he may not have been aware and known that the certificate so obtained would be used for the purpose of securing the passport in the assumed name of `SM’. There is no evidence on that aspect. The High Court also concluded that by the time A-7 submitted a false verification there was nothing on record that he was hand in glove with the other accused for the purpose of cheating. The High Court upheld the acquittal of A-7 of the charge under Section 120-B IPC. The High Court found that the proper offence made against him would be one for making forged document simplicitor punishable under Section 465 IPC. The High Court was not justified in convicting A-7 at all for it had found no case against the appellant made out under Section 120-B IPC. There was no evidence that A-7 prepared false document with intent to cause damage or injury, to the public or to any person, or to support any claim or title, or to cause any person to part with property, or to enter into any express or implied contract, or with intent to commit fraud. The ingredients of Section 463 are not satisfied. In such an event the conviction of the appellant under Section 465 IPC is unsustainable. A-7 is acquitted for the offence under Section 465 IPC and sentence awarded is set aside. [Paras 29, 30 and 35] [551-A-E; 552-B-G; 557-B] 3.4 Regarding A-8, the Postman, Head Post Office, Kurnool, there is a clear evidence which was properly appreciated by the courts below that A-8 took the envelop containing the passport addressed to `SM’ from PW-11 representing that he knew the addressee and would deliver the same. The said article was actually entrusted to PW-11 for its delivery but A-8 took the same from PW-11 for delivery to `SM’ assumed name of `M’. The courts below found that A-8 was aware of the contents of the article. It is under those circumstances the courts below rightly concluded that the evidence available on record clearly established that he participated in the conspiracy in securing the passport for `M’ in the assumed name of `SM’. Thus, the conviction of A-8 for the offences charged is upheld. There is no reason to interfere with the view taken by the High Court. However, the sentence of one year rigorous imprisonment under each count awarded by the trial court is reduced to that of 6 months rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine amount. [Paras 31 and 35] [552-G-H; 553-A- D; 557-D-E] 3.5 A-5, the Head Constable, submitted exhibit P15 report. PW-7, Junior Assistant in the District Police Office, Kurnool, PW-8, Inspector of Police, District Special Branch, Kurnool and PW-14, Sub-Inspector, District Special Branch, Kurnool were the material witnesses examined by the prosecution to prove the accusations leveled against A-5. The courts below held that the evidence of PW-7, PW-8 and PW-14 is cogent and consistent which in clear and categorical terms has proved the fact that A-5 is the person who verified the passport application particulars of `SM’ and submitted exhibit P15 inquiry report along with exhibit P16 and exhibit P17 enclosures. There cannot be any doubt whatsoever that A-5 submitted a false report in order to enable `M’ to secure a passport for herself in the assumed name of `SM’. His conviction for the offences charged is upheld. However, the High Court reduced the sentence awarded by the trial court to one year rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the instant case, the conviction of A-5 under Sections 120-B, 419 r/w 109, 420 r/w 109 and 468 IPC and as well as under Section 13 (1) (d) r/w 13(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act is upheld. However, the sentence is reduced to that of six months rigorous imprisonment under each count while maintaining the fine imposed by the trial court and the sentence to suffer imprisonment, in default, of payment of fine. The sentences are directed to run concurrently. [Paras 32 and 35] [553-E-H; 554-A-E; 556-F-H] 3.6 It is proved that `M’ was involved in the conspiracy at both pre- passport application stage and post-passport application stage. The conspiracy itself was hatched only with a view to secure a passport for `M’ in the assumed name of `SM’. It cannot be said that there was no evidence whatsoever against `M’ to prove her involvement for the offence punishable under Sections 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC. It is for her benefit that the entire conspiracy was hatched involving more than one individual in order to secure a passport for her benefit enabling her to travel abroad in the assumed name of `SM’. There is no material on the basis of which this Court would differ with the findings and conclusions concurrently arrived at by the courts below. [Para 33] [554-F-H; 555-A-B] 3.7 The original of exhibit P50 is the passport issued by the competent authorities in India and, therefore, Section 78 (6) is not applicable to the facts of the instant case. The issuance of original of exhibit P50 passport is clearly proved. It is based on that passport that `M’ travelled abroad and entered Portugal for which she had to face a prosecution and suffer conviction and sentence. The prosecution cannot be held to be vitiated. The conviction of the appellant for the offence punishable under Sections 120-B, 419 and 420 IPC is upheld. However, the High Court reduced the sentence of imprisonment imposed on `M’. The High Court also held that she is entitled for set off of the periods of detention suffered by her in Lisbon, from 18.9.2004 to 4.6.2005 and 3.11.2005 to 10.11.2005. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case and the fact that she has undergone more than 2 + years of sentence, the sentence awarded under each count directed to run concurrently is reduced to that of the period already undergone by her, while maintaining the sentence of fine awarded by the courts below. [Paras 33 and 35] [555-E-H; 556-A-B; 556-D-E] Case Law Reference: (1953) SCR 730 Referred to Para 16 (1954) SCR 1150 Referred to Para 16 (1958) SCR 822 Referred to Para 17 (1915) 238US 78 Referred to Para 17 (1961) 3 SCR 107 Referred to Para 17 AIR 1965 SC 682 Referred to Para 17 (2003) 2 SCC 152 Referred to Para 18 (1915) 237 U.S. 1153 Referred to Para 19 (1922) 260 U.S. 314 Referred to Para 20 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 782 of 2007. From the Judgment & Order dated 08.03.2007 of the High Court of Andhra Pradesh at Hyderabad in Criminal Appeal No. 1434 of 2006. With Crl. A. Nos. 783, 784 & 1357 of 2007. P.P. Malhotra, ASG, I. Venkata Narayana, Gaurave Bhargava, Niraj Gupta, V. Sridhar Reddy, V.N. Raghupathy, V. Sudeer, M.B.R.S. Raju, S. Sunita, Balaji Srinivasan, Madhu Smita Bora, Raghenth Basant, Balaji Subramanian, Arvind Kumar Sharma, D. Mahesh Babu, Ramesh Allanki for the appearing parties.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 782 OF 2007 Monica Bedi …Appellant Versus State of A.P. …Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 784 OF 2007 Shaik Abdul Sattar …Appellant Versus State of A.P. …Respondent WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 783 OF 2007 D. Gokari Saheb …Appellant Versus State of A.P. … Continue reading
As the complaint was taken on the file against 13 accused and the petitioner is one among them and the filing of the present petition, at the time of the disposal of the Sessions Case No.122 of 2008, viewed from any angle, is a speculative one without any just and reasonable cause, much less without any basis to exercise inherent powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. Therefore, I see no grounds to quash the proceedings in S.C.No.122 of 2008 on the file of the Court of Assistant Sessions Judge, Tadepalligudem, West Godavari District. Accordingly the Criminal Petition is dismissed.
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.S.APPA RAO Criminal Petition No.7291 of 2008 23-3-2011 N.Ranga Rao The State of Andhra Pradesh,Rep. by Public Prosecutor,High Court Buildings,Hyderabad and another Counsel for the Petitioner:Sri S.R.Sanku, Advocate. Counsel for the Respondent No.1: Public Prosecutor,High Court of A.P., Hyderabad. Counsel for the Respondent No.2: Sri Y.Vivekananda Swamy, Advocate :ORDER: The present … Continue reading
advocatemmmohan 