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Land Acquisition: Land Acquisition Act, 1894: Section 18 (as amended and adopted in State of Karnataka)-Reference to Court-Application under S. 18(3)(b)-Limitation period-Applicability of S. 5 of the Limitation Act-Notice of award under S. 12(2) served on the claimant-Claimant filed application under S. 18(1) seeking reference within 90 days as laid down in S. 18(2)-Deputy Commissioner failed to make a reference within 90 days as laid down in S. 18(3)(a)-Claimant approached civil court under S. 18(3)(b) after 10 years-Application for condonation of delay under S. 5 of the Limitation Act also filed-Civil Judge condoned delay and directed Deputy Commissioner to make a reference-High Court refused to interfere-Correctness of-Held: On expiry of a period of three years and 90 days right of Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of claimant to move the court gets extinguished-Section 5 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked to an application under S. 18(3)(b)-High Court’s judgment set aside-Limitation Act, 1963, S. 5. The notice of award under S. 12(2) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka) was served on the respondent-claimant. The respondent filed an application under Section 18(1) of the Act (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka) within 90 days as prescribed under Section 18(2) of the Act. But the Deputy Commissioner did not make a reference within 90 days as provided under Section 18(3)(a) of the Act. The respondent approached the civil court under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act after more than 10 years after receipt of the notice of the award. The respondent also filed an application for condonation of delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963. The civil judge condoned the delay and directed the Deputy commissioner to make a reference in terms of Section 18 of the Act. In revision, the High Court refused to interfere on the ground that Section 5 of the Limitation Act had application and there was no reason to interfere with the condoning of the delay by the civil judge. Hence the appeal. The following questions arose before the Court:- (1) Whether on expiry of the period of three years and 90 days the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to move the court get extinguished? (2) Whether Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 can be invoked to an application under Section 18(3)(b) of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (as amended and adopted in the State of Karnataka)? =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. The State Legislature by an amendment brought to Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 substituted the proviso to Section 18(2) by replacing the period of six weeks by a period of 90 days and making the starting point, the date of service of notice from the Deputy Commissioner under Section 12(2) of the Act. Section 18(3) was added directing that the Deputy Commissioner should make the reference to the court within a period of 90 days from the date of receipt of the application under Section 18(1) of the Act. If he failed to do so within the period of 90 days, the party was given a right under Section 18(3)(b) of the Act to apply to the court to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference and the court was conferred the power to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within such period as may be fixed by the court. [543-d-f] 2. No time for applying to the court in terms of Section 18(3) of the Act is fixed by the statute. But since the application is to the court, though under a special enactment, Article 137, the residuary article of the Limitation Act, 1963 would be attracted and the application has to be made within three years of the application for making a reference or the expiry of 90 days after the application. [544-d-e] The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major, AIR (1994) SC 2227, Kerala State Electricity Board v. T.P. Kunhaliumma, [1976] 4 SCC 634 and Officer on Special Duty (Land Acquisition) v. Shah Manilal Chandulal, [1969] 9 SCC 414, relied on. Special Land Acquisition Officer v. G.C. Paramraj, ILR 1991(2) Karnataka 1109, approved. 3. On a plain understanding of the Scheme of Section 18 of the Act as amended in Karnataka, it is apparent that a claimant has to make an application for reference within a period of 90 days of the service of notice under Section 12(2) of the Act. The Section casts a duty on the concerned officer to make a reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference. The mere inaction on the part of the officer does not affect or straightaway extinguish the right of the claimant-applicant. The claimant is conferred the right to approach the court but he has to do so, within three years of his having made an application for reference in view of the general law of limitation. It is in this context that it has been held that the time available to a claimant for approaching the court for getting a reference made, is in all three years and 90 days