//
archives

Karnataka High Court

This tag is associated with 55 posts

Entrusting the investigation to the CBI = the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in Writ Petition No. 7623 of 2012 whereby the Division Bench of the High Court constituted a Special Investigation Team (SIT) to investigate into the broadcasting of certain news items by certain television channels on 02.03.2012 regarding scuffle between advocates, police and media persons in the premises of the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore.= a Constitution Bench of this Court in State of West Bengal and Others vs. Committee for Protection of Democratic Rights, West Bengal and Others, (2010) 3 SCC 571 has laid down certain principles. Though the CBI has issued various principles/suggestions for endorsing the matter to CBI in para 68, it is worthwhile to refer the conclusion in paras 69 & 70. “69. In the final analysis, our answer to the question referred is that a direction by the High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution, to CBI to investigate a cognizable offence alleged to have been committed within the territory of a State without the consent of that State will neither impinge upon the federal structure of the Constitution nor violate the doctrine of separation of power and shall be valid in law. Being the protectors of civil liberties of the citizens, this Court and the High Courts have not only the power and jurisdiction but also an obligation to protect the fundamental rights, guaranteed by Part III in general and under Article 21 of the Constitution in particular, zealously and vigilantly. 70. Before parting with the case, we deem it necessary to emphasise that despite wide powers conferred by Articles 32 and 226 of the Constitution, while passing any order, the Courts must bear in mind certain self-imposed limitations on the exercise of these constitutional powers. The very plenitude of the power under the said articles requires great caution in its exercise. Insofar as the question of issuing a direction to CBI to conduct investigation in a case is concerned, although no inflexible guidelines can be laid down to decide whether or not such power should be exercised but time and again it has been reiterated that such an order is not to be passed as a matter of routine or merely because a party has levelled some allegations against the local police. This extraordinary power must be exercised sparingly, cautiously and in exceptional situations where it becomes necessary to provide credibility and instil confidence in investigations or where the incident may have national and international ramifications or where such an order may be necessary for doing complete justice and enforcing the fundamental rights. Otherwise CBI would be flooded with a large number of cases and with limited resources, may find it difficult to properly investigate even serious cases and in the process lose its credibility and purpose with unsatisfactory investigations.” Keeping the above principles in mind, considering the series of unfortunate incidents which occurred within the City Civil Court Complex, Bangalore on 02.03.2012 involving members of the bar, police personnel, journalists and media persons and in spite of the specific direction by the High Court as early as on 16.05.2012, subsequent order of this Court dated 19.10.2012, and also of the fact that the composition of SIT itself has not been finalized, we feel that the present case falls within the principles enunciated by the Constitution Bench and we are satisfied that CBI inquiry is necessitated in the matter in issue. 12) In the light of what is stated above, while setting aside the impugned order of the High Court dated 16.05.2012 and in modification of earlier order of this Court dated 19.10.2012, we entrust the entire investigation of the incident to the CBI. Accordingly, we direct the CBI to carry out the investigation and submit a report before the appropriate Court having jurisdiction at Bangalore within a period of six months from the date of receipt of copy of this judgment. We further direct the State/SIT to immediately hand over all the records pertaining to the said investigation to the CBI. 13) The appeal is allowed on the above terms. In view of the above direction, no separate order is required in I.A. No. 8 of 2013, accordingly, the same is also disposed of.

   published in     http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40700                                     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO.7159 OF 2013 2 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 22604 of 2012) WITH 3 I.A. NO. 8 IN … Continue reading

