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Indian Evidence Act

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RENT EVICTION SUIT WITH OUT SURRENDERING THE POSSESSION, A TENANT CAN NOT CHALLENGE THE TITLE OF OWNER =Rent Control and Eviction – Suit for ejectment and resumption of possession of land filed by respondents on the ground that appellant-tenant failed to pay rent from 1986 – Plea of appellant in written statement that suit land actually belonged to him and the lease deed was executed and rent was paid to respondents by mistake of fact – Trial court decreed suit for eviction after recording finding that the appellants had failed to prove the title to the land – First appellate court and High Court upheld the decision of trial court. =It is well settled that the tenant who has been let into possession by the landlord cannot deny the landlord’s title however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly surrendered possession by surrender to his landlord – Although, there are some exceptions to this general rule, none of the exceptions were established by the appellants in this case – Therefore, appellants who were the tenants of the respondents would have to surrender possession to the respondents before they can challenge the title of the respondents – Although an averment was made in the plaint that respondents were owners of the suit land, no relief for declaration of title as such was claimed by the respondents – Only the relief of eviction was sought in the plaint on the ground that the lease had not been renewed after 1986 and the rent had not been paid since 1986- Therefore, this being not a suit of declaration of title and recovery of possession but only a suit for eviction, trial Court, first appellate court and High Court were not called upon to decide the question of title – The findings of courts below on title is, therefore, set aside, but the decree for eviction is maintained – The appellants are directed to vacate the suit land within six months – Suit, if any, filed by the appellants for declaration of title and consequential relief cannot be entertained by the court unless the appellants first vacate and handover possession to the respondents. = STATE OF A.P. & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS D. RAGHUKUL PERSHAD (D) BY LRS & ORS. Respondent(s) = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx

Rent Control and Eviction – Suit for ejectment and resumption of possession of land filed by respondents on the ground that appellant-tenant failed to pay rent from 1986 – Plea of appellant in written statement that suit land actually belonged to him and the lease deed was executed and rent was paid to respondents by … Continue reading

Section 8 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872, – “…..Conduct of an accused must have nexus with the crime committed. It must form part of the evidence as regards his conduct either preceding, during or after the commission of the offence as envisaged under Section 8 of the Evidence Act….”- The general good behaviour of the appellant and the fact that he had no bad habit have no nexus with the offence alleged against the appellant and are not relevant when other circumstances have established beyond reasonable doubt that it is the appellant and the appellant alone who has committed the murder of the deceased.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 221 of 2007 Vivek Kalra …… Appellant Versus State of Rajasthan ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the judgment dated 25.10.2004 of the Rajasthan High Court, Jaipur Bench, … Continue reading

498-A and 306 of the IPC. = wife beating is a normal facet of married life. Does that mean giving one or two slaps to a wife by a husband just does not matter? We do not think that that can be a right approach. It is one thing to say that every wear and tear of married life need not lead to suicide and it is another thing to put it so crudely and suggest that one or two assaults on a woman is an accepted social norm. Judges have to be sensitive to women’s problems. Perhaps learned Sessions Judge wanted to convey that the circumstances on record were not strong enough to drive Girija to commit suicide. But to make light of slaps given to Girija which resulted in loss of her eyesight is to show extreme insensitivity. Assault on a woman offends her dignity. What effect it will have on a woman depends on facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any generalization on this issue. Our observation, however, must not be understood to mean that in all cases of assault suicide must follow. Our objection is to the tenor of learned Sessions Judge’s observations. We do not suggest that where there is no evidence the court should go out of its way, ferret out evidence and convict the accused in such cases. It is of course the duty of the court to see that an innocent person is not convicted. But it is equally the duty of the court to see that perpetrators of heinous crimes are brought to book. The above quoted extracts add to the reasons why learned Sessions Judge’s judgment can be characterized as perverse. They show a mindset which needs to change. There is a phenomenal rise in crime against women and protection granted to women by the Constitution of India and other laws can be meaningful only if those who are entrusted with the job of doing justice are sensitized towards women’s problems. In the ultimate analysis we are of the opinion that the appellant has not been able to rebut presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. Girija committed suicide within seven years from the date of her marriage in her matrimonial home. Impact of this circumstance was clearly missed by the trial court. The evidence on record establishes that Girija was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the appellant in their matrimonial home which drove her to commit suicide. The appellant is guilty of abetment of suicide. The High Court has rightly reversed the judgment of the trial court acquitting the appellant. Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 12 OF 2013 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No. 2038 of 2012] Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar … APPELLANT Versus State of Karnataka … RESPONDENT JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant (original accused 2 – A2) was … Continue reading

