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Immovable property

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Sec.59,100 of T.P. Act Charge – Deposit of Title Deeds – Mortgage – mere undertaking not to sale the property till the discharge of loan with out registration does not create any charge over the properties of JDr against the loan – the decree is only simple money decree – Suit for cancellation of decree obtained by wife against Jdr – is liable to be dismissed even though the decree is collusive one as the Finance Corporation does not hold Registered Charge over the properties = =Haryana Financial Corporation …. Appellant Verses Gurcharan Singh & Anr. …. Respondents = Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41086

Sec.59,100 of T.P. Act Charge – Deposit of Title Deeds – Mortgage – mere undertaking not to sale the property till the discharge of loan with out registration does not create any charge over the properties of JDr against the loan – the decree is only simple money decree – Suit for cancellation of decree … Continue reading

Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 = selling of minor’s property with definite share is void even by natural guardian with out permission of the court – a minor or any person having interest in minor can question the same – father died – 3 daughters and their mother as legal heirs – 1/4 th share each got – mutation to that effect – sale is void against the minor in the absence of court permission = SAROJ … APPELLANTS VERSUS SUNDER SINGH & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40989

Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956  = selling of minor‘s property with definite share is void even by natural guardian with out permission of the court – a minor or any person having interest in minor can question the same – father died – 3 daughters and their mother as legal … Continue reading

Sec.6, 33,35,38, Art. 23,47 – A of Schedule 1-A of the Stamp Act – admissibility of a document- an agreement of sale= OMPRAKASH Vs. LAXMINARAYAN & ORS. published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40861

Sec.6, 33,35,38, Art. 23,47 – A of Schedule 1-A of the  Stamp  Act – admissibility of a document-     an agreement of sale with delivery of possession scribed on Rs.50/- only – admissible only on payment of stamp duty and penalty – irrespective of pleadings.        In  the  present  case,  an     … Continue reading

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD =Dying declaration can be accepted only when it is free from all infirmities, embellishment and tutoring/appeal allowed as the same is missing.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD  Court No.53 AFR Criminal Appeal No.1689 of 1981 Asha Ram & another……………………..Appellants Versus State of U.P. ……………………………Respondents. Hon’ble Vinod Prasad, J. Two appellants, father and son, Asha Ram and Suresh, have challenged their conviction under section 304 IPC with implanted sentence of five years, recorded by Session’s Judge, Mainpuri … Continue reading

Registration Act (16 of 1908), s. 17(1) (c)-Partnership assets consisting of immovable property-Relinquishment by one partner of his share-Deed of relinquishment if should be registered. =The members of two Joint Hindu families (Appellants and Respondents) entered into partnership for carrying on business. The members of one family filed a suit in 1949 for dissolution of the partnership and the taking of accounts. The members of the second family raised the defence that the partnership was dissolved even in 1936 and that accounts were then settled between the two families. In support of that plea they relied upon an unregistered document, which showed that the partnership had come to an end. It was contended by the appellants-plaintiffs, that since the partnership assets included immovable property and the document recorded the relinquishment by the members 6f the plaintifffamily of their interest in those assets, the document was compulsorily registerable under s. 17(1)(c) of the Registration Act, 1908; and that as it was not registered, it was inadmissible in evidence to prove the dissolution as well as the settlement of accounts. HELD : The document only records the fact that the partnership had come to an end. It cannot be said to convey any immovable property by a partner to another, expressly or by necessary implication, nor is there any express reference to any immovable property, except a recital of a fact which had taken place earlier. Therefore, the unregistered deed of release by one family of its share in the partnership was admissible in evidence, even though the partnership owned immovable property. [410 D. E] The interest of a partner in partnership assets comprising of movable as well as immovable property should be treated only as movable property. His right during the insistence of the partnership is to get his share of the profits from time to time, as may be agreed upon among the partners, and his right after the dissolution of the partnership, or with his retirement from, the partnership, is only to receive e the money value of his share in the net partnership assets as on the date of dissolution or retirement, after a deduction of Liabilities and prior charges. [406 E; 407 F-G) Case law reviewed. =1966 AIR 1300, 1966( 3 )SCR 400, , ,

