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Jharkhand
Whether the State Government had no jurisdiction to authorise the Special Judge to try these cases under FERA. on transfer from Magistrate court by way of Notification ? =Section 62 of FERA made the offence under Section 56 non-cognizable. Besides, Section 61 (1) of FERA stated that ‘it shall be lawful’ for the Magistrate to pass the necessary sentence under Section 56. It does not state that the Magistrate alone is empowered to pass the necessary sentence, in which case the proceeding cannot be transferred from his Court. = The error in A.S. Impex was correctly understood by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in Mahender Singh v. High Court of Delhi, (2009) 151 Comp Cas 485 (Delhi) and in N.G. Sheth v. C.B.I., 151 (2008) DLT 89. The Division Bench in both cases took a view different from that in A.S. Impex. However, both decisions having been rendered by Division Benches, A.S. Impex, could not be overruled. Therefore, I complete the formality and overrule A.S. Impex since it does not lay down the correct law in this regard. For the reasons stated above, there is no substance in the objections raised by the petitioners. The High Court has looked into Section 407 of Cr.P.C., referred to Articles 227 and 235 of the Constitution of India, and thereafter in its impugned judgment has observed as follows:- “Having perused Section 407 Cr.P.C. and Article 227 and 235, I have no hesitation to hold that this Court either in the administration side or in the judicial side has absolute jurisdiction to transfer any criminal cases pending before one competent Court to be heard and decided by another Court within the jurisdiction of this Court. This Court in its administrative power can issue direction that cases of particular nature shall be heard by particular court having jurisdiction.” For the reasons above mentioned, the Special Leave Petitions are dismissed.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40834 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) Nos. 6219-6220 OF 2012 Kamlesh Kumar & Ors. … Petitioners Versus The State of Jharkhand & Ors. … Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. GOKHALE, J These Special Leave Petitions (Criminal) seek … Continue reading
Pension and Gratuity with holding pending inquiry = whether, in the absence of any provision in the Pension Rules, the State Government can withhold a part of pension and/or gratuity during the pendency of departmental/ criminal proceedings? = Fact remains that there is an imprimatur to the legal principle that the right to receive pension is recognized as a right in “property”. 14. Article 300 A of the Constitution of India reads as under: “300A Persons not to be deprived of property save by authority of law. – No person shall be deprived of his property save by authority of law.” Once we proceed on that premise, the answer to the question posed by us in the beginning of this judgment becomes too obvious. A person cannot be deprived of this pension without the authority of law, which is the Constitutional mandate enshrined in Article 300 A of the Constitution. It follows that attempt of the appellant to take away a part of pension or gratuity or even leave encashment without any statutory provision and under the umbrage of administrative instruction cannot be countenanced. 15. It hardly needs to be emphasized that the executive instructions are not having statutory character and, therefore, cannot be termed as “law” within the meaning of aforesaid Article 300A. On the basis of such a circular, which is not having force of law, the appellant cannot withhold – even a part of pension or gratuity. As we noticed above, so far as statutory rules are concerned, there is no provision for withholding pension or gratuity in the given situation. Had there been any such provision in these rules, the position would have been different. 16. We, accordingly, find that there is no merit in the instant appeals as the impugned order of the High Court is without blemish. Accordingly, these appeals are dismissed with costs quantified at Rs. 10,000/- each.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40650 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6770 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil) No. 1427 of 2009) State of Jharkhand & Ors. ….. Appellant(s) Vs. Jitendra Kumar Srivastava & Anr. …..Respondent(s) WITH C.A. No. 6771/2013 (arising out of … Continue reading
service matter – In the absence of public Advertisement, no posts should be filled from the selected list =there was no advertisement for direct recruitment the select list was quashed.the apex court held that There can be no scintilla of doubt that there was requirement of advertisement for inviting the names. However, as we perceive, the present case projects a totally different picture. = sec. “4. Vacancies to be filled up by persons sponsored by employment exchange. – After the commencement of this Act, all vacancies in the posts in any Government establishment or establishment of any public undertaking, statutory body, Government company or local authority shall be filled up by such persons as may be sponsored by an employment exchange.” – sec.6 Employment exchange to submit list of registrants to appointing authority – The employment exchange shall, on receipt of the requisition under section 5, submit to the appointing authority a list of registrants, other than the registrants who belong to the exempted category, in order of seniority determined on the basis of the length of the period of registration in that employment exchange and in accordance with such principle of rotation as the Director of Employment may prescribe from time to time, and also in conformity with the qualification, age, experience or other requirement, if any, as stated in the requisition.”