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life imprisonment

This tag is associated with 13 posts

Habeas corpus type writ -as her husband in imprisonment more than 20 years as her mercy petitions were rejected twice made – meaning of life imprisonment reiterated that unless properly remitted by competent authority, life imprisonment means imprisonment for entire lifetime of convict – No court set him free beyond the law with out remission by appropriate authority= ARJUN JADAV … PETITIONER VERSUS STATE OF WEST BENGAL & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41723

Habeas corpus type writ -as her husband – in imprisonment – more than 20 years as her mercy petitions were rejected twice made  – meaning  of  life  imprisonment  reiterated  that unless properly remitted by competent  authority,  life  imprisonment  means imprisonment for entire lifetime of convict – No court set him free beyond the law with out … Continue reading

Reduced the sentence from life to 10 years in sec. 304 B IPC Apex court held that same principles laid down in death cases- would apply with little modifications for assessing the sentences in other cases = SUNIL DUTT SHARMA Vs. STATE (GOVT.OF NCT OF DELHI) published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/ ?filename=40877

Reduced the sentence from life to 10 years in sec. 304 B IPC applying the participles laid down     in commuting death penalty to life imprisonment, even though there is no guide lines and separate rules for lessor sentences – other than death sentences ; Apex court held that same principles laid down in death cases-  would … Continue reading

sushil sharma death sentence was commuted in to life imprisonment = SUSHIL SHARMA Vs. STATE (NCT) OF DELHI published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40866

sushil sharma death sentence was commuted in to life imprisonment  =         The appellant was  the  State  President  of  the Youth Congress in Delhi.   The deceased was a qualified  pilot  and  she  was   also the State General Secretary of  Youth  Congress  (Girls  Wing),  Delhi.   She was an independent lady, who … Continue reading

Section 302 read with 149, 307 read with 149, as well as for offences under Sections 452, 148 and 147 IPC.= whether there was any controversy relating to the place of occurrence in order to doubt the case of the prosecution,-The I.O. found blood in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey. He also found some pellets there. He had prepared memo Ext.Ka-7. It is also said that the incient had taken place in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey of the house. PW-2 Smt. Zabira has clearly stated in her cross-examination that at the time of the incident all the injured were sitting in the ‘Verandah’ of the third storey. Thus, the place of occurrence was not doubtful.” ; whether there was any doubt about the death of the deceased, as submitted on behalf of the appellants. Mr. Jaspal Singh, learned senior counsel in his submissions referred to the Criminal Appeal No.752 of 2008 27 of 30 evidence of P.W.4, Dr. Irfan Ahmad, who examined the injured including the deceased at 5:45 pm on 05.09.1997 and contended that according to the doctor all the injuries were caused by firearm, that such injuries might have been caused from the distance of 40 feet, that the injuries were on the front side, that there was no injury on the head as compared to the evidence of P.W.5, the postmortem doctor, who stated categorically that injury No.1 was on the right side of the head, which might have been caused by Lathicharge, which was also the version of P.W.3. The learned counsel made further reference to Ext.A-18 by which the death of the deceased was communicated by the doctor to the police station for conducting a postmortem and the postmortem held on 07.09.1997. By making further reference to Ext.Ka-5, the postmortem report, which was issued by U.H.M. Hospital, Kanpur by one Dr. B.S. Chauhan while the name of P.W.5 the postmortem doctor who gave evidence was mentioned as Dr. P.V.S. Chauhan of Ursala Hospital, Kanpur, the learned counsel submitted that there were serious doubts as to whether it related to the corpse of the deceased and the concerned postmortem report really related to the deceased Zahiruddin in this case. Though, in the first blush, the said contention made on behalf of the appellants appear to be of some substance, on a close reading of the evidence of P.Ws.4 and 5, we find that such instances pointed out by learned counsel were all of insignificant factors and based on such factors it cannot be held that there was any doubt at all as to the death of the deceased or the injuries sustained by him as noted by P.W.4 in Exts.Ka-2, Ka-3 and Ka-4. Ext.Ka-3 is related to the deceased. Ext.Ka-5 postmortem certificate was issued by P.W.5. We should also state that nothing was put to the above said witnesses with reference to those alleged doubts relating to the death of the deceased Zahiruddin. We are not, therefore, inclined to entertain the said submission at this stage in order to find fault with the case of the prosecution.; whether there was any scope to hold that the offence would fall under Section 304 Part I or II and not under Section 302 IPC and that no other offence was made out, we can straight away hold that having regard to the extent of the injuries sustained by the deceased, P.Ws.2 and 3 and the aggression with which the offence was committed as against the victims, which resulted in the loss of life of one person considered along with the motive, which was such a petty issue, we are of the firm view that there was absolutely no scope to reduce the gravity of the offence committed by the appellants. We are, therefore, not persuaded to accept the said feeble submission made on behalf of the appellants to modify the conviction and the sentence imposed. 28. For all the above stated reasons, we do not find any merit in this appeal. The appeal fails and the same is dismissed.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40475 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.752 OF 2008 Rafique @ Rauf & others ….Appellants VERSUS State of U.P. ….Respondent J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. This appeal by the eight accused who were proceeded against in Crime … Continue reading

