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limitation act
Sec.5 of Limitation Act – Sec.19 Of Revision powers of High court – Apex court held that we are of the opinion that the case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (supra) was decided erroneously. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to Section 19 of the Act of 1983 =CIVIL APPEAL NO.3498 OF 2008 STATE OF M.P. & ANR. ……APPELLANTS Vs. ANSHUMAN SHUKLA ……RESPONDENT = 2014 Aug. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41818
Sec.5 of Limitation Act – Sec.19 Of Revision powers of High court – Apex court held that we are of the opinion that the case of Nagar Palika Parishad, Morena (supra) was decided erroneously. Section 5 of the Limitation Act is applicable to Section 19 of the Act of 1983 = “Whether Provision of Section 5 of the Limitation Act … Continue reading
Or.14, rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and Art.10 , 59 ,92 and 96 of Limitation – suit filed against ex trustee for declaration that the settlement deeds dt. 27-3-1978 executed by him infavour of his daughter and grand daughters in respect of Trust Property is null and void – defendant took plea that it is barred by limitation as the suit is filed beyond three years – single judge under preliminary issue dismissed the suit and D.B. bench also confirmed the same – Apex court held that No suit be dismissed on the issue of preliminary issue – when it is a question of law and fact and when suit is not barred by limitation under Art.10 of limitation Act against the trustee or his legal representatives and when it is 12 years from the date of transfer as per Art. 92 – both lower courts committed error and as such allowed the appeal by setting aside the lower court orders = Satti Paradesi Samadhi & Philliar Temple … Appellant Versus M. Sankuntala (D) Tr. Lrs. & Ors. …Respondents = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41772
Or.14, rule 1 and 2 of C.P.C. and Art.10 , 59 ,92 and 96 of Limitation – suit filed against ex trustee for declaration that the settlement deeds dt. 27-3-1978 executed by him infavour of his daughter and grand daughters in respect of Trust Property is null and void – defendant took plea that it … Continue reading
Limitation Act, 1963 – s.22 – Suit filed alleging that the defendants had illegally encroached on a public street – Trial court decreed the suit and issued permanent injunction – Decree challenged on the ground that the suit itself was barred by limitation – Held: The suit could not be said to be barred by limitation as encroachment on a public street is a continuing wrong and therefore, there existed a continuing cause of action – S.22 of the Limitation Act would apply – Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. = HARI RAM ….Appellant Versus JYOTI PRASAD & ANR. … Respondents = http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx
Limitation Act, 1963 – s.22 – Suit filed alleging that the defendants had illegally encroached on a public street – Trial court decreed the suit and issued permanent injunction – Decree challenged on the ground that the suit itself was barred by limitation – Held: The suit could not be said to be barred by … Continue reading
Whether suit filed by appellant was barred in terms of Order XXIII Rule 3-A CPC – Held: A compromise forming the basis of the decree can only be questioned before the same court that recorded the compromise and a fresh suit for setting aside a compromise decree is expressly barred under Order XXIII Rule 3-A – However, in the instant case, the compromise decree alleged to be fraudulent was passed not by a civil court but by a revenue court in a suit u/s.176 of the Land Reforms Act – Revenue courts are neither equipped nor competent to effectively adjudicate on allegations of fraud that has overtones of criminality and the courts really skilled and experienced to try such issues are the courts constituted under the CPC – Further, under s.9 of CPC, the civil court has inherent jurisdiction to try all types of civil disputes unless its jurisdiction is barred expressly or by necessary implication, by any statutory provision and conferred on any other tribunal or authority – Nothing in Order XXIII Rule 3-A bars the institution of a suit before the civil court even in regard to decrees or orders passed in suits and/or proceedings under different statutes before a court, tribunal or authority of limited and restricted jurisdiction – In the facts of the case, provision of Order XXIII not a bar against the suit filed by the appellant – Uttar Pradesh Zamindari Abolition and Land Reforms Act, 1950 – ss. 176, 178, 182, 331 and 341 and Schedule II. = HORIL … APPELLANT VERSUS KESHAV & ANR. … RESPONDENTS = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx
Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 – Or.XXIII, r.3-A – Suit – Maintainability – Appellant filed suit seeking declaration that decree passed by the Assistant Collector, Class-I, in a suit u/ss.176, 178 and 182 of the Land Reforms Act was fraudulent, inoperative and not binding upon him – Allegation that decree passed by Assistant Collector was … Continue reading
