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Ultimately, on a basis that is not presently relevant, some accommodation was reached between PPCA’s solicitors and the Network Broadcasters’ solicitors, who as I said, are Free TV’s solicitors, as to the documents that would be produced in answer to the summonses. I have no doubt that that involved an element of give and take or compromise and reflects the pragmatic approach that is often very sensible in relation to these sorts of disputes. It may well be that the documents were produced without conceding that they were relevant. On the other hand, the question of relevance would be a sterile inquiry at this stage of the proceeding. 32 If it be the fact that a significant part of the costs for performing the work to which I have referred were incurred in connection with the production of documents that ultimately are shown to have had no relevance to the proceeding, that is a matter that could be taken into account at the end of the day when the reference has been determined. I do not consider that it is appropriate at this stage to make any order for the payment of the costs of complying with the summonses. I consider that at present, the costs of complying with the summonses should prima facie be treated as Free TV’s costs of the proceeding, having regard to the connection between Free TV, on the one hand, and the Network Broadcasters. 33 I consider that the appropriate course is to defer to the occasion when consideration is given to costs generally, either at or after the final hearing, the question of whether, and, if so to what extent, the costs of complying with the summonses should be treated as something other than the costs of Free TV’s participation in the proceeding. On the other hand, as I have already said, the FremantleMedia bodies have no connection with Free TV and should properly be treated as third parties to the proceeding, such that their costs should be ordered on the basis that I have already indicated.
Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Limited under section 154(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) [2009] ACopyT 1 (29 October 2009) Last Updated: 2 February 2010 COPYRIGHT TRIBUNAL OF AUSTRALIA Phonographic Performance Company of Australia Limited under section 154(1) of the Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) [2009] ACopyT 1 Copyright Act 1968 (Cth) ss 154, 163, 164, 166, 167 Copyright Tribunal (Procedure) Regulations 1969 (Cth) rr 47, 48 … Continue reading
Service Law: Date of birth – Correction of – Representation made 9 years after joining the service – Suit filed five years thereafter – HELD: Application for change in date of birth causes prejudice and disturbance in the working of the Department – Courts below should not have entertained the claim beyond the period provided in the Rules, which in the instant case, required the application to be made within two years – Whether the suit was time barred or not, the claim was, in any case, belated – Punjab Civil Services Rules, 1994 – Delay/Laches. The date of birth of respondent no. 1 at the time of his joining the Government service on 2.4.1992 was recorded in his service book as 25.3.1962 on the basis of his matriculation certificate. On 2.7.2001 he gave a representation for correction of his date of birth as 25.11.1962. By order dated 24.9.2002 his representation was rejected on the ground that no application for correction in date of birth submitted after two years from entry into service could be entertained. Respondent no. 1 gave a notice u/s 80 CPC on 10.11.2005, and thereafter filed a suit on 16.10.2006 for a declaration that the order dated 24.9.2002 was bad in law. The suit was decreed. The decree was affirmed by the first appellate court as also by the High Court in second appeal. Aggrieved, the State Government filed the appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 The relevant rule always required an application for correction of date of birth to be submitted within two years from joining the service. The amended rule of 20.12.2000 made a slight modification that the application filed after two years could be considered which will be only on the recommendation of the Administrative Department. This provision has now been removed after the rule was amended on 13.8.2001. [para 12] 1.2 It has been held time and again that the application for correction of date of birth should not be dealt with keeping in view only the public servant concerned, but it is also to be looked into from the point of view of the department and the employees engaged therein. The other employees have expectations of promotion based on seniority and suddenly if such change is permitted, it causes prejudice and disturbance in the working of the department. It is, therefore, quite correct for the State to insist that such application must be made within the time provided in the rules, say, two years, as in the present case. [para 14] Secretary and Commissioner, Home Department vs. R. Kirubakaran 1993 ( 2 ) Suppl. SCR 376=1994 Suppl. (1) SCC 155; State of UP vs. Gulaichi 2003 (1 ) Suppl. SCR762 = 2003 (6) SCC 483; State of Punjab vs. S C Chadha 2004 (2) SCR216 = 2004 (3) SCC 394; and State of Gujarat vs. Vali Mohmed Dosabhai Sindhi 2006 (3 ) Suppl. SCR685 = 2006 (6) SCC 537 – relied on. 1.3 It is also seen that such applications are made very often, almost at the end of the service of the employee or in any case, belatedly. In the instant case, the application was made after some nine years of entering into service. Even assuming that respondent no. 1 came to know in June 2001 that there was an error in his date of birth entered in the matriculation certificate, as claimed by him, he took more than three years to issue the notice u/s 80 CPC and then to file the suit. Whether the suit was time barred or not, the claim was in any case belated. It has to be filed within the time provided or within a reasonable time and it is not to be entertained merely on the basis of plausible material. [para 15] State of UP vs. Shiv Narayan Upadhyay 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR847 = 2005 (6) SCC 49 – relied on. 1.4 In the circumstances, the High Court as well as the courts below clearly erred in entertaining the claim of respondent No.1 for correction in his date of birth at a belated stage. The rules, in the instant case, all throughout required such application to be made within two years. Therefore, the courts clearly erred in finding fault with the appellant for allegedly applying the Notification of 13.8.2001 retrospectively which was not the case over here. [para 16-17] Union of India vs. Harnam Singh 1993 (1) SCR862= 1993 (2) SCC 162 – referred to. Case Law Reference: 1993 (2) Suppl. SCR376 relied on para 13 2003 (1) Suppl. SCR762 relied on para 13 2004 (2) SCR216 relied on para 13 2006 (3) Suppl. SCR685 relied on para 13 2005 (1) Suppl. SCR847 relied on para 15 1993 (1) SCR862 referred to para 16 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7415 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 18.09.2007 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Regular Second Appeal No. 3013 of 2007. Manjit Singh, Sukhda Pritam, Prashant Shukla, Kamal Mohan Gupta for the Appellant. Manoj Swarup, Ankit Swarup, Devesh Kumar Tripathi, Ajay Kumar, for the Respondents.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7415 OF 2010 (ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION NO. 2901 OF 2008) State of Haryana Appellant Versus Satish Kumar Mittal and another Respondents JUDGMENT GOKHALE, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal seeks to challenge the order … Continue reading
M/s. Kukreja Enterprises, Delhi had filed an application under No.492040 on 1st June, 1988 containing the word “RUPA” (per se) for registration as a Trade Mark in respect of ‘brassieres and panties’ (the specification of goods as amended) in Class 25 claiming through an amended user since 1980. 2. The application was opposed by BINOD HOSIERY, 31, Shibtala Street, Calcutta 700007. The opponents claim that they have been using the trade mark “RUPA” since 1968 in respect of hosiery products including brassieres, panties, vests, under wears etc. The Deputy Registrar also erred in his finding that the appellants/opponent have not discharged the initial onus of proving reputation and goodwill. Not only is this finding erroneous on facts, but is also erroneous on the principles of Law. The Deputy Registrar has completely disregarded the dicta of a Division Bench of the Hon’ble Calcutta High Court in Prem Nath Mayer, Appellant Vs. Registrar of Trade Marks and Another, Respondents (AIR 1972 CALCUTTA 261) wherein it has been held: “As I read the Rules, I see nothing therein to justify the conclusion that the onus shifts from the applicant to the opponent at any stage. On the contrary, the indication in Rule 54 is clear, that the onus lies upon the applicant because that Rule says that even if the opponent does not file any affidavit to adduce evidence in support of the opposition, the applicant has to file within two months from the receipt of copies of the affidavits in support of the opposition, such evidence by way of affidavits, as he desires to adduce in support of his application…………The rules therefore do not enjoin a shifting of the onus from the applicant to the opponent at any stage of the proceedings. The onus of proving, that the mark, if registered, will not lead to confusion or deception, is squarely upon the applicant.” (emphasis supplied) 22. Another mitigating factor in favour of the appellant/opponent is that further 27 trade marks bearing the primary word ‘RUPA’ have been registered by them since 1993 every one of which includes ‘brassieres and panties’. This materially alters the situation in favour of the appellant. It also goes to show that the original registration by Kukreja Enterprises, Delhi also in respect of ‘brassieres and panties’ for the same trade mark ‘RUPA’ was improper. 23. The Board had already recorded its displeasure on the conduct of the respondent in these proceedings (see para 6). For the foregoing reasons we refuse the impugned application. Consequently TA/133/2003/TM/DEL is allowed and application No.492040 in Class 25 for the trade mark ‘RUPA’ is refused registration. The respondent is directed to pay a sum of Rs.10,000/- as costs of these proceedings to the appellant.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018 CIRCUIT SITTING AT DELHI TA/133/2003/TM/DEL CM(M) 47/97 TUESDAY, THIS THE 12th DAY OF JUNE, 2012 Hon’ble Smt. Justice Prabha Sridevan … Chairman Hon’ble Shri V. Ravi … Technical Member (Trade Marks) Prahalad … Continue reading
Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992: Certification of tainted shares by Custodian and its release and payment of accruals – Application for – Filed by investor before Special Court – Dismissed on the ground of filing of the application after the cut off date – Justification of – Held: Not Justified – Custodian is justified in filing an application before the Special Court requesting to fix a cut off date for certification of the tainted shares – However, the cut off date fixed by the Special Court cannot be construed so as to have a binding effect of statutory nature under the provisions of the Transaction of Sale of Securities Act, 1956, wherein there is no fixed time limit for encashment of shares nor there is prescribed procedure for certification – Custodian cannot shirk away from his function and the duty cast upon him – Special Court is duty bound to guard the interest of the bonafide investors through the Custodian – On facts, investor had no role or involvement in treatment of the alleged equity shares as tainted which required certification before payment of dividend on the same – Investors cannot be denied his due on the ground of delay in filing the application for certification specially when they sought certification of his shares only after two months of the cut off date which had no statutory force – Transaction of Sale of Securities Act, 1956. Application and interpretation of the provisions under the 1992 Act – Held: Salutary object and reasons of the Act are to be taken into consideration – Different provisions are required to be construed so that each provision will have its play – In case of conflict, a harmonious construction should be adopted so that an honest and bonafide investor is not duped of his hard earned money which he invests by purchasing the equity shares – Interpretation of statutes Object and reasons of the 1992 Act – Explained The appellant – investor purchased 100 equity shares of the respondent No. 2 Company and made payment through respondent No. 4, the share broker. The appellant approached respondent No. 2 Company seeking dividend and other benefits on the shares, however, the appellant was informed that the shares were tainted and thus, his request was rejected. The appellant then filed an application before the Special Courts under the provisions of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 seeking certification of the tainted shares by the respondent No. 1-Custodian and its release and the payment of accruals. The appellant was informed by the office of the Special Court that the application could not be entertained since it was filed after the cut off date to submit application for certification. The appellant then filed an application before the Special Court that he was not aware of any cut off date regarding the filing of the application for certification of shares as also the procedure for the same. The Special Court dismissed the application. Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal u/s. 10 of the Act. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.The order of the Special Court is set aside. The respondent- Custodian would entertain the application filed before the Special Court for certification of the shares and verify the claim of the appellant in regard to the shares and ensure payment of dividends on those shares after certification by respondent No. 2. [Para 26] [290-E-F] 2.1 It is admitted by respondent No. 1 – Custodian himself that the appellant who had purchased the shares of respondent No. 2 through respondent No. 4 whose affairs were later taken care of by respondent No. 3 also and perhaps respondent No. 5, would clearly be deemed to be bonafide purchase. However, since the shares were held to be tainted by order of the Government of India due to which it was not honoured by respondent No. 2, the need arose for its certification through the Custodian under the control and supervision of the Special Court constituted under the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992. Meanwhile, long time had elapsed between the date of purchase and the application for certification of the shares and obviously during this long period it is the respondent-Custodian in co-ordination with the notified company and respondent Nos. 3 and 4- share brokers who was responsible to certify the shares of the notified company so that the dividends