M.V. Act – COMPENSATION TO A CHILD = What is the just and fair compensation to be awarded to a child, who suffered disability in a motor accident, is the main point arising for consideration in this case.= In Kum. Michael vs. Regional Manager, Oriental Insurance Company Limited and Another[4], this Court considered the case of an eight year old child suffering a fracture on both legs with total disability only to the tune of 16%. It was held that the child should be entitled to an amount of Rs.3,80,000/- on these counts. 12. Though it is difficult to have an accurate assessment of the compensation in the case of children suffering disability on account of a motor vehicle accident, having regard to the relevant factors, precedents and the approach of various High Courts, we are of the view that the appropriate compensation on all other heads in addition to the actual expenditure for treatment, attendant, etc., should be, if the disability is above 10% and upto 30% to the whole body, Rs.3 lakhs; upto 60%, Rs.4 lakhs; upto 90%, Rs.5 lakhs and above 90%, it should be Rs.6 lakhs. For permanent disability upto 10%, it should be Re.1 lakh, unless there are exceptional circumstances to take different yardstick. In the instant case, the disability is to the tune of 18%. Appellant had a longer period of hospitalization for about two months causing also inconvenience and loss of earning to the parents. The appellant, hence, would be entitled to get the compensation as follows: – | HEAD |COMPENSATION AMOUNT | |Pain and suffering already |Rs.3,00,000/- | |undergone and to be suffered in | | |future, mental and physical shock, | | |hardship, inconvenience, and | | |discomforts, etc., and loss of | | |amenities in life on account of | | |permanent disability. | | |Discomfort, inconvenience and loss |Rs.25,000/- | |of earnings to the parents during | | |the period of hospitalization. | | |Medical and incidental expenses |Rs.25,000/- | |during the period of | | |hospitalization for 58 days. | | |Future medical expenses for |Rs.25,000/- | |correction of the mal union of | | |fracture and incidental expenses | | |for such treatment. | | |TOTAL:- |Rs.3,75,000/- | 13. The impugned judgment of the High Court in M.F.A. No. 1146 of 2008 is accordingly modified. The claimant will be entitled to a total compensation of Rs.3,75,000/- along with interest @ 6% per annum from the date of the petition. First respondent – Insurance Company is directed to deposit the enhanced compensation with interest as above within two months from today. On such deposit, it will be open to the appellant to approach the Tribunal for appropriate orders on withdrawal. The appeal is allowed as above.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40696 IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7139 OF 2013 [Arising out of S.L.P.(Civil) No. 1676 of 2012] Master Mallikarjun … Appellant (s) Versus Divisional Manager, the National Insurance Company Limited & Anr. … Respondent (s) J U D G M E N T KURIAN, J.: Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Sections 498A and 304B of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (hereinafter referred to as ‘IPC) and Sections 3, 4 and 6 of the Dowry Prohibition Act (hereinafter called the ‘DP Act’). = What is material contradiction and the material omissions =It is well settled legal proposition that while appreciating the evidence, the court has to take into consideration whether the contradictions/omissions were of such magnitude so as to materially affect the trial. Minor contradictions, inconsistencies, embellishments or improvements in relation to trivial matters, which do not effect the core of the case of the prosecution, must not be made a ground for rejection of evidence in its entirety. The trial court, after going through the entire evidence available, must form an opinion about the credibility of the witnesses, and the appellate court in the normal course of action, would not be justified in reviewing the same, without providing justifiable reasons for doing so. Where the omission(s) amount to a contradiction, creating a serious doubt regarding the truthfulness of a witness, and the other witnesses also make material improvements before the court in order to make the evidence acceptable, it would not be safe to rely upon such evidence. The discrepancies in the evidence of eyewitnesses, if found not to be minor in nature, may be a ground for disbelieving and discrediting their evidence. In such circumstances, the witnesses may not inspire confidence and if their evidence is found to be in conflict and contradiction with other evidence available or with a statement that has already been recorded, then in such a case, it cannot be held that the prosecution has proved its case beyond reasonable doubt.; Recording a finding against the medical evidence is perverse = The defence version has been that Shanthi, deceased, had developed illicit relations with one Raju, a close friend of her brother Manimaran (PW.2) and was pregnant at the time of marriage. The Trial Court accepted this version in spite of the fact that the medical evidence was otherwise. Dr. B.R.S. Kashyap (PW.17) mentioned in the post-mortem report (Ex.P-12) that the uterus was intact. Subsequently, an explanation was specifically sought on 2.2.1995 as to whether Shanthi was pregnant at the time of death. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) opined that she was not pregnant at the time of post-mortem examination. Dr. Kashyap (PW.17) denied the suggestion that he had issued report (Ex.P-14) in collusion with the complainant to the effect that she was not pregnant. 20. The Trial Court placed reliance on the medical history (Ex.P-10) mentioned in the Accident Register of the hospital that Shanthi had 3 months pregnancy. We have examined the original documents also, there is nothing on record to show as at whose behest remarks had been recorded therein. Thus, the finding of the Trial Court about pregnancy of Shanthi recorded by the Trial Court is not worth acceptance.; Duty of accused under sec. 313 Cr.P.C. to give explanation =He did not give any version about the incident, rather pleaded a false defence that Shanthi, deceased, had developed illicit relationship with Raju, a friend of her brother Manimaran, (PW.2) and was pregnant before marriage. To question no. 32, as to whether he wanted to say anything, his reply was only `No’. 23. It is obligatory on the part of the accused while being examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., to furnish some explanation with respect to the incriminating circumstances associated with him, and the Court must take note of such explanation even in a case of circumstantial evidence in order to decide whether or not the chain of circumstances is complete. When the attention of the accused is drawn to circumstances that inculpate him in relation to the commission of the crime, and he fails to offer an appropriate explanation, or gives a false answer with respect to the same, the said act may be counted as providing a missing link for completing the chain of circumstances. (Vide: Munish Mabar v State of Haryana, AIR 2013 SC 912). When sec. 113 and 116 Evidence Act comes in to play =The prosecution successfully proved its case and, therefore, provisions of Section 113 of the Evidence Act 1872 come into play. The appellant/accused did not make any attempt, whatsoever, to rebut the said presumption contained therein. More so, Shanthi, deceased, died in the house of the appellant. He did not disclose as where he had been at the time of incident. In such a fact-situation, the provisions of Section 106 of Evidence Act may also be made applicable as the appellant/accused had special knowledge regarding such facts, though he failed to furnish any explanation thus, the court could draw an adverse inference against him. 26. In view of the above, the findings recorded by the Trial Court on each issue had been perverse and the High Court has rightly reversed the said findings. The conduct of the appellant/accused during the trial also disentitled him of any indulgence whatsoever. The appeal lacks merit, and is, accordingly dismissed.

