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A contract for sale of shares is not valid as per sec.13, and 16 of Securities Contracts ( Regulation) Act and as such transfer and registration of shares in the name of purchaser is prohibited and can not be enforced = Armed with the decree, Bhagwati on 12th December, 1994 lodged the transfer deeds in respect of 14120 shares with Peerless for their transfer. Peerless, however, did not accede to the prayer of Bhagwati and by its letter dated 8th February, 1995 refused to register the said shares, inter alia, on the ground that the said transfer of shares by Tuhin in favour of Bhagwati was in violation of the provisions of Securities Contracts (Regulation) Act, 1956; hereinafter to be referred to as ‘the Regulation Act’. According to Peerless, the contract for sale of shares was not a spot delivery contract, signatures of Tuhin differed from the signatures on the record of Peerless and further the stamps affixed on the instruments of transfer had not been cancelled. Bhagwati re-lodged the shares for transfer on 14th February, 1995 with Peerless but again Peerless did not register those shares in the name of Bhagwati.- Bhagwati, aggrieved by that, approached the Company Law Board, Eastern Region by filing an application under Section 111 of the Companies Act, 1956 hereinafter to be referred to as ’the Act’ and the Company Law Board by its judgment and order dated 25th November, 1998 dismissed the said application inter alia holding that transfer of shares in favour of Bhagwati was against the provisions of Sections 13 and 16 of the Regulation Act and as such, illegal. In the opinion of the Company Law Board Peerless rightly refused registration of transfer. While doing so, the Company Law Board further observed that the shares of a public limited company which are not registered in the Stock Exchange also come under the purview of Regulation Act.= the appellant pleaded that the contract in question is a spot delivery contract and, therefore, does not come within the mischief of Section 16 of the Regulation Act.= “16. Power to prohibit contracts in certain cases.- (1) If the Central Government is of opinion that it is necessary to prevent undesirable speculation in specified securities in any State or area, it may, by notification in the Official Gazette, declare that no person in the State or area specified in the notification shall, save with the permission of the Central Government, enter into any contract for the sale or purchase of any security specified in the notification except to the extent and in the manner, if any, specified therein. (2) All contracts in contravention of the provisions of sub- section (1) entered into after the date of the notification issued thereunder shall be illegal.” – According to the definition, a contract providing for actual delivery of securities and the payment of price thereof either on the same day as the date of contract or on the next day means a spot delivery contract. When we consider the facts of the present case bearing in mind the definition aforesaid, we find that the contract in question is not a spot delivery contract. True it is that by letter dated 30th of October, 1987 written by Tuhin to Bhagwati, he had stated that the formal agreement had been executed between them on 10th November, 1986 and as per the agreement he is transferring the entire 3530 shares of Peerless purchased from the loan amount and the transfer is in its repayment. However, the agreement dated 21st November, 1994 between Bhagwati and Tuhin which formed part of the compromise decree provides that the sale of shares took place on 30th October, 1987 and in consideration thereof Bhagwati paid a sum of Rs. 10 lakhs on 21st November, 1994 and further the dividend on the entire shares up to the accounting year 1989-90 amounting to Rs.8,64,850 to be retained by Tuhin. In the face of it, the plea of Bhagwati that the payment of Rs. 10 lakh was made to buy peace, is not fit to be accepted and, in fact, that forms part of the consideration for the sale of shares. Once we take this view, the plea of the appellant that it is a spot delivery contract is fit to be rejected. We agree with the reasoning and conclusion of the Company Law Board and the High Court on this issue. Both the contentions of the appellant having no substance, we do not find any merit in this appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

 published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40558      REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7445 OF 2004 BHAGWATI DEVELOPERS PVT. LTD. APPELLANT VERSUS PEERLESS GENERAL FINANCE & INVESTMENT COMPANY LTD AND ANR. RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant aggrieved by the judgment and order dated 30th July, 2003 passed in ACO No.76 … Continue reading