from the date of the accrual of the cause of action. That accrual is when he makes an application for reference within the time prescribed by Section 18(2) of the Act. The controversy that is generated in these appeals is whether on the expiry of the said period of three years and 90 days, the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference and that of the claimant to move the court get extinguished. It is to be remembered that the claimant had made his application for reference within the 90 days prescribed by the statute. Should a construction be adopted which will lead to a position that a claimant who has done his part, loses his right on the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within 90 days of the receipt of the application for reference? That will depend on the statutory scheme. [545-g-h; 546-a-d] 4. Under the Karnataka scheme, the period for making an application for reference has been enhanced from six weeks to 90 days and the terminus a quo is the receipt of notice from the Collector under Section 12(2) of the Act. The Section proceeds further and imposes a duty on the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference to the Court within 90 days from the date of receipt of the application under Section 18( 1) of the Act. Though it may not be conclusive what one has to notice is that expression used is “shall” and not “may”. The scheme does contemplate a situation where the Deputy Commissioner, in spite of the peremptory nature of the duty cast on him, still fails to make the reference within the time stipulated by Section 18(3)(a). The claimant is, therefore, given the right to approach the Court, namely, the Court that is to deal with the claim on the reference being made, to direct the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference within a time to be fixed by the Court. This right to apply to the Court which is to deal with the reference, is not available under the Central Act. [547-d-f] 5. Extinguishment of a right can be expressly provided for or it can arise by the implication from the statute. Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka sets out a scheme. Having made an application for reference within time before the Deputy Commissioner, the claimant may lose his right by not enforcing the right available to him within the time prescribed by law. Section 18(3)(a) and Section 18(3)(b) read in harmony, casts an obligation on the claimant to enforce his claim within the period available for it. The scheme brings about a repose. It is based on a public policy that a right should not be allowed to remain a right indefinitely to be used against another at the will and pleasure of the holder of the right by approaching the court whenever he chooses to do so. When the right of the Deputy Commissioner to make the reference on the application of the claimant under Section 18( 1) of the Act stands extinguished on the expiry of 3 years and 90 days from the date of application for reference, and the right of the claimant to move the Court for compelling a reference also stands extinguished, the right itself loses its enforceability and thus comes to an end as a result. This is the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as adopted in the State of Karnataka. The High Court is, therefore, not correct in searching for a specific provision bringing about an extinguishment of the right to have a reference and on not finding it, postulating that the right would survive for ever. [551-e-h; 552-a-b] State of M.P. v. Bhai Lal AIR (1964) SC 1006, referred to. 6. Under the scheme .of Section 18 of the Act as in Karnataka the claimant loses his right to move the Court for reference on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of his making an application to the Deputy Commissioner under Section 18 (1) of the Act within the period fixed by Section 18(2) of the Act. This loss of right to move the court precludes him from seeking a remedy from the court in terms of Section 18 of the Act. This loss of right in the claimant puts an end to the right of the claimant to seek an enhancement of compensation. To say that the Deputy Commissioner can make a reference even after the right in that behalf is lost to the claimant would be incongruous. Once the right of the claimant to enforce his claim itself is lost on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act, there is no question of the Deputy Commissioner who had violated the mandate of Section 18(3)(a) of the Act, reviving the right of the claimant by making a reference at his sweet will and pleasure, whatever be the inducement or occasion for doing so. On a harmonious understanding of the scheme of the Act in the light of the general principle that even though a right may not be extinguished, the remedy may become barred, it would be appropriate to hold that on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of application for reference made within time under Section 18(1) of the Act the remedy of the claimant to have a reference gets extinguished and the right to have an enhancement becomes unenforceable. The Deputy Commissioner would not be entitled to revive a claim which has thus become unenforceable due to lapse of time or non-diligence on the part of the claimant. [552-b-f] The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994) SC 2227, relied on. Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi Bai ILR 1987 Karnataka 2132, approved. Hanamappa v. The Special Land Acquisition Officer ILR (1998) Karnataka 4071 (FB), overruled. 7. On the failure of the Deputy Commissioner to make a reference within 90 days from the date of an application under Section 18(1) of the Act, the claimant is given the right to approach the Land Acquisition Court seeking the compelling of a reference by the Deputy Commissioner. Once the right to move for a compelled reference is lost to the claimant on the scheme of Section 18, the very right to have a claim for enhancement, would come to an end in view of the fact that the remedy in that behalf becomes barred. Thereafter, the Deputy Commissioner cannot revive that right to a reference. [553-f-g] 8. The right to have a reference enforced through Court or through the Deputy Commissioner becomes extinguished on the expiry of three years and 90 days from the date of the application for reference made in time. Consistent with this position it has necessarily to be held that Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 would not be available since the consequence of not enforcing the right to have a reference made on the scheme of Section 18 of the Act as obtaining in Karnataka, is to put an end to the right to have a reference at all. Since in that sense it is an extinguishment of the right, the right cannot be revived by resorting to Section 5 of the Limitation Act. [554-g-h; 555-a] The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994) SC 2227, relied on. The Addl. Spl. Land Acquisition Officer v. Thakoredas, Major AIR (1994) SC 2227 and Assistant Commissioner v. Laxmi Bai, ILR (1987) Karnataka 2132, approved. Sanjay R. Hegde, Anil K. Mishra, A. Rohen Singh and N. Ganpathy, (NP) for the Appellant. K. Radhakrishnan and Mrs. K. Sarada Devi for the Respondent No. 1566/2001.=2006 AIR 24 , 2005(4 )Suppl.SCR535 , 2005(8 )SCC709 , 2005(8 )SCALE768 , 2005(9 )JT89
CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 2024 of 1999 PETITIONER:STATE OF KARNATAKA RESPONDENT:LAXUMAN DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/10/2005 BENCH:CJI R.C. LAHOTI,G.P. MATHUR & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN JUDGMENT:J U D G M E N T WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 4459/1999, 607-609/2000, 5547/2000, 1566/2000 and 1567/2001 P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN, J. All these appeals involve questions connected with the scope and effect … Continue reading
Indian Copyright Act, 1957; Ss.2 (k), 13, 17 and 52: Copyright in Law Report – Publishing of copy edited version of judgments, order and proceedings of Supreme Court by appellant – Copying by respondents – Claim of copyright in the publication/published work – Held: Originality in work is a requirement of copyright – It is a right to stop others from exploiting the work of owner without his consent – There is no copyright in the facts per se – All literary works have to be original/primary work for claiming such protection – However, derivative/secondary work would qualify for claiming such protection provided skill, labour and capital involved in its creation and creativity in the end product is such as to create a new work so as to make the creator of derivative work author of it – The Courts have only to evaluate as to whether the derivative work involved substantial amount of skill labour and capital and need not to evaluate the creative aspect of the same – Law Report of Supreme Court Judgments is derivative work – Reproduction of judgments in public domain do not infringe the copyright – Innovative thoughts are necessary to establish copyright in the judgments – Copy-edited judgments would not satisfy the claim of copyright merely by establishing the amount of skill, labour and capital put in the inputs of the copy edited judgments excluding innovative thoughts for creativity – But it should be such and sufficient to import to the judgments printed, some quality which original judgment does not possess and which differentiate the original judgment from the one printed in the Report – Though appellants improved the readability of judgment of the copy-edited judgment by doing considerable labour etc. but that does not meet the minimum requirement of creativity required for claiming copyright in it – However, creation of paragraph and classification of opinion of judges would require extensive reading and careful study of the subject – It also requires considerable knowledge, sound judgment and legal skill – Hence, appellants have copyright in it – Respondents are directed not to use the paragraphs and classification of Judges’ opinion as in the Report. Copyright Act – Object and scope of – Discussed. Principles: Principle of copyright – Applicability of. Supreme Court Judgments – Owner of for the purpose of copyright – Held: Government is the first owner