“On that day of the alleged occurrence Krishna deceased was preparing tea and incidentally caught fire. I extinguished the fire, as a result of which I received burn injuries and immediately brought her to General Hospital, Sonepat, and on the advice of the M.O. I was taking her for better treatment to Delhi but unfortunately she died.” The evidence of PW-7 and the endorsement marked ‘A’ in Ext. DD are evidence produced by the prosecution before the Court and such evidence produced by the prosecution before the Court supports the explanation of the appellant no.1 in his statement under section 313, Cr.P.C., that the deceased caught fire while she was preparing tea on the stove. The presumption in Section 304B of the IPC and Section 113B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 that they had caused dowry death of the deceased, thus, stood rebutted by the evidence in this case – In the result, we allow this appeal in part, set aside the conviction and sentences for the offence under Section 304B, IPC, and sustain the conviction and sentences under Section 498A, IPC. The appellant no.2 is already on bail. If appellant nos.1 and 3 have already undergone the sentence under Section 498A, IPC, they shall be released forthwith.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 636 of 2009 Devinder @ Kala Ram & Ors. …… Appellants Versus The State of Haryana ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 … Continue reading

Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 34, 61 and 114. Books of account–Entries–Proof of–Nobody supporting correctness of entries—-Account books liable to be reject- ed. Title–Proof- Presumption on basis of revenue entry–When arises. Limitation Act, 1963. Article 65–Adverse possession–Proof-Actual physical possession by claimant not necessary–Fact that property was in possession of tenants would be of no consequence. Indian Contract Act, 1872. Sections 182 and 188–Joint possession-Claim by agent–Agent actually collecting rent from tenants-Cannot claim joint possession of property. = Respondent No. 1 in the appeals instituted a suit for partition against his younger brothers and sisters, and the heirs of his deceased brothers. The plaintiff was the eldest among the brothers and sisters. The 1st and 2nd Defendants were his brothers, the 3rd Defendant his sister, the 4th and 5th Defendants, the widow and son respectively of the third brother. Defendant 6 was the widow of the fourth brother, and Defendants 7 to 12 were his children, while Defendant No. 14 was the wife of Defendant No. 1, and Defendants 13, 15, 16 and 17 were their children. The subject matter of the appeals related only to one item of property known as “Naroda Chawl” measuring 7 acres and 2 gunthas of land, where 115 rooms and huts stood con- structed, out of which 114 rooms had been let out to ten- ants, and one room was retained for the caretaker. According to Defendants No. 6 to 12 this property exclu- sively belonged to defendant No. 6 and was not liable to partition. The other defendants however supported the plain- tiff’s case that it belonged to the 233 joint family and was liable to partition. Defendants 6 to 12 pleaded that the plaintiff’s father- Bapalal orally gifted this property to his daughter-in-law Defendant No. 6 in March 1946 and made a statement before the Revenue authorities on . the basis of which her name was mutated and she was put in possession thereof, that although she came in peaceful possession, the management which in- cluded realisation of rent was in the hands of Defendant No. 1, that as some dispute arose in 1952 she assumed direct charge of the chawl and had remained in possession thereaf- ter, and that she had acquired good title therein by adverse possession before the suit was filed in 1960. The City Civil Judge who tried the suit, held that there was a joint Hindu family and a business was carried on for the benefit of the family and the income therefrom was thrown into the common pool and all the properties including the disputed chawl were treated as belonging to the family. As the case of Defendant No. 6 about the gift, the mutation of her name, and her exclusive possession from 1946 till the date of the suit was found correct, it was held that she had acquired title by adverse possession, and the suit was dismissed with respect to the disputed chawl. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Some of the defendants also filed appeals in respect of the other items of property. All these appeals were heard and disposed of by a common judgment. The High Court reversed the finding of adverse posses- sion in regard to the disputed chawl and granted a decree for partition. It held that Defendant No. 6 remained in exclusive possession of the property only since 1952, the period was thus short of the time required for prescription of title. It further held that since the rents of the chawl from 1952 were collected by her husband and after his death by her son (Defendant No. 7), she was liable to render accounts till the death of her husband, and she along with Defendant No. 7 would be jointly liable for the period thereafter. Separate Appeals were preferred by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 to this Court. Allowing the Appeals, setting aside the decision of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial Court. 