Therefore, a reading of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and Section 138 Evidence Act, insofar as it comes to the question of a criminal trial, the order of re-examination at the desire of any person under Section 138, will have to necessarily be in consonance with the prescription contained in Section 311 Cr.P.C. It is, therefore, imperative that the invocation of Section 311 Cr.P.C. and its application in a particular case can be ordered by the Court, only by bearing in mind the object and purport of the said provision, namely, for achieving a just decision of the case as noted by us earlier. Therefore, the paramount requirement is just decision and for that purpose the essentiality of a person to be recalled and re-examined has to be ascertained. To put it differently, while such a widest power is invested with the Court, it is needless to state that exercise of such power should be made judicially and also with extreme care and caution.= We do not find any bonafides in the application of the second respondent, while seeking the permission of the Court under Section 311 Cr.P.C. for his re-examination by merely alleging that on the earlier occasion he turned hostile under coercion and threat meted out to him at the instance of the appellant and other accused. It was quite apparent that the complaint, which emanated at the instance of the appellant based on the subsequent incident, which took place on 30.5.2007, which resulted in the registration of the FIR in Khizersarai Police Station in case No.78/2007, seem to have weighed with the second respondent to come forward with the present application under Section 311 Cr.P.C., by way of an afterthought. If really there was a threat to his life at the instance of the appellant and the other accused, as rightly noted by the Court below, it was not known as to why there was no immediate reference to such coercion and undue influence meted out against him at the instance of the appellant, when he had every opportunity to mention the same to the learned trial Judge or to the police officers or to any prosecution agency. Such an indifferent stance and silence maintained by the second respondent herein and the categorical statement made before the Court below in his evidence as appreciated by the Court below was in the proper perspective, while rejecting the application of the respondents filed under Section 311 Cr.P.C. In our considered opinion, the trial Court, had the opportunity to observe the demeanour of the second respondent, while tendering evidence which persuaded the trial Court to reach the said conclusion and that deserves more credence while examining the correctness of the said order passed by the trial Court. In the light of the above conclusion, applying the various principles set out above, we are convinced that the order of the trial Court impugned before the High Court did not call for any interference in any event behind the back of the appellant herein. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The order impugned dated 9.12.2010, passed in Crl. M.P. 12454/2010 of the High Court is set aside. The order of the trial Court stands restored. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial. The stay granted by this Court in the order dated 7.3.2011, stands vacated. The trial Court shall proceed with the trial from the stage it was left and conclude the same expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of the copy of this order.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40520 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. OF 2013 (@ SLP (CRL.) No.2400 of 2011) Rajaram Prasad Yadav ….Appellant VERSUS State of Bihar & Anr. ….Respondent J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal is … Continue reading

Hiba -Amongst the Ismaili school of the Shia sect a gift made during death-bed illness by a person is not valid to any extent, when it is made to one of more of several heirs to the exclusion of other legal heirs. On this point, the Shia school of law lays down, the same rule as that of the Hanafi law. 29. In the decision Saira bai w/oAsgar Hussain vs. S.S.Joshi and another reported in AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 260 it has been held that under Mohammedan Law, merely because a gift deed has been registered, the same cannot dispense with delivery of possession, which is one of the essential requirements of a valid gift under Mohammedan Law. 30. It is not in dispute that under Mohammedan Law, a gift made during death-bed illness (Marzur muth) is not valid, when it is made to one of several heirs to the exclusion of other heirs. Even in AIR 1936 Mds. 432 (cited supra), the same has been made clear. Even if the gift is given, by way of a registered document, under Mohammedan Law, for a valid gift, delivery of possession is mandatory, which cannot be dispensed with. 31. Therefore, in the light of the decisions referred above, I am of the view that Ex.B2, Settlement Deed had been executed while Abdul Raheem was in his death-bed, counting his days. There is no implied or expressed acceptance of Ex.B2 by the first respondent and the extend of possession and enjoyment of the first item of property by the appellant and the first respondent, would also show that the settlement deed, Ex.B2, has not been acted upon, prior to the death of late Abdul Raheem or subsequently

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 05.03.2008 CORAM : THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE S.TAMILVANAN A.S.No.618 of 1996 A.R. Abdul Latheef … Appellant/Plaintiff vs. 1.A.R.Mohammed Iliyas 2.Fathima Bibi 3.Mumtaz Begum 4.Karur Vysya Bank, rep. by its Manager, Peria Kadai Street, Anamalai, Pollachi Taluk. … Respondents/D-1 to 4 Appeal is filed against the … Continue reading

Full Bench Judgement on Land Acquisition Matter of Greater NOIDA & NOIDA=When the need for law is apparent and found and the legislature is slow to respond then the judiciary particularly the higher judiciary has to play a role akin to that of law maker. Of course, it is done through interpretation and within the bounds. In extreme situations, the bounds may be stretched but they are never to be broken. It is said that great events do not leave great people standing by. The Judges also cannot remain oblivious of and unaffected with the resentment shown by public against some law. It is said that the best judge is he who understands the society best. In the matter of land acquisition, the Supreme Court realized the importance of the resentment of the people at an early stage. Without waiting for the flames to rise, fire fighting efforts were initiated immediately after seeing the smoke during last couple of years. It is always easier to cure an illness at its earlier stage. Either provide a safety valve and an outlet or be ready for burst. However, it is heartening to note that Parliament is also responding promptly and it has given clear indications that it intends to modify Land Acquisition Act in near future by providing more to those persons whose lands are acquired (double or four times the market value). Some States have already taken corrective measures. In view of the above, we have directed payment of something more than market value to those persons whose lands have been acquired for secondary public purposes in order to make them sharer in the profit which is to be earned by industrialists and builders. Date:21.10.2011 NLY