accruing on the shares could be paid. In the process, no doubt, respondent No. 1- Custodian encountered several procedural hassles as the claim of payment were made at frequent intervals by large number of investors holding the shares which were informed to be tainted and thus, required certification by the Custodian. [Para 20] [285-E-H; 286-A-B] 2.2 Respondent No. 1-Custodian although might have been justified in filing an application before the Special Court requesting to fix a cut off date during which it could facilitate certification of the tainted shares, the cut off date sought by the custodian and accepted by the Special Court cannot be construed so as to have a binding effect of statutory nature under the provisions of the Transaction of Sale of Securities Act, 1956, wherein there is no fixed time limit for encashment of shares nor there is prescribed procedure for certification which emerged only on account of extra-ordinary situation when certain shares were found to be tainted which were floated by respondent No. 5 for respondent No. 2 and were traded through share brokers like respondent No. 3 and 4. [Para 21] [286-C-E] 2.3 The salutary object and reasons of the Act also would have to be taken into consideration while interpreting and applying the provisions of a statute wherein efforts are required to be made in construing the different provisions so that each provision will have its play and in the event of any conflict, a harmonious construction is required to be made so that an honest and bonafide investor is not duped of his hard earned money which he invests by purchasing the equity shares of a company. The Act of 1992 had been enacted and given effect to in order to prevent undesirable transactions in securities by regulating the business of dealing therein as also certain other matters connected therewith which also provided for the establishment of a special court for the trail of offences relating to transaction in securities and for matters connected therewith or incidental thereto. The courts specially the Special Courts has to bear in mind the objects and reasons of the Act which clearly indicate that in course of the investigations by the Reserve Bank of India, large scale irregularities and mal practices noticed in transactions by both the Government and other securities through some brokers in collusion with the employees of banks, companies and financial institutions. The other irregularities and malpractices led to the divergence of funds from banks and financial institutions to the individual accounts of certain brokers. In order to deal with the situation and in particular to ensure speedy recovery of the huge amount involved, to punish the guilty and restore confidence and to maintain the basic integrity and credibility of the banks and financial institutions, the Act of 1992 was enacted for speedy trial of offences relating to transactions in securities and disposal of properties attached. This Act envisages the appointment of one or more custodians to take steps for guarding the interests with a view to check the diversion of funds invested in the form of shares by the offenders which may be in the form of companies or share brokers. Therefore, the duty of the Custodian as also the Special Court is to take into consideration that while the plea of the Custodian for facilitating certification of shares by fixing cut off date might have been reasonable in the given situation where large number of investors were filing applications for certification of the tainted shares time and again and thus, cut off date might have been justified, it was also expected to take care and guard the interest of the investors who are based and live not merely within the geographical boundaries of the Special Court which had fixed the cut off date but also live far and wide even across the boundaries of the country which is the fact in the instant matter also. [Para 22] [286-F-H; 287-A-H] 2.4 It was obligatory on the part of the Special Court and the Custodian to notice an important fact that when the shares purchased by the appellant were reported to be tainted which was issued through respondent No. 5 Company by the share broker companies i.e. respondent No. 4 and 5 and the same was ordered to be attached by the Custodian in view of the Government of India Regulation, it was clearly nefarious and dubious activity on the part of the respondent No. 5 due to which the unnecessary hassle of certification of the shares issued in the name of respondent No. 5 became essential. The investors like the appellant had absolutely no role in such activity and thus, even if the cut off date was fixed by the Special Court for certification of such shares, the same could not have been enforced oblivious of its repercussion on those investors who could not approach the Special Court for certification for reasons beyond their control as it has happened in the case of the appellant who could not approach the Special Court for certification of his tainted shares for aforestated