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Karnataka High Court

This tag is associated with 55 posts

National Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPCA) under the DPCO,1995, – the Drugs (Prices Control) Order (for short, ‘DPCO’) – Fixation of prices /Revised prices of the drugs manufactured & stocked by company by notification – Whether operative in respect of all sales subsequent to 15 days from the date of the notification by the Government in the official gazette/receipt of the price fixation order by the manufacturer – Karnataka High court held that it applies from the date of notification -that revised prices will not apply to the existing stocks but only to new batches of drugs and formulations to be manufactured after 15 days of the notification cannot be accepted. The provisions of the DPC Order are clear that prices should be revised within 15 days even in regard to the formulations which were manufactured prior to the date of notification or those manufactured within 15 days from the date of notification. – Delhi high court held that it applies only after 15 days of notification – Apex court held that Karnataka High court view is correct and Delhi High court view is incorrect – held that it applies only from the date of Notification to all sales & stocks = GlaxoSmithKline Pharmaceuticals Limited (Formerly known as SmithKline Beecham Pharmaceuticals (India) Limited) … Appellant Versus Union of India & Ors. … Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41053

National  Pharmaceutical Pricing Authority (NPCA) under the DPCO,1995, – the  Drugs      (Prices  Control)  Order  (for  short,  ‘DPCO’)  – Fixation of prices /Revised prices of the drugs manufactured & stocked by company by notification – Whether operative in respect of all sales subsequent  to 15 days from the date of the notification by the Government in the  official gazette/receipt of the price … Continue reading

Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act 1882. Doctrine of lis pendens is based on legal maxim ‘ut lite pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new should be introduced). A transferee pendente lite is bound by the decree just as much as he was a party to the suit. A litigating party is exempted from taking notice of a title acquired during the pendency of the litigation. = KN Aswathnarayana Setty (D) Tr. LRs. & Ors. …Petitioners Versus State of Karnataka & Ors. …Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41041

Section  52  of  the Transfer of Property Act 1882.     Doctrine of lis  pendens  is  based      on  legal  maxim  ‘ut  lite  pendente nihil innovetur’ (During a litigation nothing new  should  be         introduced). A transferee pendente lite is bound  by  the         decree just as much as he was a … Continue reading

Service = When the appointment of one person held wrong , the other person can not be appointed automatically by way of writ of Mandamus unless in exceptional circumstances = GANAPATH SINGH GANGARAM SINGH RAJPUT … APPELLANT Versus GULBARGA UNIVERSITY REP. BY ITS REGISTRAR & OTHERS … RESPONDENTS = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40953

When the appointment of one person held wrong , the other person     can not be appointed automatically by way of writ of Mandamus unless in exceptional circumstances  =   Shivanand challenged the aforesaid selection and appointment in a writ petition filed before the High Court, inter alia, contending  that  Masters’ Degree in Mathematics  will  not … Continue reading

Whether there is an arbitration clause in contract agreement – No – aggrieved party remedy is only civil court = = M/s. P. Dasaratharama Reddy Complex … Appellant versus Government of Karnataka and another … Respondents – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40902

Whether there is an arbitration clause in contract agreement – No –     aggrieved party remedy is only civil court =       Leave granted in SLP (C) Nos. 16117 of 2004, 17147 of 2004,  24655  of   2004, 26073 of 2004, 5951 of 2006, 12552 of 2006,  12553 of 2006,  8597  of   … Continue reading

Industrial Disputes Act sec. 25F,25FF sec.25N and Section 17B of I.D. Act – Estopel – State of Maharashtra & Anr. … Appellants Versus Sarva Shramik Sangh, Sangli & Ors. … Respondents = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40894

Industrial Disputes Act sec. 25F,25FF  sec.25N and Section 17B of I.D. Act – Estopel – Already     decided case attained finality – and same was applied with some suitable modifications = Retrenchment of labours temporary having serice of more than 10 years of service with out sufficient notice and with out payment of damages on the trasfer … Continue reading

