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Karnataka High Court

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whether the will of one Smt. Nagammanni was validly executed, and whether the same was duly proved by the respondent no.1 and another (original plaintiffs). – whether a learned Judge of the High Court of Karnataka was right in interfering in Second Appeal, into the concurrent findings of the Trial Court and the Lower Appellate Court in exercise of High Court’s powers under Section 100 of Code of Civil Procedure.- A Will, has to be executed in the manner required by S 63 of the Succession Act. Section 68 of the Evidence Act requires the will to be proved by examining at least one attesting witness. Section 71 of the Evidence Act is another connected section “which is permissive and an enabling section permitting a party to lead other evidence in certain circumstances”, as observed by this Court in paragraph 11 of Janki Narayan Bhoir Vs. Narayan Namdeo Kadam reported in 2003 (2) SCC 91 and in a way reduces the rigour of the mandatory provision of Section 68. As held in that judgment Section 71 is meant to lend assistance and come to the rescue of a party who had done his best, but would otherwise be let down if other means of proving due execution by other evidence are not permitted. At the same time, as held in that very judgment the section cannot be read to absolve a party of his obligation under Section 68 of the Evidence Act read with Section 63 of the Succession Act to present in evidence a witness, though alive and available. – we do hold that the plaintiffs/respondents had proved that Smt. Nagammanni had duly executed a will on 24.10.1943 in favour of the plaintiffs, and bequeathed the suit properties to them. She got the will registered on the very next day. The finding of the Trial Court as well as the First Appellate Court on issue no.2 was clearly erroneous. The learned Judge of the High Court was right in holding that the findings of the Trial and Appellate Court, though concurrent, were bad in law and perverse and contrary to the evidence on record. The second appeal was, therefore, rightly allowed by him. Accordingly, we dismiss the present civil appeal. The Suit No.32 of 1975 filed by the respondents in the Court of Principal Civil Judge at Mandya in Karnataka will stand decreed. They are hereby granted a declaration of their title to the suit property, and for a permanent injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with their possession thereof. In case their possession has been in any way disturbed, they will be entitled to recover the possession of the concerned property, with future mesne profits. In the facts of the present case, however, we do not order any costs. ………..

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1071 OF 2006 M.B. Ramesh (D) By LRS. …Appellants Versus K.M. Veeraje Urs (D) By LRS. & Ors. …Respondents J U D G E M E N T H.L. Gokhale J. This Civil Appeal raises the question as to whether the will … Continue reading

The trial court further observed that since the accused denied the very occurrence, no reliance could be placed on the alleged injuries suffered by them, insofar as the trial of S.C. No. 84/1993 is concerned.- Nonetheless, we have gone through the records to see the individual culpability of the seven appellants but we find that the judgment of the High Court is faultless and the conviction of the seven appellants has been arrived at correctly and on a proper appreciation of the prosecution evidence. 20. We, thus, find no merit in these appeals which are accordingly dismissed. The bail bond of Gangappa Ningappa Ugarkhod, appellant in Criminal Appeal No. 683 of 2005, is cancelled and he is order to surrender within 4 weeks, failing which the trial court is directed to take coercive steps to take him in custody and to make him serve out the remaining sentence.

Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.683 OF 2005 GANGAPPA NINGAPPA UGARKOHOD … APPELLANT VERSUS STATE OF KARNATAKA … RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1064 OF 2005 AND CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.47 OF 2007 J U D G M E N T Aftab Alam, J. 1. These three appeals arise … Continue reading