reasons. [Para 22] [286-H; 288-A-D] 2.5 The appellant had filed an application before the Special Court seeking a direction for certification of the shares on 27.8.2005 which even if counted from the cut off date, would at the most was delayed by two months as the appellant had not received any notice which could be proved, indicating that the application for certification had to be filed by 27.6.2005 although the same is asserted by the Custodian, which cannot be accepted in absence of appearance of respondent Nos. 3, 4. But even it if were so, the court should have certainly considered the circumstance whether a bonafide purchaser of shares could be denied his due merely on the ground of violation of a cut off date which clearly did not have its existence in the statue, and thus, had no statutory force. The order sought from the Special Court to fix a cut off date for receiving application for certification was, thus,based merely on the theory of convenience of the Custodian clearly ignoring its ramification on the bonafide investor. It is common knowledge that when public at large invest in securities by purchasing shares of a notified company, it purchases through various modes including the modern tools and technique of internet and many other modern modes and methods. But thereafter, if the shares are held to be tainted which is clearly beyond the control of the investor and its certification is required, it is surely the custodian in co-ordination with the company floating shares as also the share broker company or the stock exchange, which has the onus and responsibility to take care of the interest of the investors under the supervision of the Special Court in view of the provision of the 1992 Act. Thus, the Custodian cannot shirk away from his function and the duty cast upon him by limiting his responsibilities and seeking a cut off date during which only he could perform the duty of certification, oblivious of its consequence and other ramification on the investors which include small investors also who put in their hard earned money in the shares of the company and later comes to know that the shares were tainted on which they have absolutely no role or control.[Para 23] [288-E-H; 289-A-E] 2.6 The Special Court clearly had the duty to ensure that in absence of statutory time limit prescribed for certification of shares under the Act of 1956, read with the Special Courts Act of 1992, the Special Court was duty bound to guard the interest of the investors through the Custodian at least in case of those investors who had bonafide purchased the shares of a notified company which for reasons beyond the control of investors, was held to be tainted. [Para 24] [288-F-G] 2.7 The appellant on the one hand was saddled with the tainted shares for no-fault on his part through respondent Nos. 4, 5 and 6 on which he had no control or any role to play and on the top of it, when he sought a remedy of certification for claiming dividends, he had to suffer an order by which his application was rejected on the ground that he had not moved an application within the cut off date which had no statutory force as the same had been fixed at the instance of the Custodian seeking approval from the Special Court. [Para 25] [290-B-D] CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 948 of 2006. From the Judgment & Order dated 28.11.2005 of the Special Court Constituted Under the Special Court (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) Act, 1992 in Misc. Application No. 536 of 2005. Pravin Satale, Naresh Kumar for the Appellant. Subramonium Prasad, Shyam D. Nandan, Shweta Mazumdar, Rajat Khattri for the Respondents.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 948 OF 2006 Varghese K. Joseph .. Appellant Versus The Custodian & Ors. ..Respondents JUDGMENT GYAN SUDHA MISRA, J. This appeal has been filed under Section 10 of the Special Courts (Trial of Offences Relating to Transactions in Securities) … Continue reading
The last case relied on was “Ajodhya Bhagat and others Vs State of Bihar and others” – 1974 AIR (SC) 1886 where it was held “ that the appellant cannot be allowed to raise the grounds in appeal, which were not taken in the petition.” 31. Obviously, the opponent/respondent are in the rice trade and have been alert enough to oppose the impugned mark at the first available opportunity. We agree with the applicant that many of the bill/invoices furnished by the opponent are prima facie suspicious. But how does that improve the prospect of securing the applicant the registration of the impugned mark?. This is not a case where the validity of the opponent’s registered trade mark is in issue. This Board is meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to us must come with a clean hand. The Assistant Registrar who heard the matter has come to the conclusion that the applicants are not and cannot be the proprietor of the impugned trade mark. He has also ruled that they are not entitled to the benefit Section 12. The respondent /opponent have adopted and registered