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Kerala High Court

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Appointments on compassionate basis are recognised as a permissible mode of induction into service under the Kerala Education Rules framed under the Kerala Education Act. Rule 9A appearing in Chapter XXIVA and Rule 51B appearing in Chapter XIVA of the said Rules are relevant in this regard. While Rule 9A deals with employment of dependants of the non- teaching staff of an aided school dying-in-harness, Rule 51B deals with employment of dependants of an aided school teacher dying-in-harness. The said rules are as under:- “9A: The manager shall give employment to a dependant of the non- teaching staff of an aided school dying in harness. Government orders relating to employment assistance to the dependents of Government servants dying in harness shall, mutatis mutandis, apply in the matter of such appointment.” (emphasis supplied) “51B: The Manager shall give employment to a dependant of an aided school teacher dying in harness. Government orders relating to employment assistance to the dependents of Government servants dying in harness shall mutatis mutandis, apply in the matter of such appointments.” “19. The time limit for preferring applications under the scheme will be 2 years from the date of death of govt. Servants. In the case of minor, the period will be within 3 years after attaining majority.” if an employee of the school died in harness and his legal representatives required any assistance in the form of compassionate appointment it is for them to approach the school in that regard by making an application in the manner prescribed. If the legal heirs did not do so, the Manager could reasonably assume that they were not in need of any assistance for otherwise they would ask for the same.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4848 OF 2012 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) 7556 of 2008   Shreejith L. …Appellant Versus Deputy Director (Education) Kerala & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4852, 4851, 4854, 4853, 4849-4850 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.4954/2009, SLP (C) … Continue reading

Whether a Village Panchayat established under Section 3 of the Goa Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 (for short, ‘the Act’) or any other statutory dispensation existing prior to the enactment of the Act has the locus to file a petition under Article 226 and/or 227 of the Constitution for setting aside an order passed by the designated officer exercising the power of an appellate authority qua the action/decision/resolution of the Village Panchayat is the question which arises for consideration in these appeals filed against order dated 18.08.2010 passed by the learned Single Judge of the Bombay High Court, Goa Bench in Writ Petition Nos. 16 and 312 of 2010. “ordinarily” the petitioner who seeks to file an application under Art. 226 of the Constitution should be one who has a personal or individual right in the subject-matter of the petition. A personal right need not be in respect of a proprietary interest : it can also relate to an interest of a trustee. That apart, in exceptional cases, as the expression “ordinarily” indicates, a person who has been prejudicially affected by an act or omission of an authority can file a writ even though he has no proprietary or even fiduciary interest in the subject matter thereof. The appellant has certainly been prejudiced by the said order. The petition under Art. 226 of the Constitution at his instance is, therefore, maintainable.” 26. By applying the ratio of the aforesaid judgments to the facts of these cases, we hold that the writ petitions filed by the appellant were maintainable and the learned Single Judge of the High Court committed grave error by summarily dismissing the same. We also declare that the contrary view expressed by the High Court in other judgments does not represent the correct legal position. 27. In the result, the appeals are allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the writ petitions filed by appellant are restored to their original numbers. The High Court shall now issue notice to the respondents and decide the writ petitions on merits. 28. It will be open to the appellant to apply for interim relief. If any such application is filed, then the High Court shall decide the same on its own merits.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4832 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 1758 of 2011) Village Panchayat, Calangute … Appellant Versus The Additional Director of Panchayat-II and Others … Respondents with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4833 OF 2012 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 10569 of 2011) … Continue reading

apex court reassessed the entire evidence on bank guarantee and set aside the High court judgement and restore the lower court judgment as correct= This is a letter written by defendant 1 to the plaintiff-bank in response to the demand notice dated 23/6/1984 issued to defendant 1. DW-1 in his evidence has admitted that the said letter (Ex-A6) was written by defendant 1.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4446 OF 2006   PUNJAB & SIND BANK … APPELLANT Vs. M/S. C.S. COMPANY & ORS. … RESPONDENTS   JUDGMENT   (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J.   1. The appellant – Punjab & Sind Bank (for short, “the plaintiff-bank”) has challenged in this … Continue reading

