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Ludhiana

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Fire accident= When there is no clause not to make any constructions to the building with out permission – No claim should be rejected when fire accident was occurred due to short – circute – not concerned with building works = the petitioner issued an insurance policy number 201002/11/03/00372 called ‘Standard Fire and Special Perils Policy’ in favour of the complainant / respondent for a sum of Rs.20.50 lacs for the period 17.3.2004 to 16.03.2005. Out of this amount of Rs.20.50 lacs, Rs.20 lacs was meant for stocks of all kinds of sofa material, curtains cloth, mattresses, pillows, cushions, towels, bed sheets, etc., and Rs.50,000/- was the coverage for furniture, fixtures, fittings and electrical items. During the currency of the policy, fire occurred on 19.09.2004 at about 3:30 a.m. and the respondent estimated the loss to be Rs.20,68,090/-. An intimation was given by the respondent to the local police on the date of the fire and the insurance company was also intimated. The petitioner insurance company appointed a surveyor to assess the loss. Vide his report dated 29.01.2005, the surveyor assessed the loss at Rs.10,80,770/-. The surveyor also pointed out that at the time of loss, there was construction going on in the shop on the first and second floors of the building. In order to supply electric current to first and second floor, electric wires had been put on the main electric meter for the shop, which resulted in probable short-circuiting, leading to fire. The petitioner repudiated the claim, saying that there was violation of conditions of the policy, because construction was going on in the premises. = construction activity was being carried out at the premises in question and as per the surveyor’s report, the probable cause of fire could be due to short-circuiting, but we agree with the findings of the District Forum and State Commission that in this case also, the insurance company cannot escape responsibility to pay the claim under the Policy. We do not agree with the contention of the petitioner that the construction activity had resulted in increased risk for the insured stocks in question. It has also been made clear that there are separate electric connections for the ground floor and first floor and there are separate electricity meters for the same. It is not clear anywhere that the insured was required to obtain permission of the insurance company before starting the construction. The District Forum in their order have rightly assessed the value of the total stocks, in question and the value of the stocks lying safe in the godown, and allowed the claim after taking into consideration both these values. We, therefore, find no illegality or irregularity in the orders passed by the District Forum and State Commission which reflect true appreciation of the facts and circumstances on record. These orders are, therefore, upheld and the present revision petition stands dismissed with no order as to costs.

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130807112019251RP23812012.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI   REVISION PETITION NO. 2381 OF 2012 (From the order dated 30.03.2012 in First Appeal No. 970/2008 of Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission)   United India Insurance Co. Ltd. Regd. & Head Office 24, Whites Road Chennai – 600014 Through its Regional office No. 1 Kanchenjunga Building … Continue reading

ARBITRATION ACT= The matter was, thereafter, taken up by the designate Judge who came to a finding that the agreement dated 24.05.2005 was not legal and valid and, therefore, the disputes between the parties arising out of the said agreement could not be referred to an arbitrator. The application under Section 11(6) of the 1996 Act was, therefore, dismissed. 9. It is the said decision of the designate Judge, which is the subject matter of challenge in these appeals. The issue regarding the continued existence of the arbitration agreement, notwithstanding the main agreement itself being declared void, was considered by the 7-Judge Bench in SBP & Co. (supra) and it was held that an arbitration agreement could stand independent of the main agreement and did not necessarily become otiose, even if the main agreement, of which it is a part, is declared void. has to first decide his own jurisdiction and whether the party concerned has approached the right High Court.; whether there is an arbitration agreement and as to whether the person who has made the request before him, is a party to such agreement. ; whether the claim was a dead one or a long-barred claim, that was sought to be resurrected. = The above views expressed by the 7-Judge Bench and by the learned Single Judge are sufficient to dispose of these appeals. In the light of what has been indicated hereinbefore, we have no hesitation in setting aside the impugned judgment and the order of the designated Judge once again and directing that the matter be again considered de novo in the light of the observations made hereinabove and the various decisions cited at the Bar.