SERVICE MATTER = where the respondent allegedly worked in the College as part- time Lecturer without any appointment letter and without any selection process. Since the Society never issued any letter of appointment a letter of termination was also not served upon the respondent. 25. As stated above, in the absence of any appointment letter, issued in favour of the respondent as he was temporary/part-time lecturer in the College, there cannot be any legitimate expectation for his continuing in the service.. This was the reason that when in the years 1995 and 1996, two persons were appointed one after the other on the post of Lecturer in History, the respondent did not challenge the said appointments. Even assuming that the respondent was permitted to work in the College as part-time lecturer for some period, the action of the management of the college asking him to stop doing work cannot be held to be punitive. The termination simplicitor is not per se illegal and is not violative of principles of natural justice. 26. After giving our anxious consideration in the matter and analyzing the entire facts of the case, we are of the view that the impugned order passed by the Education Appellate Tribunal and the High Court cannot be sustained in law and are liable to be set aside. 27. For the reasons aforesaid, these appeals are allowed and the impugned orders are set aside.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2948 OF 2013 (Arising out of the Special Leave Petition (C) No.27031 of 2011) B.T. Krishnamurthy …. Appellant (s) Versus Sri Basaveswara Education Society & Ors. ….Respondent (s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2949 OF 2013 (Arising out of Special Leave Petition( … Continue reading

Order VI Rule 16 and Order VII Rule 11 of the CPC. = whether, to maintain an election petition, it is imperative for an election petitioner to file an affidavit in terms of Order VI Rule 15(4) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 in support of the averments made in the election petition in addition to an affidavit (in a case where resort to corrupt practices have been alleged against the returned candidate) as required by the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Representation of the People Act, 1951. In our opinion, there is no such mandate in the Representation of the People Act, 1951 and a reading of P.A. Mohammed Riyas v. M.K. Raghavan & Ors., (2012) 5 SCC 511 which suggests to the contrary, does not lay down correct law to this limited extent. Another question that has arisen is that if an affidavit filed in support of the allegations of corrupt practices of a returned candidate is not in the statutory Form No. 25 prescribed by the Conduct of Election Rules, 1961, whether the election petition is liable to be summarily dismissed. In our opinion, as long as there is substantial compliance with the statutory form, there is no reason to summarily dismiss an election petition on this ground. However, an opportunity must be given to the election petitioner to cure the defect. Further, merely because the affidavit may be defective, it cannot be said that the petition filed is not an election petition as understood by the Representation of the People Act, 1951 From the text of the relevant provisions of the R.P. Act, Rule 94-A and Form 25 as well as Order 6 Rule 15 and Order 19 Rule 3 of the Code and the resume of the case law discussed above it clearly emerges (i) a defect in the verification, if any, can be cured (ii) it is not essential that the verification clause at the foot of the petition or the affidavit accompanying the same should disclose the grounds or sources of information in regard to the averments or allegations which are based on information believed to be true (iii) if the respondent desires better particulars in regard to such averments or allegations, he may call for the same in which case the petitioner may be required to supply the same and (iv) the defect in the affidavit in the prescribed Form 25 can be cured unless the affidavit forms an integral part of the petition, in which case the defect concerning material facts will have to be dealt with, subject to limitation, under Section 81(3) as indicated earlier. Similarly the court would have to decide in each individual case whether the schedule or annexure referred to in Section 83(2) constitutes an integral part of the election petition or not; different considerations will follow in the case of the former as compared to those in the case of the latter.” “However, in fairness whenever such defects are pointed out then the proper course for the Court is not to dismiss the petition at the threshold. In order to maintain the sanctity of the election the Court should not take such a technical attitude and dismiss the election petition at the threshold. On the contrary after finding the defects, the Court should give proper opportunity to cure the defects and in case of failure to remove/cure the defects, it could result into dismissal on account of Order 6 Rule 16 or Order 7 Rule 11 CPC. Though technically it cannot be dismissed under Section 86 of the Act of 1951 but it can be rejected when the election petition is not properly constituted as required under the provisions of CPC but in the present case we regret to record that the defects which have been pointed out in this election petition were purely cosmetic and do not go to the root of the matter and secondly even if the Court found them of serious nature then at least the Court should have given an opportunity to the petitioner to rectify such defects.” 65. Applying these principles to the facts of the present case, it seems quite clear that the affidavit filed by Prasanna Kumar in compliance with the requirements of the proviso to Section 83(1) of the Act was not an integral part of the election petition, and no such case was set up. It also seems quite clear that the affidavit was in substantial compliance with the requirements of the law. Therefore, the High Court was quite right in coming to the conclusion that the affidavit not being in the prescribed format of Form No.25 and with a defective verification were curable defects and that an opportunity ought to be granted to Prasanna Kumar to cure the defects. No submissions were made with regard to the striking out, in accordance with Order VI rule 16 of the CPC, of specifically objectionable paragraphs in the election petition. In any event this is a matter for trial and we see no reason to take a view different from that taken by the High Court. Conclusion: 67. There is no merit in these appeals and they are, accordingly dismissed, but without any costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2250-2251 OF 2013 Arising out of SLP(C) Nos. 14172-14173 OF 2010 G.M. Siddeshwar … Appellant Versus Prasanna Kumar … Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2252-2255 OF 2013 Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 24886-24889 OF 2010 J U D G M … Continue reading