 published in      http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40665        Non-Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2280 of 2009   S. Govidaraju …Appellant Versus State of Karnataka …Respondent   J U D G M E N T   Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.   1. This appeal has been preferred against the … Continue reading

Both suits are remanded due to contradictory recordings for clubbing and disposal = We may have remanded the matter to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeals filed by the appellant and respondent No. 2 but keeping in view the fact that the findings recorded in the two suits regarding Item No. 5 of Schedule `B’ properties specified in the plaint of O.S. No. 4528 of 1980 are contradictory and substantial portion of the judgment of O.S. No. 4528 of 1980 is based on surmises and conjectures, we feel that ends of justice would be met by setting aside the impugned judgment and remitting the matter to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the suits filed by respondent Nos. 1 and 2. In the result, the appeals are allowed. The impugned judgment is set aside. The judgments of the trial Court in O.S. Nos. 4528 of 1980 and 2062 of 1981 are also set aside and the matter is remitted to the trial Court for fresh disposal of the suits. With a view to avoid the possibility of conflicting findings regarding Item No.5 of Schedule `B’ properties specified in the plaint of O.S. No.4528 of 1980, we direct the trial Court to club the two suits and dispose of 3 the same by one judgment. The parties shall be free to file applications for additional evidence and bring on record the orders passed by the Land Tribunal and the High Court in relation to Item Nos. 1 to 4 of Schedule `B’ appended to the plaint of O.S. No.4528 of 1980.