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4596 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP(C)No.7334 of 2010] M/s Today Homes & Infrastructure Pvt. Ltd. …Appellant Vs. Ludhiana Improvement Trust & Anr. …Respondents WITH C.A. No.4597 of 2013 @ SLP(C)No.11778/2010, C.A. No.4598 of 2013 @ SLP(C)No.10795/2010, C.A. No.4595 of 2013 … Continue reading

Penal Code 1860, Sections 304-A, 88, 92, 93-Criminal Liability for Medical Negligence-Death due to medical negligence-Criminal liability of doctor-Held, to prosecute a medical professional for criminal negligence it must be shown that the accused doctor did something or failed to do something which in the given facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do-Hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of such a nature that the resultant injury was most likely imminent-On facts, held, doctor can not be proceeded against under S. 304-A as it is a case of non-availability of oxygen cylinder-Rationale for special treatment of doctOTHERS discussed in detail and guidelines laid down to protect interest of doctOTHERS, and to save them from unwarranted and malicious proceedings. Sections 304-A, 88, 92, 93-Mens rea in criminal negligence-Held, for negligence to amount to a criminal offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist- Recklessness, i. e. disregard for the possible consequences, constitutes the mens rea in criminal negligence. Section 304-A-Negligence-As a tort and criminal negligence-Nature of Negligence required-Held, to fasten liability in criminal law, degree of negligence has to be higher than negligence enough to fasten liability for damages in civil law-For criminal libility, the negligence has to be gross or of a very high degree-Expression “rash and negligent act” to be reads qualified by “grossly”. 304-A-Liability under-When attracted-Held, death must be direct result of act of accused-Such act must be causa causans-Not enough if it is cause sine qua non-Criminal Law-Negligence-Causation. Section 304-A-Res ipsa loquitor-Applicability in criminal law-Held, this rule cannot be applied for determining per se the liability for negligence in criminal law and case under section 304-A cannot be decided solely by applying this rule. Tort-Professional negligence-Scope of-Held, a professional may be held liable for negligence if he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or he did not exercise the skill which he possessed with reasonable competence in the given case-Standard of care required is of the ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession-Test laid down in Bolam’s case held, applicable in India. Professional negligence distinguished from occupational negligence. Tort-Negligence-Medical Neglicence-Detailed explanation of when devation from normal medical practice would amount to evidence of medical negligence. Tort-Negligence-Res ipsa loquitor-Application to Medical Practioners-Held, has to be applied with extreme care and caution to the cases of medical negilgence. Complainant’s father was admitted to the hospital. He felt difficulty in breathing. Duty nurse called some doctor to attend to the patient. No doctor turned up for 20-25 minutes. Then the appellant and another doctor came to the patients room. An oxygen cylinder was brought and connected to the mouth of the patient but the breathing problem increased further. The oxygen cylinder was found to be empty. There was no other gas cylinder available. Later, the patient was declared dead. An offence under sections 304-A/34 Penal Code, 1860 was registered and charges filed against the doctOTHERS. Doctor’s petition to High Court to quash the charges was dismissed. Hence the appeal. Citation: 2005 AIR 3799,2005(2 )Suppl.SCR383 ,2005(6 )SCC300 ,2005(6 )SCALE173 ,2005(6 )JT614Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD : 1.1. Negligence in the context of medical profession necessarily calls for a treatment with a difference. To infer rashness or negligence on the part of a professional, in particular a doctor, additional considerations apply. A case of occupational negligence is different from one of professional negligence. A simple lack of care, an error of judgment or an accident, is not proof of negligence on the part of a medical professional. So long as a doctor follows a practice acceptable to the medical profession of that day, he cannot be held liable for negligence merely because a better alternative course or method of treatment was also available or simply because a more skilled doctor would not have chosen to follow or resort to that practice or procedure which the accused