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Landlord
Sec. 45 Karnataka Land Reforms Act – cultivate tenant = HARSHA V. RAI Vs. STATE OF KARNATAKA & ANR THROUGH LRS published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40860
Sec. 45 Karnataka Land Reforms Act – Cultivate tenant – by1st of March, 1974 one must be a cultivating tenant – with out framing proper question , no case is to be determined – Hence the Apex court remanded the case on two counts 1.whether the property said to have been given on lease to … Continue reading
Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.6 – Suit filed by landlord under s.6 against trespasser when tenant in exclusive possession of suit property is dispossessed forcibly by a trespasser/third party – Maintainability of – Held: Maintainable – Non-impleadment of tenant is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit as tenant is not necessary party in such suit. Words and phrases: Word `dispossessed’ – Meaning of – In the context of s.6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The questions which arose for consideration in the present appeal were whether landlord can maintain suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 against a trespasser for immediate possession where a tenant in exclusive possession was dispossessed forcibly by the trespasser and whether tenant is a necessary party in such suit.- Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The key words in Section 6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 are “dispossessed” and “he or any person claiming through him”. A person is said to have been dispossessed when he has been deprived of his possession; such deprivation may be of actual possession or legal possession. Possession in law follows right to possession. The right to possession, though distinct from possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself for certain purposes. A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is dispossession of the landlord. The word “dispossessed” in Section 6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly, the expression “any person claiming through him” would bring within its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law. What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. [Paras 16 and 19] [1082-f-h; 1084-c- d] Veeraswami Mudali v. P.R. Venkatachala Mudali and others AIR 1926 Madras 18; Ramchandra v. Sambashiv AIR 1928 Nagpur 313; (Kanneganti) Ramamanemma v. (Kanneganti) Basavayya AIR 1934 Madras 558, overruled. Nobin Das v. Kailash Chandra Dey (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924; Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai and Mohideen avuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1898) 21 Madras 288; Sailesh Kumar and ANOTHER v. Rama Devi AIR (1952) Patna 339; Gobind Ram Jamna Dass v. Mst. Mewa w/o Parbhati AIR (1953) Pepsu 188, approved. Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai (1898) 21 Madras 288; Mohideen Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1921) 44 Madras 937, referred to. Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition, page 617), referred to. 1.2. Section 6 of the Act provides that suit to recover possession under the said provision could be filed by the person who is dispossessed or any person claiming through him. The tenant having lost the possession though without his consent to a third party, may not be interested in recovery of possession. He may not be available. He may not like to involve himself in litigation. In such circumstances, if a landlord brings the suit to recover possession against trespasser under Section 6, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that tenant must necessarily be impleaded as party to such suit. It may be desirable that a landlord in a suit under Section 6 of the Act against a trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant, impleads the tenant, but his non-impleadment is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit. [Para 20] [1085-c-g] Case Law Reference: AIR 1926 Madras 18 overruled Para 7 (1898) 21 Madrass 288 referred to Para 7 (1921) 44 Madras 937 referred to Para 7 AIR 1928 Nagpur 313 overruled Para 8 AIR 1934 Madras 558 overruled Para 9 (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924 approved Para 11 (1898) 21 Madras 288 approved Para 12 AIR (1952) Patna 339 approved Para 13 AIR (1953) Pepsu 188 approved Para 14 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1930 of 2010. From the Judgment AND Order dated 28.3.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application No. 1235 of 2001. Amol Chitale, Abhijat P. Medh for the Appellants. Sushil Karanjka, Vishal A. Patil, K.N. Rai for the Respondent.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1930 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No. 10418 of 2008] Sadashiv Shyama Sawant [D] …. Appellants Through L.Rs., & Ors. Vs. Anita Anant Sawant ….Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA,J. Leave granted. 2. The main question for consideration in this appeal by … Continue reading