published in       http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx NON REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6714-6715 OF 2002 Y. Nagaraj ……..Appellant   Versus   Smt. Jalajakshi and others …….Respondents     J U D G M E N T   G. S. Singhvi, J.   1. These appeals … Continue reading

failures of Appellate court = the Appellate Court was required to deal with each and every question raised on behalf of the appellants. Though the aforesaid questions were raised before the trial court as well as the High Court, we find that the High Court failed to discuss and decide the questions raised by the appellants -Apex court remanded for fresh disposal = the Division Bench held that the accused persons have failed to explain the circumstances under which they had come in possession of the motor cycle belonging to PW-1 which had been used by the deceased and, therefore, the presumption would arise against the accused under Section 106 of the Evidence Act.= High court (i) The prosecution failed to prove the recovery of motor cycle from the possession of the appellant as the witnesses, who were the Panch had not stood to the test of cross-examination. (ii) PW-40 was examined to prove the alleged seizure of motor cycle (MO5). But the said witness deposed that he reached the place after the seizure. PW-40 could not state the date and time when seizure was made and he signed in Mahazar (Ex.P.23). According to PW.40 he had signed the Mahazar at the cross of Nelagadahalli Village but according to Seizure Mahazar (Ex.P.23), the place of seizure was NITF Cross. In the cross-examination he admitted that he did not remember MO5 vehicle was seized by the police. (iii) PW-2 in his deposition stated that the deceased had informed him that the motor cycle was seized for violation of Traffic Rules. This clearly shows that the motor cycle had already been seized by the Police. (iv) The prosecution also failed to prove the recovery of Wrist Watch (MO6) of the deceased. To prove the said aspect prosecution examined PW-8 and PW-9. The case of the prosecution was that Wrist Watch (MO6) was seized from PW-8, the brother of accused No.1. But PW-8 turned hostile and stated that nothing has been seized from him. Another witness was PW-9, who in his evidence stated that he had not seen any seizure and also turned hostile. In Ex.P.1, the complainant, PW-17 (mother of the deceased) has not stated anything regarding Wrist Watch of the deceased. Therefore, it is clear that the story of Wrist Watch was subsequently inserted to create evidence against the accused, but the prosecution failed to establish. (v) The prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the allegation that the exhumation of dead body was at the instance of the accused. The Investigation Officer (PW-45) in his cross-examination deposed that he knew the place of burial of dead body prior to the recording of the voluntary statement of the accused. Therefore, it can be said that the dead body has been recovered at the instance of the accused. (vi) The prosecution also failed to prove the last seen theory. The Poojari who performed the Pooja of motor cycle has categorically stated that he cannot identify the persons who visited the temple, as thousands of people used to visit the temple in a day. (vii) Once the prosecution has failed to prove the main offence under Section 302 of the IPC, offence under 201 IPC also does not survive for consideration. The evidence of PWs-2, 10, 11, 14 and 45, not at all stood the test of the cross-examination. the High Court being the Appellate Court was required to deal with each and every question raised on behalf of the appellants. Though the aforesaid questions were raised before the trial court as well as the High Court, we find that the High Court failed to discuss and decide the questions raised by the appellants. 8. In view of the finding recorded above, we are of the view that the case should be remitted to the High Court for fresh disposal in accordance with law. The impugned judgment dated 19th January, 2010 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Karnataka, Bangalore in Criminal Appeal No.968 of 2006 is, accordingly, set aside. The case is remitted back to the High Court for fresh disposal of the appeal in accordance with law. It will be open to the appellants to raise all the questions and objections as raised in this appeal or as taken before the High Court. The respondents may also contest the case in support of the judgment passed by the trial court. The appeal stands disposed of with the aforesaid observation.