followed. When it comes to the failute of taking precautions what has to bee seen is whether those precautions were taken which the ordinary experience of men has found to be sufficient; a failure to use special or extraordinary precautions which might have prevented the particular happening cannot be the standard for judging the alleged negligence. So also, the standard of care, while assessing the practice as adopted, is judged in the light of knowledge available at the time of the incident, and not at the date of trial. Similarly, when the charge of negligence arises out of failure to use some particular equipment, the charge would fail if the equipment was not generally available at that particular time (that is, the time of the incident) at which it is suggested it should have been used. [338-B-F] 1.2. A professional may be held liable for negligence on one of the two findings: either he was not possessed of the requisite skill which he professed to have possessed, or, he did not exercise, with reasonable competence in the given case, the skill which he did possess. The standard to be applied for judging, whether the person charged has been negligent or not, would be that of an ordinary competent person exercising ordinary skill in that profession. It is not possible for every professional to posses the highest level of expertise or skills in that branch which he practices. A highly skilled professional may be possessed of better qualities, but that cannot be made the basis or the yardstick for judging the performance of the professional proceeded against on indictment of negligence. The test for determining medical negligence as laid down in Bolam’s case [1957] 1 W.L.R. 582, holds good in its applicability in India. [338-F-H; 339-A] Micheal Hyde and Associates v. J.D. William & Co., [2001] PNLR 233; Bolam v. Friern Hospital Management Committee, [1957] 1WLR 582 Eckersley v. Binnie, [1988] 18 Con LR 1; Hucks v. Cole, [1968] 118 New LJ 469; Maynard v. West Midlands Regional Health Authority, [1985] 1 All ER 635 and Hunter v. Hanley, [1995] SLT 213, relied on. Suresh Gupta (Dr.) v. Govt. of NCT of Delhi, [2004] 6 SCC 422; John Oni Akerele v. R., AIR (1943) PC 72; Kurban Hussein Mohammedali Rangwalla v. State of Maharashtra, [1965] 2 SCR 622; Kishan Chand v. State of Haryana, [1970] 3 SCC 904; Juggankhan v. State of M.P., [1965] 1 SCR 14 and Emperor v. Omkar Rampratap, (1902) 4 Bom LR 679, relied on. Dr. Laxman Balkrishna Joshi v. Dr. Trimbak Bapu Godbole, [1969] 1 SCR 206; Indian Medical Association v. V.P. Shantha, [1995] 6 SCC 651; Poonam Verma v. Ashwin Patel, [1996] 4 SCC 332; Achutrao Haribhau Khodwa v. State of Maharashtra, [1996] 2 SCC 634; Spring Meadows Hospital v. Harjot Ahluwalia, [1998] 4 SCC 39; Whitehouse v. Jorden, (1981) 1 ALL ER 267 and State of Haryana v. Santra, [2005] 5 SCC 182, referred to. 2.1. The jurisprudential concept of negligence differs in civil and criminal law. What may be negligence in civil law may not necessarily be negligence in criminal law. Generally speaking, it is the amount of damages incurred which is determinative of the extent of liability in tort; but in criminal law it is not the amount of damages but the amount and degree of negligence that is determinative of liability. For negligence to amount to an offence, the element of mens rea must be shown to exist. It is recklessness that constitutes mens rea in criminal law as far as negligence is concerned. The moral culpability of recklessness is not located in a desire to cause harm. It resides in the proximity of the reckless state of mind to the state of mind present when there is an intention to cause harm. There is, in other words, a disregard for the possible consequences. For an act to amount to criminal negligence, the degree of negligence should be much higher i.e. gross or of a very high degree. Negligence which is neither gross nor of a higher degree may provide a ground for action in civil law but cannot form the basis for prosecution. [318-C, E, H; 319-A; 320-C; 339-A-B] 2.2. The word `gross’ has not been used in Section 304A of IPC, yet it is settled that in criminal law negligence or recklessness, to be so held, must be of such a high degree as to be `gross’. The expression `rash or negligent act’ as occurring in Section 304A of the IPC has to be read as qualified by the word `grossly’. To impose criminal liability under Section 304-A IPC, it is necessary that the death should have been the direct result of a rash and negligent act of the accused, and that act must be the proximate and efficient cause without the intervention of another’s negligence. [332-C-D; 339-C-D] 2.3. To prosecute