PETITIONER: ADDANKI NARAYANAPPA & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: BHASKARA KRISHTAPPA AND 13 ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 21/01/1966 BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. BENCH: MUDHOLKAR, J.R. SARKAR, A.K. WANCHOO, K.N. CITATION: 1966 AIR 1300 1966 SCR (3) 400 CITATOR INFO : F 1967 SC 401 (9) RF 1968 SC 676 (6) D 1974 SC1066 (4,5) R 1977 SC 489 … Continue reading

an agreement of sale by paying stamp duty and penalty can be received as a documentary evidence in suit for specific performance under the proviso of sec.49 and sec.35 of stamp act

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICEK.C. BHANU A.S.NO. 462 OF 2011 JUDGMENT: 1          This appeal is directed against the Docket Order dated 07.08.2003 passed by the learned Principal Senior Civil Judge, Visakhapatnam rejecting the plaint presented by the appellant on the ground that the agreement of sale dated 14.03.2001, which is a suit document, is not registered as … Continue reading

Gift Tax Act, 1958: Sections 2(xii), 4(1) (c) and (d)-Gift of immovable property by unregistered document-Held, for a valid gift under Section 2 (xii) and (4) compliance with the provisions of Transfer of property Act and Registration Act necessarv- transfer of Properly Act, 1882-Sections 122 and 123-Registration Act, 1908- Sections 17. Words & Phrases . “Gift”-Meaning of in the context of Section 2(xii) of Gift Tax Act, 1958 and Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882. Respondent, by an unregistered declaration sought to make a gift of certain immovable property to his wife. The Gift Tax Officer held that no valid gift had been made by respondent since the provisions of Section 123 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 had not been complied with. The said Findings were affirmed by the Assistant Commissioner and the Tribunal. However, on reference, the High Court observed that the definition of the word ‘gift’ under the Gift Tux Act, 1958 was wider than the definition of ‘gift’ in the Transfer of Property Act, and held that registration of document was not necessary for a valid gilt under Section 4 of the Act. Hence the present appeal by Revenue. -Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. High court erred in coming to the conclusion that the case fell within the provisions of Section 4 of the Gift Tax Act, 1958 and, therefore, as it was a deemed gift it was not necessary that the document had to be registered. [619-H; 620-A] 1.2. There can be no doubt that certain transactions may not be regarded as a gift for the purposes of the Transfer of Property Act but would fall within the ambit of the expression ‘gift’ by virtue of Section 4 of the Gift Tax Act, but in each one of the cases which in certain circumstances is to be regarded as a gift under Section 4 there has to be a transfer of immovable property and a transfer by reason of Section 17 of the Registration Act can only be by way of a registered document. Surrender or forfeiture of an interest in immovable property as contemplated by Section 4(1) (c) or vesting of any property in another person as contemplated by Section 4(1) (d) in the case of an immovable property would also attract the provisions of Section 17 of the Registration Act. [618-G-H; 619-A, B, C] 1.3. In order that there could be a transfer of property by way of gift as contemplated by the Transfer of Property Act, there has to be a registered document if the property sought to be transferred is immovable. The general law did not stand abrogated and the requirement of complying with the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act and the Registration Act had to be fulfilled. [617-F, 619-G-H] Commissioner of Gift Tax, Kerala v. R. Valsala Amma, 82 ITR 828 (SC), relied on. Smt. Padma Lalchand Mirchandani v. Commissioner of Income Tax, New Delhi, 128 ITR 174 (Delhi); Commissioner of Gift-tax, Bombay III v. Matilda Ferreira, 112 ITR 934 (Bombay); K. Madhavakrishnan v. Commissioner of Gift- tax, Tamil Nadu, 124 ITR 233 (Madras) and Darbar Shivrajkumar v. Commissioner of Gift-tax, Gujarat-IV, 131 ITR 647 (Gujarat), approved. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6725 of 1994. From the Judgment and Order dated 12.2.1985 of the Rajasthan High Court in Income Tax Ref. No. 27/75. B.B. Ahuja, K.C, Kaushik, Rajiv Tyagi, R.R. Dwivedi and B.V. Balram Das for Ms. Sushma Suri for the Appellant. N.M. Ranka, Sushil Kumar Jain and Raj Kumar Yadav for the Respondent.

