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An important question of criminal jurisprudence as to in a case of multiple variable dying declarations, which of the dying declaration would be taken into consideration by the Court, what principles shall guide the judicial discretion of the Court or whether such contradictory dying declarations would unexceptionally result in prejudice to the case of the prosecution, arises in the present case.- when death was staring her in the eyes that she was burnt by her husband by pouring kerosene oil on her. Both these witnesses successfully stood the subtle cross-examination conducted by the counsel appearing for the accused. We see no reason to disbelieve these witnesses who were well known to both, the deceased as well as the accused.The recoveries from the place of occurrence clearly show a struggle or fight between the deceased and the accused before she suffered the burn injuries. the second and third dying declarations are authentic, voluntary and duly corroborated by other prosecution witnesses including the medical evidence. These dying declarations, read in conjunction with the statement of the prosecution witnesses, can safely be made the basis for conviction of the accused.It is a settled principle of law of evidence that the question of presumption in terms of Section 114 of the Evidence Act only arises when an evidence is withheld from the Court and is not produced by any of the parties to the lis. 26. As a result of the above discussion, we find no infirmity in the appreciation of evidence and law in the concurrent judgments of the courts. Hence, we dismiss this appeal.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.2472 OF 2009 Shudhakar … Appellant Versus State of M.P. … Respondent J U D G M E N T Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. An important question of criminal jurisprudence as to in a case of multiple variable dying declarations, which of the … Continue reading

offence punishable under Section 302, Indian Penal Code (for short ‘IPC’) imposing the sentence of imprisonment for life and a fine of Rs. 1,000/- with default sentence of simple imprisonment for a period of three months.- Having considered the above factors, we find that every circumstance noted by the trial Court goes to show that it was the appellant who got enraged by the conduct of the deceased in his attempt t liking, inasmuch as he was not in good terms with PW-3, the mother of tho develop close relationship with his daughter PW-2 which was not to hise deceased. The appellant was stated to have been aggrieved by the non- cooperation of PW-3 in his attempt to dissolve the marriage with his wife who is the daughter of the elder sister of the appellant as well as PW-3. Merely because PWs-3,4,6 and 7 are related to the deceased, there is no reason why they should implicate the appellant who is also closely related to them. If according to the appellant, he was not present when the murder of the deceased took place in his residence, as rightly pointed out by the trial Court, then it was for him to explain as to how the dead body was found in his house. Admitting the presence of the dead body of the deceased in the courtyard of the appellant’s house, no step was taken by the appellant to explain the situation of the presence of the dead body in his house. The theory of the hostile witnesses PWs-1 and 2 that they went for shopping along with the appellant was rightly rejected by the trial Court in the absence of any other supporting material both oral as well as documentary. The evidence of the doctor (PW-13) and Exhibit P-8 disclose that the deceased was mercilessly wounded with the knife (M.O.-10) which resulted in his instantaneous death due to shock and hemorrhage. The overall consideration of the evidence available on record only substantiate the guilt of the accused-appellant in the killing of the deceased and consequently the conclusion reached by the trial Court and upheld by the High Court does not call for any interference. The appeal, therefore, fails and the same is dismissed.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2168 OF 2009 Polamuri Chandra Sekhararao @ Chinna@ Babji ….Appellant VERSUS State of A.P. .…Respondent J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the conviction and sentence imposed upon the appellant … Continue reading

