IndianPenal Code

This tag is associated with 107 posts

power of state govt. in varying salary of constitutional appointee ; Binding nature of judgment = G.L. BATRA Vs. STATE OF HARYANA & ORS. judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40864

State Govt. is not competent to vary the remuneration fixed to the constitutional appointee ;     Earlier judgment of same bench is binding on the later bench of same quorum;       The earlier  judgment         may seem to be not correct yet it will have the binding effect on … Continue reading

Sec.306 of I.P.C. but not under sec.304 B I.P.C. – suicide of wife = STATE OF RAJASTHAN Vs. GIRIDHARI LAL Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40859

When there is no evidence that the suicide was committed due to curelty and harassment by her husband for dowry soon before her death, Accused is liable to be punished only under sec.306 of I.P.C. but not under sec.304 B I.P.C. =         whether Babita’s death is  an  instance  of   dowry … Continue reading

sec. 354 outrage the modesty of women is to be considered stringy, no lenient view – Ajahar Ali … Appellant VERSUS State of West Bengal … Respondent published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40857

Sec. 354 outrage the modesty of women is to be considered stringy, no lenient view should be taken while granting punishment – Due to delay of 18 years, the accused is not entitled  to any benefit under the provisions of Probation of Offenders Act, 1958 – No lenient view       The provisions of Section 354 … Continue reading

Wrong procedure adopted by Magistrate = In a Kidnap case on a private complaint, when the police filed charge sheet excluding kidnap and filed only under sec. 323 and 343 of I.P.C. – with out conducting trial no court should pass orders on plea of guilty and releasing the accused on probation with a direction – not to affect his service = conviction of an employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis of his conviction. The word “disqualification” contained in Section 12 of the 1958 Act refers to a disqualification provided in other statutes, as explained by this Court in the above referred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given the benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.”= the trial court had no competence to make any observation having civil consequences so far as the private respondents are concerned. The High Court rejected the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant only on the ground that the appellant neither challenged the order of taking cognizance nor raised any objection at the time of reading over of the charges to the accused. The High Court failed to appreciate that before the statement of the appellant or any other witness could be recorded, the trial court disposed off the matter on the date when the application itself had been submitted admitting the guilt. Even otherwise if the trial court wanted to entertain any issue of plea bargaining under Chapter XXI-A, inserted w.e.f. 5.7.2006, then too the court was obliged there under to put the victim to notice before extending any such benefits that have been given in the present case. The procedure therefore appears to have been clearly violated. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant had no opportunity to raise any grievance before the appropriate forum.= In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial court dated 15.7.2011 as well as of the High Court dated 23.4.2012 are set aside. The matter is remitted

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40841     REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1547 of 2013       Girraj Prasad Meena …Appellant   Versus   State of Rajasthan & Ors. …Respondents               J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

When a court not inclined to grant anticipatory bail , can not direct the lower court to grant bail on the surrender of the accused – the orders to consider the bail application on surrender and release him on it’s satisfaction of sureties submitted was misread by lower courts = On a reading of the said authoritative pronouncement and the principles that have been culled out in Savitry Agarwal there is remotely no indication that the Court of Session or the High Court can pass an order that on surrendering of the accused before the Magistrate he shall be released on bail on such terms and conditions as the learned Magistrate may deem fit and proper or the superior court would impose conditions for grant of bail on such surrender. When the High Court in categorical terms has expressed the view that it is not inclined to grant anticipatory bail to the petitioner-accused it could not have issued such a direction which would tantamount to conferment of benefit by which the accused would be in a position to avoid arrest. It is in clear violation of the language employed in the statutory provision and in flagrant violation of the dictum laid down in Gurbaksh Singh Sibbia and the principles culled out in Savitri Agarwal.”= In the case at hand, though such an order was not passed by the learned single Judge, yet the order passed by him was potent enough to create enormous confusion. And it has so happened. It is the duty of the superior courts to follow the command of the statutory provisions and be guided by the precedents and issue directions which are permissible in law. We are of the convinced opinion that the observations made by the learned single Judge while dealing with second application under Section 438 CrPC was not at all warranted under any circumstance as it was neither in consonance with the language employed in Section 438 CrPC nor in accord with the established principles of law relating to grant of anticipatory bail. We may reiterate that the said order has been interpreted by this Court as an order only issuing a direction to the accused to surrender, but as we find, it has really created colossal dilemma in the mind of the learned Additional Sessions Judge. We are pained to say that passing of these kind of orders has become quite frequent and the sagacious saying, “A stitch in time saves nine” may be an apposite reminder now. We painfully part with the case by saying so. 30. The appeal is disposed of in terms of the modification in the order passed by the learned single Judge in M.Cr.C. No. 701 of 2013 and the observations made hereinabove.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40837         IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1545 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7678 of 2013)       Ranjit Singh … Appellant   Versus   State of M.P. and others …Respondents                 … Continue reading