of the copyright in the judgment. Words and Phrases: `Copyright Protection’ – Meaning of in the context of Copyright Protection Act, 1957. Literary works – Classification of. `Original work’ and `derivative work’ – Meaning of. Appellant is the publisher of a law report publishing therein orders, practice directions, record of proceedings, short judgments and Judgments of the Supreme Court of India. After the initial procurement of the judgments, orders and proceedings for publication from the Registrar, Supreme Court of India, the appellants make copy-editing of the judgments, orders and record of proceedings procured and various inputs are put in the judgments and orders by making an addition of cross-references, formatting of the text, paragraph numbering, verification etc. to make them user friendly. The appellants also prepare the headnotes, which require considerable amount of skill, labour and expertise. And for the said work a substantial amount of capital expenditure on infrastructure, such as office equipments, computers and for maintaining extensive library, besides recurring expenditure on both the management of human resources and infrastructural maintenance has been made by the appellants. Appellants alleged that the Law Report, so prepared, constitutes an `original literary work’ in which copyright subsists in terms of Section 13 of the Copyright Act, 1957 and thus the appellants alone have the exclusive right to make printed as well as electronic copies of the same under Section 14 of the Act. Any scanning or copying or reproduction done of or from the Reports or pages or paragraphs or portions of any volume of the Report by any other person, is an infringement of the copyright in the Report within the meaning of Section 51 of the Act. Appellants further alleged that respondent No. 2, another publisher, has brought out a software called “Grand Jurix” published on CD-ROMs and the other respondent, also a publisher, has brought out software package called “The Laws” published on CD-ROMs; and that all the modules in the respondents’ software packages have already been lifted verbatim from their work; copied the sequencing, selection and arrangement of the cases coupled with the entire text of copy-edited judgments as published in the Law Report, along with and including the style and formatting, the copy-editing paragraph numbers, footnote numbers, cross-references, etc.; and such acts of the defendant-respondents constitute infringement of the appellants’ exclusive right to the same. The appellants moved the High Court for issuance of temporary injunction by filing applications in the Suit against the respondents. Single Judge of the High Court dismissed the applications for interim injunction. However, before the Single Judge, the respondents conceded that the appellants have copyright in the headnotes and as such they undertook not to copy these headnotes in their CD-ROMs. Aggrieved by the order of the Single Judge of the High Court refusing to grant interim injunction, the appellants preferred appeals before a Division Bench of the Delhi High Court and the applications praying for interim relief were also filed in both the appeals. The applications praying for the interim relief were disposed of by the Division Bench of the High Court directing that during pendency of the appeals the respondents would be entitled to sell their CD-ROMs with the text of the judgment of the Supreme Court along with their own headnotes which should not in any way be a copy of the headnotes and the text of the plaintiff-appellants. Disposing of the matter, the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court held that the appellants were not the author of the Supreme Court judgments and by merely making certain corrections therein or giving paragraph numbers, the character of a judgment does not change and it does not become materially different from the original judgment; that once a person has a right to obtain certified copy of the judgment from the Registry of the Court and to publish it, it cannot be said that others have no right to take text of the judgment from the journal where it is already reported; that the act of reproduction of any judgment or order of the Court, Tribunal or any other judicial authority under Section 52(1)(q) of the Copy Right Act, is not an infringement of the copyright. Any person can, therefore, publish judgments of the Courts, however, there would be copyright in the headnotes to the judgments prepared by the appellants. So far as footnotes and editorial notes are concerned, it cannot be denied that these are the publisher’s own creations and based on publisher’s own research and, thus, will have a copyright of the appellants. Hence, the Division Bench modified the judgment of the Single Judge by allowing the respondents to sell their CD-ROMs with the text of the judgments of the Supreme Court along with their own headnotes, editorial notes, if any, which should not in any way be copy of the headnotes of the appellants. Thus, the High Court has not accepted the case of the appellants that they have a copyright in the copy-edited