published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40539     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 887 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(Crl.)No.1937 of 2013) P. NAGESH AND ANOTHER … APPELLANTS VERUS STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT   J U D G M E N T   SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J.   This … Continue reading

whether the mother tongue or the regional language can be imposed by the State as the medium of instruction at the primary education stage.= The vital question involved in this petition has a far-reaching significance on the development of the children in our country who are the future adults. The primary school years of a child is an important phase in a child’s education. Besides, it moulds the thinking process and tutors on the communication skills. Thus, primary education lays the groundwork for future learning and success. Succinctly, the skills and values that primary education instills are no less than foundational and serve as bases for all future learning. Likewise, the importance of a language cannot be understated; we must recollect that reorganization of States was primarily based on language. Further, the issue involved in this case concerns about the fundamental rights of not only the present generation but also the generations yet to be born. (i) What does Mother tongue mean? If it referred to as the language in which the child is comfortable with, then who will decide the same? (ii) Whether a student or a parent or a citizen has a right to choose a medium of instruction at primary stage? (iii) Does the imposition of mother tongue in any way affects the fundamental rights under Article 14, 19, 29 and 30 of the Constitution? (iv) Whether the Government recognized schools are inclusive of both government-aided schools and private & unaided schools? (v) Whether the State can by virtue of Article 350-A of the Constitution compel the linguistic minorities to choose their mother tongue only as medium of instruction in primary schools?= With regard to the above, all the connected matters including petitions/applications shall be placed before the Constitution Bench. Since the matter in issue started in the year 1994, early disposal of the case is desirable. Hence, the Registry is directed to place the same before Hon’ble the Chief Justice of India for necessary directions.

  published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40528   REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION   1   2 CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5166-5190 OF 2013   3 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 18139-18163 of 2008       The State of Karnataka & Anr. …. Appellant (s)   Versus   The Associated Management … Continue reading

the Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1971 (in short ‘the Act’),= occupation of government accommodation by members of all the three branches of the State, viz., the Legislature, the Executive and the Judiciary beyond the period for which the same were allotted. The occupation of such government houses/quarters beyond the period prescribed causes difficulty in accommodating other persons waiting for allotment and, therefore, the Government is at a loss on the one hand in not being able to accommodate those persons who are in need and on the other is unable to effectively deal with the persons who continue to occupy unauthorisedly beyond the period prescribed.= The following suggestions would precisely address the grievances of the Centre and the State governments in regard to the unauthorized occupants: Suggestions: (i) As a precautionary measure, a notice should be sent to the allottee/officer/employee concerned under Section 4 of the PP Act three months prior to the date of his/her retirement giving advance intimation to vacate the premises. (ii) The Department concerned from where the government servant is going to retire must be made liable for fulfilling the above-mentioned formalities as well as follow up actions so that rest of the provisions of the Act can be effectively utilized. (iii) The principles of natural justice have to be followed while serving the notice. (iv) After following the procedure as mentioned in SR 317-B-11(2) and 317- B-22 proviso 1 and 2, within 7 working days, send a show cause notice to the person concerned in view of the advance intimation sent three months before the retirement. (v) Date of appearance before the Estate Officer or for personal hearing as mentioned in the Act after show cause notice should not be more than 7 working days. (vi) Order of eviction should be passed as expeditiously as possible preferably within a period of 15 days. (vii) If, as per the Estate Officer, the occupant’s case is genuine in terms of Section 5 of the Act then, in the first instance, an extension of not more than 30 days should be granted. (viii) The responsibility for issuance of the genuineness certificate should be on the Department concerned from where the government servant has retired for the occupation of the premises for next 15 days and further. Giving additional responsibility to the department concerned will help in speedy vacation of such premises. Baseless or frivolous applications for extensions have to be rejected within seven days. (ix) If as per the Estate Officer the occupant’s case is not genuine, not more than 15 days’ time should be granted and thereafter, reasonable force as per Section 5(2) of the Act may be used. (x) There must be a time frame within how much time the Estate Officer has to decide about the quantum of rent to be paid. (xi) The same procedure must be followed for damages. (xii) The arrears/damages should be collected as arrears of land revenue as mentioned in Section 14 of the Act. (xiii) There must be a provision for compound interest, instead of simple interest as per Section 7. (xiv) To make it more stringent, there must be some provision for stoppage or reduction in the monthly pension till the date of vacation of the premises. (xv) Under Section 9 (2), an appeal shall lie from an order of eviction and of rent/damages within 12 days from the day of publication or on which the order is communicated respectively. (xvi) Under Section 9(4), disposal of the appeals must be preferably within a period of 30 days in order to eliminate unnecessary delay in disposal of such cases. (xvii) The liberty of the appellate officer to condone the delay in filing the appeal under Section 9 of the Act should be exercised very reluctantly and it should be an exceptional practice and not a general rule. (xviii) Since allotment of government accommodation is a privilege given to the Ministers and Members of Parliament, the matter of unauthorized retention should be intimated to the Speaker/Chairman of the House and action should be initiated by the House Committee for the breach of the privileges which a Member/Minister enjoys and the appropriate Committee should recommend to the Speaker/Chairman for taking appropriate action/eviction within a time bound period. (xix) Judges of any forum shall vacate the official residence within a period of one month from the date of superannuation/retirement. However, after recording sufficient reason(s), the time may be extended by another one month. (xx) Henceforth, no memorials should be allowed in future in any Government houses earmarked for residential accommodation. It is unfortunate that the employees, officers, representatives of people and other high dignitaries continue to stay in the residential accommodation provided by the Government of India though they are no longer entitled to such accommodation. Many of such persons continue to occupy residential accommodation commensurate with the office(s) held by them earlier and which are beyond their present entitlement. The unauthorized occupants must recollect that rights and duties are correlative as the rights of one person entail the duties of another person similarly the duty of one person entails the rights of another person. Observing this, the unauthorized occupants must appreciate that their act of overstaying in the premise directly infringes the right of another. No law or directions can entirely control this act of disobedience but for the self realization among the unauthorized occupants. The matter is disposed of with the above terms and no order is required in I.As for impleadment and intervention.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40526 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4064 OF 2004   S.D. Bandi …. Appellant(s) Versus Divisional Traffic Officer, KSRTC & Ors. …. Respondent(s)   2   J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, J. 1) The instant case relates to the occupation of … Continue reading