234 HELD: 1. The principle that revenue entry furnishes presumptive evidence of title is inapplicable in the instant case. It cannot be denied that title to Naroda Chawl could not have passed to Defendant No. 6 by virtue of the entry Ext. 247. The value of the chawl even in 1946 was large and no registered instrument of transfer was executed. Besides Ext. 247 describes the plaintiff’s father (Bapalal) and Defendant No. 6 (Chandrakanta) as Kabjedar, that is occu- pant. In such circumstances, the presumption which can be raised in favour of Defendant No. 6 from this entry is with respect of her possession and possession only. [238F-G] Gangabai and others v. Fakirgowda Somaypagowda Desai and others, AIR 1930 Privy Council 93; and Desai Navinkant Kesarlal v. Prabhat Kabhai, 9 Gujarat Law Reporter 694, referred to. 2. The account books have to be rejected as not reli- able. It is apparent from the evidence that nobody takes the responsibility of supporting the correctness of the entries therein. Many of the documents produced by Defendant No. 1 were accepted, but the account books which were S. Nos. 123-75 to 123-97 of Ext. 123 were in express terms not admitted. The plaintiff filed his objection–Ext. 172. Defendant No. 6 also filed her objection–Ext. 275. The books were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits on the statement of the plaintiff which he made in cross-exami- nation. The plaintiff by saying that he had written as per the instructions of Defendant No. 1 made it clear that he Could not vouchsafe for its reliability. Defendant No. 1 could not summon courage to support them either personally or through any witness. No reason has been suggested as to why he did not produce other important documents in his possession which could have supported the account books and the joint case of the parties resisting the appellant’s claim. [243B-E] 3. Defendant No. 1 cannot be treated to be in joint possession as he was actually collecting the rents from the tenants. it is well settled that the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fidu- ciary relationship, Defendant No. 1 cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. [247D-E] David Lyeii v. John Lawson Kennedy, [1889] XIV H.L.(E) 437; Williams v. Pott, L.R. XII Equity Cases 149 and Secre- tary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta, 29 Indian Appeals 104, referred to. 4(a). It is the intention to claim exclusive title which makes 235 possession adverse and this animus possidendi must be evi- denced and effectuated by the manner of occupancy which again depends upon the nature of the property. The manner of possession depends upon the kind of possession which the particular property is susceptible. That possession to the extent to which it is capable of demonstration must be hostile and exclusive and will cover only to the extent of the owner’s possession. [246E-F] (b). The title to the chawl as owner, subject to the tenancy was an interest in immovable property so as to be covered by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which specifically mentioned, “.. . or any interest therein”. [246E] In the instant case, the parties have been fighting for the rent from the chawl so long as it continued in posses- sion of the tenants. Before the gift of 1946 the Defendant No. 1 was collecting the rent and he continued to do so even thereafter till 1952. The appellant has, however, estab- lished her case that the Defendant No. 1 acted as her agent after 1946 and when he repudiated this agency in 1952 he was effectively removed from the management of the chawl. Since 1946 the tenants attorned to the Defendant No. 6 and paid rent to her under printed receipts announcing her ownership, but of course through her agent the Defendant No. 1. The fact that the tenants have been in actual physical posses- sion of the chawl is, in the circumstances, of no assistance to the respondents. What is material is that they paid the rent to the Defendant No. 6. Defendant No. 6 was in adverse possession from the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent Defendant No. 1 and thereafter through her husband and son Defendant No. 7 till 1960 when the suit was filed, the total period being more than 12 years. [246G-H; 248G] Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju and another v. Josyula Hanumayamma and another, [1963] 3 SCR 910 and Hari Prasad Agarwalla and another v. Abdul Haw and others, A.I.R. 1951 Patna 160, referred to. =1989 AIR 1269, 1989( 2 )SCR 232, 1989( 2 )SCC 630, 1989( 1 )SCALE802 , 1989( 4 )JT 115

PETITIONER: SMT. CHANDRAKANTABEN ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: VADILAL BAPALAL MODI & OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT30/03/1989 BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) KANIA, M.H. CITATION: 1989 AIR 1269 1989 SCR (2) 232 1989 SCC (2) 630 JT 1989 (4) 115 1989 SCALE (1)802 ACT: Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 34, 61 and 114. Books of … Continue reading