Kerala General Sales Tax Act, 1963 – Entry 104 – Satilon/Tuflon coated cookware – Held: Classifiable under Entry 104 and not under Entry 5 – Such products cannot be treated as ordinary aluminium household utensils – Satilon/Tuflon coating makes the products non sticky and hence different from aluminium household utensil falling under Entry 5 – The amendment to Entry 104 in 1999 by which the word `non-stick’ cookware was added was merely clarificatory in nature. The questions which arose for consideration in these appeals were whether the satilon coated cookware and articles coated with tuflon are classifiable under Entry 5 of First Schedule under Kerela General Sales Tax Act, 1963 as `an aluminium household utensil made of utensil’ or whether these products would fall under Entry 104 which pertains to `pressure cooker, cook and serve ware to keep food warm, casseroles, water filters and similar home appliances not coming under any other entry’. The Assessing Authority classified the product under Entry 5. The Appellate Authority held that as the satilon coating made the goods non-stick, it would make it different from the aluminium household utensils made of aluminium covered under Entry 5 of the First Schedule. The Tribunal upheld the same. High Court held that the products were classifiable under the heading “similar home appliances” under Entry 104 of the Act and that the amendment to Entry 104 in the year 1999 by which the word “non-stick cookware” was added was only clarificatory in nature. Hence these appeals. =Dismissing the appeals, the Court HELD: 1.1. The view taken by the Tribunal as well as the High Court that “satilon coated aluminium products” are not identical with “aluminium household utensils made of aluminium and aluminium alloys” is correct. The coating of satilon makes all the difference to the product. The Tribunal rightly recorded a finding that in trade parlance, no one would describe satilon coated aluminium products as aluminium household utensils. [Para 5] [80-F] 1.2. The satilon coated cookware cannot be treated as ordinary aluminium household utensils. Price of the satilon coated cookware is much more than the aluminium household utensils made of aluminium and its alloys. The Hawkins cookware sold by the assessee cannot be categorized as household utensils made of aluminium for the reasons that the satilon coating makes the goods non-sticky and hence different from the aluminium household utensils. In common parlance, Hawkins cookware with satilon coating is not understood as aluminium ware. The view taken by the High Court that the amendment to Entry 104 of the First Schedule is clarificatory in nature is also correct. [Para 6] [80-H; 81-A-B] Gujarat Steel Tubes Ltd and Ors. v. State of Kerala and Ors. (1989) 3 SCC 127; Metlex (I) (P) Ltd. v. Commissioner of Central Excise, New Delhi (2005) 1 SCC 271; Commissioner of Central Excise, Cochin v. Apollo Tyres Ltd. (2005) 11 SCC 444 – distinguished. 2. Coating of tuflon also makes the article non-stick. [Para10] [81-G] T.L.V. Iyer, Gopal Jain, Kaushik Mishra, Bindu K. Nair, Sarika Singh, Ruby Singh Ahuja, K.R. Sasiprabhu, Krishan Venugopal, K. Varghese, Sidhartha, Naresh Kumar, G. Prakash, Beena Prakash, Varun Sarin (for Ramesh Babu M.R.) for the appearing parties.=, 2008(7 )SCR77 , , 2008(6 )SCALE657 , 2008(6 )JT237

CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 6469-6470 of 2002 PETITIONER: Hawkins Cookers Limited RESPONDENT: State of Kerala DATE OF JUDGMENT: 29/04/2008 BENCH: ASHOK BHAN & DALVEER BHANDARI JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T REPORTABLE CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6469-6470 OF 2002 With Civil Appeal No. 7169 of 2004 Talent Marketing Agencies …..Appellant(s) – Versus – … Continue reading

Apex court approved the Lyngdoh committee suggestions with some modifications and directed all universities in India to conduct Student elections as per the guidelines of Lyngdoh committee read with Apex court modifications=the students elections in universities should be held in accordance with the Lyngdoh Committee recommendations.= It appears that by way of judicial intervention, this Court wanted to introduce fairness and transparency in the holding of elections to the Students’ Unions in various Universities across the