judgments of the Supreme Court. Hence the present appeals and the Contempt Petition. In the present case, the questions which require determination by the Court were as to what shall be the standard of originality in the copy-edited judgments of the Supreme Court which is a derivative work and what would be required in a derivative work to treat it the original work of an author and thereby giving a protected right under the Copyright Act, 1957 to the author of the derivative work and as to whether the appellants would be entitled for a copyright as an original literary work in the entire version of the copy-edited text of the judgments published in the appellants’ law report or as to whether the appellants would be entitled to the copyright in some of the inputs which have been put in the raw text. Appellants contended that the copyright subsists as a law report in their publication `SCC’ as a whole based cumulatively and compendiously on all the substantial contributions of skill, labour and capital in the creation of various parts of the Report; that the copyright subsists in the copy-edited version; that they do not claim copyright in the raw text of the judgments, certified copies of which are being obtained from the Registry; that they do not claim a monopoly in publishing judgments of the Supreme Court as they are being published by other publishers also without copying from each other publication; that their copyright is in the copy-edited version of the text of judgments as published in SCC which is a creation of their skill, labour and capital and there are contributions/inputs/ additions in creating the version of the text of judgments as published in the report; that Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Act does not bar the recognization of copyright in the copy-edited version of the text of judgments of the courts as published in law reports; that the Government is the first owner of copyright in the judgments of the courts as per Section 2(k) read with Section 17 and Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Act provides that any person wanting to reproduce or publish judgments would not infringe the copyright of the Government, but Section 52(1)(q)(iv) does not imply that in case a person has expended independent skill, labour and capital on the judgments of the courts to create and publish his version of the judgments, any other person is free to copy that person’s version of the judgments, substantially or in its entirely; that Copyright subsists in the copy-edited version of the text of judgments of the courts as published in law reports, which have been created by the application of skill, labour and capital which is not trivial or negligible; that the inputs put in the copy-edited judgments in SCC, is a derivative literary work created from pre-existing material of the judgments of the court which is in public domain; that the exercise of independent skill, labour and capital in its creation by the author of such work, and the derivative literary work so created is by their independent skill, labour and capital, which gives them copyright in such creations; that it is not necessary that work created should have a literary merit; that the courts can only evaluate whether the skill, labour and capital actually employed, required in creating the work, is not trivial or negligible; that in deciding whether a derivative work qualifies for copyright protection, it must be considered as a whole, and it is not correct to dissect the work into fragments and consider the copyrightability of each such fragment piecemeal and individually apart from the whole; and that the respondents if wish to reproduce or publish a work already in public domain was obliged to go to the public domain/common source of such work rather than misappropriating the effort and investment of the appellants by copying the version of such work which was created by them by their independent expenditure of skill, labour and capital. Respondent submitted that the judgment of the court is a Government work as defined under Section 2(k)(iii) of the Act; that on account of Section 17 (d) of the Act, the Government in the absence of any agreement to the contrary be the first owner of the copyright therein; that in terms of Section 52(1)(q)(iv) of the Act, publication of the judgments of the apex court by the respondents would not tantamount to infringement of the copyright of the appellants; that the judgments published in the Supreme Court Cases is nothing but merely a derivative work based upon the judgments of the court, which lacks originality as it does not depict independent creation even a modicum of creativity; that the inputs put by the appellants is nothing but expressing an idea which can be expressed in a limited way and as such there cannot be a copyright in it; that filling the blanks or gaps by providing names of the parties or citations of the judgments, both of which are well known and unchangeable parts of that idea, are not original work to warrant copyright protection, either singly or in combination; and that the additions made in the reported judgment by