Sanction to prosecution is a conditional precedent = whether the Special Judge/Magistrate is justified in referring a private complaint made under Section 200 Cr.P.C. for investigation by the Deputy Superintendent of Police – Karnataka Lokayukta, in exercise of powers conferred under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. without the production of a valid sanction order under Section 19 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988.= The High Court, after hearing the parties, took the view that the Special Judge could not have taken notice of the private complaint unless the same was accompanied by a sanction order, irrespective of whether the Court was acting at a pre-cognizance stage or the post- cognizance stage, if the complaint pertains to a public servant who is alleged to have committed offences in discharge of his official duties. The High Court, therefore, quashed the order passed by the Special Judge, as well as the complaint filed against the appellant. ;Taking cognizance of an offence= “It is necessary to mention here that taking cognizance of an offence is not the same thing as issuance of process. Cognizance is taken at the initial stage when the Magistrate applies his judicial mind to the facts mentioned in a complaint or to a police report or upon information received from any other person that an offence has been committed. The issuance of process is at a subsequent stage when after considering the material placed before it the court decides to proceed against the offenders against whom a prima facie case is made out.”; whether, in the above mentioned legal situation, the requirement of sanction is a pre-condition for ordering investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., even at a pre-cognizance stage. Section 2(c) of the PC Act deals with the definition of the expression “public servant” and provides under Clauses (viii) and (xii) as under: “(viii) any person who holds an office by virtue of which he is authorised or required to perform any public duty. (xii) any person who is an office-bearer or an employee of an educational, scientific, social, cultural or other institution, in whatever manner established, receiving or having received any financial assistance from the Central Government or any State Government, or local or other public authority.”= When a Special Judge refers a complaint for investigation under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C., obviously, he has not taken cognizance of the offence and, therefore, it is a pre-cognizance stage and cannot be equated with post-cognizance stage. = “19. Previous sanction necessary for prosecution.—(1) No court shall take cognizance of an offence punishable under Sections 7, 10, 11, 13 and 15 alleged to have been committed by a public servant, except with the previous sanction— a) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of the Union and is not removable from his office save by or with the sanction of the Central Government, of that Government; b) in the case of a person who is employed in connection with the affairs of a State and is not removeable from his office save by or with the sanction of the State Government, of that Government; c) in the case of any other person, of the authority competent to remove him from his office.”- “Section 19(3) – Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974)- a) no finding, sentence or order passed by a special judge shall be reversed or altered by a court in appeal, confirmation or revision on the ground of absence of, or any error, omission or irregularity in the sanction required under sub-section (1), unless in the opinion of that Court, a failure of justice has in fact been occasioned thereby; b) xxx xxx xxx c) xxx xxx xxx”= Once it is noticed that there was no previous sanction, as already indicated in various judgments referred to hereinabove, the Magistrate cannot order investigation against a public servant while invoking powers under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. – “Thus, in view of the above, the law on the issue of sanction can be summarized to the effect that the question of sanction is of paramount importance for protecting a public servant who has acted in good faith while performing his duty. In order that the public servant may not be unnecessarily harassed on a complaint of an unscrupulous person, it is obligatory on the part of the executive authority to protect him….. If the law requires sanction, and the court proceeds against a public servant without sanction, the public servant has a right to raise the issue of jurisdiction as the entire action may be rendered void ab-initio.”= We are of the view that the principles laid down by this Court in the above referred judgments squarely apply to the facts of the present case. We, therefore, find no error in the order passed by the High Court. The appeals lack merit and are accordingly dismissed.

  published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40843     REPORTABLE           IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS. 1590-1591 OF 2013 (@ Special Leave Petition (Criminal) Nos.6652-6653 of 2013)   Anil Kumar & Ors. ….. Appellants   Versus   M.K. Aiyappa & Anr. ….. Respondents     … Continue reading