Section 432 Cr.PC for remission and Section 433 Cr.PC for commutation – No Sentence should be considered for remission and commutation before serving of the minimum sentence = All murders shock the community; but certain murders shock the conscience of the Court and the community. The distinguishing aspect of the latter category is that there is shock coupled with extreme revulsion. What should be the penological approach in that category is one question arising for consideration in this case. What is the scope of consideration of Death Reference by the High Court under Chapter XXVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’), is the other question. Whether there is any restriction on the exercise of power under Section 432 Cr.PC for remission and Section 433 Cr.PC for commutation in cases of minimum sentence is the third main issue.= In the present case, the respondent has been awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. Under Section 376 of IPC also he has been awarded life imprisonment. The third substantive sentence is under Section 201 of IPC. All these sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The sentence of life imprisonment is till the end of one’s biological life. However, in view of the power of the State under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.PC, in the present case, we are of the view that the sentences shall run consecutively, in case there is remission or commutation. We further make it clear that the remission or commutation, if considered in the case of the respondent, shall be granted only after the mandatory period of fourteen years in the case of offence under Section 302 of IPC. Punishment has a penological purpose. Reformation, retribution, prevention, deterrence are some of the major factors in that regard. Parliament is the collective conscience of the people. If it has mandated a minimum sentence for certain offences, the Government being its delegate, cannot interfere with the same in exercise of their power for remission or commutation. Neither Section 432 nor Section 433 of Cr.PC hence contains a non-obstante provision. Therefore, the minimum sentence provided for any offence cannot be and shall not be remitted or commuted by the Government in exercise of their power under Section 432 or 433 of the Cr.PC. Wherever the Indian Penal Code or such penal statutes have provided for a minimum sentence for any offence, to that extent, the power of remission or commutation has to be read as restricted; otherwise the whole purpose of punishment will be defeated and it will be a mockery on sentencing. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Section 432 or 433 of Cr.PC, the sentence under Section 376 of IPC shall not be remitted or commuted before seven years of imprisonment. In other words, in that eventuality, it shall be ensured that the respondent will first serve the term of life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. In case there is any remission after fourteen years, then imprisonment for a minimum period of seven years under Section 376 of IPC shall follow and thereafter three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC. The sentence on fine and default as awarded by the Sessions Court are maintained as such.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40836 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 659 OF 2006 State of Rajasthan … Appellant (s) Versus Jamil Khan … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: 1. All murders shock the community; but certain murders shock the conscience of the Court and … Continue reading

One accused is acquitted due to non-mention of his name in FIR and also no attributions or overt acts against him ; Death penalty converted in imprisonment to life = Principle of prudence, enunciated by Bachan Singh is sound counsel on this count which shall stand us in good stead – whenever in the given circumstances, there is difference of opinion with respect to any sentencing prop (sic)/rationale, or subjectivity involved in the determining factors, or lack of thoroughness in complying with the sentencing procedure, it would be advisable to fall in favour of the “rule” of life imprisonment rather than invoking the “exception” of death punishment.”= In the present case, even if we decide to ignore the similar deficiencies in the prosecution, and look into the oral evidence which has come on record, the case of prosecution against appellant no: 2, Naresh Paswan is rather weak. His name was not mentioned in the FIR. PW-2 Birendra Singh who is an injured witness, though states in the dock that he had seen the appellants slitting the throats, he failed to identify Naresh Paswan in Court. None of the other witnesses including PW-3 Lawlesh Singh, who is another injured witness, have attributed any role to him. None of them said that he was a member of MCC. It is material to note that Madhusudan who was named at Sr. No.5 in the FIR also faced a similar allegation. It was PW-2 Birendra Singh who named Madhusudan as one of the accused who slit the throats of the deceased, but had failed to identify him in the dock. In the absence of other witnesses throwing any light on his participation in the occurrence, Madhusudan was acquitted by the learned designated Judge. = (i) In the circumstances, Crl. Appeal No.791 of 2009 is allowed in part. The judgment convicting appellant no.2, accused Naresh Paswan is set- aside, and he will stand acquitted. He is acquitted of the offences for which he was charged, and it is ordered that he be released forthwith if not required in any other case. (ii) As far as appellant nos.1 and 3, accused Vyas Ram and Bugal Mochi are concerned, although their conviction under the offences for which they were charged is upheld, the death sentence awarded to them is commuted to imprisonment for life, which is to mean the rest of their natural life. (iii) Consequently, the Death Reference Case (R) No.2 of 2011 filed by State of Bihar is hereby dismissed.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40818     REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   Criminal Appeal No.791 OF 2009   Vyas Ram @ Vyas Kahar & Ors. … Appellants   Versus   State of Bihar … Respondent   With   Death Reference Case (R) No.2 of 2011   State of Bihar … Applicant … Continue reading

