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IPC

This tag is associated with 62 posts

376(2)(g) and 302/34, IPC and sec. 306 of Cr.p.c – Approver – Lower court punished to death basing on the evidence of approver – High court disbelieved the version of approver as he has not disclosed himself as prima accused in the offence and lack of corroboration and set aside the sentence – Apex court set aside the high court order – punished for life etc., = State of Rajasthan …… Appellant Versus Balveer @ Balli & Anr. ….. Respondents – Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40947

376(2)(g) and 302/34, IPC and sec. 306 of Cr.p.c – Approver – Lower court punished to     death basing on the evidence of approver – High court disbelieved the version of approver as he has not disclosed himself as prima accused in the offence and lack of corroboration and set aside the sentence – Apex court set aside … Continue reading

SEC. 304 B , 306 AND 498 A I.P.C. – When wife stated that she committed suicide as she was fed up with the acts of husband with out disclosing the activities – it can not be considered as an offence under sec. 304 B as there is no allegation that soon before her committing suicide the husband harassed her dowry etc., Apex court punished the husband under sec.306 and 498 A I.P.C. = Rajeev Kumar …… Appellant Versus State of Haryana ….. Respondent – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40946

SEC. 304 B , 306 AND 498 A I.P.C. – When wife stated that she committed suicide as she     was fed up with the acts of husband with out disclosing the activities – it can not be considered as an offence under sec. 304 B as there is no allegation that soon before her committing suicide the … Continue reading

Bail – When the main accused is reason for entire panic – is not entitled for bail simply because no bullet from his weapon – hit the deceased – Bail granted by single judge High court set aside = Sita Ram …..Appellant Versus Balbir @ Bali & Anr. …..Respondents – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40899

Appeal by informant of FIR for cancellation of Bail – When the main accused is reason for entire     panic – is not entitled for bail simply because no bullet from his weapon – hit the deceased – Bail granted by single judge High court set aside =       It  is  true … Continue reading

Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under Sections 25 and 27 of the Arms Act – Apex court set aside the orders of conviction and confirmed the lower court acquittal orders – Joginder Singh … Appellant Versus State of Haryana …Respondent – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40895

Sections 302 and 307 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code (IPC) and under Sections     25 and 27 of  the  Arms Act – Duty of High court while reversing  the acquittal judgement based on sound principles – not to be disturbed  with out settling the issues on material aspects  – Non- examination … Continue reading

Reduced the sentence from life to 10 years in sec. 304 B IPC Apex court held that same principles laid down in death cases- would apply with little modifications for assessing the sentences in other cases = SUNIL DUTT SHARMA Vs. STATE (GOVT.OF NCT OF DELHI) published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ ?filename=40877

Reduced the sentence from life to 10 years in sec. 304 B IPC applying the participles laid down     in commuting death penalty to life imprisonment, even though there is no guide lines and separate rules for lessor sentences – other than death sentences ; Apex court held that same principles laid down in death cases-  would … Continue reading

Under Sec. 304 Part II of IPC – sentence reduced to 7 years from life – KUNWAR PAL Vs. STATE OF UTTARAKHAND published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40870

Sec. 304 Part II of IPC = Using guns in marriage ceremonies even though prohibited – when     caused death of a person who gathered in the marriage ceremony, the accused is liable to be punished under sec. 304 Part II of the IPC. but not under rash and negligent act under sec. 304 … Continue reading