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION I.A. NOS. 22, 23 & 24 IN CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 887 OF 2009 UNIVERSITY OF KERALA Appellant (s) VERSUS COUNCIL,PRINCIPALS’,COLLEGES,KERALA & ORS. Respondent(s) ORDER Heard Mr. Gopal Subramanium, learned amicus curiae, Mr. Sanjay Parikh, learned counsel appearing for the Jawaharlal Nehru University Students’ Union, … Continue reading

Indian Succession Act, 1925: Section 88. Will-Other Instilments-Rules of interpretation-Difference in-Inconsistent clauses in will-Later shall prevail over earlier. Legal Maxims : Maxim “cum duo inter sc pugnantia reperiuntur in testamento ultimum ratum est”-Meaning of. This petition has been filed on the ground that the Kerala High Court has not properly interpreted the will in question. =Dismissing the petition, this Court HELD : 1. The rules of interpretation of a “Will” are different from the rules which govern the interpretation of other documents say, for example, Sale Deed or a Gift Deed or a Mortgage Deed or, for that matter, any other instrument by which interest in immovable property is created. While in these documents if there is any inconsistency between earlier or the .subsequent part or specific clauses Inter-se contained therein, the earlier part will prevail over the latter as against the rule of interpretation applicable to a Will under which the subsequent part, clause or portion prevails over the earlier part. [37-A-B] Ramachandra Shenoy and Anr. \. Mm. Hilda Brite and Ors., AIR (1964) SC 1323; Named Lai v. Gokul and Ors., AIR (1976) SC 794 and Ramakrihorc Lal and Anr. v. Kamalnarayan, AIR (1963) SC 890, referred to. 2. A Will may contain several clauses and the latter clause may be inconsistent with the earlier clause. In such a situation, the last intention of the testator is given effect to and it is on this basis that the latter clause is held to prevail over the earlier clause. This is regulated by the well known maxim “cum duo inter sc pugnantia reperiuntur in testarnento ultimum ratum est” which means that if in a Will there are two inconsistent provisions, the latter shall prevail over the earlier. This principle is also contained in Section 88 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, However, this rule of interpretation can be invoked only if different clauses cannot be reconciled. [37-C-E; 38-A] Hammond v, Trehame, [1938] 3 All England Reports 308 and Rameshwar v. Balraj, AIR (1935) PC 187, referred to. CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Special Leave Petition No. 4597 of 1990. From the Judgment and Order dated 6.11.89 of the High Court of Kerala in S.A. No. 750/80-G. K,V. Viswana than for M.T. George for the Petitioner. S. Balakrishnan and S, Prasad for the Respondent. =1995 AIR 2491, 1995( 3 )Suppl.SCR 35, 1995( 5 )SCC 444, 1995( 5 )SCALE23 , 1995( 7 )JT 164

CASE NO.: Special Leave Petition (civil) 4597 of 1990 PETITIONER: KAILVELIKKAL AMBUNH1 (DEAD) BY LRS. AND ORS. RESPONDENT: H.GANESH BHANDARY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/08/1995 BENCH: KULDIP SINGH & S. SAGHIR AHMAD JUDGMENT: JUDGMENT 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR 35 The Judgment of the Court was delivered by S, SAGHIR AHMAD, J. The only ground on which … Continue reading