the editors of the Report are only the well known extensions of the reported decision. These extensions lack even the minimal degree of author’s creativity or originality or intellectual labour nor does it create additional knowledge, the protection of which is the very basis of the copyright protection. Respondents in the connected Civil Appeal submitted that there is a distinction between a `law report’ as understood in England and a `law journal’ as printed in India; that the appellants’ journal `SCC’ is not a law report in the strict sense, inasmuch as it reproduces the judgments of the court verbatim along with inputs. However, a law report known in the traditional English sense is when a law reporter present in the court would record in his own words and language the arguments of the counsel on both sides, give a summary of the facts and incorporate into the said report his transcript of the speech of the Judge. Thus, the appellants’ work could only be a law journal and not a law report; that the judgments were specifically made a part of the exception to copyright infringement and thus find place in Section 52(1)(q) of the Act; that for claiming protection of copyright in a derivative work, under the Indian law originality is a pre-condition and originality means only that the work was independently created by the author as opposed to copied from other works, and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity; that reporting of the judgments of the Supreme Court with certain inputs could only be said to be a discovery of facts already in existence; that to create a copyright by alterations of the text, these must be extensive and substantial practically making a new version; that the copy-editing inputs of the appellants are only discoveries/facts and there are limited ways/unique of expressing the various copy- editing inputs and thus no copyright can subsist in such limited/unique expressions; that the facts which are discovered could be expressed in limited ways and as such ways adopted cannot give copyright protection to the inputs or the judgments as a whole; that recognizing the copyright in the copy-edited version of the law reports would amount to giving the appellants a monopoly in the judgments of the courts which is against the intendment of Section 52(1)(q)(iv) and would defeat the purpose of putting judgments in the public domain; that for a derivative work, the originality test as applied in United States Supreme Court should be made applicable whereby the author of a derivative work would satisfy that the work has been produced from his exercise of skill and judgment; and that the exercise of skill and judgment required to produce the work must not be so trivial that it could be characterized a purely mechanical exercise. The work should be independently created by the author as opposed to copied from the other works and that it possesses at least some minimal degree of creativity. =Partly allowing the appeals, and disposing of the Contempt Petition, the Court HELD: 1.1. The copyright protection finds its justification in fair play. When a person produces something with his skill and labour, it normally belongs to him and the other person would not be permitted to make a profit out of the skill and labour of the original author and it is for this reason the Copyright Act gives to the authors certain exclusive rights in relation to the certain work referred in the Act. The object of the Act is to protect the author of the copyright work from an unlawful reproduction or exploitation of his work by others. (Para – 8) [229-D-E-F] 1.2. Copyright is a right to stop others from exploiting the work without the consent or assent of the owner of the copyright. A copyright law presents a balance between the interests and rights of the author and that of the public in protecting the public domain, or to claim the copyright and protect it under the copyright statute. One of the key requirements is that of originality which contributes, and has a direct nexus, in maintaining the interests of the author as well as that of public in protecting the matters in public domain. It is a well-accepted principle of copyright law that there is no copyright in the facts per se, as the facts are not created nor have they originated with the author of any work which embodies these facts. (Para – 8) [229-F-G-H; 230-A] 1.3. For copyright protection, all literary works have to be original as per Section 13 of the Act. Broadly speaking, there would be two classes of literary works : (a) primary or prior works: These are the literary works not based on existing subject-matter and, therefore, would be called primary or prior works; and (b) secondary or derivative works: These are literary works based on existing subject-matter. Since such works are based on existing subject-matter, they are called derivative work or secondary work. (Para -13) [234-F-G] 2. In many cases, a work is derived from an existing work. Whether in such a derivative work, a new copyright work is created, will depend on various factors, and would one of them be only skill, capital and labour expended