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6725 of 1994 PETITIONER: COMMISSIONS OF INCOME TAX, JAIPUR RESPONDENT: SIKBHMAL NAWALAKHA DATE OF JUDGMENT: 16/08/2001 BENCH: B.N. KIRPAL & SHIVRAJ V. PATIL JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 2001 Supp(1) SCR 615 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by KIRPAL, J. The respondent was the owner of immovable property and by declaration dated … Continue reading

Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.12 – Applicability of – Specific performance of contract – Agreement of sale of a house – Representation by vendor that he was absolute owner of the house – Receipt of advance money by vendor – Vendor’s wife sought cancellation of agreement on the ground that the vendor was not absolute owner of the house and she owned half share in the house which, by virtue of s.14 of Hindu Succession Act, was received by her on death of her son – Suit for specific performance of contract by vendee – Held: Vendee cannot seek specific performance of contract of entire house, and decree for specific performance can be granted only to the extent of vendor’s share in the house – The husband under such circumstances, in the absence of any express authority from the wife could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her Streedhana property – It was not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but the whole of the contract insofar as the vendor was concerned since he had agreed to sell the property in its entirety but it later turned out that vendor had only half share in the property and his wife held the remaining half – Thus, the agreement was not binding on the vendor’s wife – s.12 was not applicable in facts of the case -s.41 of the Transfer of Property Act was also not applicable since it was not the case of the vendee that the vendor was the ostensible owner of the property – Right to invoke s.4 of the Partition Act also not available to the vendee – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.41 – Partition Act, 1893 – s.4 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Contract. The original defendant no.1-vendor entered into an agreement of sale with the original plaintiff-vendee in respect of the suit house for a consideration of Rs.1 lac. The vendee paid Rs.10,000/- as advance and agreed to pay remaining consideration of Rs.90,000/- by 20.6.1984 whereupon sale deed was to be executed and registered. On 24.3.1984, the defendant no.2-vendor’s wife sent a notice to the vendee as well as to the vendor calling upon them to cancel the agreement as she held half share in the property having devolved upon her on the death of her son. She also stated in the notice that she was not willing to sell her share and was ready to purchase the share of her husband-vendor. The vendee sent reply to her notice that the agreement was binding on her and notice given by her was in collusion with the vendor. His correspondence with the vendor failed and he filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement against the vendor and his wife. He prayed for a direction to them to execute the sale deed and in the alternative, he prayed for refund of the advance amount along with interest. The vendor and his wife filed separate written statements. The vendor admitted execution of agreement and receipt of advance amount of Rs. 10,000/-. The vendor further averred that he had one son, who had half share in the property; the son died intestate and after his death, his half share devolved upon his wife and, thus vendodr did not have absolute title to the property and, therefore, was unable to execute the sale deed. The trial court decreed the suit with a direction to the vendor and his wife to execute registered sale deed as per the terms of the sale agreement. Aggrieved, the vendor’s wife filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court recorded the findings that the property was ancestral property in which the deceased son had half share on whose death that share devolved upon the vendor’s wife; the vendee could not be said to have any knowledge that the vendor’s wife had half share and in the absence of any express authority from his wife, the vendor could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her share in the property. The High Court finally held that the agreement of sale although covered the entire property but as the vendor had only half share and interest in the property, the decree for specific performance could only be granted to the extent of the vendor’s share in the property. The instant appeals were filed by the legal representatives of the vendee and also by the vendor’s wife challenging the order of the High Court. =Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1. It was not in dispute that the agreement was an agreement of sale and there was concluded contract in this regard between the vendor and vendee. The vendor in his reply to the notice received from the vendee had not disputed the nature of the agreement. As a matter of fact, in view of the admitted position between the parties, particularly, the vendor and the vendee about the agreement, no issue was struck by the trial court in this regard nor any argument was advanced on behalf of the vendor before the trial court that the agreement was not an agreement of sale or that the same did not tantamount to concluded contract. Insofar as the vendor was concerned, he did not challenge the judgment passed by the trial court. It was only vendor’s wife who filed appeal before the High Court. Even before the High Court, no plea was raised by the vendor’s wife or the vendor that the agreement was not a concluded contract for sale of the property. [Paras 