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CHEATING – HAVING SEXUAL INTERCOURSE ON THE PROMISE OF MARRYING = The facts as they unfold from the statement of the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) are, that even before the first act of sexual intercourse, the accused-appellant Karthick used to tease her. He also used to tell her, that he wished to marry her. The fact that he had sexual intercourse with her, when the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) was all alone in her house, is not disputed. The prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) has confirmed in her deposition, that at the time of the first sexual intercourse with her at her house, the accused- appellant Karthick had gagged her mouth with his right hand. He had promised to marry her, by placing his hand on her head, after having ravaged her. The subsequent acts of sexual intercourse, were actions of actively cheating her, by giving her the impression that he would marry her. The occurrence at the Murugan temple, is of significant importance. At the temple, for the first time the accused-appellant Karthick told the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), that he would not marry her. The instant factual position has been confirmed by Chandran (PW9) and Ilangovan (PW10). Despite lengthy cross-examination, the accused-appellant has not been able to create any dent in the testimony of the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1). In the aforesaid view of the matter, we confirm the concurrent determination of the courts below, that the accused-appellant Karthick committed deceit with the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) by promising to marry her. On the strength of the said deception, in the first instance persuaded her not to disclose the occurrence to anyone, and thereafter, repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the accused-appellant Karthick, that sexual intercourse by the accused- appellant Karthick with the prosecutrix Poomari was consensual. Obtaining consent by exercising deceit, cannot be legitimate defence to exculpate an accused.; NO DELAY IN FILING A CASE = there has been no delay whatsoever at the hands of the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1). As long as commitment of marriage subsisted, the relationship between the parties could not be described as constituting the offence of rape under Section 376 of the Indian penal Code. It is only after the accused-appellant Karthick declined to marry the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), that a different dimension came to be attached to the physical relationship, which had legitimately continued over the past six months. Things changed when the accused-appellant declined to marry the prosecutrix. After the promised alliance was declined, the prosecutrix without any delay disclosed the entire episode to her immediate family. Without any further delay, the brother and father of the Poomari (PW1) approached the village elders. The village elders immediately summoned the accused-appellant Karthick by holding a panchayat. The village elders made all efforts to settled the issue amicably. The family, as is usual in such matters, wished to settle the matter amicably by persuading the accused-appellant to view the matter realistically. It is only on the refusal of the accused-apellant Karthick, to marry the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), that the question of making a criminal complaint arose. After the meetings of the panchayat, wherein the accused-appellant declined to marry the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), without any further delay, the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) reported the matter to the police on 10.10.2003. In the above view of the matter, in the peculiar facts of this case, it is not possible for us to hold, that any doubt can be said to have been created in the version of the prosecution, merely on account of delay in the registration of the first information report. 18. No other submission, besides those noticed hereinabove, was advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.= “The accused-appellant Karthick was ordered to be released on bail by this Court vide order dated 4.4.2008. He shall now be taken into custody, to serve the remaining part of the sentence.”

‘ ‘ PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40457 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.601 OF 2008 Karthi @ Karthick … Appellant Versus State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu … Respondent J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. 1. The appellant, Karthi @ Karthick was convicted for … Continue reading