the impugned mark prior in point of time. The Assistant Registrar has ruled that concurrent use of the mark would result in likelihood of confusion. It is not the case of the applicant that the first use in commerce of their mark is prior to the respondent/opponent. The Assistant Registrar has taken judicial notice that the impugned mark is confusingly similar and they do not qualify for registration under Section 12 of the Act. From the reading of the documents and pleading we believe that the applicant/appellant are making an all out eleventh hour efforts to leapfrog into the register through the appellate route having failed to make the cut before the Assistant Registrar. Adopting an identical mark for same goods in the same class is a high risk crime and even the best case scenario so ably put forward by the Learned Counsel for the applicant/appellant at the hearing cannot save either the applicant or his application. Who can deny that there will be total confusion in the market if the applicants trade mark is allowed to co-exist on the register?. This Board will do its best to discourage illicit commerce by use of such tainted mark. Making concession under Section 12 which is essentially meant for a public purpose in respect of the impugned mark is totally unwarranted giving rise to public misgivings and would erode the legislative intent for which it was engrafted in the Act. On a totality of the case, we have no reasons to interfere with the findings of the Assistant Registrar. Once we come to this conclusion , all other incidental grounds vigorously raised both by the appellant (dubious supporting documents) and the respondent including (complicated ownership history of the appellant trade mark which passed through several hands) need not be gone into at length and in finer details to sort out unresolved conundrums and acknowledged disconnect as these do not materially alter the factual position of the case. This is the gist of what can be extrapolated from the voluminous case record. The appeal is accordingly dismissed with cost of Rs.5,000/- to be paid to the opponent /respondent herein.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018 ***** (CIRCUIT BENCH SITTING AT DELHI) OA/05/2007/TM/DEL FRIDAY THIS THE 18th DAY OF MAY, 2012 HON’BLE MS. S.USHA … VICE CHAIRMAN HON’BLE SHRI V.RAVI … TECHNICAL MEMBER … Continue reading
The provisions of Rule 50 (2) are mandatory and the Registrar has no discretion. If the evidence affidavit has not been filed within the time prescribed, the opposition would have to be deemed to have been abandoned. The Registrar has also no discretion in extending the time beyond the maximum period of one month prescribed under Rule 50(1).” 19. It is against the judgement cited in 2006 (32) PTC 287 (IPAB) that this order has been passed. Therefore, 2006 (32) PTC 287 (IPAB) cited has been over ruled. 20. In the present case the order shows that the Assistant Registrar had disallowed the TM-56 holding that the opponent may file their evidence in reply under Rule 52. 21. The order is correct. If the appellant wants to file any evidence in reply, they may do so subject to any objection that may be raised by the respondents herein that the evidence is not strictly in reply but the main evidence itself. Therefore, the evidence, if filed by the appellant, shall be strictly considered and only that evidence which is strictly in reply may be received as such and nothing else. The appeal is, therefore, dismissed with costs of Rs.2,500/-.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, 443 Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai-600018 (Circuit Bench Sitting at Delhi) OA/8/2006/TM/DEL FRIDAY, THIS THE 18th DAY OF MAY, 2012 HON’BLE SMT. JUSTICE PRABHA SRIDEVAN … CHAIRMAN HON’BLE SHRI V. RAVI … TECHNICAL MEMBER M/s Mahalakshmi Products, Sandeep Cinema Compound, Muzzafarnagar (U.P.) … … Continue reading
any person may file a notice of opposition within three months from the date of advertisement or within such further period not exceeding one month in the aggregate as the Registrar may allow on an application for extension. Section 21(1) of the Trade Marks Act, 1999: “21. Opposition to registration. – (1) Any person may, within three months from the date of the advertisement or re-advertisement of an application for registration or within such further period, not exceeding one month in the aggregate, as the Registrar, on application made to him in the prescribed manner and on payment of the prescribed fee, allows, give notice in writing in the prescribed manner to the Registrar, of opposition to the registration.” Rule 47(6) of the Trade Marks Rules, 2002: “47. Notice of opposition: (1) to (5) xxxxx (6) An application for an extension of the period within which a notice of opposition to the registration of a trade mark may be given under sub-section (1) of section 21, shall be made in Form TM-44 accompanied by the fee prescribed in First Schedule before the expiry of the period of three months under sub-section (1) of section 21.”