appointment to the post of Lokayukta or Upa Lokayukta – whether the views expressed by the Chief Justice of the High Court of Karnataka has got primacy while making appointment to the post of Lokayukta or Upa Lokayukta by the Governor of Karnataka in exercise of powers conferred on him under Section 3(2)(a) and (b) of the Karnataka Lokayukta Act, 1984 (for short ‘the Act’).- The doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’ = Merely because a wrong has been committed several times in the past does not mean that it should be allowed to persist, otherwise it will never be corrected. The doctrine of ‘prospective overruling’ has no application since there is no overwhelming reason to save the appointment of the Upa-lokayukta from attack. As already held, in the absence of any consultation with the Chief Justice, the appointment of Justice Chandrashekharaiah as an Upa-lokayukta is void ab initio. However, this will not affect any other appointment already made since no such appointment is under challenge before us. 82. It was also contended that the High Court ought not to have laid down any procedure for the appointment of the Upa-lokayukta. In the view that I have taken, it is not necessary to comment on the procedure proposed by the High Court. Conclusion: 83. The appointment of Justice Chandrashekharaiah as the Upa-lokayukta is held void ab initio. Since some of the contentions urged by the appellants are accepted, the appeals are partly allowed to that extent only.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs.197-199 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) NOs.15658-15660 OF 2012] Mr. Justice Chandrashekaraiah (Retd.) .. Appellant Versus Janekere C. Krishna & Ors. etc. .. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 200-202 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (Civil) Nos.16512-16514 OF 2012]   J … Continue reading

498-A and 306 of the IPC. = wife beating is a normal facet of married life. Does that mean giving one or two slaps to a wife by a husband just does not matter? We do not think that that can be a right approach. It is one thing to say that every wear and tear of married life need not lead to suicide and it is another thing to put it so crudely and suggest that one or two assaults on a woman is an accepted social norm. Judges have to be sensitive to women’s problems. Perhaps learned Sessions Judge wanted to convey that the circumstances on record were not strong enough to drive Girija to commit suicide. But to make light of slaps given to Girija which resulted in loss of her eyesight is to show extreme insensitivity. Assault on a woman offends her dignity. What effect it will have on a woman depends on facts and circumstances of each case. There cannot be any generalization on this issue. Our observation, however, must not be understood to mean that in all cases of assault suicide must follow. Our objection is to the tenor of learned Sessions Judge’s observations. We do not suggest that where there is no evidence the court should go out of its way, ferret out evidence and convict the accused in such cases. It is of course the duty of the court to see that an innocent person is not convicted. But it is equally the duty of the court to see that perpetrators of heinous crimes are brought to book. The above quoted extracts add to the reasons why learned Sessions Judge’s judgment can be characterized as perverse. They show a mindset which needs to change. There is a phenomenal rise in crime against women and protection granted to women by the Constitution of India and other laws can be meaningful only if those who are entrusted with the job of doing justice are sensitized towards women’s problems. In the ultimate analysis we are of the opinion that the appellant has not been able to rebut presumption under Section 113A of the Evidence Act. Girija committed suicide within seven years from the date of her marriage in her matrimonial home. Impact of this circumstance was clearly missed by the trial court. The evidence on record establishes that Girija was subjected to mental and physical cruelty by the appellant in their matrimonial home which drove her to commit suicide. The appellant is guilty of abetment of suicide. The High Court has rightly reversed the judgment of the trial court acquitting the appellant. Appeal is, therefore, dismissed.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 12 OF 2013 [Arising out of Special Leave Petition (Crl.)No. 2038 of 2012] Vajresh Venkatray Anvekar … APPELLANT Versus State of Karnataka … RESPONDENT JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. The appellant (original accused 2 – A2) was … Continue reading