Sanction to prosecution when necessary = whether sanction before prosecution is required from each of the competent authorities entitled to remove an accused from the offices held by him, in situations wherein the accused holds a plurality of offices. The second determination was in respect of the requirement of sanction, in situations where the accused no longer holds the office, which he is alleged to have abused/misused, for committing the offence (s) for which he is being blamed. In answer to the first query, it has unambiguously been concluded, that if an accused holds a plurality of offices, each one of which makes him a public servant, sanction is essential only at the hands of the competent authority (entitled to remove him from service) of the office which he had allegedly misused. This leads to the clear inference, that other public offices held by the accused wherein an accused holds a plurality of offices, are irrelevant for purposes of obtaining sanction prior to prosecution. On the second issue it was concluded, that sanction was essential only if, at the time of taking cognizance, the accused was still holding the public office which he had allegedly abused. If the legal position determined in the above judgments is taken into consideration, there is certainly no doubt, that in the facts and circumstances of this case, sanction if required, ought to have been obtained from the Governor of the State of Madhya Pradesh. The instant determination is premised on the fact, that the appellant is stated to have misused his position while discharging his responsibilities as a nominee Director of the MPSIDC. It is clear to us, specially from the deliberation recorded hereinabove, that the appellant’s participation in the Cabinet Review Meeting dated 28.1.1994, and in the relevant meetings of the Board of Directors (of the MPSIDC) had no nexus to the post of Industries Commissioner, Government of Madhya Pradesh, or the subsequent office held by him as Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Government of India. Accordingly, in our considered view, sanction of the authorities with reference to the post of Industries Commissioner, Government of Madhya Pradesh and Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Government of India held by the appellant, was certainly not required. We therefore, hereby reject the submission advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, that since the appellant continued to hold the above-mentioned public office(s) in his capacity as a member of the IAS cadre, at the time the first charge sheet was filed on 24.9.2007, prosecution could be proceeded with, and cognizance taken, only upon sanction by the competent authority(ies) of the said two offices (Industries Commissioner, Government of Madhya Pradesh and Joint Secretary, Department of Heavy Industries, Government of India), as wholly misconceived.= We are of the view, that the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant is a mixed question of fact and law.- whether the accused is guilty of the accusation levelled against him. Therefore, it is neither proper nor possible for us to deal with the last contention advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant, at the present juncture.= we find no merit in the instant appeals. The same are accordingly hereby dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40781 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1454 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No.61 of 2012) Ajoy Acharya … Appellant Versus State Bureau of Inv. against Eco. Offence … Respondent With CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1455 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 400 of 2012) J … Continue reading

Tamil Nadu Borstal Schools Act, 1925 = since on the date of his conviction the Petitioner was over 21 years old, and therefore, was not a juvenile under the erstwhile or current statutory dispensation as per the wisdom of the Legislature, there was no impediment or legal impropriety in his having to undergo his sentence in an ordinary jail; on the contrary being an adult it would not have been advisable for him to be detained in a Borstal School as he may detrimentally influence younger persons. The position would have been totally different had he, on the date of his conviction, been between ages of 16 and 21 years as he would then have required to be placed in a Borstal School. Even if this infraction had occurred, the Petitioner would not be entitled to bail today solely on that score. In any event, the entire argument is totally academic since on the present date the Petitioner is over 30 years of age and on the date of his conviction for the commission of the offence, the Petitioner was over 21 years of age. The Borstal Schools Act merely concerns detention of a convict, whereas the Juvenile Justice Act deals with detention as also the punishment or sentence that can be imposed. 6. Accordingly the Application for bail, on the grounds pressed before us, is devoid of merit and is dismissed.

punishable   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40792      REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRL.M.P. NO.853 OF 2013 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.811 OF 2011       Nagoor Pichai @ Badusha …..Petitioner   Versus   State Tr. Sub-Inspector of Police …..Respondent                   J … Continue reading

DEATH CONFIRMED = Herein, A1 and A2 have committed a cold blooded murder in a pre-ordained fashion without any provocation whatsoever. The motive behind the gruesome act was to avenge the act of informant in approaching the machinery of law enforcement inspite of threats by the appellants. The victims were five innocent children and wife of the informant who were sleeping unalarmed when the appellants came and locked them inside their house while it was set ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2 is reflected in their act of first gagging the informant, thereafter attempting to burn him alive and later, when he tried to escape, firing at him thereby leaving no stone unturned in translating their threats into reality. As a result of the aforesaid incident, having witnessed the threats of burning given by the A1 to the informant tuned into reality, none but the family of the deceased-informant came forth to depose against the appellant-accused persons during the trial. The crime, enormous in proportion having wiped off the whole family, is committed so brutally that it pricks and shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the collective conscience of the society. It demands just punishment from the Court and the Court is bound to respond within legal parameters. The demand for justice and the award of punishment have to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the Courts. “…the punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; and, in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishments as being a deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else… The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” 90. In light of the aforesaid, having regard to the gravity of the offence committed, we are of the considered opinion that with regard to A1 and A2 this case falls into the category of rarest of the rare cases and is not a case where imprisonment for life is an adequate sentence and thus, constrained to reach the inescapable conclusion that death sentence imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed. 91. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and the sentence awarded to A3 is commuted to life imprisonment till the rest of his life. 92. The order of stay on the execution of the capital punishment of A1 and A2 is vacated.

punishable in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40794          REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011       DEEPAK RAI Appellant(s)   VERSUS   STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s)   WITH   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011       JAGAT RAI AND ANR. Appellant(s) … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,850,416 hits



Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,901 other followers

Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com