Wrong procedure adopted by Magistrate = In a Kidnap case on a private complaint, when the police filed charge sheet excluding kidnap and filed only under sec. 323 and 343 of I.P.C. – with out conducting trial no court should pass orders on plea of guilty and releasing the accused on probation with a direction – not to affect his service = conviction of an employee in an offence permits the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings against the employee or to take appropriate steps for his dismissal/removal only on the basis of his conviction. The word “disqualification” contained in Section 12 of the 1958 Act refers to a disqualification provided in other statutes, as explained by this Court in the above referred cases, and the employee cannot claim a right to continue in service merely on the ground that he had been given the benefit of probation under the 1958 Act.”= the trial court had no competence to make any observation having civil consequences so far as the private respondents are concerned. The High Court rejected the application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. filed by the appellant only on the ground that the appellant neither challenged the order of taking cognizance nor raised any objection at the time of reading over of the charges to the accused. The High Court failed to appreciate that before the statement of the appellant or any other witness could be recorded, the trial court disposed off the matter on the date when the application itself had been submitted admitting the guilt. Even otherwise if the trial court wanted to entertain any issue of plea bargaining under Chapter XXI-A, inserted w.e.f. 5.7.2006, then too the court was obliged there under to put the victim to notice before extending any such benefits that have been given in the present case. The procedure therefore appears to have been clearly violated. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of the case, the appellant had no opportunity to raise any grievance before the appropriate forum.= In view of the above, the appeal succeeds and is allowed. The judgment and order of the trial court dated 15.7.2011 as well as of the High Court dated 23.4.2012 are set aside. The matter is remitted

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40841     REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1547 of 2013       Girraj Prasad Meena …Appellant   Versus   State of Rajasthan & Ors. …Respondents               J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

Section 432 Cr.PC for remission and Section 433 Cr.PC for commutation – No Sentence should be considered for remission and commutation before serving of the minimum sentence = All murders shock the community; but certain murders shock the conscience of the Court and the community. The distinguishing aspect of the latter category is that there is shock coupled with extreme revulsion. What should be the penological approach in that category is one question arising for consideration in this case. What is the scope of consideration of Death Reference by the High Court under Chapter XXVIII of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (hereinafter referred to as ‘Cr.PC’), is the other question. Whether there is any restriction on the exercise of power under Section 432 Cr.PC for remission and Section 433 Cr.PC for commutation in cases of minimum sentence is the third main issue.= In the present case, the respondent has been awarded life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. Under Section 376 of IPC also he has been awarded life imprisonment. The third substantive sentence is under Section 201 of IPC. All these sentences are ordered to run concurrently. The sentence of life imprisonment is till the end of one’s biological life. However, in view of the power of the State under Sections 432 and 433 of Cr.PC, in the present case, we are of the view that the sentences shall run consecutively, in case there is remission or commutation. We further make it clear that the remission or commutation, if considered in the case of the respondent, shall be granted only after the mandatory period of fourteen years in the case of offence under Section 302 of IPC. Punishment has a penological purpose. Reformation, retribution, prevention, deterrence are some of the major factors in that regard. Parliament is the collective conscience of the people. If it has mandated a minimum sentence for certain offences, the Government being its delegate, cannot interfere with the same in exercise of their power for remission or commutation. Neither Section 432 nor Section 433 of Cr.PC hence contains a non-obstante provision. Therefore, the minimum sentence provided for any offence cannot be and shall not be remitted or commuted by the Government in exercise of their power under Section 432 or 433 of the Cr.PC. Wherever the Indian Penal Code or such penal statutes have provided for a minimum sentence for any offence, to that extent, the power of remission or commutation has to be read as restricted; otherwise the whole purpose of punishment will be defeated and it will be a mockery on sentencing. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the present case, we make it clear that in the event of State invoking its powers under Section 432 or 433 of Cr.PC, the sentence under Section 376 of IPC shall not be remitted or commuted before seven years of imprisonment. In other words, in that eventuality, it shall be ensured that the respondent will first serve the term of life imprisonment under Section 302 of IPC. In case there is any remission after fourteen years, then imprisonment for a minimum period of seven years under Section 376 of IPC shall follow and thereafter three years of rigorous imprisonment under Section 201 of IPC. The sentence on fine and default as awarded by the Sessions Court are maintained as such.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40836 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 659 OF 2006 State of Rajasthan … Appellant (s) Versus Jamil Khan … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: 1. All murders shock the community; but certain murders shock the conscience of the Court and … Continue reading