Supreme Court, Criminal Appellate jurisdiction of–Certif- icate of fitness, if can be granted by High Court on a question of fact Dying declaration evidiantry value of-If must be corroborated in order to sustain conviction-Consti- tution of India, Art. 134(1)(c)- Indian Evidence Act (.1 of 1872), s. 32(1).= HEADNOTE: The Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a Court of criminal appeal, and it is not competent for a High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution to grant a certifi- cate of fitness for appeal to this Court on a ground which is essentially one of fact. Haripada Dey v. The -State of West Bengal” – (1956) S.C.R. 639, followed. There is no absolute rule of law, not even a rule of pru- dence that has- ripened -into a: rule of law- that a dying declaration in order-that it may sustain an order of convic- tion must be corroborated by, other independent evidence. The observations made by this Court in Madhoprasad v. The State of Madhya Pradesh are in the nature of obiter dicta and do not lay down the law. Madhoprasad v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. (1953) S.C. 420, considered. In re Guruswami Tevar, I.L.R. (1940) Mad. I58, approved. Case-law reviewed.The provision of s. 32(I) of the Indian Evidence Act ” which makes the statement in a dying declaration as to the cause of death and the circumstances that brought it about rele- vant, is an exception to the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence and evidence untested by cross-examination. The special sanctity which the Legislature attaches to such a declaration must be respected unless such declaration can be shown not to have been made in expectation of death or to be otherwise unreliable and any evidence adduced for this purpose can only detract from its value but not affect its admissibility. Although a dying declaration has to be very closely scruti-nised, and tested as any other piece of evidence, once the Court comes to the conclusion, in any particular case, that it is true, no question of corroboration arises. A dying declaration cannot be placed in the same category as the evidence of an accomplice or a confession. Consequently, in a case where the trial judge as also the High Court founded their orders of conviction of an accused person under S. 302 Of the Indian Penal Code mainly on three dying declarations made by the murdered person in quick succession one after the other, and the High Court, relying on a decision of this Court, sought for corroboration of such dying declarations in the fact that the accused person had absconded and was arrested in suspicious circumstances, but was in doubt as to the sufficiency of such evidence of corroboration and granted the certificate of fitness under= Held, that the certificate granted by the High Court was incompetent and as the case disclosed no grounds on which this Court could possibly grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution, the appeal must be dismissed.

reported in/ published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=609 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12 PETITIONER: KUSHAL RAO Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/09/1957 BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. MENON, P. GOVINDA KAPUR, J.L. CITATION: 1958 AIR 22 1958 SCR 552 ACT: Supreme Court, Criminal Appellate jurisdiction of–Certif- icate of … Continue reading

ACQUITTAL under Section 302 read with Section 201 of the Indian Penal Code 1860 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘IPC’).= Admittedly, there was a divorce between the parties. Therefore, the question of demand of dowry or ill-treatment or harassment could not arise after 8 years of divorce decree by the court. The mother of Ratna has deposed about the illicit relationship of the appellant and another woman and the appellant wanted to marry that woman. In case the parties had separated by a divorce through court, we fail to understand how Ratna (deceased) or her parents were concerned about such a relationship. 15. It is a settled legal proposition that in case there are apparent discrepancies in two dying declarations, it would be unsafe to convict the accused. In such a fact-situation, the accused gets the benefit of doubt. In case of plural/multiple dying declarations, the court has to scrutinise the evidence cautiously and must find out whether there is consistency particularly in material particulars therein. In case there are inter-se discrepancies in the depositions of the witnesses given in support of one of the dying declarations, it would not be safe to rely upon the same.= whether they are material or not and while scrutinising the contents of various dying declarations, the court has to examine the same in the light of the various surrounding facts and circumstances. In case of dying declaration, as the accused does not have right to cross-examine the maker and not able to elicit the truth as happens in the case of other witnesses, it would not be safe to rely if the dying declaration does not inspire full confidence of the court about its correctness, as it may be result of tutoring, prompting or product of imagination. The court has to be satisfied that the maker was in a fit state of mind and had a clear opportunity to observe and identify the assailant (s). – In exceptional cases where there are compelling circumstances and the judgment under appeal is found to be perverse, the appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal. The appellate court should bear in mind the presumption of innocence of the accused and further that the trial Court’s acquittal bolsters the presumption of his innocence. Interference in a routine manner where the other view is possible should be avoided, unless there are good reasons for interference. The High Court did not consider the matter in correct perspective nor observed the parameters laid down by this court to interfere against the order of acquittal. In view of the above, the appeal is allowed and the judgment and order of the High Court is set aside. The judgment and order of the Sessions Court is restored. The appellant is on bail. His bail bonds stand discharged.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.248 of 2007 Bhadragiri Venkata Ravi …Appellant Versus Public Prosecutor High Court of A.P., Hyderabad …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been filed against the judgment and order dated … Continue reading