Mere Delay in sending FIR not fatal to the prosecution = where the FIR was actually recorded without delay and the investigation started on the basis of that FIR and there is no other infirmity brought to the notice of the Court then, however improper or objectionable the delay in receipt of the report by the Magistrate concerned be, in the absence of any prejudice to the accused it cannot by itself justify the conclusion that the investigation was tainted and the prosecution insupportable.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40473 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1020 OF 2004 Sheo Shankar Singh …. Appellant VERSUS State of U.P. ….Respondent CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1021 OF 2004 Sarvajit Singh @ Sobhu …. Appellant VERSUS State of U.P. ….Respondent J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim … Continue reading

13 June 2013 PRESS SUMMARY O’Neill No 2 (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland) Lauchlan (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland) [2013] UKSC 36 On appeal from: [2012] HCJAC 51; [2012] HCJAC 20 JUSTICES: Lord Hope (Deputy President), Lord Kerr, Lord Wilson, Lord Hughes and Lord Toulson BACKGROUND TO THE APPEALS The issues in these appeals relate to the right to a fair trial. Alison McGarrigle had a son, Robert, by her former husband. Robert was subject to a residential supervision order requiring him to live with his father during the week but permitted him to visit his mother on Saturdays. On 14 June 1997 Robert did not return to his father’s address and instead he and his mother went to live with the appellants in a house in Largs. A drinking session took place there on or about the 20 June 1997 at which a number of people including the appellants, Robert and Mrs McGarrigle were present. The next morning she was gone and was never seen by Robert again. She was reported to police as missing on 16 February 1998. The investigation continued but in the meantime, on 17 June 1998, the appellants were convicted of sexual offences including offences against Robert McGarrigle and were sentenced to 6 and 8 years imprisonment respectively. Whilst serving their sentences the appellants were taken by police for questioning on suspicion of conspiracy to murder Alison McGarrigle. They were asked by the officers whether they were involved in her murder, but they both remained silent. Owing to a lack of evidence at that time, proceedings were not commenced against the pair. The appellants were eventually charged in 2005 for the murder of Mrs McGarrigle and remanded in custody. On 10 June 2010 the appellants were found guilty in the High Court of Justiciary at Glasgow of the murder of Mrs Allison McGarrigle between 21 June and 1 September 1997 and of a subsequent attempt to defeat the ends of justice by disposing of her body in the sea. In a separate trial held immediately before, the appellants were found guilty of a series of sexual offences relating to children. Both trials took place in front of the same judge, Lord Pentland, but with different juries. After the verdict in the first trial the Advocate Depute moved for sentence and handed the judge a list of the appellants’ previous convictions. The judge reserved sentencing for the sexual offences until after the trial for murder was complete. At the time of informing the appellants of this, the judge referred to their records and made comments to them that they were ‘evil, determined, manipulative and predatory paedophiles of the worst sort’. The two issues for the Supreme Court were: (1) when the appellants were ‘charged’ for the purposes of their right to a trial within a reasonable time in terms of article 6(1) of the Convention (the appellants argued that time started to run when they were first questioned in 1998 and therefore there had been a breach of their right); and (2) whether the comments and conduct of the trial judge were such as to breach the appellants’ right to a fair trial by an impartial tribunal in terms of article 6(1) of the Convention and, if so, whether the act of the Lord Advocate in persevering with the trial was The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom Parliament Square London SW1P 3BD T: 020 7960 1886/1887 F: 020 7960 1901 www.supremecourt.gov.ukincompatible with the appellants’ rights under article 6(1). Both issues arose from the refusal of the Appeal Court to grant leave for the relevant grounds of appeal to be argued in the appeal in Scotland. The Appeal Court did however