advocatemmmohan
just another law knowledge bank
judgment of conviction
DEATH CONFIRMED = Herein, A1 and A2 have committed a cold blooded murder in a pre-ordained fashion without any provocation whatsoever. The motive behind the gruesome act was to avenge the act of informant in approaching the machinery of law enforcement inspite of threats by the appellants. The victims were five innocent children and wife of the informant who were sleeping unalarmed when the appellants came and locked them inside their house while it was set ablaze. Further, wrath of A1 and A2 is reflected in their act of first gagging the informant, thereafter attempting to burn him alive and later, when he tried to escape, firing at him thereby leaving no stone unturned in translating their threats into reality. As a result of the aforesaid incident, having witnessed the threats of burning given by the A1 to the informant tuned into reality, none but the family of the deceased-informant came forth to depose against the appellant-accused persons during the trial. The crime, enormous in proportion having wiped off the whole family, is committed so brutally that it pricks and shocks not only the judicial conscience but even the collective conscience of the society. It demands just punishment from the Court and the Court is bound to respond within legal parameters. The demand for justice and the award of punishment have to be in consonance with the legislative command and the discretion vested in the Courts. “…the punishment is the way in which society expresses its denunciation of wrong doing; and, in order to maintain respect for the law, it is essential that the punishment inflicted for grave crimes should adequately reflect the revulsion felt by the great majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the objects of punishments as being a deterrent or reformative or preventive and nothing else… The truth is that some crimes are so outrageous that society insists on adequate punishment, because the wrong doer deserves it, irrespective of whether it is a deterrent or not.” 90. In light of the aforesaid, having regard to the gravity of the offence committed, we are of the considered opinion that with regard to A1 and A2 this case falls into the category of rarest of the rare cases and is not a case where imprisonment for life is an adequate sentence and thus, constrained to reach the inescapable conclusion that death sentence imposed on A1 and A2 be confirmed. 91. Therefore, the sentence of death imposed on A1 and A2 is confirmed and the sentence awarded to A3 is commuted to life imprisonment till the rest of his life. 92. The order of stay on the execution of the capital punishment of A1 and A2 is vacated.
punishable in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40794 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.249-250 OF 2011 DEEPAK RAI Appellant(s) VERSUS STATE OF BIHAR Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.1747-1748 OF 2011 JAGAT RAI AND ANR. Appellant(s) … Continue reading
3 contradictory Dying declarations not proved free and fair , not proved the contents were read over and explained , not proved who recorded the translated version from Telugu to Kannada =- ends in acquittal =. Conviction can indisputably be based on a dying declaration. But before it can be acted upon, the same must be held to have been rendered voluntarily and truthfully. Consistency in the dying declaration is the relevant factor for placing full reliance thereupon. In this case, the deceased herself had taken contradictory and inconsistent stand in different dying declarations. They, therefore, should not be accepted on their face value. Caution, in this behalf, is required to be applied.” In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12), she (deceased) stated that her husband instigated her to pour kerosene on her body, therefore, she poured the kerosene on her body and her husband further poured kerosene on her and put on fire using a match box. In the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22), she (deceased) stated that her husband along with Laxmi poured kerosene on her body and put on fire by using match stick. In the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29), she (deceased) stated that her husband poured kerosene on her and Laxmi lit the match stick and thrown upon her body. Apart from the contradictions, the credibility of three dying declarations (Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29) is to be doubted. In the first dying declaration (Ex.P.12) dated 14th January, 2000 the thumb impression of victim has been shown. Whereas in the second dying declaration (Ex.P.22) taken on the same day, i.e, 14th January, 2000 and the third dying declaration (Ex.P.29) given on the next day, i.e., 15th January, 2000, the victim had stated that she had not given her signatures since her hand was completely burnt. Dr. Bhimappa (PW-22), who signed the Ex.P.22, in his cross-examination stated that he was not aware whether Neelamma (deceased) was talking in Telugu. Dr. Dhanjaya Kumar (PW-20), who signed Ex.P.12, in his cross-examination specifically stated that he can understand Kannada but does not know Telugu language and that Neelamma was talking in Telugu language. Padmavathi (PW-8), mother of the deceased, in her crossexamination stated that Neelamma (deceased) was not knowing the correct writing the Telugu. But she was writing some Telugu. The prosecution has failed to state as to why three dying declarations were recorded in Kannada, if the deceased, Neelamma was talking in Telugu. It has also not made clear as to who amongst the Tehisldar, PSI or SI or the Doctors who has signed in Ex.P.12, Ex.P.22 and Ex.P.29 had knowledge of Telugu and translated the same in Kannada for writing dying declarations in those exhibits and that in the bottom of three dying declarations it has not been mentioned that they were read over in Kannada and explained in Telugu that the deceased understood the contents of the same. The above mentioned facts create doubt in our mind as to the truthfulness of the contents of the dying declarations as the possibility of she being influenced by somebody in making the dying declarations cannot be ruled out. On careful perusal of the materials on record, we are unable to come to the conclusion that the prosecution in this case has established its case beyond reasonable doubt to base a conviction on the appellant. Hence, we are of the opinion that both the courts below have erred in coming to the contra conclusion. 28. For the reasons stated above, this appeal succeeds and the judgment and conviction recorded by the courts below are set aside. The appeal is allowed. The appellant, who is in jail, is directed to be released forthwith.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40519 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 175 OF 2007 KASHI VISHWANATH … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. The appellant, who is accused No.1, by this appeal has challenged the judgment … Continue reading