Today the original applicant is not available and his wife is pursuing this litigation. By a Government Resolution dated 04.07.1995, after making references to various other earlier resolutions of the Government of Maharashtra relating to grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension, the criteria for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension was specified under two different categories, namely, one under “Prisoners Freedom Fighter” and the other under the category of “Underground Freedom Fighter”. A perusal of the documents enclosed by the appellant’s husband along with his application disclose that the appellant’s husband made out a case for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension under the category “Underground Freedom Fighter”. Applying the broad principles laid down in the decision of this Court in Gurdial Singh (supra), it will have to be held that there was nothing more for the State to examine to honour the claim of the appellant’s husband for grant of Freedom Fighters’ Pension. The claim of the appellant’s husband cannot be held to be a fraudulent one or without any supporting material.-The respondent State is directed to grant Freedom Fighters’ Pension in favour of the appellant’s husband and since he is no more, grant the same with all arrears to the appellant by passing appropriate orders expeditiously preferably within four weeks from the date of communication of copy of this order. We hope and trust that the State Government will not indulge in any further delay in the matter of grant of pension so as to enable the appellant to avail the benefits at least during her life time. The appeal stands allowed with the above directions to the respondent State. No costs.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5344 OF 2012 (@ SLP (C) NO. 8899 OF 2010)   Kamalbai Sinkar ….Appellant VERSUS State of Maharashtra & Ors. .…Respondents J U D G M E N T   Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal arises … Continue reading

But, because of lodging of FIR, Ext D2, and his statement under Section 313 of the Cr.P.C., one fact that completely stands established and is undisputable is that the appellant was present at the place of occurrence and also that he had a fight with the deceased. Once these two circumstances are admitted, they fully provide corroboration to the dying declaration, the statements of PW11 and PW14 as also the other material evidence led by the prosecution. If the appellant was carrying a sword and others were carrying lathis, it is not understable as to how could the deceased suffer as many as 15 injuries including the incised wound, abrasions, amputation of middle finger from terminal phalages and other serious injuries and the appellant merely suffered six simple injuries. This itself belies the stand taken by the appellant.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.106 OF 2010 Bable @ Gurdeep Singh … Appellant Versus State of Chattisgarh Tr.P.S.O.P. Kursipur … Respondent J U D G M E N T Swatanter Kumar, J. 1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment of the High Court of Judicature … Continue reading

First, as rightly pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner the order dated 20.10.2010 of the District Forum dismissing the interim application for bringing the legal representatives of Chandrappa on record and holding that after the death of Chandrappa the cause of action had been extinguished was not challenged by the respondent (legal representative) and hence attained finality qua the legal representative. Secondly, the complaint itself having abated with the cause of action with the complainant having died during the pendency of the complaint proceedings, the right to sue the petitioners for “personal injury” allegedly suffered by the complainant also did not survive. This is abundantly clear from the detailed discussion in the order of the Supreme Court in the aforesaid case (particularly, paragraph 9). 8. The view taken by the Apex Court in the case of Mukesh Kumari (Minior and Dead) by LRs v M. Lal Oswal Cancer Treatment and Research Foundation and Another was, in our respectful opinion, applicable to the specific facts and circumstances of that case and the observation, “Even otherwise the complaint was for compensation for medical negligence. In such a complaint the right to sue would survive in the legal heirs who would then be entitled to compensation” would not, therefore, have general applicability as sought to be claimed by the learned counsel for the respondent. 9. In view of the foregoing discussion, we allow the revision petition and set aside the orders of the State Commission and the District Forum. Needless to add, both the complaints are also dismissed as not being maintainable after the death of the patient H.B. Chandrappa. The parties shall bear their own costs.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION No. 2702 of 2011 (From the order dated 04.07.2011 of the Karnataka State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission, Bangalore in RP no. 12 of 2011) 1. Malnad Hospital and Institute of Oncology Super Specialty Surgical Centre, 9th Mile Bus Stop, B. H. Road P.O. Nidige, Shimoga – 577 … Continue reading