Succession Act, 1925 – s.90 – Effect of, on interpretation of the Will – Held: In absence of a contrary intention in the Will, the description of the properties in the Will would be deemed to refer to and include the property answering that description at the death of the testator – The Will would then be deemed to speak from the date of the testator’s death – English Wills Act (U.K) – s.24. Will – Statutory presumption against intestacy – Held: While construing a Will, the Court should lean against any intestacy – However, the presumption against intestacy cannot be raised ignoring the intention in the Will. Interpretation of Statutes – Deeming provision – Interpretation and effect of – Legal fiction. Words and Phrases – “deemed” and “comprise” – Meaning of. Dispute arose between the parties over some properties bequeathed in terms of a Will. In the Will, seven items of property were bequeathed. Pursuant to an application filed by the appellants under Section 278 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the District Judge granted the letters of administration in respect of all the seven items of property in the Will. On appeal, the High Court affirmed the grant of letters of administration in respect of items 1 to 3. It declined to grant the letters of administration in respect of items 4 to 7 on the ground that on the date of the Will, the testator’s title over item nos.4 to 7 was not perfected; and that it was perfected only on the registration of the sale deed (executed in favour of the testator), which was after the execution of the Will. In the instant appeals, the question which arose for consideration was whether in view of the provisons of s.90 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925, the judgment of the High Court was erroneous and liable to be set aside. =Disposing of the appeals, the Court HELD:1.1. Section 90 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 is based on Section 24 of the English Wills Act. Prior to the English Wills Act under the common law, testamentary disposition of real property spoke from the date of the Will. But the English Wills Act changed that by a statutory presumption to the effect, that unless a contrary intention appears from the recitals of the Will, the Will speaks from the date of the testator’s death. [Para 13] [1142-F] 1.2. Section 90 uses the legal fiction “deemed” and that is used with the specific purpose of raising a presumption against intestacy. On an analysis of the provisions of Section 90, it is clear that the property described in the Will shall be deemed to refer to and comprise the property answering that description at the death of the testator. In the absence of a contrary intention in the Will, the description of the properties in the Will shall be deemed to refer to and include the property answering that description at the death of the testator. [Paras 14, 16] [1142-G-H] Shorter Oxford Dictionary on Historical Principles, p.386; Webster’s Comprehensive Dictionary Encyclopedic Edition, p.269 and Law of Wills by Williams, 3rd edition, p.429, referred to. 2. When the legislature uses a deeming provision to create a legal fiction, it is always used to achieve a purpose. The obvious purpose herein is to avoid intestacy in respect of properties referred to and comprised in the Will. Once the purpose is ascertained, the Court must give full effect to the statutory fiction and the fiction is to be carried to its logical end. Going by this test, the High Court did not properly appreciate the purport of Section 90 in the context of the Will when it is common ground that the Will does not contain any contrary intention in respect of the bequest of items 4 to 7 of the properties. [Paras 17, 18, 19] [1143-E-H; 1144-A-C] State of Travancore-Cochin and others v. Shanmugha Vilas Cashewnut Factory, Quilon AIR 1953 SC 333 and State of Bombay v. Pandurang Vinayak and others AIR 1953 SC 244, relied on. East End Dwellings Co. Ld. v. Finsbury Borough Council 1952 AC 109, referred to. 3. On general principles also, a Will speaks only from the date of the death of the testator. In the present case, assuming that the testator had not acquired title in respect of half of the property, namely, items 4 to 7 of the property bequeathed by him in the Will on 8.5.1967, but the sale deed having been registered on 8.5.1967, the title reverts back to the date of execution of the sale deed on 2.5.67 under Section 47 of the Registration Act. And the testator died on 20.7.71. Therefore, much before his death, the testator acquired full title over items 4 to 7 of the property. Therefore, the High Court was in clear error in not appreciating the effect of Section 90 on the interpretation of the Will. [Para 21] [114- F-H] 4. It is one of the well established principles that while construing a Will, the Court should lean against any intestacy. The presumption against intestacy cannot be raised ignoring the intention in the Will. That is why Section 90 stipulates that the deeming clause will operate only where there is no contrary intention. In this case, it is common ground that no contrary intention could be discerned in the Will in respect of items 4 to 7. In construing a Will both the English Courts and the Supreme Court of India lean against any presumption favouring intestacy in the absence of a manifest contrary intention in the Will. The judgment of the High Court is thus set aside and that of the District Judge is restored. [Paras 32, 34 and 39] [1147-F-H; 1148-F-G; 1149-F] Ram Saran Lall and others v. Mst. Domini Kuer and others, AIR 1961 SC 1747, distinguished. Hamda Ammal v. Avadiappa Pathar and 3 others (1991) 1 SCC 715, and A. Jithendernath v. Jubilee Hills Coop. House Building Society and another (2006) 10 SCC 96, held inapplicable. Gnambal Ammal v. T Raju Ayyar and others, AIR 1951 SC 103; N. Kasturi v. D. Ponnammal and others, AIR 1961 SC 1302; Pearey Lal v. Rameshwar Das AIR 1963 SC 1703 and Navneet Lal alias Rangi v. Gokul and others AIR 1976 SC 794, relied on. Alavandar Gramani Vs. Danakoti Ammal and others (AIR 1927 Madras 383); Abdulsakur Haji Rahimtulla and others v. Abubakkar Haji Abba and others AIR 1930 Bombay 191; Rangoo Ramji Vs. Harisa and another, AIR 1932 Nagpur 163, referred to. Re Harrison Turner Vs. Hellard, (1885) 30 Chancery Division 390; Re Fleming’s Will Trusts Ennion Vs. Hampstead Old People’s Housing Trust Limited and Another (1974) 3 All ER 323 and Venkata Narasimha Appa Row vs. Parthasarthy Appa Row and another 41 Indian Appeals 51, referred to. Case Law Reference: AIR 1953 SC 333 relied on Para 17 AIR 1953 SC 244 relied on Para 18 1952 AC 109 referred to Para 18 (1885) 30 Chancery Division 390 referred to Para 22 (1974) 3 All ER 323) referred to Para 23 AIR 1927 Madras 383 referred to Para 26 AIR 1930 Bombay 191 referred to Para 27 AIR 1932 Nagpur 163 referred to Para 28 41 Indian Appeals 51 referred to Para 31 AIR 1951 SC 103 relied on Para 32 AIR 1961 SC 1302 relied on Para 33 AIR 1963 SC 1703 relied on Para 33 AIR 1976 SC 794 relied on Para 33 AIR 1961 SC 1747 distinguished Para 35 (1991) 1 SCC 715 held inapplicable Para 38 (2006) 10 SCC 96 held inapplicable Para 38 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 7226 of 2002. From the Judgment & Order dated 6.12.2000 of the High Court of Kerala at Ernakulam in M.F.A. No. 44 of 1990. WITH C.A. No. 4432 of 2003 T.L. Vishwanatha Iyer, T.G. Narayanan Nair, K.N. Madhusoodanan, Romy Chacko, Jasaswini Mishra for the appearing parties.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.7226 OF 2002 Ittianam & Others ..Appellant(s) Versus Cherichi alias Padmini ..Respondent(s) WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.4432 OF 2003 J U D G M E N T GANGULY, J. CIVIL APPEAL NO.7226 OF 2002 1. This appeal is directed against the judgment of the … Continue reading