the delay of 449 days in filing the appeals before the Division Bench = Considering the issues raised and the positive direction given by the learned single Judge, we are of the view that the Division Bench of the High Court ought to have condoned the delay and gone into the merits of the matter in the light of the provisions of the Karnataka Stamp Act, 1957. Though the High Court concentrated only on narrating the pleadings of the parties, reasoning of the learned single Judge and cause shown for condoning the delay, but has not considered the substantial grounds urged by the State. As rightly pointed out by learned senior counsel for the State that though in the last paragraph there is some reference about the reasoning of the learned single Judge, not much attention was given on the merits of the claim made by the State.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 8803-8805 OF 2012 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 14177-14179 of 2010)     The State of Karnataka & Ors. …. Appellant (s) Versus Vivekananda M. Hallur & Ors. …. Respondent(s)     J U D G M E … Continue reading

Hindu Succession Act, 1956 – s. 14 – Rights of female Hindu under – Held: Any property of a female Hindu is her absolute property – She has full ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana – She may dispose of the same as per her wish, and the same shall not be treated as a part of the joint Hindu family property – There is no presumption that of joint family property, and there must be some strong evidence in favour of the same – On facts, propositor after marriage lived in the paternal house of his wife (`P’) – `P’ was gifted a property by her father by a gift deed at the time of marriage, and continued to be in possession and purchased more properties from the income of the land gifted to her – Propositor except having some income from tenanted land had no personal income nor agricultural income which he could utilize for purchase of any property – Suit for partition by son of `P’ alleging that the entire property was a joint family property – Trial court rightly held that lands other than the tenanted portion as occupied by propositor, were the absolute self acquired properties of `P’ which she had purchased/acquired from the income and funds from the lands gifted by `P’, whereas the order of the High Court that the properties to the suit were joint family properties and the parties to the suit were entitled for 1/3rd share in those properties, set aside. `S’ and `P’ got married in 1924 and at the time of the marriage, the father of `P’ gifted her land A7 under a Gift Deed. `S’ after his marriage, continued to reside in his in-laws house and during his life time, he had no other source of income except from the tenanted lands. `P’ purchased certain lands A(4)-A(6) under a Sale Deed from the income of the land gifted to her by her father. Thereafter, with the income from the said two lands, `P’ purchased another land A(8)-(12). `S’ died in the year 1951 leaving behind four sons and one daughter-`M’ (appellant-defendant), `N’ (respondent-plaintiff), `B’ (deceased); and `SN’ and `C’ (pre-deceased). In her life time `P’ relinquished her share in land A(4)-A(6) in favour of the appellant. Thereafter, subsequent to an oral partition, she gave one part of the property A(8)-A(12) to the respondent and other to legal heirs of `B’. In 1984, `P’ executed a will of `Stridhana’ land to her daughter, `SN’. Thereafter `P’ died. The respondents filed a suit for partition seeking separate possession of 1/3rd share each alleging that the entire property is the joint family property and not the personal property of `P’. The trial court held that except tenanted portion the said properties were self acquired properties of `P’. The High Court held that the properties described in the suit are joint family properties and the parties to the suit are entitled for 1/3rd share in those properties. Therefore, the appellant filed the instant appeal. Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 clearly mandates that any property of a female Hindu is her absolute property and she, therefore, has full ownership. The Explanation to sub-section (1) further clarifies that a Hindu woman has full ownership over any property that she has acquired on her own or as stridhana. As a consequence, she may dispose of the same as per her wish, and that the same shall not be treated as a part of the joint Hindu family property. There is no presumption that of joint family property, and there must be some strong evidence in favour of the same. [Paras 21 and 22] [451-E-G] Appasaheb Chamdgade v. Devendra Chamdgade and Ors. (2007) 1 SCC 521 – referred to. 2.1 The High Court did not accept the findings and conclusion reached by the trial court. The High Court wrongly shifted the burden of proving that the said lands were a part of the self acquired property of `P’ and not a part of the joint family property of the appellants-defendents, when there was no affirmative proof of anything contrary. The High Court erred in shifting the burden of proof on the appellants, especially when there was nothing on record either by way of oral or documentary evidence produced by the respondents-plaintiffs before the trial court. [Para 13] [446-F-H] 2.2 Suit Land A(7) was `stridhana’ property of `P’. This