15, 16] [784-c; 785-C-e] 2. The finding of the two courts was divergent regarding question whether the property was ancestral property or not. The trial court held that the property was not the ancestral property but the High Court on re-appraisal of the evidence did not agree with that finding. The High Court concluded that under section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, the share devolved upon the mother and it would become her Streedhana property. The husband under such circumstances, in the absence of any express authority from the wife, cannot alienate or otherwise dispose of her Streedhana property. The High Court correctly considered this aspect and there is no justifiable reason to take a view different from the High Court. [Para 17] [785-F; 786-B-C] 3. As regards applicability of Section 41 of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, the High Court rightly observed that it was not even the case of the vendee that the vendor was the ostensible owner of the property and, therefore, Section 41 has no application. In view of the findings of the High Court, the conclusion that the vendee is not entitled to seek specific performance of the agreement to the extent of half share of vendor’s wife cannot be faulted. [Para 18] [786-F, G] 4. As regards the question whether the agreement could be enforced against the vendor to the extent of his half share, the terms of the agreement would show that the vendor represented to the vendee that he was absolute owner of the property that fell to his share in the partition effected with his brothers and he did not have any male child. The vendor assured the vendee that excepting him none had got any right over the property and he would obtain the witness signatures of his daughters and get their voluntary consent letters in his favour. It is clear from the evidence that the vendee had no knowledge that vendor’s wife had half share in the property which devolved upon her on the death of her son intestate. Section 12 of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 prohibits specific performance of a part of a contract except in the circumstances under sub-sections (2), (3) and (4). The circumstances mentioned in these sub-sections are exhaustive. Section 12 is not attracted in the facts and circumstances of the instant case. The instant case is not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but the whole of the contract insofar as the vendor is concerned, since he had agreed to sell the property in its entirety but it later turned out that the vendor had only half share in the property and his wife held the remaining half. The agreement is binding on the vendor as it is without being fractured. As regards him, there is neither segregation or separation of contract nor creation of a new contract. In the facts and circumstances, there was no impediment for enforcement of the agreement against the vendor to the extent of his half share in the property. [Paras 19, 21, 24] [786-H; 787-A, B; 788-F-H] Kartar Singh v. Harjinder Singh & Ors. (1990) 3 SCC 517; Manzoor Ahmed Magray v. Ghulam Hassan Aram & Ors. (1999) 7 SCC 703; Abdul Rashid Khan (Dead) & Ors. v. P.A.K.A. Shahul Hamid & Ors. (2000) 10 SCC 636 – relied on. HPA International v. Bhagwandas Fateh Chand Daswani & Ors. (2004) 6 SCC 537, distinguished. 5. The High Court rightly concluded that Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 was not attracted. It is only after the sale deed is executed in favour of the vendee that right under Section 4 of the Partition Act, 1893 may be available. Similarly, insofar as vendee is concerned, he has right to apply for partition of the property and get the share demarcated only after the sale deed is executed in his favour. Section 44 of the T.P. Act is also of no help to the case of vendor’s wife. [Para 26] [797-F] Ghantesher Ghosh v. Madan Mohan Ghosh & Ors. (1996) 11 SCC 446; Pramod Kumar Jaiswal and Ors. v. Bibi Husn Bano and Ors. (2005) 5 SCC 492; Shanmughasundaram & Ors. v. Diravia Nadar (Dead) By LRs. & Anr. (2005) 10 SCC 728, referred to. 6. The balance sale consideration of Rs. 90,000/- was deposited by the vendee on July 18, 1991 before the trial court and was lying there for more than 19 years. Therefore, there was no merit in the contention of the vendor’s wife that it was not proved that vendee was ready and willing to purchase the property all along. The plea that the decree granted by the High Court would result in hardship since the vendor and vendor’s wife are dead and their 10 daughters had been residing in the property was also not accepted since the facts do not constitute hardship justifying denial of decree for specific performance to the extent of vendor’s half share in the property. [Paras 27, 28] [797-G; 798-D, E] Case Law Reference: (1990) 3 SCC 517 relied on Para 21 (1999) 7 SCC 703 relied on Para 22 (2000) 10 SCC 636 relied on Para 23 (2004) 6 SCC 537 distinguished Para 24 (1996) 11 SCC 446 referred to Para 25 (2005) 5 SCC 492 referred to Para 25 (2005) 10 SCC 728 referred to Para 25 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 6088 of 2003. From the Judgment & Order dated 23.12.2002 of the High Cout of A.P. at Hyderabad in AN No. 287 of 1994. WITH C.A. No. 7265 of 2003. Sudha Gupta and A.T.M. Sampath for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6088 OF 2003 Kammana Sambamurthy (D) By LRs. …Appellants Versus Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (D) & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7265 OF 2003 JUDGEMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The original contesting parties are dead. They are now represented by their legal representatives. This … Continue reading