grant permission to appeal its refusal to the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court held that it had jurisdiction to consider the issues on the basis that they were compatibility issues in terms of the Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995 (as amended by the Scotland Act 2012), issue (1) being an appeal against a decision of the Appeal Court and issue (2) being a reference from the Appeal Court. JUDGMENT The court determines the two compatibility issues as follows: (1) that the date when the reasonable time began for the purposes of the appellants’ article 6(1) Convention right was 5 April 2005; and (2) that the Lord Advocate’s act in proceeding with the trial on the murder charges was not incompatible with the appellants’ article 6(1) right to a trial before a tribunal that was independent and impartial. The proceedings will be remitted to the High Court of Justiciary [58]. Lord Hope gives the judgment of the court. REASONS FOR THE JUDGMENT References in square brackets are to paragraphs in the judgment The meaning of the word ‘charged’ has been considered in a number of cases regarding article 6(1), which provides that in the determination of any “criminal charge against him” a person has the right to a fair trial within a reasonable time and article 6(3)(c) which provides a right to legal assistance for anyone “charged with a criminal offence” [25-32]. The focus of article 6(3)(c) is on the state of affairs when the suspect is first interrogated, as to wait until the stage is reached when there is sufficient evidence to charge before the suspect has the right of access to a lawyer could seriously prejudice his right to a fair trial. This is in contrast with the reasonable time guarantee of article 6(1): it relates to the running of time, not on what is needed to preserve the right to a fair trial. The rationale is the person should not remain too long in a state of uncertainty. Time runs from the date which the suspect’s position is substantially affected by the official notification. In the United Kingdom this could be some time after he is first questioned [33-34]. The date from which reasonable time begins is the subject of a separate guarantee from the guarantee that the trial will be fair and falls to be approached independently [36]. The appellants were certainly not at any stage of their interviews “charged” in the formal sense. They were both asked directly whether they killed Mrs McGarrigle. But, in the context in which these questions were being put, it cannot be said that this amounted to an official notification that they were likely to be prosecuted [37]. In the absence of any evidence to show where, when and how she had died, the police were in no position to initiate criminal proceedings. In August 2003 they received information that led to further enquiries and resulted in the appellants being charged with murder in 2005 [38]. On the issue of apparent bias, the test is contained in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 and considered in a number of authorities [47-52]. It would only be if the judge expressed outspoken opinions about the appellants’ character that were entirely gratuitous, and only if the occasion for making them was plainly outside the scope of the proper performance of his duties, that the fair minded and informed observer would doubt the judge’s ability to perform those duties with an objective judicial mind. The context indicates that nothing of the kind happened in this instance [53-54]. Furthermore, no objection was made by the defence at any point to the fact that Lord Pentland was to preside over the murder trial as well and there are no grounds for doubting his impartiality [55-56]. NOTE This summary is provided to assist in understanding the Court’s decision. It does not form part of the reasons for the decision. The full judgment of the Court is the only authoritative document. Judgments are public documents and are available at: www.supremecourt.gov.uk/decided-cases/index.html The Supreme Court of the United Kingdom Parliament Square London SW1P 3BD T: 020 7960 1886/1887 F: 020 7960 1901 www.supremecourt.gov.uk

Trinity Term [2013] UKSC 36 On appeal from: [2012] HCJAC 51; [2012] HCJAC 20 JUDGMENT     O’Neill No 2 (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland) Lauchlan (AP) (Appellant) v Her Majesty’s Advocate (Respondent) (Scotland) before Lord Hope, Deputy President Lord Kerr Lord Wilson Lord Hughes Lord Toulson JUDGMENT GIVEN ON 13 June 2013 … Continue reading