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD Reserved on 30.09.2011. Delivered on 21.10.2011. Group-1 (Writ petitions relating to village Patwari) (1)Case :- WRIT – C No. – 37443 of 2011 Petitioner :- Gajraj And Others Respondent :- State Of U.P. And Others With (2)Case :- WRIT – C No. – 48089 of 2011 Petitioner :- Meghraj … Continue reading

Benefit of difference in age should be given to the accused for offences u/ss 363, 366, 376 IPC/Appeal allowed.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD  RESERVED AFR Criminal Appeal No. 5029 of 2005 Raj Kumar Shukla ………………………………….Appellant Versus State of U.P. ………………………………………..Respondent Connected with Criminal Revision No. 723 of 2006 Sarju Prasad Mishra……………………………………….Revisionist Versus State of U.P. and another………………………………Respondents. Hon Vinod Prasad, J Appellant Raj Kumar Shukla, in Criminal Appeal No. 5029 of 2005, … Continue reading

For a cheque issued by a third party-Bank Manager cannot be prosecuted u/s 138 N.I. Act.

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT ALLAHABAD  Reserved AFR CRIMINAL MISC. APPLICATION NO. 21683 OF 2007 R.K. Dixit………………………………………………Applicant versus State of U.P. and others……………………….Respondent Hon’ble Vinod Prasad, J. Applicant R.K. Dixit, Manager Allahabad Bank/Field Officer, Allahabad Bank Branch, P.S. Civil Lines, District Moradabad has approached this court u/s 482 Cr.P.C., through instant Application, praying for quashing … Continue reading

Oudh Lands Act, 1876-Sections 7(b) & 8-U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1957-Right of pre-emption-Property brought within the municipal limits of a town-Transfer of the property through sale-Claim of the right being a co-sharer of the property- Availability of-Held, the customary right of pre-emption existed for a long time and is available in view of recognition by the courts-On facts the right existed with the co- sharer on the date of the transfer of the property-Right not ceased to exist after the latter enactment. One S transferred the suit property to his wife in lieu of dower debt. The property is situated in a village. A part of the village was included within municipal limits of a town. She sold the property in 1951 to one M, who is the predecessor of respondent Appellant filed a suit before trial court claiming a right of pre-emption on the property being a co-sharer under the provisions of the Oudhs Land Act, 1876. The trial court decreed the suit holding that the right of pre-emption existed with the appellant even after the property is included within the municipal limits. Appellate Court dismissed the appeal of the respondent on the basis of a finding of Commissioner that the property was within the municipal limits on the date of the transfer of the property. High Court allowed the second appeal of the respondent holding that the custom relating to pre-emption was not available in that town under the Act and that the appellant could not prove the right on the date of transfer. Hence the appeal. The respondent contended that the appellant failed to produce evidence to show that the customary right of pre-emption existed on the date of transfer of the property; that the appellant is not a co-sharer of the property and that after the enactment of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1957, the right of pre-emption ceased to exist =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1 It is the burden of the respondent to show that the customary right of pre-emption was either abandoned or discontinued and was not continuing on the date of the transfer of the suit property in view of the recognition of the customary right of pre-emption of a co-sharer in respect of town land by the courts. Judicial decisions recognising custom are relevant and admissible notwithstanding that they are not inter parties and such evidence is the most satisfactory evidence. [836-F-G] 1.2. The view of the High Court that there was complete transformation in the social system prevailing in cities is contrary to the recognition by the courts of such customary right in respect of town land. The finding of the High Court that there is no evidence that the custom was a continuing one is erroneous since this custom was prevalent in the town for a long period. Further there was no evidence from the side of the respondent that this custom was discontinued at any point of time. [837-D-E] Abdul Alim and Ors. v. Hayat Mohammad and Ors., AIR 33 (1946) Oudh 188, distinguished. 1.3. The appellant is a co-sharer in view of the finding by the lower courts. The contention of the respondent that the right of pre-emption ceased to exist after the enactment of the U.P. Urban Areas Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1957 was not urged either before the High Court or before the lower courts. Further, on perusal of the Act, it is not acceptable that the customary right of pre-emption ceased to exist in the area. Hence the appellant, being a co-sharer, has acquired a right of pre- emption over the suit property. [837-G-H] CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 661 of 1997 =, 2002(1 )SCR833 , 2002(2 )SCC652 , 2002(2 )SCALE23 , 2002(2 )JT1

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 661 of 1997 PETITIONER: FAZLE RAB Vs. RESPONDENT: MOHD. YAKEEN DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/02/2002 BENCH: Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri & S.N. Phukan JUDGMENT: Phukan, J. This appeal arising out of judgment of the High Court of Judicature at Allahabad is by the plaintiff. The parties shall be referred to as arrayed … Continue reading

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