HINDU SUCCESSION ACT – KARNATAKA AMENDMENT IN RESPECT OF DAUGHTERS SHARE ON PAR WITH SONS = it was open to the appellant to claim enhancement of her share in the joint family properties because she had not married till the enforcement of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994.= if law governing the parties is amended before the conclusion of the final decree proceedings, the party benefited by such amendment can make a request to the court to take cognizance of the amendment and give effect to the same. If the rights of the parties to the suit change due to other reasons, the court seized with the final decree proceedings is not only entitled but is duty-bound to take notice of such change and pass appropriate order.- the Act was amended by the State Legislature and Sections 6-A to 6-C were inserted for achieving the goal of equality set out in the Preamble of the Constitution. In terms of Section 2 of Karnataka Act 23 of 1994, Section 6-A came into force on 30-7-1994 i.e. the date on which the amendment was published. As on that day, the final decree proceedings were pending. Therefore, the appellant had every right to seek enlargement of her share by pointing out that the discrimination practised against the unmarried daughter had been removed by the legislative intervention and there is no reason why the court should hesitate in giving effect to an amendment made by the State Legislature in exercise of the power vested in it under Article 15(3) of the Constitution.”

‘     ITEM NO.4 COURT NO.3 SECTION IVA S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal (Civil)……/2013 CC 9253-9255/2013 (From the judgement and order dated 11/01/2010 in RFA No.935/2003,RFA No.1012/2003 dated 06/01/2012 in RP … Continue reading