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION=there is adequate credible evidence on record that the Respondent’s husband was suffering from tuberculosis and that he had suppressed this material fact. This has been established by the medical certificate of the District Tuberculosis Officer which we note, was supplied by the Respondent herself to the Petitioner/Insurance Company. Further, it is also on record and not disputed that the insuree had taken medical leave for long periods for his treatment of tuberculosis. Since, an insurance is a contract entered between the parties in “utmost good faith”, suppression of any material facts by the insuree(as was done in this case), entitled the Petitioner/Insurance Company to repudiate the claim as per the terms and conditions of the policy.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 3050 of 2007 (Against order dated 07.05.2007 in Appeal No.295/2006 of the State Commission, H.P.) LIC of India & Ors.                                                        ……..Petitioners   Vs. Smt.Shakuntala Devi & Anr.                                       …….. Respondents  BEFORE:              HON’BLE MR. JUSTICE ASHOK BHAN, PRESIDENT           HON’BLE MRS. VINEETA RAI, MEMBER For the Petitioners                 :        Mr. Ashok Kashyap, Advocate For the Respondents             :        NEMO. Pronounced on 15th  November, 2011 … Continue reading

application of sec.324r/w 120 B of I.P.C.= there is nothing on record to establish meeting of minds between the appellant and the other accused. Assuming that the appellant had produced certain documents pertaining to the said auto rickshaw, it cannot be concluded on the basis thereof that he had entered into conspiracy with A1 to A3 to repossess the said auto rickshaw because the loan amount was not repaid and in pursuance thereto A1 to A3 murdered the driver of the said auto rickshaw. The evidence on record is totally inadequate to come to such a conclusion. It is, therefore, not possible to sustain the impugned judgment.

NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1221 OF 2005 SHERIMON … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF KERALA … RESPONDENT JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. The appellant (original accused 4) along with three others (original accused 1, 2 & 3) was tried by the Additional Sessions Judge, Kottayam in … Continue reading

divorce on plea of second marriage ? customary divorce ?= whether the marriage of the respondent and PW.2 was dissolved before the elders of their caste, according to PW.2, he himself and the respondent belonged to scheduled caste and customary divorce has been prevailing in their community. The respondent has examined RW.4 L. Malleswara Rao. He has categorically deposed that he and the respondent belonged to scheduled caste community and that customary divorce has been prevailing since time immemorial in their caste and that remarriages are also accepted and recognized in their community. During the course of arguments, it is not disputed that the customary divorce is prevailing in the scheduled caste communities in Andhra Pradesh. The respondent has also examined RW.3. RW.3 is the grand father of the respondent. He is also related to PW.2 Kanithi Jacob. Rw.3 has categorically deposed that PW.2 obtained divorce from the respondent and that he has also signed as a witness in the divorce deed in Ex.B1. He denied the suggestion that Ex.B1 is a fabricated document. Thus, the evidence on record proves that the respondent had obtained divorce from her former husband PW.2 before the elders of their community and the customary divorce is prevailing in their community. The version of the petitioner that he came to know about the earlier marriage of the respondent with Kanithi Jacob just before filing the petition for divorce also appears to be not correct. Admittedly, the marriage of the petitioner and the respondent was solemnized on 10.11.1997. Admittedly, the petition for divorce was filed in the year 1999, and it appears to be most unnatural and improbable to say that the petitioner could not come to know about the earlier marriage of the respondent with Kanithi Jacob for about two years. We have gone through the judgment of the learned Judge, Family Court. It is unfortunate to note that the learned Judge, Family Court, had simply extracted the evidence of all the witnesses one after another and then gave his conclusions which are not supported by any reason. It is the primary duty of the Court to examine the entire evidence in proper perspective and then analyze the same. Mere extracting the evidence of witnesses one after another and then simply saying that the evidence proves the case of one party cannot be said to be the proper method of appreciating the evidence. It is the duty of the Court to apply its mind and to draw just and reasonable conclusions from the evidence. The Court must examine whether the version of a witness is truthful or probable and whether the same is in conformity with the normal human conduct and acceptable. The Court must examine whether the version of a party is consistent with other oral and documentary evidence, whether a witness stood the test of cross-examination. When the Court examines the contradictions, it must ascertain whether the contradictions go to the root of the matter and whether the evidence is shaken in cross-examination and whether those contradictions make the version of a witness unacceptable and the witness unreliable and untrustworthy. Thus, a great responsibility lies on the Presiding Officer of a Court to analyze the evidence. The learned Judge, Family Court, gave his findings without assigning any valid reasons for his conclusions. All the conclusions must be arrived on evidence and for arriving to such conclusions valid reasons have to be assigned. Any order which is not supported by reasons on the face of it would become perverse order. In view of the above, it is clear that the impugned order passed by the lower Court cannot stand to scrutiny and the same is liable to be set aside. Accordingly, the same is set aside.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.V. RAMANA AND THE HON’BLE SRI B. CHANDRA KUMAR F.C.A.No.90 of 2010 04-03-2011 Smt.Potnuru Sugunavani Potnuru Krupanandam Counsel for Appellant :Smt. M. Bhaskara Lakshmi Counsel for respondent : Sri K.A. Narasimham :Judgment: (per Hon’ble Sri Justice B. Chandra Kumar) This appeal is directed against the order and decree dated 09.03.2009 made … Continue reading

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