s.149 CPC = No document which is chargeable with a fee under the Act shall be acted on by any court or any public office unless the appropriate fee payable under the Act in respect of such a document is paid – When a document on which court fee is payable is received in any court or public office, though the whole or any part of the appropriate court fee payable on such document has not been paid, either because of a mistake or inadvertence of the Court, the Court, in its discretion, may allow the payment of the deficit court fee within such time as may be fixed – Upon such payment, such document “shall have the same force and effect” as if the court fee had been paid in the first instance – Indisputably, the expression “document” takes within its sweep a plaint contemplated under the Code of Civil Procedure – Court Fees Act, 1870. Judicial discretion: Exercise of – Scope – Held: It is well settled that the judicial discretion is required to be exercised in accordance with the settled principles of law – It must not be exercised in a manner to confer an unfair advantage on one of the parties to the litigation.= A. Nawab John & Ors. ….Appellants Versus V.N. Subramaniyam ….Respondent = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx
Court Fees Act, 1870: Filing of plaint – Deficient court fee – Right of defendant to raise objection – Held: Question of court fee is a matter between the plaintiff and the Court – If the Court comes to the conclusion that the court fee paid in the lower court is not sufficient, … Continue reading
Sections 138,142 of the NI Act = “Whether the complaint filed under Section 138 of the NI Act is within or beyond time as it was contended that it was not filed within one month from the date on which the cause of action arose under clause (c) of the proviso to Section 138 of the NI Act?”- “Whether for calculating the period of one month which is prescribed under Section 142(b), the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose?”= Section 138 of the N.I. Act reads as under: “138. Dishonour of cheque for insufficiency, etc., of funds in the account. Where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for payment of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid. either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from that account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act, be punished with imprisonment for a term which may be extended to two years, or with fine which may extend to twice the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that nothing contained in this section shall apply unless- (a) the cheque has been presented to the bank within a period of six months from the date on which it is drawn or within the period of its validity, whichever is earlier; (b) the payee or the holder in due course of the Cheque, as the case may be, makes a demand for the payment of the said amount of money by giving a notice in writing, to the drawer of the cheque, within thirty days of the receipt of information by him from the bank regarding the return of the cheque as unpaid; and (c) the drawer of such cheque fails to make the payment of the said amount of money to the payee or, as the case may be, to the holder in due course of the cheque, within fifteen days of the receipt of the said notice.” Section 142 of the N.I. Act reads as under: “142. Cognizance of offences: Notwithstanding anything contained in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (2 of 1974 ),- (a) no court shall take cognizance of any offence punishable under section 138 except upon a complaint, in writing, made by the payee or, as the case may be, the holder in due course of the cheque; (b) such complaint is made within one month of the date on which the cause of action arises under clause (c) of the proviso to section 138; [Provided that the cognizance of a complaint may be taken by the Court after the prescribed period, if the complainant satisfies the Court that he had sufficient cause for not making a complaint within such period.] (c) no court inferior to that of a Metropolitan Magistrate or a Judicial Magistrate of the first class shall try any offence punishable under section 138.” Sections 12(1) and (2) of the Limitation Act, 1963 reads as under: “12. Exclusion of time in legal proceedings.- (1) In computing the period of limitation for any suit, appeal or application, the day from which such period is to be reckoned, shall be excluded. (2) In computing the period of limitation for an appeal or an application for leave to appeal or for revision or for review of a judgment, the day on which the judgment complained of was pronounced and the time requisite for obtaining a copy of the decree, sentence or order appealed from or sought to be revised or reviewed shall be excluded.” Section 9 of the General Clauses Act, 1897 reads as under: “9. Commencement and termination of time.- (1) In any [Central Act] or Regulation made after the commencement of this Act, it shall be sufficient, for the purpose of excluding the first in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “from”, and, for the purpose of including the last in a series of days or any other period of time, to use the word “to”. (2) This section applies also to all [Central Acts] made after the third day of January, 1868, and to all Regulations made on or after the fourteenth day of January, 1887.”= we are of the opinion that Saketh lays down the correct proposition of law. We hold that for the purpose of calculating the period of one month, which is prescribed under Section 142(b) of the N.I. Act, the period has to be reckoned by excluding the date on which the cause of action arose. We hold that SIL Import USA does not lay down the correct law. Needless to say that any decision of this Court which takes a view contrary to the view taken in Saketh by this Court, which is confirmed by us, do not lay down the correct law on the question involved in this reference. The reference is answered accordingly.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40692 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1079 OF 2006 ECON ANTRI LTD. … APPELLANT VS. ROM INDUSTRIES LTD. & ANR. … RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. On 13/10/2006, while granting leave in Special Leave Petition (Criminal) No.211 of 2005, … Continue reading