DEATH CONFIRMED = Herein, A1 and A2 have committed a cold blooded murder in a pre-ordained fashion without any provocation whatsoever. The motive behind the gruesome act was to avenge the act of informant in approaching the machinery of law enforcement inspite of threats by the appellants. The victims were five innocent children and wife of the informant who were sleeping unalarmed when the appellants came and locked them inside their house while it was set ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2 is reflected in their act of first gagging the informant, thereafter attempting to burn him alive and later, when he tried to escape, firing at him thereby leaving no stone unturned in translating their threats into reality. As a result of the aforesaid incident, having witnessed the threats of burning given by the A1 to the informant tuned into reality, none but the family of the deceased-informant came forth to depose against the appellant-accused persons during the trial. The crime, enormous in proportion having wiped off the whole family, is committed so brutally that it pricks and shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the collective conscience of the society. It demands just punishment from the Court and the Court is bound to respond within legal parameters. The demand for justice and the award of punishment have to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the Courts. “…the punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; and, in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishments as being a deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else… The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” 90. In light of the aforesaid, having regard to the gravity of the offence committed, we are of the considered opinion that with regard to A1 and A2 this case falls into the category of rarest of the rare cases and is not a case where imprisonment for life is an adequate sentence and thus, constrained to reach the inescapable conclusion that death sentence imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed. 91. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and the sentence awarded to A3 is commuted to life imprisonment till the rest of his life. 92. The order of stay on the execution of the capital punishment of A1 and A2 is vacated.

punishable in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40794          REPORTABLE     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011       DEEPAK RAI Appellant(s)   VERSUS   STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s)   WITH   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011       JAGAT RAI AND ANR. Appellant(s) … Continue reading

whether the consent given by woman believing the man’s promise to marry her, is a consent which excludes the offence of rape. = Section 375 IPC defines the expression “rape”, which indicates that the first clause operates, where the woman is in possession of her senses, and therefore, capable of consenting but the act is done against her will; and second, where it is done without her consent; the third, fourth and fifth, when there is consent, but it is not such a consent as excuses the offender, because it is obtained by putting her on any person in whom she is interested in fear of death or of hurt. The expression “against her will” means that the act must have been done in spite of the opposition of the woman. An inference as to consent can be drawn if only based on evidence or probabilities of the case. “Consent” is also stated to be an act of reason coupled with deliberation. It denotes an active will in the mind of a person to permit the doing of an act complained of. Section 90 IPC refers to the expression “consent”. Section 90, though, does not define “consent”, but describes what is not consent. “Consent”, for the purpose of Section 375, requires voluntary participation not only after the exercise of intelligence based on the knowledge of the significance and moral quality of the act but after having fully exercised the choice between resistance and assent. Whether there was consent or not, is to be ascertained only on a careful study of all relevant circumstances. = where the accused had assured the prosecutrix that he would marry her and had sexual affair, which was repeated on several occasions as well. But he did not marry and she became pregnant. That was a case where there was delay of eight months in filing the complaint. The accused was given the benefit of doubt holding that it would not be possible to conclude that the alleged sexual act was committed without the consent of the prosecutrix. 18. We have already referred to the evidence of PW2 to PW4 and that their consistent version is that PW2 had previous acquaintance with the accused being her elder brother’s friend for a period of more than two years before the date of incident. The place of the alleged incident and the time is very crucial, so for as this case is concerned. It was early morning at 8.30 AM and the place of the alleged incident was on the side of a public road. If she had made any semblance of resistance or made any hue and cry it would have attracted large number of people from the locality. Further the first information report, as already indicated, was lodged after a period of 10 months of the alleged incident. All these factors cast some shadow of doubt on the version of PW2.=The trial Court as well as the High Court has committed an error in holding that the accused is guilty of the offence punishable under Section 376 IPC. In such circumstances, we are inclined to allow this appeal and set aside the conviction and sentence imposed on the appellant and order accordingly.

 published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40795   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1467 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 3093 of 2012] Kaini Rajan .. Appellant Versus State of Kerala .. Respondent J U D G M E N T K. S. Radhakrishnan, J. Leave granted. 2. This appeal … Continue reading

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