- The Act provides that the persons are to be selected from the candidates sponsored by the employment exchange. It is admitted by the learned counsel for the State that on the basis of the statutory command names were called for from the employment exchange. As stated earlier, he would clarify that though the names were called for from the employment exchange, the process of selection was not restricted to only the sponsored candidates. In essence, the submission of the learned counsel for the appellants and the learned counsel for the State that when thousands of candidates had appeared, though not sponsored by the employment exchange, the panel prepared after following due procedure should not have been quashed. – There can be no scintilla of doubt that there was requirement of advertisement for inviting the names. However, as we perceive, the present case projects a totally different picture. The number of posts available was 1446 in the group ‘D’ category. For the said posts more than 57000 candidates competed. On a querry being made, the learned counsel for the State would admit that the vacancies have not been filled up because of pendency of litigation. Regard being had to the special features of the case, we are inclined to set aside the order of the High Court and that of the tribunal and we so do. We further direct the State Government to fill up the posts available from among the select list. We may hasten to clarify that if any one whose name features in the select list has been appointed in any other department or statutory organization or Government company, he cannot claim an appointment in the Department of Irrigation and Waterways. We further direct the respondent-State and its functionaries to adjust respondents 1 and 2 and extend them the benefit of appointment. The appointees cannot claim any seniority with retrospective effect as that might create cavil amongst the appointees in other departments at earlier point of time. The aforesaid exercise shall be completed within a period of eight weeks from today. 13. The appeals are disposed of in above terms. However, there is no order as to costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40651 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6748-6749 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 6177-6178 of 2012) Buddhadeb Ruidas & ors. etc. etc. … Appellants Versus State of West Bengal and ors. …Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6750-6751 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) … Continue reading
whether such negligence of the appellant was sufficient for the disciplinary authority to dismiss him from service. There was no charge against the appellant that he had in any way aided or abetted the offence under Section 392 IPC or that he knew that his son had stolen the car and yet he did not inform the police. The appellant, as we have held, was guilty of negligence of not having enquired from his son about the car kept in front of the government quarters occupied by him. The appellant had served the government as a Constable and thereafter as a Head Constable from 07.08.1971 till he was dismissed from service on 28.02.2005, i.e. for 34 years, and for such long service he had earned pension. In our considered opinion, the punishment of dismissal of the appellant from service so as to deprive him of his pension for the service that he had rendered for long 34 years was shockingly disproportionate to the negligence proved against him.
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 7548 OF 2011 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 19150 of 2008) Surendra Prasad Shukla … Appellant Versus The State of Jharkhand & Ors. … Respondents O R D E R A. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted. 2. This is an appeal … Continue reading
the respondent-M/s Shivam Coke Industries, Dhanbad is a manufacturer of coal and was registered under the provisions of the Bihar Finance Act, 1981 [now repealed – for short “BFT Act, 1981”] and presently under the provisions of Jharkhand Value Added Tax, 2005. Respondent-assessee being manufacturers of hard coke buys coal from Bharat Coking Coal Ltd. after making the payment of local Sales Tax @ 4% which is being used as an input for the purpose of manufacturing the hard coke. Respondent was assessed to tax for the Financial Years 1988-89, 1992-93 and 1996-97 determining the tax on intra-State sales transactions as well as Central Sales Tax on inter-State sales transactions. Respondent preferred an Appeal before the Joint Commissioner of Commercial Taxes (Appeals), Dhanbad Division, Dhanbad against the assessment orders passed between 26.4.1990 to 23.12.1998 for the Financial Years 1988-89, 1992-93 and 1996-97, who vide order dated 25.08.2003 remanded the aforesaid assessment proceedings by a common order to re-examine the books of account and to re-determine the nature of sales as to whether they are intra-state sales or inter-state sales, on the basis of the books of account and the audit reports as well as on the basis and within the meaning and scope of Section 3(a) of the Central Sales Tax Act, 1956 (for short “the CST Act”).
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6889-6891 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 19104-19106 of 2008] State of Jharkhand & Ors. Etc. …. Appellants Versus M/s. Shivam Coke Industries, Dhanbad, Etc. …. Respondents With CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6892 OF 2011 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. … Continue reading
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