advocatemmmohan
Inspector
Sec.36 and sec. 173 of Cr.P.C. – Whether the station officer alone has got right to submit final report under sec.173 (2) but not other superior officers ? = STATE OF BIHAR & ANR. … APPELLANTS VERSUS LALU SINGH …RESPONDENT = Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40913
Sec.36 and sec. 173 of Cr.P.C. – Whether the station officer alone has got right to submit final report under sec.173 (2) but not other superior officers ? Apex court held wrong and set aside this observation made by high court and distinguished the observation made by Apex court judgement M.C.Mehta (Taj Corridor Scam) v. … Continue reading
NDPS Act = Search and seizer is a mandatory under sec.42 and sec.50 = Balbir singh principle – Gurjant Singh @ Janta …. Appellant VERSUS State of Punjab …. Respondent = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40907
NDPS Act = Search and seizer is a mandatory under sec.42 and sec.50 = but when police officer himself summoned DSP who is an acting DSP with out DSP rank then the Balbir singh principle not apply Lower court and High court committed grave error – Apex court set aside = Balbir … Continue reading
compensation for wrongful detention by abusing the police powers – apex court granted 2 lakhs – Crime No.11/98 was registered against the appellant under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code = the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No.1426 of 2010 is under challenge. By the impugned judgment the Division Bench upheld the judgment dated 27th April, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.1243 of 2003 and dismissed the appeal, affirming the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge by his judgment dismissed the writ petition preferred by the appellant claiming the damages and praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay him jointly and severally a sum of Rs.10,00,000/ for his alleged illegal detention and confinement. = Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.= It has already been noticed that the respondents before the Advisory Board or before the trial court failed to bring on record any evidence to frame the charges against the appellant under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC or under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. In spite of the same, Ist respondent, 2nd respondent, V.Jegannathan, the then Inspector General and Commissioner of Police, Salem City and the 3rd respondent, M. Ramasamy, the then Inspector of Police, Fairlands Police Station, Salem City before this Court have taken similar plea that the appellant was inciting the police personnel in Tamil Nadu to form an association to fight for their rights and toured the districts of Coimbatore, Tiruchirapalli, Pudukottai and Chennai City and incited the serving police personnel over forming of an association, and acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. By way of additional affidavit certain so called statements of persons have been enclosed which have been filed without any affidavit and were neither the part of the trial court record or material placed before the Advisory Board. The aforesaid action on the part of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondent in support of their act of detaining the appellant illegally by placing some material which has beyond the record justifies the appellant’s allegation that the respondents abused their power and position to support their unfair order. In view of the observation made above, though we do not give specific finding on mala fide action on the part of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondent but we hold that the respondentState and its officers have grossly abused legal power to punish the appellant to destroy his reputation in a manner nonoriented by law by detaining him under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in lodging a Criminal Case No.11/98 under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC based on the wrong statements which were fully unwarranted.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40488 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4815 OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.32704 OF 2010) N. SENGODAN … APPELLANT VERUS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME (PROHIBITION & EXCISE) DEPARTMENT, CHENNAI AND OTHERS … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 2. In this appeal the judgment dated 16th August, 2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No.1426 of 2010 is under challenge. By the impugned judgment the Division Bench upheld the judgment dated 27th April, … Continue reading
PROMOTION = Seniority was only to be taken into consideration where merit and ability of two eligible candidates was found to be approximately equal. This would lead us to yet another relevant inference on the issue in hand. In the above view of the matter, every claim for onward promotion from the post of Motor Vehicles Inspector (Grade II) was liable to be considered on the basis of merit. Therefore, an individual with superior merit would steal a march over those less meritorious. Thus viewed, if respondent no.5, K.V. Karthalingan, was actually possessed of outstanding and exceptional merit, as is sought to be suggested, he would have stolen a march over his seniors even under the existing Special Rules. Thus viewed, even by the manner/method of onward progression postulated in the Special Rules, a person with conspicuous merit and ability (as postulated under Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules), would overtake others without having to invoke Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules. This does not seem to have happened in case of respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan. On his consideration, after he had acquired eligibility for promotion to the post of Motor Vehicles Inspector (Grade I), he was promoted as such only on 10.5.2000. The merit and ability possessed by respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, is not shown to have resulted in his having superseded other members of the cadre senior to them. For the instant reason also, reliance placed by respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, for out of turn/accelerated promotion under Rule 36(b)(ii) of the General Rules deserves outright rejection. We find it difficult to appreciate the approach of the Administrative Tribunal, as also, the High Court. The simple reason depicted in the State Government’s order dated 8.12.1998 was, that the instances of extraordinary service relied upon by respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, to claim out of turn/accelerated promotion, could not be treated as exceptional or unprecedented, as such instances were common in the Transport Department. Even though respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, had not disputed the aforesaid factual position, it is difficult to understand how the Administrative Tribunal, as also, the High Court had accepted the claim of respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, by concluding that he had actually rendered extraordinary and exemplary service. Since the factual assertion made by the State Government in its order dated 8.12.1998, had remained unrebutted, we are of the view, that the Administrative Tribunal, as also, the High Court, were wholly unjustified in recording such a conclusion. For the instant reason also, the impugned orders dated 10.7.2002 (passed by the Administrative Tribunal) and 13.10.2004 (passed by the High Court) deserve to be set aside. 30. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find merit in the various contentions advanced by the learned counsel for the appellants. The order passed by the Administrative Tribunal on 10.7.2002 (while disposing of Original Application no. 429 of 2002) and the order passed by the High Court on 13.10.2004 (while disposing of Writ Petition (Civil) no. 21562 of 2003) directing the promotion of respondent no. 5, K.V. Karthalingan, to the post of Regional Transport Officer, are clearly unsustainable. They are accordingly hereby set aside. 31. Allowed in the aforesaid terms.
PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40460 Page 1 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4832 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 3464 of 2012) P. Dharni & Ors. … Appellants Versus Govt. of Tamil Nadu & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. … Continue reading
anti corruption case – In a case of corruption by public servant, quantum of amount is immaterial. Ultimately it depends upon the conduct of the delinquent and the proof regarding demand and acceptance established by the prosecution. d) Merely because the delinquent lost his job due to conviction under the Act may not be a mitigating circumstance for reduction of sentence, particularly, when the Statute prescribes minimum sentence.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 650 OF 2008 A.B. Bhaskara Rao …. Appellant(s) Versus Inspector of Police, CBI Visakhapatnam …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) This appeal is directed against the final judgment and order dated 03.10.2007 passed by … Continue reading
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