Transfer of Property Act, 1882-Section 53-A-Agreement to sell-Part performance of contract-Claim for-Written agreement to sell-Necessity of- Letters written by transferor agreeing to sell his part of the share in property-Letters not spelling out the terms of the agreement or time frame within which the sale deed was to be executed-High Court holding that the letters constitute a valid agreement to sell, allowing the claim for part- performance of contract-Validity of-Held, letters written by transferor could not be construed to be an agreement to sell within the meaning of Section 53-A of the Act-Order of the High Court set aside. The issue involved in the present appeal is whether a proposed vendee could protect his possession of an immoveable property on the plea of part performance under Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 on the basis of an oral agreement. Plaintiff-appellants were owners of the property in dispute. They had permitted the predecessor-in-interest of respondent to occupy the suit property as a licensee. When respondent failed to vacate the property, the appellants filed a suit for possession of the property and for recovery of mesne profit. Respondent resisted the suit contending that appellant No. 1 wrote several letters agreeing to sell his half share of property had also received certain sale consideration. Thus, they claimed protection under section 53-A of T.P. Act and also alternatively claimed title by adverse possession. Trial Court held that the respondents have perfected the title to the property in dispute by way of adverse possession to the extent of half share of appellant No. 1 and dismissed the suit to that extent. However, on appeal the First Appellate Court decreed the suit of appellants for possession of entire property in dispute alongwith mesne profits. On second appeal, High Court held that respondents were entitled to protect the possession under section 53-A of the Act. Hence the present appeal by plaintiff. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. Section 53-A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882 provides that where any person contracts to transfer for consideration any immoveable property, in writing signed by him or on his behalf from which the terms necessary to constitute the transfer can be ascertained with reasonable certainty and the transferee has, in part performance of the contract, taken possession of the property or any part thereof, or the transferee, being already in possession, continues any possession in part performance of the contract, and has done some act in furtherance of the contract and the transferee has performed or is willing to perform his part of the contract then he is entitled to protect his possession in respect of the property of which he was put in possession in part performance of the agreement to sell. [707-E-F] Nathulal v. Phool Chand, [1969] 3 SCC 120 and Sardar Govindrao Mahadik v. Devi Sahai, [1982] 1 SCC 237, relied on. Mohan Lal (deceased) through his LRs. Kachru and Ors. v. Mirza Abdul Gaffar and Anr., [1996] 1 SCC 639 and Roop Singh v. Ram Singh, [2000] 3 SCC 708, referred to. 1.2. In the instant case, the letters written by appellant No. 1 cannot be termed to be agreement to sell within the meaning of Section 53-A spelling out the terms of the agreement for sale. At the most it is an admission of an oral agreement to sell and not a written agreement. Statutorily the emphasis is not on written agreement only. In addition the emphasis is on the terms of the agreement as well which can be ascertained with reasonable certainty from the written document. In the instant case, there was no meeting of minds. Admission made by appellant No. 1 of an oral agreement to sell does not spell out other essential terms of agreement to sell such as time frame within which the Sale Deed was to be executed and as to who would pay the registration charges etc. Written agreement has to precede the putting of the proposed vendee in possession of the property. In the instant case, the predecessor in interest of the respondents was never put in possession of the property pursuant to the written agreement arrived at between the parties. Thus, High Court fell in error in coming to the conclusion that the letters written by appellant No. 1 constituted an agreement to sell. The suit filed by plaintiff/appellants for possession of property and mesne profit is decreed. [709-E-H; 710-A-B] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 5920 of