Indian Evidence Act, 1872-Chapter II-Sec. 45–Held, opinion of typewriter expert is admissible in evidence. Words and Phrases: “Science” “Handwriting”-Meaning of-In the context of opinion of typewriting expert-S.45 of Evidence Act. 1872. The respondent was tried in the Sessions Court, New Delhi for offences under Sections 302 IPC and Sections 3 and 4 of Explosive Sub-stances Act, 1908. When the prosecution wanted to examine a typewriter expert for proof of certain incriminating facts against the respondent based on the identity of a typewriter on which a material document was alleged to have been typed, an objection was taken to the admissibility of the opinion evidence of the typewriter expert under Section 45 of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 based on the decision of the Supreme Court in Hanumant v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR (19952) SC 343 = [1952] SCR 1091. The trial court upheld the objection. The Revision Petition before the High Court was also dismissed. The Appellants challenged the correctness of the findings in Hanumant’s case and sought for reconsideration of the said judgment. =Allowing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1. The observations made in the decision in Hanumant’s case on the basis of a concession does not reflect the correct position of law on this point and should, therefore, be treated as no longer good law on the point. The decision in Hanumant’s case proceeds on the concession that the evidence of a typewriter expert is not admissible in evidence under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. The decision in Hanumant cannot be taken as deciding that point event though on the basis of that observation the evidence of typewriter expert was excluded as inadmissible. [567-E-F; 559- D-E] Hanumant v. Tlie State of M.P., AIR (1952) SC 343 = [1952] SCR 1091, overruled. 2. The opinion of the typewriter expert in the present case is admissible under Section 45 of the Evidence Act and the contrary view taken by the Trial Court and the High Court is erroneous. [567-F] 3. Irrespective of the view that the word “handwriting” in Section 45 includes typewriting the word “science” is wide enough to meet the requirement of treating the opinion of a typewriter expert as an opinion evidence coming within the ambit of Section 45 of the Evidence Act. [567-B] Statutory Interpretation by Francis Bennion, Second edition pp. 617 to 619; ‘Question Documents, Second Edition, by Albert S. Osborn pg. 598; ‘Photographic Evidence’ by Charles C. Scott., Second Edition, Volume 1 pg. 636; ‘Law of Disputed and Forged Documents’, by J. Newton Baker pp. 451-453 and ‘Typewriting Identification (Identification System for Questioned (Typewriting)’ by Billy Prior Bates pg. 59, referred to. 4. The word “Science” occurring independently and in addition to the word “handwriting” in Section 45 of the Act of 1872, is sufficient to indicate that the opinion of a person specially skilled in the use of typewriters and having the scientific knowledge of typewriters would be an expert in this science and his opinion about the identity of typewriting for the purpose of identifying the particular typewriter on which the writing is typed is a relevant fact under Section 45 of the Evidence Act. [561-E-F] The Oxford Encyclopedic English Dictionary; the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 2; Collins Dictionary of the English Language, referred to. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 461 of 1987. =1996 AIR 1491, 1996( 2 )SCR 556, 1996( 2 )SCC 428, 1996( 2 )SCALE37 , 1996( 2 )JT 186

CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 461 of 1987 PETITIONER: STATE (THROUGH CBI/NEW DELHI) RESPONDENT: S.J.CHOUDHARY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 13/02/1996 BENCH: JAGDISH SARAN VERMA & G.N.RAY & N.P.SINGH & FAIZAN UDDIN & G.T.NANAVATI JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT Delivered By: JAGDISH SARAN VERMA J.S VERMA. J. The reference made in this appeal to the Constitution Bench is for deciding the … Continue reading

Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 112-Presumption of law-Conclusive proof of legitimacy-Birth during lawful wedlock. =The presumption under section 112 of the Indian Evidence Act is a conclusive presumption of law which can be displaced only by non-access between the parties to the marriage at a time when according to the ordinary course of nature the husband could have been the father of the child. Access and non-access connote existence and non- existence of opportunities for marital intercourse. Karapaya v. Mayandy referred to. Non-access can be proved by evidence direct or circumstantial though the proof of non-access must be clear and satisfactory as the presumption of legitimacy is highly favoured by law. The principle of English common law according to which neither a husband nor a wife is permitted to give evidence of non-access after marriage to bastardize a child born in lawful wedlock, does not apply to legitimacy proceedings in India as no such rule is to be found anywhere in the Indian Evidence Act and the old common law doctrine itself has been abrogated in England by the provisions of section 7 of the Matrimonial Cause Act, 1950. That by the evidence on the record the defendant No. 1 (husband) did not succeed in proving that there was no opportunity for intercourse between him and defendant No. 2 (his wife) at the time when the infant plaintiff was conceived and the High Court erred in holding that there was no opportunity for access between the parties at the material period.

PETITIONER: CHILUKURI VENKATESWARLU Vs. RESPONDENT: CHILUKURI VENKATANARAYANA. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/12/1953 BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BENCH: MUKHERJEA, B.K. BHAGWATI, NATWARLAL H. JAGANNADHADAS, B. CITATION: 1954 AIR 176 1954 SCR 424 CITATOR INFO : R 1971 SC2352 (13) ACT: Indian Evidence Act (1 of 1872), s. 112-Presumption of law-Conclusive proof of legitimacy-Birth during lawful wedlock. HEADNOTE: The … Continue reading

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