Section 4 of the Act reads as under: “4. Fixation of Fair Rent. – (1) The Controller shall on application made by the tenant or the landlord of a building and after holding such enquiry as he thinks fit, fix the fair rent for such building in accordance with the principles set out in the following sub-sections: (2) The fair rent for any residential building shall be nine per cent gross return per annum on the total cost of such building. 3) The fair rent for any non-residential building shall be twelve per cent gross return per annum on the total cost of such building. 4) The total cost referred to in sub-section (2) and sub- Section (3) shall consist of the market value of the site in which the building is constructed, the cost of construction of the building and the cost of provision of anyone or more of the amenities specified in schedule 1 as on the date of application for fixation of fair rent. Provided that while calculating the market value of the site in which the building is constructed, the Controller shall take into account only that portion of the site on which the building is constructed and of a portion upto fifty per cent, thereof of the vacant land, if any, appurtenant to such building the excess portion of the vacant land, being treated as amenity; Provided further that the cost of provision of amenities specified in Schedule 1 shall not exceed- i) in the case of any residential building, fifteen per cent; and ii) in the case of any non-residential building, twenty- five per cent, of the cost of site in which the building is constructed and the cost of construction of the building as determined under this section.” From the principles set out in sub-Sections (2) to (4) of Section 4 it is apparent that market value of the site on which the building is constructed is an important factor to be taken into consideration for fixing the fair rent of the building. 15. Reverting to the facts of this case, we find that the appellants are tenant of three premises of which the respondents are the landlords. Out of the three premises, the first premises is a non-residential building constructed on land bearing D.No.23, T.T.K. Road, Chennai relating to which fair rent has already been determined by the Rent Controller in RCOP NO. 1046 of 1994. In the said case, the Rent Controller (Small Causes Court), Chennai by judgment dated 28.6.1996 determined the market fair rent on accepting the market value of the land at Rs.25 lakhs per ground. Against the said judgment, appeals have been preferred by both the appellant-tenants and the respondent-landlords but no order of stay has been passed by the appellate authority; matter is still pending. With regard to rest two rented premises, the building are situated on the adjacent land bearing D.No. 22, TTK Road, Chennai which are the subject matter of dispute. The mere fact that the appeal filed by appellants and respondents remain pending for disposal for more than 8 years and during the pendency the respondent-landlord filed two petitions under Section 4 of the Act before the Rent Controller, cannot be made a ground to deprive the appellants-tenants of their legitimate right to rely on a market value of adjacent land (D.No. 23, TTK Road, Chennai) already determined by the Rent Controller. Even if the appeals are dismissed by the appellate authority, the market value of the adjacent land as determined will remain Rs. 25 lakhs per ground. In the cases in hand, it was not open to the appellate authority to ignore the market value of the adjacent land already determined on the ground of pendency of an appeal. The High Court failed to appreciate the aforesaid fact though it was a fit case for the High Court to interfere under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. 16. In the result, the appeals are allowed in part; the impugned judgments of the Appellate Authority dated 14.10.2006 as affirmed by the High Court, so far as it relates to “market value of the land” is concerned, are set aside; Appeals, RCOP No. 1393, 1394, 1404 and 1405 of 2004 are remitted to the appellate authority (learned VIIIth Judge, Court of ‘Small Causes Court’, Chennai) for determination of limited issue relating to the market value of the land on which the building premises is situated (D.No. 22, TTK Road, Chennai-18) taking into consideration the evidence on record including Exh.A-4, Exh.A-9 and the market value of the adjacent land as was determined by the Rent Controller in RCOP No. 1046 of 1994, etc., preferably within six months. 17. So far as the findings of the appellate authority with respect to ‘classification of building’, ‘depreciation’, ‘plinth area’, ‘construction charges’ and of basic amenities of the petition building as affirmed by the High Court are not interfered with by this Court and they are upheld. There shall be no order as to costs.
REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 5218-22 OF 2012 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.20550-20554 OF 2008) V.S. KANODIA ETC. ETC. … APPELLANTS VERSUS A.L.MUTHU (D) THR. LRS. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA,J. 1. Leave granted. These appeals have … Continue reading
The supreme court of U.K. =Mexfield Housing Co-Operative Ltd (“Mexfield”) is a fully mutual housing co-operative association, which was founded by a bank as part of a mortgage rescue scheme, ie with a view to buying mortgaged properties from individual borrowers who are in difficulty, and then letting the properties back to them. In that capacity, it acquired a number of residential properties, which it then let out to the former owner-mortgagors, who, in the normal way for tenants of a fully mutual housing co-operative, were required by its rules to be members of Mexfield.