FAILURE OF INVESTIGATION OFFICER , DOES NOT HAMPER THE CONVICTION, IF IT IS OTHERWISE SOUND – unless lapses made on the part of Investigating authorities are such, so as to cast a reasonable doubt on the case of the prosecution, or seriously prejudice the defence of the accused, the court would not set aside the conviction of the accused merely on the ground of tainted investigation. = “It is well established on record that SI Rajesh Kumar had not conducted the investigation properly and he was favourably inclined to the appellant and therefore, spoiled the case. – Investigating Officer did not care to get the same photographed nor mentioned the same anywhere in the investigation proceedings. Therefore, the complainant cannot be made to suffer for the lapse of the Investigating Officer…….= The complainant named the appellant and his co-accused Kalia in the FIR itself. However, distorted version was recorded in the FIR and when the complainant party received copy of FIR on 26.1.2005 (as stated by Birma Devi PW.4), they learnt of the same= The appellant had been named in the FIR on 7.1.2005, but still SI Rajesh Kumar did not even join him in investigation and did not interrogate him, what to talk of arresting him. The statements of Maya Devi and Birma Devi, therefore, cannot be discarded in view of the manner in which SI Rajesh Kumar was conducting the investigation from the very beginning.”= (i) There is no reason for the false implication of the appellant, who being the Sarpanch of the village was an influential person. (ii) Omkar Singh (PW.8) was an independent witness and there was no ground to disregard his testimony. (iii) Abadi was at some distance from the place of occurrence. Therefore, the hue and cry raised by Raj-deceased, and subsequently by Maya Devi (PW.3), could not have attracted the attention of any person. (iv) No attempt was made by the defence to falsify the allegation of the non payment of the sum of Rs.47,000/-, as consideration for the sale of a buffalo by the deceased to the appellant. = In view of the above, we do not find any force in the appeal, which lacks merit and is accordingly, dismissed. 19. Before parting with the case, we feel it necessary to bring the matter to the notice of the administration of the State of Haryana that in spite of the fact that certain serious findings have been recorded by the Trial Court, as well as by the High Court regarding the unfair investigation conducted by Shri Rajesh Kumar, who was the SHO of the Police Station, Sadar Dadri on 7.1.2005, but for the reasons best known to the administration, no action was taken against him. We have no words to express our anguish, and fail to understand under what circumstances the State authorities have adopted such an indifferent attitude where a helpless divorcee has been murdered, and her widowed mother has been crying and running from pillar to post to secure justice, but the administration did not feel it necessary to wake up from its deep slumber. We request the learned Chief Secretary of the State of Haryana to examine the case, and proceed in accordance with law. A copy of the judgment be sent by the registry directly to the Chief Secretary, Haryana.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1474 of 2010 Karan Singh …Appellant Versus State of Haryana & Anr. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 6.2.2009 in … Continue reading

SINGLE WITNESS IS ENOUGH TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED IF FOUND RELIABLE = it has been held that if the testimony of a singular witness is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment in recording the conviction of the accused on such proof. In the said pronouncement it has been further ruled that the law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness.- On the analysis of evidence of PW-6 we find that his evidence is cogent and trustworthy and further gets corroboration from the medical evidence and also for the factum of recovery of gold and silver ornaments which has been clearly proven by PW-9. 20. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not perceive any error in the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Judge that has been affirmed by the High Court and, accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.

Page 1     Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 642 OF 2008 Kusti Mallaiah …Appellant Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Calling in question the legal propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence … Continue reading

Section 376(2) (f) of the Indian Penal Code= the victim is an eight year old girl who possibly would be deprived of the dreams of “Spring of Life” and might be psychologically compelled to remain in the “Torment of Winter”. When she suffers, the collective at large also suffers. Such a singular crime creates an atmosphere of fear which is historically abhorred by the society. It demands just punishment from the court and to such a demand, the courts of law are bound to respond within legal parameters. It is a demand for justice and the award of punishment has to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the court. The mitigating factors put forth by the learned counsel for the appellant are meant to invite mercy but we are disposed to think that the factual matrix cannot allow the rainbow of mercy to magistrate. Our judicial discretion impels us to maintain the sentence of rigorous imprisonment for life and, 22Page 23 hence, we sustain the judgment of conviction and the order of sentence passed by the High Court. 23. Ex consequenti, the appeal, being sans merit, stands dismissed.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1860 OF 2010 Shyam Narain …Appellant Versus The State of NCT of Delhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The wanton lust, vicious appetite, depravity of senses, mortgage of mind to the inferior endowments of … Continue reading