property was gifted to her by her father under a registered Gift Deed in 1924. She was the owner of the said land. She continued to be in possession of the said land till she bequeathed the same in favour of defendant No.5 under a Will dated 30.06.1984. On the death of `P’ and on the basis of the said Will, the legatee-defendant No.5 claims she became owner of the said land which was noted in the Revenue Records. The Will and the Revenue entries made were questioned by the plaintiffs and successfully proved that the said Will was not executed by `P’. Therefore, defendant No.5 cannot claim title over A(7) under the Will and this property cannot be brought into the hotchpotch of the joint family property and would not be available for partition. Stridhana belonging to a woman is a property of which she is the absolute owner and which she may dispose of at her pleasure, if not in all cases during coverture, in all cases during widowhood. Since the plaintiffs proved that `P’ had not alienated the property by executing a Will in favour of defendant No. 5 during her lifetime, the property is the absolute property of `P’ and would not be available for partition among the members of joint family since it does not partake the character of joint family property. [Para 18] [448-E-H; 449-A-B] 2.3 As regards the Suit Schedule properties Item No.A(4) to A(6), it is the case of the plaintiffs that the said properties were purchased by `S’, father of the plaintiffs and the defendants under a Sale Deed dated 05.10.1944, but, in the name of his wife `P’ from and out of the income of the tenancy lands A(1) to A(3) for the purpose of the joint family for which he was also the Karta of the family. However, it is the case of the contesting defendants that the said property is the self acquired property of `P’ from and out of her income derived from the property gifted to her by her father in the year 1924; that `S’ was the tenant of the property A(1) to A(3) only from the year 1947 and, therefore, plaintiffs cannot claim that from out of the income of the property A(1) to A(3), lands in item A(4) to A(7) were purchased. It has come in evidence of the contesting defendants that propositor `S’ was the tenant of the lands A(1) to A(3) only from the year 1947. The same was not disputed by the plaintiffs by leading any other cogent evidence to prove that `S’ was the tenant of the lands A(1) to A(3) even prior to 1944, the date of the Sale Deed. In the absence of any evidence, much less cogent and reliable evidence, it is difficult to accept the version of the plaintiffs that the suit schedule A(4) to A(6) should be put into common hotch potch and partitioned by meters and bounds. [Para 19] [449-C-G] 2.4 As regards the lands at Item A(8) to A(12), it is the case of the plaintiffs that on the death of propositor `S’, joint family continued and during its continuance, agricultural lands which is now sub-divided as items A(8) to A(12) came to be purchased out of the joint family funds, but, in the name of `P’, since she was eldest member of the joint family at the relevant point of time. The oral evidence was led in support of the assertion made in the plaint. The plaintiffs did not produce any other evidence in support of the claim so made. The defence pleaded by the defendants, apart from others, is that `P’ had her independent source of income from A(7) lands. She, with the aid of the said income, acquired not only A(4) to A(6) but also A(8) to A(12) lands and the tenancy lands was held by joint family. It is also contended by them that propositor `S’, after marrying `P’, lived in the paternal house of his wife `P’, which fact is not denied by the plaintiffs, and `S’ had no personal income nor agricultural income which he could utilize for purchase of any property, much less A(8) to A(12) properties. The trial court, after considering the entire evidence on record came to the conclusion that lands A(8) to A(12) is the absolute self acquired properties of `P’. The findings and the conclusion so arrived is based on the proper appreciation of the evidence on record and the respondents did not bring anything contrary to make a different view. Therefore, lands A(8) to A(12) of the suit Schedule is not the joint family property but the absolute property of `P’, which she purchased/acquired from the income and funds from the lands A(7) and A(4) to A(8). [Para 23] [452-C-H; 453-A-B] 3. The reasoning given by the High Court cannot be accepted. Thus, the reasoning and conclusion reached by the trial court is concurred with. Thus, the judgment and order passed by the High Court is set aside and that of the trial court is restored. [Paras 24 and 25] [453-C-D] Case Law Reference: (2007) 1 SCC 521 Referred to Para 22 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 3495 of 2001. From the Judgment and Order dated 30.03.1999 of the High Court of Karnataka in RFA no. 385 of 1993. Rajesh Mahale and Giri K., for the Appellants. Gireesh Kumar (for Khwairakpam Nobin Singh), M.A. Chinnasamy and Ankur S. Kulkarni for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 3495 OF 2001 Marabasappa (D) by LRs. & Ors. ………….. Appellants versus Ningappa (D) by LRs. & Ors. …………..Respondents J U D G M E N T H.L. DATTU, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the Judgment and Order of the … Continue reading