Special Public Prosecutor asked not to appear without justifiable cause = the order dated 10.9.2013 passed by the Government of Karnataka asking Shri G. Bhavani Singh – respondent no.4, Special Public Prosecutor (hereinafter referred to as ‘SPP’) in a pending prosecution against the petitioners not to appear in the said matter; the communication dated 14.9.2013 passed by the Chief Justice of High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore by which the Chief Justice has approved the removal of Shri G. Bhavani Singh as SPP, as well as the consequential order dated 16.9.2013 issued by the State Government removing the respondent no.4 from the post of SPP. 2. A prosecution was launched against the petitioners for having assets disproportionate to their known income in the year 1996-1997 in the State of Tamil Nadu. = The Karnataka Civil Services (General Recruitment) Rules, 1977 authorise the State Government to appoint a retired government servant on contractual basis after meeting certain formalities, for a specific period as may be necessary. So far as judicial officers are concerned, their services are governed by the Karnataka Judicial Services (Recruitment) Rules, 1983 and Rule 3(2) thereof provides the application of the rules framed under any law or proviso under Article 309 of the Constitution to judicial officers, though subject to the provisions of Articles 233, 234 and 235 of the Constitution. The Rules of 1983 stand repealed by the Karnataka Judicial Service (Recruitment) Rules 2004 (hereinafter referred to as the ‘Rules 2004’) and Rule 11(2) thereof reads as under: “11(2). All rules regulating the conditions of service of the members of the State Civil Services made from time to time under any law or the proviso to Article 309 of the Constitution of India shall, subject to Articles 233, 234 and 235 be applicable to the Civil Judges (Junior Division), Civil Judges (Senior Division) and the District Judges recruited and appointed under these rules.” Thus, it is evident that the State Government is competent to appoint the learned Special Judge on contractual basis after his retirement for the period required to conclude the present trial, though with the consultation of the High Court as required under Article 235 of the Constitution. Further, in our humble opinion, such a course must be adopted in the manner prescribed under the Rules 2004 and in view thereof, the matter requires to be considered by the State Government with the consultation of the High Court. 31. Therefore, in view of the aforestated facts, we refer the matter to the High Court of Karnataka to decide on the administrative side as to whether, in order to conclude the trial expeditiously as guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution requires the extension of the services of the learned Special Judge. Considering the urgency of the matter, we request the High Court of Karnataka to take a decision in this regard as early as possible. 32. In view of the above, we are of the considered opinion that the order of removal of Shri G. Bhavani Singh-respondent no.4 is a product of mala fides and the impugned order is not sustainable in the eyes of law as such the same is hereby quashed. 33. With the aforesaid observations/directions, the writ petitions stand disposed of.

REPORTABLE        published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40840 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CRIMINAL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION   WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 154 OF 2013       Selvi J. Jayalalithaa & Ors. …Petitioners   Versus   State of Karnataka & Ors. …Respondents       WITH   WRIT PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO. 166 OF 2013 … Continue reading