a complaint against the respondents alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the IPC. Crime No.41/10 was accordingly registered in the Central Crime Branch, Chennai Suburban, St. Thomas Mount for the said offences against respondents 2, 3 and 4. Aggrieved, the respondents filed Criminal O.P. No.15917 of 2010 for quashing of the FIR as also investigation in connection therewith =suit based on two forged sale deeds = In Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court had authoritatively declared that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. was attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in any court and during the time the same was in custodia legis.= It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the court records.- The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.”- the bar contained in Section 195 against taking of cognizance was not attracted to the case at hand as the sale deeds relied upon by GWL for claiming title to the property in question had not been forged while they were in custodia legis.= In the light of the above, the High Court was wrong in quashing the FIR on the ground that the allegations did not constitute an offence even when the same were taken to be true in their entirety. It was also, in our view, wrong for the High Court to hold that the respondents were not the makers of the documents or that the filing of a civil suit based on the same would not constitute an offence. Whether or not the respondents had forged the documents and if so what offence was committed by the respondents was a matter for investigation which could not be prejudged or quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

  ‘ ITEM NO. Judgment Court No.10 SECTION IIA     S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2013 @ SLP(Crl.) No. 1962 of 2011   C.P.SUBHASH Appellant (s)   VERSUS   INSPECTOR OF … Continue reading

FRAUDULENTLY OBTAINED DISCHARE FROM CRIMINAL CASE = “court is not a laboratory where children come to play”. The action of the accused-respondent depicts the attitude where one calculatedly conceives Page 2 the concept that he is entitled to play a game of chess in a court of law and the propriety, expected norms from a litigant and the abhorrence of courts to the issues of suppression of facts can comfortably be kept at bay. Such a proclivity appears to have weighed uppermost in his mind on the base that he can play in aid of technicalities to his own advantage and the law, in its essential substance, and justice, with its divine attributes, can unceremoniously be buried in the grave. = The fraudulent intention is writ large. In fact, he has shown his courage of ignorance and tried to play possum. The High Court, as we have seen, applied the principle “when infrastructure collapses, the superstructure is bound to collapse”. However, as the order has been obtained by practising fraud and suppressing material fact before a court of law to gain advantage, the said order cannot be allowed to stand. That apart, we have dealt with regard to the legal sustainability of the order in detail. Under these circumstances, we are disposed to think that the power under Article 142 of the Constitution is required to be invoked to do complete justice between the parties. Cognizance of the offences had been rightly taken by the learned Magistrate and charges, as we find, have been correctly framed by the learned trial Judge. A victim of a crime has as much right to get justice from the court as an accused who enjoys the benefit of innocence till the allegations are proven against him. when an order of quashment of summons has been obtained by suppression, this Court has an obligation to set aside the said order and restore the order framing charges and direct the trial to go on. And we so direct.= Consequently, the appeal is allowed, the order passed by the High Court in Criminal Revision No. 327 of 2011 and the order passed by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No.1, Jodhpur, in Criminal Revision No. 7 of 2009 are set aside and it is directed that the trial which is pending before the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge, No. 3, Jodhpur, shall proceed in accordance with law.

Page 1     Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 785 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl. ) No. 294 of 2013) Moti Lal Songara …Appellant Versus Prem Prakash @ Pappu and Anr. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