Michaelmas Term [2011] UKSC 52 On appeal from: [2010] EWCA Civ 811 JUDGMENT Berrisford (FC) (Appellant) v Mexfield Housing Cooperative Limited (Respondent) before Lord Hope, Deputy President Lord Walker Lady Hale Lord Mance Lord Neuberger Lord Clarke Lord Dyson JUDGMENT GIVEN ON 9 November 2011 Heard on 5 and 6 October 2011Appellant Respondent Mark Wonnacott … Continue reading
T.P.Act – S.111 – Demised property belongs to Wakf – father (original tenant) died – suit filed against and suit notice issued to only one of the sons leaving other legal heirs – Maintainability of the suit on the face of non-joinder of all the legal heirs. Implied surrender of possession raised – Mere abandonment of possession does not satisfy doctrine of surrender. Whether there is need to issue quit notices separately to each of the legal heirs – On the death of original tenant, tenancy rights devolve on his heirs and all of them will be joint tenants under a single tenancy – Quit notice issued to one of them as also suit against him is good. >HELD: A tenancy can be determined in accordance with Section 111 of the Transfer of Property Act. According to clauses (f) & (g) of Sectgion 111 of T.P.Act, a lease of immovable property can be determined by express surrender or by implied surrender. Whether there has been implied surrender on the part of the other legal heirs of the deceased tenant or not is the moot question.
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE T.CH.SURYA RAO SECOND APPEAL NO.490 OF 1999 10/03/2000 S.A.Wali Quadri petitioner Sadar Anjuman-e-Islamia, Rep. By its Secretary respondent <T.P.Act – S.111 – Demised property belongs to Wakf – father (original tenant) died – suit filed against and suit notice issued to only one of the sons leaving other legal heirs – … Continue reading
Stamp Act, 1899-ss. 2(14), 33, 35, 37 and 48B-Impounding of document-In a suit photocopy of a document accepted in secondary evidence-On the ground that original was lost-Original document bearing the stamp of sufficient amount, but of improper description-Order of admission of the document in secondary evidence set aside-Order for impounding the document-Correctness of-Held : Impounding of a document can be done only when the document is an instrument within meaning of s. 2(14) i.e. original document-Photocopy of a document cannot be impounded-It also cannot be accepted as secondary evidence-Madhya Pradesh Stamp Rules, 1942-r. 19-Evidence Act, 1872-s. 63. Agreement was entered into by the parties herein. Such agreement was required to be affixed a stamp of Re. 1/- under Schedule I, Item 42 of Stamp Act, 1899. The document was affixed with a notorial stamp of Rs. 4/- instead under the statutory provision. In the suit between the parties, appellant filed an application for acceptance of the photocopy of the agreement as a secondary evidence, on the ground that original thereof was stolen. Trial Court admitted the same as secondary evidence. In a Writ Petition, against the order, High Court setting aside the order of trial court, remitted the matter to decide the question as to whether a photocopy of an improperly stamped original document could be received as secondary evidence. Trial Court ordered for impounding of the document, it being insufficiently stamped. Document was sent to the Collector of Stamps for affixing appropriate stamp duty. Challenge to this order was dismissed by trial court in Review Petition. In Writ Petition, thereagainst, High Court held that such document could not be admitted in evidence, neither could it be impounded nor accepted in secondary evidence. Hence the present appeal. The question for consideration was : Whether the Court could impound the photocopy of the instrument (document) of improper description exercising its power under the provisions of the Indian Stamp Act , 1899 ?
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4696 of 2007 PETITIONER: Hariom Agrawal RESPONDENT: Prakash Chand Malviya DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/10/2007 BENCH: B.N. AGRAWAL,P.P. NAOLEKAR & P. SATHASIVAM JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (arising out of Special Leave Petition (Civil)No.12573 of 2006) P.P. NAOLEKAR, J.: 1. Leave granted. 2. The facts necessary for deciding … Continue reading
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