upon it to qualify for copyright protection in a derivative literary work created from the pre-existing material in the public domain, and the required exercise of independent skill, labour and capital in its creation by the author would qualify him for the copyright protection in the derivative work. Or would it be the creativity in a derivative work in which the final position will depend upon the amount and value of the corrections and improvements, the independent skill and labour, and the creativity in the end-product is such as to create a new copyright work to make the creator of the derivative work the author of it; and if not, there will be no new copyright work and then the original author will remain the author of the original work and the creator of the derivative work will have been the author of the alterations or the inputs put therein, for their nature will not have been such as to attract the protection under the law of copyright. (Para – 14) [235-G-H; 236-A-B-C] 3.1. In the absence of any agreement to the contrary, the Government shall be the first owner of the copyright in the judgments of the Supreme Court, the same being a Government work in terms of Section 2(k) of the Act. (Para – 13) [235-C-D] 3.2. The judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court would be in the public domain and its reproduction or publication would not infringe the copyright. The reproduction or publication of the judgments delivered by the Supreme Court by any number of persons would not be infringement of a copyright of the first owner thereof, namely, the Government, unless it is prohibited. (Para – 13) [235-E-F] 4.1. The reports in the Supreme Court Cases (SCC) of the judgments of the Supreme Court is a derivative work in public domain. (Para – 38) [257-H; 258-A] 4.2. The judicial pronouncements of the Apex Court would be in the public domain and its reproduction or publication would not infringe the copyright. That being the position, the copy-edited judgments would not satisfy the copyright merely by establishing amount of skill, labour and capital put in the inputs of the copy-edited judgments and the original or innovative thoughts for the creativity are completely excluded. Accordingly, original or innovative thoughts are necessary to establish copyright in the author’s work. The principle where there is common source the person relying on it must prove that he actually went to the common source from where he borrowed the material, employing his own skill, labour and brain and he did not copy, would not apply to the judgments of the courts because there is no copyright in the judgments of the court, unless so made by the court itself. (Para – 38) [258-B-C-D-E] 4.3. To secure a copyright for the judgments delivered by the court, it is necessary that the labour, skill and capital invested should be sufficient to communicate or impart to the judgment printed in the Report, SCC, some quality or character which the original judgment does not possess and which differentiates the original judgment from the printed one. The Copyright Act is not concerned with the original idea but with the expression of thought. Copyright has nothing to do with originality or literary merit. Copyrighted material is that what is created by the author by his own skill, labour and investment of capital, maybe it is a derivative work which gives a flavour of creativity. The copyright work which comes into being should be original in the sense that by virtue of selection, co-ordination or arrangement of pre-existing data contained in the work, a work somewhat different in character is produced by the author. On the face of the provisions of the 1957 Act, the principle laid down by the Canadian Court would be applicable in copyright of the judgments of the Apex Court. It is clarified that the decision of this Court would be confined to the judgments of the courts which are in the public domain as by virtue of Section 52 of the Act there is no copyright in the original text of the judgments. (Para – 38) [258-E-F-G-H; 259-A] Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co. Inc., 18 USPQ 2d. 1275; Key Publications, Inc. v. Chinatown Today Publishing Enterprises, Inc., 945 F.2d.509; Macmillan and Company v. K. and J. Cooper, 1924 Privy Council 75; CCH Canadian Ltd. v. Law Society of Upper Canada, 2004 (1) SCR 339 (Canada) – referred to. 5.1. No doubt the appellants have collected the material and improved the readability of the judgment by putting inputs in the original text of the judgment by considerable labour and arranged it in their own style, but that does not give the flavour of minimum requirement of creativity. The exercise of the skill and judgment required to produce the work is trivial and is on account of the labour and the capital invested and could be characterized as purely a work which has been brought about by putting some amount of labour by the appellants. Although for establishing a copyright, the creativity standard applies is not that something must be novel or non-obvious, but some amount of creativity in the work to claim a copyright is required. It does require