Hiba -Amongst the Ismaili school of the Shia sect a gift made during death-bed illness by a person is not valid to any extent, when it is made to one of more of several heirs to the exclusion of other legal heirs. On this point, the Shia school of law lays down, the same rule as that of the Hanafi law. 29. In the decision Saira bai w/oAsgar Hussain vs. S.S.Joshi and another reported in AIR 1960 Madhya Pradesh 260 it has been held that under Mohammedan Law, merely because a gift deed has been registered, the same cannot dispense with delivery of possession, which is one of the essential requirements of a valid gift under Mohammedan Law. 30. It is not in dispute that under Mohammedan Law, a gift made during death-bed illness (Marzur muth) is not valid, when it is made to one of several heirs to the exclusion of other heirs. Even in AIR 1936 Mds. 432 (cited supra), the same has been made clear. Even if the gift is given, by way of a registered document, under Mohammedan Law, for a valid gift, delivery of possession is mandatory, which cannot be dispensed with. 31. Therefore, in the light of the decisions referred above, I am of the view that Ex.B2, Settlement Deed had been executed while Abdul Raheem was in his death-bed, counting his days. There is no implied or expressed acceptance of Ex.B2 by the first respondent and the extend of possession and enjoyment of the first item of property by the appellant and the first respondent, would also show that the settlement deed, Ex.B2, has not been acted upon, prior to the death of late Abdul Raheem or subsequently

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED : 05.03.2008 CORAM : THE HONBLE MR. JUSTICE S.TAMILVANAN A.S.No.618 of 1996 A.R. Abdul Latheef … Appellant/Plaintiff vs. 1.A.R.Mohammed Iliyas 2.Fathima Bibi 3.Mumtaz Begum 4.Karur Vysya Bank, rep. by its Manager, Peria Kadai Street, Anamalai, Pollachi Taluk. … Respondents/D-1 to 4 Appeal is filed against the … Continue reading

FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ─ Contributions ─ Where the husband challenged the trial Judge’s conclusion with respect to the post-separation contributions of the parties ─ Where none of the findings of fact made by the trial Judge were shown to have been other than reasonably open to his Honour ─ Not established that it was not reasonably open to the trial Judge to conclude as he did with respect to the post-separation period ─ Where the Court found no error of principle with the trial Judge’s evaluation of the post-separation period ─ Where the fact that the parties are no longer cohabiting did not mean that the impacts of the wife’s substantial and equal contributions over the course of the parties’ cohabitation could not carry forward in the way in which the trial Judge accepted that they had ─ Challenge unsuccessful. FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ─ Discretion ─ Where the husband challenged the substantial s 75(2) adjustment determined by the trial Judge in the wife’s favour ─ Not demonstrated that his Honour’s conclusion with regard to s 75(2) was “plainly wrong” or that his Honour’s determination of that issue exceeded “the generous ambit within which reasonable disagreement is possible” ─ Challenge unsuccessful. FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ─ Add-backs ─ Whether the trial Judge erred in law in adding back the legal costs paid by the husband in such circumstances where those costs were asserted to have been paid from income earned after separation ─ Where the husband’s assertion that the legal fees were paid from his income had not been challenged at trial ─ Where although the trial Judge could have added back the husband’s paid legal fees, notwithstanding that they were paid out of income, having not done so on that basis, the challenge of the husband with respect to the add-back of the paid legal fees succeeds ─ The Court re-exercised the trial Judge’s discretion in relation to this topic. FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ COSTS ─ Where the appeal was allowed in part ─ Where it was submitted on behalf of the husband that, if the appeal were allowed, the wife should pay the husband’s costs ─ Where the Court did not agree that the trial Judge’s error, to which the wife had not been shown to have caused or contributed to, should be visited upon the wife ─ Where the Court considered it to be appropriate to order that each party receive costs certificates with respect to the appeal to this Court.