This case is a glaring example of how cause of justice can be defeated by inefficient, lackadaisical and incompetent investigating agency.= We began by commenting on the unhappy conduct of the investigating agency. We conclude by reaffirming our view. We are distressed at the way in which the investigation of this case was carried out. It is true that acquitting the accused merely on the ground of lapses or irregularities in the investigation of a case would amount to putting premium on the deprecable conduct of an incompetent investigating agency at the cost of the victims which may lead to encouraging perpetrators of crimes. This Court has laid down that the lapses or irregularities in the investigation could be ignored subject to a rider. They can be ignored only if despite their existence, the evidence on record bears out the case of the prosecution and the evidence is of sterling quality. If the lapses or irregularities do not go to the root of the matter, if they do not dislodge the substratum of the prosecution case, they can be ignored. In this case, the lapses are very serious. PW-5 Jaldhari Yadav is a pancha to the seizure panchnama under which weapons and other articles were seized from the scene of offence and also to the inquest panchnama. Independent panchas have not been examined. The investigating officer has stated in his evidence that the seized articles were not sent to the court along with the charge-sheet. They were kept in the Malkhana of the police station. He has admitted that the seized articles were not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. No explanation is offered by him about the missing sanha entries. His evidence on that aspect is evasive. Clothes of the deceased were not sent to the Forensic Science Laboratory. The investigating officer admitted that no seizure list of the clothes of the deceased was made. Blood group of the deceased was not ascertained. No link is established between the blood found on the seized articles and the blood of the deceased. It is difficult to make allowance for such gross lapses. Besides, the evidence of eye-witnesses does not inspire confidence. Undoubtedly, a grave suspicion is created about the involvement of the accused in the offence of murder. It is well settled that suspicion, however strong, cannot take the place of proof. In such a case, benefit of doubt must go to the accused. In the circumstances, we quash and set aside the impugned judgment and order. The appellants-accused are in jail. We direct that the appellants – A1-Sunil Kundu, A2-Bablu Kundu, A3-Nageshwar Prasad Sah and A4-Hira Lal Yadav be released forthwith unless otherwise required in any other case. 20. The appeals are disposed of in the aforestated terms.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1073 OF 2008 SUNIL KUNDU AND ANR. … APPELLANTS Versus STATE OF JHARKHAND … RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1419 OF 2008 HIRA LAL YADAV … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF JHARKHAND … RESPONDENT WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1512 OF 2009 NAGESHWAR … Continue reading

Apex court confirm the high court judgment = i) The prosecution did not examine the material witnesses like the investigating officer as well as other witnesses who, as per the case of the prosecution, were actually present at the time of occurrence of the incident. ii) According to the prosecution, PW-1 and PW-2 both are eye- witnesses but they are the widow and brother of the deceased, and therefore, are interested witnesses and their statement cannot be relied upon by the Court. iii) The accused persons themselves had lodged a counter report against the deceased, PW-2 and other relations of the deceased, alleging attack/aggression. This was not a counter blast but a true and correct happening of events as reported by the accused, against the complainants, in which the accused Ram Dutt had suffered injuries. For these reasons, the accused should be entitled to the benefit of doubt and consequently, to an order of acquittal. 10

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.77 OF 2007   Mano Dutt & Anr. … Appellants Versus State of U.P. … Respondent     J U D G M E N T     Swatanter Kumar, J.     1. The present appeal is directed against the judgment and … Continue reading

Rape and murder. while doing rape , murder happen due to gagging her mouth with her saree, taking in to consideration of the age of the accused who are not habitual offenders, and chances of reform themselves, death penalty converted in to life for 21 years as it is not a rarest of rare case.

REPORTABLE   IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NOS.166-167 OF 2010   Ramnaresh & Ors. … Appellants Versus State of Chhattisgarh … Respondent J U D G M E N T   Swatanter Kumar, J.   1. The present appeals are directed against the concurrent judgments of conviction and award … Continue reading

unlawful assembly -“Section 149 has two parts. First part deals with the commission of an offence by a member of unlawful assembly in prosecution of the common object of that assembly and the second part deals with the liability of the members of the unlawful assembly who knew that an offence was likely to be committed in prosecution of the object for which they had assembled. Even if the common object of the 14

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1840 of 2008   Onkar & Anr. …Appellants Versus State of U.P. …Respondent     J U D G M E N T     Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.   1. This appeal has been preferred against the judgment and order dated … Continue reading

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