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 5920 of 1998 PETITIONER: MOOL CHAND BAKHRU & ANR. Vs. RESPONDENT: ROHAN & OTHERS DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/01/2002 BENCH: V.N. Khare & Ashok Bhan JUDGMENT: Bhan, J. Point for consideration in this appeal is as to whether: “A person (claiming to be a proposed vendee) can protect his possession of an … Continue reading

Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.12 – Applicability of – Specific performance of contract – Agreement of sale of a house – Representation by vendor that he was absolute owner of the house – Receipt of advance money by vendor – Vendor’s wife sought cancellation of agreement on the ground that the vendor was not absolute owner of the house and she owned half share in the house which, by virtue of s.14 of Hindu Succession Act, was received by her on death of her son – Suit for specific performance of contract by vendee – Held: Vendee cannot seek specific performance of contract of entire house, and decree for specific performance can be granted only to the extent of vendor’s share in the house – The husband under such circumstances, in the absence of any express authority from the wife could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her Streedhana property – It was not a case of the performance of a part of the contract but the whole of the contract insofar as the vendor was concerned since he had agreed to sell the property in its entirety but it later turned out that vendor had only half share in the property and his wife held the remaining half – Thus, the agreement was not binding on the vendor’s wife – s.12 was not applicable in facts of the case -s.41 of the Transfer of Property Act was also not applicable since it was not the case of the vendee that the vendor was the ostensible owner of the property – Right to invoke s.4 of the Partition Act also not available to the vendee – Transfer of Property Act, 1882 – s.41 – Partition Act, 1893 – s.4 – Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s.14 – Contract. The original defendant no.1-vendor entered into an agreement of sale with the original plaintiff-vendee in respect of the suit house for a consideration of Rs.1 lac. The vendee paid Rs.10,000/- as advance and agreed to pay remaining consideration of Rs.90,000/- by 20.6.1984 whereupon sale deed was to be executed and registered. On 24.3.1984, the defendant no.2-vendor’s wife sent a notice to the vendee as well as to the vendor calling upon them to cancel the agreement as she held half share in the property having devolved upon her on the death of her son. She also stated in the notice that she was not willing to sell her share and was ready to purchase the share of her husband-vendor. The vendee sent reply to her notice that the agreement was binding on her and notice given by her was in collusion with the vendor. His correspondence with the vendor failed and he filed the suit for specific performance of the agreement against the vendor and his wife. He prayed for a direction to them to execute the sale deed and in the alternative, he prayed for refund of the advance amount along with interest. The vendor and his wife filed separate written statements. The vendor admitted execution of agreement and receipt of advance amount of Rs. 10,000/-. The vendor further averred that he had one son, who had half share in the property; the son died intestate and after his death, his half share devolved upon his wife and, thus vendodr did not have absolute title to the property and, therefore, was unable to execute the sale deed. The trial court decreed the suit with a direction to the vendor and his wife to execute registered sale deed as per the terms of the sale agreement. Aggrieved, the vendor’s wife filed appeal before the High Court. The High Court recorded the findings that the property was ancestral property in which the deceased son had half share on whose death that share devolved upon the vendor’s wife; the vendee could not be said to have any knowledge that the vendor’s wife had half share and in the absence of any express authority from his wife, the vendor could not alienate or otherwise dispose of her share in the property. The High Court finally held that the agreement of sale although covered the entire property but as the vendor had only half share and interest in the property, the decree for specific performance could only be granted to the extent of the vendor’s share in the property. The instant appeals were filed by the legal representatives of the vendee and also by the vendor’s wife challenging the order of the High Court.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6088 OF 2003 Kammana Sambamurthy (D) By LRs. …Appellants Versus Kalipatnapu Atchutamma (D) & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7265 OF 2003 JUDGEMENT R.M. Lodha, J. The original contesting parties are dead. They are now represented by their legal representatives. This … Continue reading

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