where an appeal is to be filed on acquittal of calendar case? =In view of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in Calendar Case No.975 of 2008 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Visakhapatnam, and in view of the amended provisions of Section 372 of the Criminal Procedure Code, which came into effect from 31.12.2009, the appeal has to be presented before the Sessions Court
THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE N.R.L.NAGESWARA RAO CRIMINAL APPEAL (SR) No.2368 OF 2012 JUDGMENT:- In view of the fact that the acquittal of the accused in Calendar Case No.975 of 2008 on the file of the Chief Metropolitan Magistrate at Visakhapatnam, and in view of the amended provisions of Section 372 … Continue reading
Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 34, 61 and 114. Books of account–Entries–Proof of–Nobody supporting correctness of entries—-Account books liable to be reject- ed. Title–Proof- Presumption on basis of revenue entry–When arises. Limitation Act, 1963. Article 65–Adverse possession–Proof-Actual physical possession by claimant not necessary–Fact that property was in possession of tenants would be of no consequence. Indian Contract Act, 1872. Sections 182 and 188–Joint possession-Claim by agent–Agent actually collecting rent from tenants-Cannot claim joint possession of property. = Respondent No. 1 in the appeals instituted a suit for partition against his younger brothers and sisters, and the heirs of his deceased brothers. The plaintiff was the eldest among the brothers and sisters. The 1st and 2nd Defendants were his brothers, the 3rd Defendant his sister, the 4th and 5th Defendants, the widow and son respectively of the third brother. Defendant 6 was the widow of the fourth brother, and Defendants 7 to 12 were his children, while Defendant No. 14 was the wife of Defendant No. 1, and Defendants 13, 15, 16 and 17 were their children. The subject matter of the appeals related only to one item of property known as “Naroda Chawl” measuring 7 acres and 2 gunthas of land, where 115 rooms and huts stood con- structed, out of which 114 rooms had been let out to ten- ants, and one room was retained for the caretaker. According to Defendants No. 6 to 12 this property exclu- sively belonged to defendant No. 6 and was not liable to partition. The other defendants however supported the plain- tiff’s case that it belonged to the 233 joint family and was liable to partition. Defendants 6 to 12 pleaded that the plaintiff’s father- Bapalal orally gifted this property to his daughter-in-law Defendant No. 6 in March 1946 and made a statement before the Revenue authorities on . the basis of which her name was mutated and she was put in possession thereof, that although she came in peaceful possession, the management which in- cluded realisation of rent was in the hands of Defendant No. 1, that as some dispute arose in 1952 she assumed direct charge of the chawl and had remained in possession thereaf- ter, and that she had acquired good title therein by adverse possession before the suit was filed in 1960. The City Civil Judge who tried the suit, held that there was a joint Hindu family and a business was carried on for the benefit of the family and the income therefrom was thrown into the common pool and all the properties including the disputed chawl were treated as belonging to the family. As the case of Defendant No. 6 about the gift, the mutation of her name, and her exclusive possession from 1946 till the date of the suit was found correct, it was held that she had acquired title by adverse possession, and the suit was dismissed with respect to the disputed chawl. The plaintiff appealed to the High Court. Some of the defendants also filed appeals in respect of the other items of property. All these appeals were heard and disposed of by a common judgment. The High Court reversed the finding of adverse posses- sion in regard to the disputed chawl and granted a decree for partition. It held that Defendant No. 6 remained in exclusive possession of the property only since 1952, the period was thus short of the time required for prescription of title. It further held that since the rents of the chawl from 1952 were collected by her husband and after his death by her son (Defendant No. 7), she was liable to render accounts till the death of her husband, and she along with Defendant No. 7 would be jointly liable for the period thereafter. Separate Appeals were preferred by Defendant Nos. 6 and 7 to this Court. Allowing the Appeals, setting aside the decision of the High Court and restoring that of the Trial Court. 234 HELD: 1. The principle that revenue entry furnishes presumptive evidence of title is inapplicable in the instant case. It cannot be denied that title to Naroda Chawl could not have passed to Defendant No. 6 by virtue of the entry Ext. 247. The value of the chawl even in 1946 was large and no registered instrument of transfer was executed. Besides Ext. 247 describes the plaintiff’s father (Bapalal) and Defendant No. 6 (Chandrakanta) as Kabjedar, that is occu- pant. In such circumstances, the presumption which can be raised in favour of Defendant No. 6 from this entry is with respect of her possession and possession only. [238F-G] Gangabai and others v. Fakirgowda Somaypagowda Desai and others, AIR 1930 Privy Council 93; and Desai Navinkant Kesarlal v. Prabhat Kabhai, 9 Gujarat Law Reporter 694, referred to. 2. The account books have to be rejected as not reli- able. It is apparent from the evidence that