Kasiopoulos & Garapiperis [2012] FamCAFC 85 (21 June 2012) Last Updated: 22 June 2012 FAMILY COURT OF AUSTRALIA   KASIOPOULOS & GARAPIPERIS [2012] FamCAFC 85   FAMILY LAW ─ APPEAL ─ PROPERTY SETTLEMENT ─ Contributions ─ Where the husband challenged the trial Judge’s conclusion with respect to the post-separation contributions of the parties ─ Where … Continue reading

Indian Limitation Act, 1963: Adverse possession–Claim of Among co-heirs there must be evidence of an essertion of hostile title coupled with possession and enjoyment Mohd. Zainulabdeen and Yasin By filed a suit for decla- ration that they were entitled to be in enjoyment and pos- session of Saint Syeed Moosa Shah Khadiri Dargah in Madras for 27 days and to restrain the defendants from interfering with tile plaintiffs’ aforesaid right and management in the Dargah. In reply the defendant No. 1 alleged that in the manage- ment of the Dargah, female members had no right nor could they claim the right of Mujawar. It was also alleged that Fathima Bee through whom the Plaintiffs were claiming never enjoyed the right to Hundial collection of the Dargah and share in the Mujawarship and even if she had any right the same was lost as she did not claim any right till her death and therefore the Plaintiffs were also not entitled to any relief. Defendants 7, 8 and 10 however in their written statements admitted family members to be sharer in the income and management of the Dargah and they also admitted that they were paying such share to their sister Ahamadun- nissa (10th defendant) in the Hundial collections and that the City Civil Court in suit No. 7518 of 1971 had also recognised the right of 7th defendant Anser Bi to management of the Dargah for 9 days in a year. Thus it was false to contend that the females were not entitled to claim manage- ment. The trial court decreed the suit of the Plaintiffs and held that they were entitled to manage the Dargah 1or 27 days in a year. Defendants 3 to 6 and 12 to 19 filed appeals against the judgment of the trial court.The City Civil Judge, however, affirmed the judgment of the Trial Court with some modifications in the relief. Different sets of defendant filed two second appeals before the High Court and both were disposed of by the High Court by its judgment and Order dated 17th November, 1981 whereby it reversed the 520 judgments and decrees of the courts below and dismissed the suit filed by the Plaintiffs. This Court came to the conclusion that there is no controversy as regards the period of 27 days falling to the share of the Plaintiffs and the right of the females to the management of the Dargah according to Muslim law. As regards the question of right of Fathima Bee having become barred by limitation by ouster and that as such the Plaintiffs too had lost that right, this Court, while setting aside the Judg- ment and Decree of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial Court as modified by the First Appellate Court, HELD: It iS well settled that where one co-heir pleads adverse possession against another co-heir it is not enough to show that one out of them was in sole possession and enjoyment of the profits of the properties. The possession of one co-heir is considered in law as possession of all the co-heirs. The co-heir in possession cannot render his pos- session adverse to the other co-heirs not in possession merely by any secret hostile animus on his own part in derogation of the other co-heirs title. [526G-H; 527A] It is a settled rule of law as between co-heirs that there must be evidence of open assertion of hostile title coupled with exclusive possession and enjoyment by one of them to the knowledge of the other so as to construe ouster. [527A] The High Court in the instant case committed a serious error in reversing the finding of the lower Appellate Court and in taking a wrong approach in holding ouster on the basis of the judgment and decree given in Suit No. 116 of 1909 and on the ground that Fathima Bee had not made a demand or asked for her share of the hundial collections at any point of time till her death in 1957. [527G] P. Lakshmi v.L. Lakshmi Reddy, [1957] SCR 195, referred to. 1990 AIR 507, 1989( 2 )Suppl.SCR 519, 1990( 1 )SCC 345, 1989( 2 )SCALE1381, 1989( 4 )JT 563

PETITIONER: MOHD. ZAINULABUDEEN (SINCE DECEASED) BY L.RS. Vs. RESPONDENT: SAYED AHMED MOHINDEEN AND ORS. DATE OF JUDGMENT15/12/1989 BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) BENCH: KASLIWAL, N.M. (J) SINGH, K.N. (J) CITATION: 1990 AIR 507 1989 SCR Supl. (2) 519 1990 SCC (1) 345 JT 1989 (4) 563 1989 SCALE (2)1381 ACT: Indian Limitation Act, 1963: Adverse possession–Claim … Continue reading