V. Vijay Sai Reddy- cancellation of bail granted to the respondent herein.= It is true that the Special Judge while granting bail imposed certain conditions and the High Court has also added some more additional conditions, however, taking note of few instances in which how the respondent has acted, it cannot be possible for the investigating agency to collect the remaining materials for the remaining three charge sheets to be filed. In such circumstances, we are satisfied firstly the Special Court took irrelevant materials for consideration for grant of bail and secondly, the High Court having arrived definite conclusion that several findings of Special court are unacceptable or irrelevant but ultimately affirmed the very same order of the special Judge granting bail. = While granting bail, the court has to keep in mind the nature of accusations, the nature of evidence in support thereof, the severity of the punishment which conviction will entail, the character of the accused, circumstances which are peculiar to the accused, reasonable possibility of securing the presence of the accused at the trial, reasonable apprehension of the witnesses being tampered with, the larger interests of the public/State and other similar considerations.= It has also to be kept in mind that for the purpose of granting bail, the Legislature has used the words “reasonable grounds for believing” instead of “the evidence”= whether there is a genuine case against the accused and that the prosecution will be able to produce prima facie evidence in support of the charge. Taking note of all the aspects discussed above, without expressing any opinion on the merits, we set aside both the orders of the Special Judge and the High Court granting bail to A-2 and allow the appeal filed by the CBI with a direction to complete all the investigation relating to the remaining three charge sheets and file appropriate report before the trial Court within a period of four months from today. Thereafter, the respondent herein is free to renew his prayer for bail before the trial Court and if any such petition is filed, the trial Court is free to consider the prayer for bail independently on its own merits without being influenced by the present appeal. During the course of hearing, it is brought to our notice that the marriage of the daughter of the respondent has been fixed for 26.05.2013. Taking note of the said aspect, we direct the respondent herein to surrender on or before 5-6-2013 before the Special Court for being sent to the custody. 33) The appeal is allowed.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 729 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5946 of 2012 Central Bureau of Investigation …. Appellant(s) Versus V. Vijay Sai Reddy …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This … Continue reading

Section 311 Cr.P.C. empowers the court to summon a material witness, or to examine a person present at “any stage” of “any enquiry”, or “trial”, or “any other proceedings” under the Cr.P.C., or to summon any person as a witness, or to recall and re-examine any person who has already been examined if his evidence appears to it, to be essential to the arrival of a just decision of the case.= Undoubtedly, an application filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. must be allowed if fresh evidence is being produced to facilitate a just decision, however, in the instant case, the learned Trial Court prejudged the evidence of the witness sought to be examined by the appellant, and thereby cause grave and material prejudice to the appellant as regards her defence, which tantamounts to a flagrant violation of the principles of law governing the production of such evidence in keeping with the provisions of Section 311 Cr.P.C. By doing so, the Trial Court reached the conclusion that the production of such evidence by the defence was not essential to facilitate a just decision of the case. Such an assumption is wholly misconceived, and is not tenable in law as the accused has every right to adduce evidence in rebuttal of the evidence brought on record by the prosecution. The court must examine whether such additional evidence is necessary to facilitate a just and proper decision of the case. The examination of the hand-writing expert may therefore be necessary to rebut the evidence of Rabi Lal Thapa (PW.40), and a request made for his examination ought not to have been rejected on the sole ground that the opinion of the hand-writing expert would not be conclusive. In such a situation, the only issue that ought to have been considered by the courts below, is whether the evidence proposed to be adduced was relevant or not. Identical is the position regarding the panchnama witness, and the court is justified in weighing evidence, only and only once the same has been laid before it and brought on record. Mr. B.B. Sharma, thus, may be in a position to depose with respect to whether the documents alleged to have been found, or to have been seized, were actually recovered or not, and therefore, from the point of view of the appellant, his examination might prove to be essential and imperative for facilitating a just decision of the case. The High Court has simply quoted relevant paragraphs from the judgment of the Trial Court and has approved the same without giving proper reasons, merely observing that the additional evidence sought to be brought on record was not essential for the purpose of arriving at a just decision. Furthermore, the same is not a case where if the application filed by the appellant had been allowed, the process would have taken much time. In fact, disallowing the said application, has caused delay. No prejudice would have been caused to the prosecution, if the defence had been permitted to examine said three witnesses. In view of above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the Trial Court, as well as of the High Court impugned before us, are set aside. The application under Section 311 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant is allowed. The parties are directed to appear before the learned Trial Court on the 17th of May, 2013, and the learned Trial Court is requested to fix a date on which the appellant shall produce the three witnesses, and the same may thereafter be examined expeditiously in accordance with law, and without causing any further delay. Needless to say that the prosecution will be entitled to cross examine them.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.709 of 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.3271 of 2013) Natasha Singh …Appellant Versus CBI (State) …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned … Continue reading

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