nobody takes the responsibility of supporting the correctness of the entries therein. Many of the documents produced by Defendant No. 1 were accepted, but the account books which were S. Nos. 123-75 to 123-97 of Ext. 123 were in express terms not admitted. The plaintiff filed his objection–Ext. 172. Defendant No. 6 also filed her objection–Ext. 275. The books were admitted in evidence and marked as exhibits on the statement of the plaintiff which he made in cross-exami- nation. The plaintiff by saying that he had written as per the instructions of Defendant No. 1 made it clear that he Could not vouchsafe for its reliability. Defendant No. 1 could not summon courage to support them either personally or through any witness. No reason has been suggested as to why he did not produce other important documents in his possession which could have supported the account books and the joint case of the parties resisting the appellant’s claim. [243B-E] 3. Defendant No. 1 cannot be treated to be in joint possession as he was actually collecting the rents from the tenants. it is well settled that the possession of the agent is the possession of the principal and in view of the fidu- ciary relationship, Defendant No. 1 cannot be permitted to claim his own possession. [247D-E] David Lyeii v. John Lawson Kennedy, [1889] XIV H.L.(E) 437; Williams v. Pott, L.R. XII Equity Cases 149 and Secre- tary of State for India v. Krishnamoni Gupta, 29 Indian Appeals 104, referred to. 4(a). It is the intention to claim exclusive title which makes 235 possession adverse and this animus possidendi must be evi- denced and effectuated by the manner of occupancy which again depends upon the nature of the property. The manner of possession depends upon the kind of possession which the particular property is susceptible. That possession to the extent to which it is capable of demonstration must be hostile and exclusive and will cover only to the extent of the owner’s possession. [246E-F] (b). The title to the chawl as owner, subject to the tenancy was an interest in immovable property so as to be covered by Article 144 of the Indian Limitation Act, 1908, which specifically mentioned, “.. . or any interest therein”. [246E] In the instant case, the parties have been fighting for the rent from the chawl so long as it continued in posses- sion of the tenants. Before the gift of 1946 the Defendant No. 1 was collecting the rent and he continued to do so even thereafter till 1952. The appellant has, however, estab- lished her case that the Defendant No. 1 acted as her agent after 1946 and when he repudiated this agency in 1952 he was effectively removed from the management of the chawl. Since 1946 the tenants attorned to the Defendant No. 6 and paid rent to her under printed receipts announcing her ownership, but of course through her agent the Defendant No. 1. The fact that the tenants have been in actual physical posses- sion of the chawl is, in the circumstances, of no assistance to the respondents. What is material is that they paid the rent to the Defendant No. 6. Defendant No. 6 was in adverse possession from the period 1946 to 1952 through her agent Defendant No. 1 and thereafter through her husband and son Defendant No. 7 till 1960 when the suit was filed, the total period being more than 12 years. [246G-H; 248G] Uppalapati Veera Venkata Satyanarayanaraju and another v. Josyula Hanumayamma and another, [1963] 3 SCR 910 and Hari Prasad Agarwalla and another v. Abdul Haw and others, A.I.R. 1951 Patna 160, referred to. =1989 AIR 1269, 1989( 2 )SCR 232, 1989( 2 )SCC 630, 1989( 1 )SCALE802 , 1989( 4 )JT 115
PETITIONER: SMT. CHANDRAKANTABEN ETC. Vs. RESPONDENT: VADILAL BAPALAL MODI & OTHERS. DATE OF JUDGMENT30/03/1989 BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) BENCH: SHARMA, L.M. (J) KANIA, M.H. CITATION: 1989 AIR 1269 1989 SCR (2) 232 1989 SCC (2) 630 JT 1989 (4) 115 1989 SCALE (1)802 ACT: Indian Evidence Act, 1872. Sections 34, 61 and 114. Books of … Continue reading
condonation of delay=Though Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963, is always open to be construed liberally and even a feeble explanation showing a shadow of a sufficient cause may be acceptable in view of the need for a decision on any dispute on merits but not on technicalities, the total absence of any allegation of existence of any sufficient cause cannot be condoned even if the person requesting for such condonation is the State itself.
IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESH AT HYDERABAD FRIDAY, THE FOURTEENTH DAY OF OCTOBER TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN Present HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE G. BHAVANI PRASAD C.R.P.M.P.No.5642 of 2011 and C.R.P.(SR).No.23470 of 2011 Between: Government of Andhra Pradesh .. Petitioner AND L. Krishnavardhan Reddy & 5 others .. Respondents The Court made the … Continue reading
Arbitration = 30 days limitation for filing objections for award, is from the date of notice and not from the date of knowledge of filing of the award in the court =The Division Bench of the High Court has taken a view in the impugned order that as the Executive Engineer was looking after the arbitration proceedings, he was the one who could have filed the objections to the award on behalf of the Union of India and thus notice of the filing of the award on the Executive Engineer was mandatory and the starting point of
Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1734 OF 2006 Union of India & Anr. … Appellants Versus M/s Deepak Electric & Trading Company & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal against the order dated 03.01.2003 … Continue reading