motorcycle accident – personal injury = “The heads under which compensation is awarded in personal injury cases are the following: Pecuniary damages (Special damages) (i) Expenses relating to treatment, hospitalization, medicines, transportation, nourishing food, and miscellaneous expenditure. (ii)Loss of earnings (and other gains) which the injured would have made had he not been injured, comprising: (a) Loss of earning during the period of treatment; (b) Loss of future earnings on account of permanent disability. (iii) Future medical expenses. Non-pecuniary damages (General damages) (iv) Damages for pain, suffering and trauma as a consequence of the injuries. (v)Loss of amenities (and/or loss of prospects of marriage). (vi) Loss of expectation of life (shortening of normal longevity).= In the present case, the claim petition filed by the appellant claimed an amount of Rs.3,50,000/-, the Tribunal awarded Rs.1,94,350/- which was enhanced by the High Court to Rs.2,65,000/-. The evidence of the doctor tendered in the Tribunal on 3.12.2008 stated that the future treatment would cost more than Rs.90,000/-. This corroborating evidence has not been contravented. The High Court however awarded only an amount of Rs.15,000/- towards future medical expenses. In view of the dicta in Raj Kumar Vs. Ajay Kumar (supra) we accept the corroborative evidence given by the doctor, and add the amount as reflected in the doctor’s evidence. A similar view has been taken by a Bench of this Court recently in Civil Appeal No. 5945 of 2012 Kavita Vs. Deepak, decided on 22.8.2012 to which one of us (G.S. Singhvi J) was party. This would add the remaining amount of Rs.75,000/- to the compensation awarded by the High Court which takes it to a figure of Rs.3,40,000/. Since, the doctor has said that the expenses could be more than Rs.90,000/- but has not specified how much would be that amount, we add the remaining amount of Rs.10,000/- to make it Rs.3,50,000/- and thus fully allow the claim of the appellant. The amount of Rs.85,000/- thus added, with interest at 8% from the date of the petition (as originally awarded) will give her an added amount in the range of Rs. 1,25,000/. That will meet her requirement as placed before the MACT in her claim petition in its entirety. . The appeal is accordingly allowed. The claim petition filed by the appellant will stand decreed at Rs.3,50,000/- with interest @ 8% per annum from the date of the petition as awarded by the MACT. The respondent No.2 insurance company is directed to pay the amount as now added with interest at 8% as above within 8 weeks from today.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4340 OF 2013 (Arising out SLP (C) No.8164 of 2012) Smt. V. Sudha … Appellant Versus P. Ganapathi Bhat & Anr. … Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. Delay condoned. Leave granted. 2. This … Continue reading

INAMS ABOLITION ACT, LAND REFORMS ACT= “1. Whether an Inamdar who has been granted occupancy rights under the Inam Abolition Act can invoke Section 41 to recover possession from a person who is not a tenant of the land in question? 2. Whether the order passed by the Tahsildar is sustainable on merits?”= ONCE OCCUPANCY RIGHTS HAS GIVEN , ALL MORTGAGES MADE BEFORE THE INAMS ABOLITION ACT WERE DEEMED TO BE DISCHARGED OR WIPED OFF. FOR IMPLEMENTING OCCUPANCY RIGHTS, THE TAHSILDAR HAS GOT JURISDICTION UNDER LAND REFORMS ACT TO EVICT THE UNAUTHORIZED PERSONS FROM THE LANDS=Since it was extensively pointed out by the learned Single Judge in the order dated 1.2.2005, as well as in the present impugned order highlighting the malpractices indulged in by the Tehsildar, while passing the order directing possession in favour of the appellant and while upholding the order of the learned Single Judge referred to above, the order of remand passed by the learned Single Judge stands restored. We, however, make it clear that the only issue which can be examined by the Tehsildar can be with regard to the claim of the appellant for restoring possession based on the grant of occupancy rights in its favour, by the proceeding dated 11.2.1993. It is further made clear that this order of remand to the Tehsildar, shall not entitle the respondents to raise any issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Tehsildar, in particular, based on the mortgages of the year 1955 and 1967. 19. The appeals stand allowed with the above directions. In light of the fact that the issue is pending for nearly two decades, we direct the Tehsildar to hear the parties and after giving due opportunity to put forth their submissions, pass final orders in accordance with law expeditiously, preferably within three months from the date of receipt of copy of this order.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.4150-4163 OF 2013 NI PRA CHANNABASAVA DESHIKENDRA …APPELLANT SWAMIGALU MATADHIPATHIGALU KANNADA MUTT VERSUS C.P. KAVEERAMMA & ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. Unsuccessful appellant in the Writ Appeal before the Division Bench … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,873,445 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,905 other followers

Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com