motive is not a very strong one= The motive may be considered as a circumstance which is relevant for assessing the evidence but if the evidence is clear and unambiguous and the circumstances prove the guilt of the accused, the same is not weakened even if the motive is not a very strong one. It is also settled law that the motive loses all its importance in a case where direct evidence of eyewitnesses is available, because even if there may be a very strong motive for the accused persons to commit a particular crime, they cannot be convicted if the evidence of eyewitnesses is not convincing. In the same way, even if there may not be an apparent motive but if the evidence of the eyewitnesses is clear and reliable, the absence or inadequacy of motive cannot stand in the way of conviction.”
PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40455 Page 1 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1130 of 2010 Birendra Das & Anr. … Appellants Versus State of Assam …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of conviction and order of sentence dated … Continue reading
SINGLE WITNESS IS ENOUGH TO CONVICT THE ACCUSED IF FOUND RELIABLE = it has been held that if the testimony of a singular witness is found by the court to be entirely reliable, there is no legal impediment in recording the conviction of the accused on such proof. In the said pronouncement it has been further ruled that the law of evidence does not require any particular number of witnesses to be examined in proof of a given fact. However, faced with the testimony of a single witness, the court may classify the oral testimony into three categories, namely, (i) wholly reliable, (ii) wholly unreliable, and (iii) neither wholly reliable nor wholly unreliable. In the first two categories there may be no difficulty in accepting or discarding the testimony of the single witness. The difficulty arises in the third category of cases. The court has to be circumspect and has to look for corroboration in material particulars by reliable testimony, direct or circumstantial, before acting upon the testimony of a single witness.- On the analysis of evidence of PW-6 we find that his evidence is cogent and trustworthy and further gets corroboration from the medical evidence and also for the factum of recovery of gold and silver ornaments which has been clearly proven by PW-9. 20. In view of the aforesaid analysis, we do not perceive any error in the judgment of conviction and order of sentence passed by the learned trial Judge that has been affirmed by the High Court and, accordingly, the appeal, being devoid of merit, stands dismissed.
Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 642 OF 2008 Kusti Mallaiah …Appellant Versus The State of Andhra Pradesh …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Calling in question the legal propriety of the judgment of conviction and order of sentence … Continue reading
Whether accused are liable to be convicted under sec. 304 part -I or 302 of I.P.C.= Learned trial Judge has not accepted the allegation of dragging of the deceased solely on the basis that no injuries were caused on the wrist.- It is worthy to note that the dead body was found at a distance of 10 kms., but it is not necessary to establish that the accused had dragged the deceased for about 10 kms.- It is well settled in law that the evidence of the hostile witness can be relied upon by the prosecution as well as by the defence. = It is settled legal proposition that the evidence of a prosecution witness cannot be rejected in toto merely because the prosecution chose to treat him as hostile and cross-examined him. The evidence of such witnesses cannot be treated as effaced or washed off the record altogether but the same can be accepted to the extent that their version is found to be dependable on a careful scrutiny The singular purpose of referring to the testimonies of these two witnesses is that the incident did occur and the accused had dashed the vehicle against the cycle. ;whether the offence is ‘murder’ or ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, on the facts of a case, it will be convenient for it to approach the problem in three stages. The question to be considered at the first stage would be, whether the accused has done an act by doing which he has caused the death of another. Proof of such causal connection between the act of the accused and the death, leads to the second stage for considering whether that act of the accused amounts to “culpable homicide” as defined in Section 299. If the answer to this question is prima facie found in the affirmative, the stage for considering the operation of Section 300, Penal Code, is reached. This is the stage at which the court should determine whether the facts proved by the prosecution bring the case within the ambit of any of the four clauses of the definition of ‘murder’ contained in Section 300. If the answer to this question is in the negative the offence would be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first or the second part of Section 304, depending, respectively, on whether the second or the third clause of Section 299 is applicable. If the question is found in the positive, but the case comes within any of the exceptions enumerated in Section 300, the offence would still be ‘culpable homicide not amounting to murder’, punishable under the first part of Section 304, Penal Code.
Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.532-533 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) Nos. 5099-5100 of 2012) Khachar Dipu @ Dilipbhai Nakubhai .. Appellant Versus State of Gujarat … Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. In these appeals, … Continue reading
where the husband killed his wife and children as the wife was having talks with one third person. out of rage, he killed all and he tried to kill himself by the same knife and went to commit suicide also. he gave himself an FIR. He is the great looser. Requires no death penalty as it is not rarest of rare case . Dealth penalty converted in to life imprisonment for 21 years by Apex court.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.113-114 OF 2010 Brajendrasingh … Appellant Versus State of Madhya Pradesh … Respondent J U D G M E N T Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. The present appeals are directed against the judgment of the High Court … Continue reading
Penal Code, 1860: ss. 409, 420, 467, 477-A r/w 120-B-Forgery and misappropriation of bank loans-Bank Manager and Field Officer in conspiracy with each other sanctioned and disbursed loans in names of fictitious persons-Trial Court holding both guilty and sentencing them-Acquittal by High Court-HELD: Prosecution has brought ample material on record which led to only one conclusion that accused committed the offences-Exoneration of one of the accused in departmental inquiry initiated only against him having concluded before police investigation stated in the case, would be of no avail as Inquiry Officer did not have benefit of the evidence that was made available in the criminal proceedings-Besides, the inquiry report was not brought on record and factum of exoneration in departmental proceedings was taken as a defence, it was for the accused to bring on record the relevant material, which was not done-High Court also erred in purporting to hold that specimen finger print and handwritings could not have been taken from accused-ss. 5 and 6 of Identification of Prisoners Act, clearly provides for such a contingency-High Court completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal-Judgment of High Court set aside-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1944-ss. 5(1) and 5(2)-Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973-Appeal against acquittal-Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920-ss. 5 and 6. Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947: s. 5(1) r/w s.5(2), proviso-Bank Manager and Field Officer forging loans in names of fictitious persons-Both held guilty by trial court-Acquittal by High Court-HELD: Bank Manager completing all formalities required to be complied with for grant of loan including obtaining appraisal report from Field Officer, sanction and disbursement of loan on date of filing of loan application itself-Entire prosecution relating to forgery and misappropriation having been attributed to the Manager, and he having used the appraisal reports prepared by Field Officer, a case is made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-s.(2) of s.5 in the case of Field Officer-Therefore, while upholding conviction and sentence awarded by trial court as against the Manager, sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months is imposed on Field Officer-Penal Code, 1860-ss. 409, 420, 467 and 477-A r/w 120-B IPC. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973: Appeal against acquittal-Jurisdiction of appellate Court-HELD: an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal against acquittal, would be entitled to consider the evidence brought on record and arrive at its own conclusion-Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken but when only one view is possible to be taken, appellate court would not hesitate to interfere with judgment of acquittal-In the instant case no two views are possible to be taken-Accused were rightly held guilty of the offences charged-High Court misdirected itself in passing judgment of acquittal-Judgment of High Court set aside-Penal Code, 1860-ss. 409, 420, 467, 477-A r/w s.120-B-Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947-ss. 5(1), (2). Respondent A-1 and respondent A-2, who were Manager and Field Officer respectively of the appellant Bank, were prosecuted under ss. 409, 420, 467 and 477-A read with s.120-B IPC and s.5 read with s.5(2) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The allegations against them were that during the period 7.12.1984 to 14.8.1986, they conspired with each other in matter of sanctioning and disbursing 6 Crop Loans of Rs.5000/- each in the names of fictitious persons by forging signatures and thumb impressions of proposed borrowers in documents resulting in misappropriation of the proceeds of Rs.30,000/-. The trial court held both the accused guilty of the offences charged and sentenced both of them to rigorous imprisonment for six moths. It rejected the plea of respondent A-2 that in view of the departmental proceedings against him resulting in his exoneration he was entitled to be acquitted. On appeal, the High Court acquitted the accused observing, inter alia, that the procedure adopted for obtaining finger prints being contrary to fundamental rights of the accused, the same was not admissible in evidence; that neither the Bank received any complaint from loanees nor did the prosecution bring any corroborative material on record. In the instant appeals filed by the Bank, it was contended for respondent A-2 that he merely prepared the appraisal report and he was not involved in any forgery; that he joined the service only in 1984 and was transferred on or about 14.8.1986, and subsequent renewals of loans having been prepared in 1987, he was entitled to acquittal. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, evidently, the formalities required to be complied with for grant of loan, appraisal report recommendation prepared by respondent A-2 and sanction and disbursement of loan by respondent A-1 were completed on the very same day on which application for grant of loan was filed. It has furthermore been brought on record that PW-21 and PW-22 on whose behalf loan was applied, were known to respondent A-1. They stated that they were residents of a district different than that shown in their applications. This clearly establishes that the transactions were manipulated by respondent A-1. PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, stated that all transactions right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon of a day and all the documents used to be processed during the lunch hour, whereas as per to the procedure, the disbursement of loan could take place only upon proper verification thereof. The modus operandi of respondent A-1 appeared to be that he had affixed his own thumb impression instead of those of the loanees. Upon sanction of the said loan, the accountant concerned paid the amount of loan to accused A-1. The said loans were also renewed for the years 1986 and 1987. [Para s 12, 14, 24 and 25] [581-C; 582-B-C-D; 584-B-C] 1.2. The finger print expert (PW-17), in his evidence, proved that specimen fingerprints tallied with the disputed fingerprints. PW-17 is a qualified and experienced fingerprint expert. There is no reason to discredit his testimony. Apart from the fingerprints, the prosecution also obtained the specimen handwritings of respondent A-1. Handwritings on the said loan documents/applications for grant of loan was found to be that of accused No.1. The High Court also committed a manifest error in purporting to hold that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings could not have been taken from respondent A-1. Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 clearly provides for such a contingency. [Paras 15, 17, 18, 34 and 35] [582-E, G; 583-A-B; 586-F-G] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR (1961) SC 1808, relied on. 1.3. It may be true that there was no documentary evidence to show that the amount had actually been paid in cash to the respondent A-1. But then no documentary evidence would be available as it was for the respondent A-1, as Manager of the Bank, to hand over the amount in cash to the loanees upon receiving the same from PW-3. Besides, PW-5 also stated that debit vouchers (Ext. P-6) contained only one stamp showing as cash paid but it did not contain his signature, although it purported to have been shown to be his. Ext. P-6 was, therefore, a forged document. [Paras 20 and 21] [583-E-F, D] 1.4. PWs 3 and 5 who had been working in the same branch of the bank with the respondents have proved the procedure adopted in the matter of grant of loan. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that ample materials have been brought on record by the prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the accused were responsible therefor. [Para 22] [583-G] 1.5. It may be that no act of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-2, but he was the one who had prepared the appraisal report. After preparation of such appraisal report, the loan amounts were sanctioned and the amount of loan purported to have been paid to the loanees and, therefore, he was also guilty of commission of the said offences. [Para 23] [583-H; 584-A] 2. The High Court purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration of respondent A-2 in departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry was initiated only against respondent A-2 and was completed even before the police investigation in the case started. The enquiry officer did not have the occasion to consider all the materials brought on record by the prosecution which clearly established the involvement of the respondents. Exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that he was not guilty of commission of the offences wherefor he was charged. Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been brought on record. Besides, the factum of exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings was raised by way of defence. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to bring on record all the relevant documents, including the findings of the Enquiry Officer. [Paras 27, 28, 29 and 33] [574-E-F; 584-G-H; 585-A; 586-D-E] P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, [1996] 9 SCC 1, distinguished. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1990] 3 SCR 259=[1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 and Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 225, referred to. 3. The High Court, therefore, completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents. The trial judge had assigned cogent reasons in support of its findings. The High Court did not meet the said reasoning. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. [Paras 26 and 37] [584-D; 859-B] 4. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that presumption of innocence is a human right and when an accused is acquitted by a court, such presumption becomes stronger. It is, however, a trite law that an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal, would also be entitled to consider the evidences brought on record by both the prosecution and the defence and arrive at its own decision. Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken, but when on appraisal thereof, only one view is possible, the appellate court would not hesitate to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. In this case, the Court is firmly of the view that no two views are possible to be taken. [Paras 37 and 38] [589-B, D, E] State of Haryana v. Sher Singh & Ors., [2002] 9 SCC 356; Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P., [2004] 10 SCC 699 and Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., [2006] 9 SCC 731, referred to. 5. The entire prosecution case relating to charges of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-1 alone. Thus, a case has been made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in the case of respondent A-2. Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period and was still undergoing probation. Forgery and misappropriation was committed by respondent A-1 even thereafter. The appraisal reports prepared by respondent A-2 were used by respondent A-1 also for the subsequent period, namely, 1987 when respondent A-2 was no longer working in the said branch. Therefore, while upholding the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial judge as against respondent A-1, in view of the special reasons recorded in the judgment, a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months is imposed on respondent A-2. He shall, however, be liable to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) and in default shall undergo a sentence of three months. [Paras 40, 41 and 42] [589-G; 590-A-C] A. Sharan , ASG., Amit Anand Tiwari and P. Parmeswaran for the Appellants. L.N. Rao, R. Santhan Krishnan, K. Radha Rani, P. Vijaya Kumar and D. Mahesh Babu for the Respondents. =Allowing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. In the instant case, evidently, the formalities required to be complied with for grant of loan, appraisal report recommendation prepared by respondent A-2 and sanction and disbursement of loan by respondent A-1 were completed on the very same day on which application for grant of loan was filed. It has furthermore been brought on record that PW-21 and PW-22 on whose behalf loan was applied, were known to respondent A-1. They stated that they were residents of a district different than that shown in their applications. This clearly establishes that the transactions were manipulated by respondent A-1. PW-3, in her deposition, in no uncertain line, stated that all transactions right from application to disposal took place in the afternoon of a day and all the documents used to be processed during the lunch hour, whereas as per to the procedure, the disbursement of loan could take place only upon proper verification thereof. The modus operandi of respondent A-1 appeared to be that he had affixed his own thumb impression instead of those of the loanees. Upon sanction of the said loan, the accountant concerned paid the amount of loan to accused A-1. The said loans were also renewed for the years 1986 and 1987. [Para s 12, 14, 24 and 25] [581-C; 582-B-C-D; 584-B-C] 1.2. The finger print expert (PW-17), in his evidence, proved that specimen fingerprints tallied with the disputed fingerprints. PW-17 is a qualified and experienced fingerprint expert. There is no reason to discredit his testimony. Apart from the fingerprints, the prosecution also obtained the specimen handwritings of respondent A-1. Handwritings on the said loan documents/applications for grant of loan was found to be that of accused No.1. The High Court also committed a manifest error in purporting to hold that the specimen fingerprints and handwritings could not have been taken from respondent A-1. Sections 5 and 6 of the Identification of Prisoners Act, 1920 clearly provides for such a contingency. [Paras 15, 17, 18, 34 and 35] [582-E, G; 583-A-B; 586-F-G] State of Bombay v. Kathi Kalu Oghad, AIR (1961) SC 1808, relied on. 1.3. It may be true that there was no documentary evidence to show that the amount had actually been paid in cash to the respondent A-1. But then no documentary evidence would be available as it was for the respondent A-1, as Manager of the Bank, to hand over the amount in cash to the loanees upon receiving the same from PW-3. Besides, PW-5 also stated that debit vouchers (Ext. P-6) contained