just relief to the builders etc., even though the acquisition was quashed and approved by Apex court=In the result, the appeals are dismissed. However, keeping in view the fact that some of the members of the appellant may have built their houses on the sites allotted to them, we give liberty to the appellant to negotiate with the respondents for purchase of their land at the prevailing market price and hope that the landowners will, notwithstanding the judgments of the High Court and this Court, agree to accept the market price so that those who have

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7425-26 OF 2002 Bangalore City Cooperative Housing Society Ltd. … Appellant versus State of Karnataka and others … Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 774-778 OF 2005 J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. These appeals … Continue reading

Delay -6500 days- On the part of Government litigant – Condonation of – Land ceiling proceeding – Land Tribunal holding that declarants were holding lands in excess of the ceiling limit – Writ petitions challenging the order of Tribunal by declarants and also by State – Writ by declarants withdrawn – State’s writ dismissed – Review filed by State alleging fraud on the part of declarant and the Secretary of Land Tribunal – Delay of 14 years in filing the Review – Dismissal of Review Petition – Special Leave Petition – Delay in filing of 6500 days against original order and 300 days against order in Review =Held: Delay, specially in cases where large tracts of land and large sums of revenue involved, is done to protect unscrupulous litigants at the cost of public interest/public exchequer – Courts though take liberal attitude in delay by Government, yet such attitude can be extended upto a certain limit – s.5 of Limitation Act must receive liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice – In the instant case, in order to protect public justice, delay condoned, subject to payment of exemplary cost of Rs.10 Lakhs – SLP to be admitted subject to payment of the cost – Limitation Act, 1963 – s.5 – Cost – Imposition of as a condition for condonation of delay – Constitution of India, 1950 – Article 136 – Admission of SLP, subject to payment of cost – Practice and Procedure – Karnataka Land Reforms Act, 1961 – s.66(4) – Administration of justice. G. Ramegowda, Major etc. v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer, Bangalore AIR 1988 SC 897 – relied on. State (NCT of Delhi) v. Ahmed Jaan 2008 (11) SCALE 455; Nand Kishore v. State of Punjab 1995(6) SCC 614 – referred to. Case Law Reference 2008(11)SCALE 455 Referred to. Para 15 1995 (6) SCC 614 Referred to. Para 16 AIR 1988 SC 897 Relined on. Para 19 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petiton (C ) Nos. 11398-11400 of 2009 From the Judgement and Order dated 07.11.1990 of the High Court of Karnataka at Bangalore in W.P. No. 40425 of 1982, W.P. No. 10920 of 1983 and order dated 26.09.2007 in R.P. 817 of 2004 in WP No. 40425 of 1982, C/W WP No. 10920 of 1983 Sanjay R. Hegde, for the Appellant(s).

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITON (C ) NOS. OF 2009 (Arising out of CC Nos. 3324-3326 OF 2009) State of Karnataka …Petitioner Versus   Y. Moideen Kunhi( dead) by Lrs. And Ors. …respondents   JUDGMENT   Dr. ARIJIT PASAYAT, J   1. The special leave petitions … Continue reading

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