From a conspectus of the facts and circumstances of the case and material obtaining on record, there cannot be denial of the factual position that faced with the recovery proceedings initiated by the Bank, the complainant had filed consumer complaint alleging deficiency in service on the part of the Opposite Party Bank. The District Forum unmindful of the provisions of section 34 of the said Act had passed an adinterim order directing the opposite party bank not to take any steps for recovery of the loan dues from the complainant by taking coercive measures. In our view, to say the least, such an order was clearly without jurisdiction and amounted to the usurping of the jurisdiction which was legally vested in another statutory tribunal under a particular statute. The State Commission has done well in setting aside the said order and dismissing the complaint because once it is found that the complainant had already approached the Appropriate Tribunal which was ceased of the entire gamut of controversy. The complainant could not agitate the said question before a consumer fora established under the Consumer Protection Act, 1986. Various tribunals constituted under the statute are expected to exercise their jurisdiction in accordance with the provisions of the Act under which they have been constituted. There is a clear cut demarcation of the jurisdiction and powers amongst various tribunals and no attempt should be made by one Tribunal to usurp the powers and jurisdiction of other either directly or indirectly. Such a situation may lead to anomalous situation because the orders passed by the two or more tribunals on the same controversy may vary. The question would then arise as to which of the order is binding and valid on the parties. Such a situation has to be avoided in all circumstances. In the case in hand, what we have found is that the District Forum has exercised a jurisdiction which was not vested in it. Rather such a jurisdiction was specifically taken away from any other Court / Tribunal / Forum under section 34 of the Act, 2002. 5. On a consideration of the matter, we are of the clear opinion that the impugned order passed by the State Commission is eminently justified and is in consonance with the settled legal position and suffers from no illegality, material irregularity much less any jurisdictional error which warrants interference of this Commission. Revision petition is accordingly dismissed on both the counts.

NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 995 OF 2012 (From the order dated 27.04.2011 in Appeal No. 91/2010 of Orissa State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission) Harianandan Prasad S/o Late Sradhanandan Prasad Through Special Power of Attorney Holder Baladev Bhawan, Station Road P.O. / Distt. Puri, Proprietor of M/s. Oceanic Colour Lab. At – Ratnakar Road, P.O. / Town / Distt. / Puri                                  …     Petitioner Versus State Bank … Continue reading

, at the stage of Section 204 Cr.P.C. the standard to be adopted by the Magistrate in scrutinizing the evidence is not the same as the one which is to be kept in view at the stage of framing of charges by the Sessions Court. 10. The result of the aforesaid discussion is that the order dated 09.02.2011 of the Magistrate taking cognizance under Section 190 Cr.P.C. and issuing process against the petitioner and her husband under Section 204 Cr.P.C. could not have been interfered with by the High Court in the Revision filed by the petitioner. Moreover, once the order of the Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing process against the petitioner and her husband was sustained, there is no scope for granting the relief of further investigation for the purpose of finding out whether someone other than the petitioner and her husband had committed the offences in respect of the deceased persons Aarushi and/or Hemraj. As has been held by this Court in Randhir Singh Rana v. State (Delhi Administration) [(1997) 1 SCC 361], once a Magistrate takes cognizance of an offence under Section 190 Cr.P.C., he cannot order of his own further investigation in the case under Section 156(3) Cr.P.C. but if subsequently the Sessions Court passes an order discharging the accused persons, further investigation by the police on its own would be permissible, which may also result in submission of fresh charge-sheet. 11. For these reasons, I agree with my learned brother Khehar, J. that this Review Petition has no merit and should be dismissed.

“REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION REVIEW PETITION (CRL.) NO. 85 OF 2012 IN CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 68 OF 2012 Nupur Talwar …. Petitioner Versus Central Bureau of Investigation & Anr. …. Respondents O R D E R 1. The instant controversy emerges out of a double murder, committed on the … Continue reading

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