only one stamp showing as cash paid but it did not contain his signature, although it purported to have been shown to be his. Ext. P-6 was, therefore, a forged document. [Paras 20 and 21] [583-E-F, D] 1.4. PWs 3 and 5 who had been working in the same branch of the bank with the respondents have proved the procedure adopted in the matter of grant of loan. There cannot, therefore, be any doubt whatsoever that ample materials have been brought on record by the prosecution which led to only one conclusion that the accused were responsible therefor. [Para 22] [583-G] 1.5. It may be that no act of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-2, but he was the one who had prepared the appraisal report. After preparation of such appraisal report, the loan amounts were sanctioned and the amount of loan purported to have been paid to the loanees and, therefore, he was also guilty of commission of the said offences. [Para 23] [583-H; 584-A] 2. The High Court purported to have laid emphasis on exoneration of respondent A-2 in departmental enquiry. The departmental enquiry was initiated only against respondent A-2 and was completed even before the police investigation in the case started. The enquiry officer did not have the occasion to consider all the materials brought on record by the prosecution which clearly established the involvement of the respondents. Exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings cannot, therefore, lead to the conclusion that he was not guilty of commission of the offences wherefor he was charged. Furthermore, the enquiry report has not been brought on record. Besides, the factum of exoneration of respondent A-2 in the departmental proceedings was raised by way of defence. It was, therefore, obligatory on his part to bring on record all the relevant documents, including the findings of the Enquiry Officer. [Paras 27, 28, 29 and 33] [574-E-F; 584-G-H; 585-A; 586-D-E] P.S. Rajya v. State of Bihar, [1996] 9 SCC 1, distinguished. State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, [1990] 3 SCR 259=[1992] Supp. 1 SCC 335 and Superintendent of Police (CBI) v. Deepak Chowdhary & Ors., [1995] 6 SCC 225, referred to. 3. The High Court, therefore, completely misdirected itself in passing a judgment of acquittal in favour of the respondents. The trial judge had assigned cogent reasons in support of its findings. The High Court did not meet the said reasoning. The impugned judgment of the High Court cannot be sustained. [Paras 26 and 37] [584-D; 859-B] 4. The Court is not oblivious of the fact that presumption of innocence is a human right and when an accused is acquitted by a court, such presumption becomes stronger. It is, however, a trite law that an appellate court, while entertaining an appeal from a judgment of acquittal, would also be entitled to consider the evidences brought on record by both the prosecution and the defence and arrive at its own decision. Interference with a judgment of acquittal may not be made when two views are possible to be taken, but when on appraisal thereof, only one view is possible, the appellate court would not hesitate to interfere with the judgment of acquittal. In this case, the Court is firmly of the view that no two views are possible to be taken. [Paras 37 and 38] [589-B, D, E] State of Haryana v. Sher Singh & Ors., [2002] 9 SCC 356; Narender Singh & Anr. v. State of M.P., [2004] 10 SCC 699 and Budh Singh & Ors. v. State of U.P., [2006] 9 SCC 731, referred to. 5. The entire prosecution case relating to charges of forgery and misappropriation has been attributed to respondent A-1 alone. Thus, a case has been made out to invoke the proviso appended to sub-section (2) of Section 5 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947 in the case of respondent A-2. Furthermore, he worked in the bank for a short period and was still undergoing probation. Forgery and misappropriation was committed by respondent A-1 even thereafter. The appraisal reports prepared by respondent A-2 were used by respondent A-1 also for the subsequent period, namely, 1987 when respondent A-2 was no longer working in the said branch. Therefore, while upholding the conviction and sentence awarded by the trial judge as against respondent A-1, in view of the special reasons recorded in the judgment, a sentence of rigorous imprisonment of three months is imposed on respondent A-2. He shall, however, be liable to pay a fine of Rs.20,000/- (Rupees twenty thousand only) and in default shall undergo a sentence of three months. [Paras 40, 41 and 42] [589-G; 590-A-C] A. Sharan , ASG., Amit Anand Tiwari and P. Parmeswaran for the Appellants. L.N. Rao, R. Santhan Krishnan, K. Radha Rani, P. Vijaya Kumar and D. Mahesh Babu for the Respondents. =2008 AIR 368 , 2007(11 )SCR570 , , 2007(12 )SCALE618 , 2007(12 )JT413
CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 1394-1395 of 2004 PETITIONER: State through SPE & CBI, AP RESPONDENT: M. Krishna Mohan & Anr DATE OF JUDGMENT: 12/10/2007 BENCH: S.B. Sinha & Harjit Singh Bedi JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T S.B. Sinha, J. 1. Correctness of a judgment of acquittal passed by the High Court … Continue reading
advocatemmmohan 