Board not liable to pay any amount to the Bank towards subsidy amount as the Borrower committed default =The Borrower had borrowed money from the Bank for its business and as per policy of the State of Karnataka, the Board had assured the Bank that by way of subsidy, the amount of interest would be paid by the Board to the Bank, provided there was no default in repayment of the principal amount by the Borrower.= the Board has been wrongly saddled with the liability of paying Rs.75,213/-.= The question only is with regard to the liability of the Board. The Board is neither a borrower nor a guarantor. = The Commission and the Karnataka State Khadi and Village Industries Board, will have no liability of any kind either in respect of the principal amount of loan or payment of 4% or revised rate of interest to be borne by the borrowers for which interest subsidy eligibility certificate has been issued by the Commission. Its liability shall be restricted only to the extent of payment of interest subsidy as per scheme. The Commission would be liable to pay interest subsidy as per the scheme only for the period of which the loan is sanctioned by the Bank and is not liable to pay such interest subsidy for the defaulted period 87-88.”= In other words, upon default committed by the Borrower, the Board was absolved of its liability of paying interest on behalf of the Borrower to the Bank and its liability was only to the effect that it would surrender its first charge over the moveable and immoveable assets of the borrower in favour of the Bank. 10. In spite of the aforestated facts, the trial court came to the conclusion that the Board was liable to pay interest which was due and payable by the Borrower. In our opinion, the said finding of the trial court is not correct. Even the High Court’s view of confirming the said finding is not correct and therefore, we quash and set aside the judgment of the appellate court as well as the decree passed by the trial court so far as it makes the Board liable to pay the interest on behalf of the Borrower. In view of the contents of the aforestated letter dated 23rd March, 1988, the Board shall surrender its first charge over all the moveable and immoveable assets of the Borrower in favour of the Bank as soon as possible. 11. The appeal stands partially allowed to the above extent with no order as to costs. Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40772 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8182 OF 2003 (Arising out of SLP ( C) No. 12161 of 2006)   Karnataka State K.V. Industries Board …..APPELLANT   VERSUS Punjab National Bank & Ors. ….RESPONDENTS   1 J U D G M E N T   … Continue reading

LAND REFORMS ACT – The appellants claim to be the owners of lands in Sy. Nos. 33, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 and 53 situated in village Halligeri, Dharward Taluk, Karnataka, having purchased the same in the year 1956. According to the appellants, the lands were in their personal cultivation since then. 3. The 2nd respondent, Gangappa (since deceased) filed an application before the Special Tahasildar, Land Reforms, Dharwad, contending therein that he had sent an application on 23rd June, 1975 in Form No.7 for registering him as an occupant of the lands belonging to the appellants.- whether in fact the 2nd respondent had filed an application in Form No.7, and if it was found that he had made such an application, then to consider it on merits in accordance with law. = the Tribunal admitted Form No.7 produced by the 2nd respondent and on an enquiry gave definite finding that the applicant-2nd respondent was not in occupation or cultivation of the suit land as a tenant as on 1st March, 1974 or prior thereto. In view of such finding of the Tribunal it was not open for the learned Single Judge to remand the matter again to the Tribunal to enquire whether Form No.7 is on record or Form No.7 was produced by the 2nd respondent which in fact rendered the order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Tribunal ineffective for no reason. The Division Bench of the High Court also failed to notice the above-said fact and thereby erred in affirming the order passed by the learned Single Judge. 14. For the reasons aforesaid, we set aside the impugned order dated 2nd June, 2006 passed by the Division Bench in W.A.No.3836/2005(LR) and order dated 3rd June, 2005 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.15722/1997, order dated 2nd June, 1997 passed by the Land Tribunal, Dharwad is restored. The appeal is allowed. There shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40793 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 8289 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.14496 of 2006) CHANNABASAPPA(DEAD) BY LR & ANR. … APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 1. This … Continue reading

suit for specific performance of compromise order = compromise was arrived at, whereby, the respondent No.2 agreed to re-convey the land to the extent of 1.16 acres to the appellant. This was on the condition that the respondent No.2 would use the remaining 1 acre land for building the administrative block. The appellant was also required to use the re-conveyed parcel of land for industrial purposes. = Thus, there was no breach of the compromise on the part of the Government which would necessitate her to file a suit for specific performance. Once it is held that the Government retracted its steps well in time, there could not be any decree of specific performance based on the alleged breach of the compromise. ; non-issue of the notice under Section 80 could not be permitted to be raised for the first time in the second appeal, when this contention was not raised seriously at any stage earlier.

 publisehd in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40721 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1361 OF 2006   Tarabai (Dead) Through L.Rs. … Appellant (s) Versus Govt. of Karnataka & Ors. … Respondent (s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.3789-3791 OF 2007 J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. These appeals are … Continue reading

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