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY APPELLATE BOARD Guna Complex, Annexe-I, 2nd Floor, Anna Salai, Teynampet, Chennai 600 018 (Circuit Sitting at Ahmedabad) OA/71/2009/TM/AMD FRIDAY, THIS THE 18TH DAY OF MAY, 2012 Hon’ble Ms. S.USHA ….. Vice-Chairman Hon’ble Shri V.RAVI ….. Technical Member M/s.Swastic Oil Industries, F-5 to 8, Industrial Area, Newai – 304021, District … Continue reading
TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT & APPELLATE TRIBUNAL=Petitioner, a Multi Service Operator operating in the town of Shadnagar in the State of Andhra Pradesh, has filed these petitions inter-alia praying for a direction upon the Respondents herein to supply signals of their respective channels to its network as provided under Clause 3.2 of the Telecommunication (Broadcasting & Cable Services) Interconnection Regulations, 2004, as amended from time to time (‘The Regulations’).=The cable operator has no valid registration certificate, no valid permissions, no required equipment installed, no business house, no proper documents presented as per rules, Hence not entitled for any relief as prayed for.
Page 1 of 20 TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT & APPELLATE TRIBUNAL NEW DELHI DATED 13TH MARCH, 2012 Petition No.376 (C) of 2011 Shri Hanuman Communications … Petitioner Vs. Sun 18 Media Services South Pvt. Ltd. … Respondent Petition No.377 (C) of 2011 Shri Hanuman Communications … Petitioner Vs. Maa Television Network Ltd. … Respondent Petition No.378 … Continue reading
TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT & APPELLATE TRIBUNAL=Any broadcaster, multisystem operator or HITS operator, as the case may be or any agent/ any other intermediary of the [broadcaster, multisystem operator or HITS operator, as the case may be to whom a request for providing TV channel signals is made, should either provide the signals on mutually agreed terms to the distributor of TV channels who is seeking signals, or specify the terms and conditions on which they are willing to provide TV channel signals, in a reasonable time period but not exceeding sixty days from the date of the request. In case, the broadcaster, multisystem operator or HITS operator, as the case may be or any agent/ any other intermediary of the broadcaster, multisystem operator or HITS operator, as the case may be to whom a request for Page 5 of 12 providing TV channel signals is made, turns down the request for TV channel signals, the reasons for such refusal must also be conveyed within sixty days from the date of the request for providing TV channel signals so as to enable the distributor of TV channels to agitate the matter at the appropriate forum.”
Page 1 of 12 TELECOM DISPUTES SETTLEMENT & APPELLATE TRIBUNALNEW DELHIDATED 13TH MARCH, 2012Petition No.488(C) of 2011Praja Cable Net … PetitionerVs.Sun 18 Media Services South Pvt. Ltd. … RespondentBEFORE:HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE S.B. SINHA, CHAIRPERSONHON’BLE MR.P.K. RASTOGI, MEMBERFor Petitioner : Mr. Yoginder Handoo, AdvocateFor Respondent : Mr. Nittin Bhatia, AdvocateORDERPetitioner is a Local Cable Operator operating … Continue reading
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