a minimal degree of creativity. Arrangement of the facts or data or the case law is already included in the judgment of the court. Therefore, creativity of the Report, SCC, would only be addition of certain facts or material already published, case law published in another law report and its own arrangement and presentation of the judgment of the court in its own style to make it more user- friendly. The selection and arrangement can be viewed as typical and at best result of the labour, skill and investment of capital lacking even minimal creativity. It does not as a whole display sufficient originality so as to amount to an original work of the author. (Para – 40) [260-E-F-G-H; 261-A-B] 5.2. Novelty or invention or innovative idea is not the requirement for protection of copyright but it does require minimal degree of creativity. The inputs put by the appellants in the copy-edited judgments do not touch the standard of creativity required for the copyright. (Para – 40) [261-C-D] 5.3. The task of paragraph numbering and internal referencing requires skill and judgment in great measure. The editor who inserts para numbering must know how legal argumentation and legal discourse is conducted and how a judgment of a court of law must read. Often legal arguments or conclusions are either clubbed into one paragraph in the original judgment or parts of the same argument are given in separate paragraphs. It requires judgment and the capacity for discernment for determining whether to carve out a separate paragraph from an existing paragraph in the original judgment or to club together separate paragraphs in the original judgment of the court. Setting of paragraphs by the appellants of their own in the judgment entailed the exercise of the brain work, reading and understanding of subject of disputes, different issues involved, statutory provisions applicable and interpretation of the same and then dividing them in different paragraphs so that chain of thoughts and process of statement of facts and the application of law relevant to the topic discussed is not disturbed, would require full understanding of the entire subject of the judgment. Making paragraphs in a judgment could not be called a mechanical process. It requires careful consideration, discernment and choice and thus it can be called as a work of an author. (Para – 41) [261-F-G-H; 262-A-B] 5.4. Creation of paragraphs would obviously require extensive reading, careful study of subject and the exercise of judgment to make paragraph which has dealt with particular aspect of the case, and separating intermixing of a different subject. Creation of paragraphs by separating them from the passage would require knowledge, sound judgment and legal skill. This exercise and creation thereof has a flavour of minimum amount of creativity. The said principle would also apply when the editor has put an input whereby different Judges’ opinion has been shown to have been dissenting or partly dissenting or concurring, etc. It also requires reading of the whole judgment and understanding the questions involved and thereafter finding out whether the Judges have disagreed or have the dissenting opinion or they are partially disagreeing and partially agreeing to the view on a particular law point or even on facts. In these inputs put in by the appellants in the judgments reported in the Report, the appellants have a copyright and nobody is permitted to utilize the same. (Para – 41) [262-B-C-D-E] 6. The High Court has already granted interim relief to the plaintiff-appellants. It is further directed that the defendant-respondents shall not use the paragraphs made by the appellants in their copy-edited version for internal references and their editor’s judgment regarding the opinions expressed by the Judges by using phrases like `concurring’, `partly dissenting’, etc. on the basis of reported judgments in SCC. The judgment of the High Court is modified to the extent that in addition to the interim relief already granted by the High Court. (Para – 42) [262-F; G-H; 263-A] 7. In view of the decision so rendered, it is not necessary to pass any order on the contempt petition. The contempt petition stands disposed of accordingly. (Para – 43) [263-B] Raju Ramachandran, Sudeep Mallik, Anitha Shenoy, Saurab Sinha, Rishad Ahmad Chowdhury, Raj Shekhar Rao, M.R. Vij, Nitin Ramesh, Samar Bansal, S.K. Mohanty, Lokesh Kumar, M.K. Garg, Pratibha M. Singh, Gaurav Sharma, Bishwajit Dubey, Shruti Kakker, Sumeet Bhatia and Maninder Singh for the Appearing parties. =2008 AIR 809 , 2007(=13 )SCR182 , 2008(1 )SCC1 , 2007(14 )SCALE191 ,
THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE P.S.NARAYANA C.R.P. NO.2801 OF 2006 11-06-2007 Kesari Goutham Reddy Velpula John Victor Macaulay Respondent/Appellant. 2.Yellampalli Sobhadevi Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri Prabhakar Peri Counsel for the Respondent : Sri S.Srinivas Reddy :ORDER: Heard Sri Prabhakar Peri, the learned counsel representing the revision petitioner-proposed party and Sri S.Srinivas Reddy, the learned … Continue reading
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