a medical professional for negligence under criminal law it must be shown that the accused did something or failed to do something which in the given facts and circumstances no medical professional in his ordinary senses and prudence would have done or failed to do. The hazard taken by the accused doctor should be of such a nature that the injury which resulted was most likely imminent. [339-D-E] R. v. Lawrence, [1981] 1 All ER 974; R. v. Caldwell, [1981] 1 All ER 961; Andrews v. Director of Public Prosecutions, (1937) AC 576; Syad Akbarnr v. State of Karnataka, [1980] 1 SCC 30; Reg v. lndu Beg, [1881] 3All 776 Riddell v. Raid, [1942] 2 All ER 161; Bhalchandra Waman Pathe v. State of Maharashtra, (1968) Mah LJ 423 (SC), relied on. Roscoe’s Law of Evidence (15th Edn.), pp. 848-49; “Speeches and Poems with the Report and Notes on the Indian Penal Code” by Lord Macaulay (Houghton Mifflin and Company, published in 1874), pp. 419, 421 & 422; Alan Merry and Alexander McCall Smith ErrOTHERS, Medicine and the Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 241-248, relied on. 3. Res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence and operates in the domain of civil law specially in cases of torts and helps in determining the onus of proof in actions relating to negligence. It cannot be pressed in service for determining per se the liability for negligence within the domain of criminal law. Res ipsa loquitur has, if at all, a limited application in trial on a charge of criminal negligence. [339-E-F] Syad Akbar v. State of Karnataka, [1980] 1 SCC 30, relied on Krishnan v. State of Kerala, [1996] 10 SCC 508, explained, 4. To protect the interest of doctOTHERS and to save them from unwarranted and malicious proceedings, statutory Rules or Executive Instructions incorporating certain guidelines need to be framed and issued by the Government of India and/or the State Governments in consultation with the Medical Council of India. So long as it is not done, the following guidelines will be in force which should govern the prosecution of doctOTHERS for offences of which criminal rashness or criminal negligence is an ingredient. A private complaint may not be entertained unless the complainant has produced prima facie evidence before the Court in the form of a credible opinion given by another competent doctor to support the charge of rashness or negligence on the part of the accused doctor. The investigating officer should, before proceeding against the doctor accused of rash or negligent act or omission, obtain an independent and competent medical opinion preferably from a doctor in government service qualified in that branch of medical practice who can normally be expected to give an impartial and unbiased opinion applying Bolam’s test to the facts collected in the investigation. A doctor accused of rashness or negligence, may not be arrested in a routine manner, unless his arrest is necessary for furthering the investigation or for collecting evidence or unless the investigation officer feels satisfied that the doctor proceeded against would not make himself available to face the prosecution unless arrested. [340-F-H; 341-A-B] 5. In the present case all the averments made in the complaint, even if held to be proved, do not make out a case of criminal rashness or negligence on the part of the accused-appellant. It is not the case of the complainant that the accused-appellant was not a doctor qualified to treat the patient whom he agreed to treat. It is a case of non-availability of oxygen cylinders either because of the hospital having failed to keep available a gas cylinder or because of the gas cylinder being found empty. Then, probably the hospital may or may not be liable in civil law but the accused-appellant cannot be proceeded against under Section 304-A IPC on the parameters of the Bolam test. [341-C-E] G.E. Vahanvati, Rakesh Dwivedi, Ashok H. Desai, Vivek K. Tankha, Rupinder Singh Suri, Mrs. Gurvinder Suri, Jagjit Singh Chhabra, Atul Nanda, Addl. Advocate General for State of Punjab, Bimal Roy Jad, P.N. Puri, Maninder Singh, Kirtiman Singh, Saurabh Mishra, Angad Mirdha, Mrs. Pratibha M. Singh, Devadatt Kamat, Ms. Rameeja Hakem, Chinmoy Pradip Sharma, Hrishikesh Barua, Ms. Suruchi Suri, Ravinder Narain, Ms. Sushma Sharma, Ms. Meghalee Barthakur, Ms.Kanika Gamber, Rajan Narain, Harekhrishna Upadhyaya, Prashant Kumar, Siddharth Singh Chauhan, Harsh Pathak, A.A. Maitrya, Praveen Khattar, Mrs. Sudha Gupta, Avik Datt and V. K. Monga for the appearing parties.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 21 CASE NO.: Appeal (crl.) 144-145 of 2004 PETITIONER: Jacob Mathew RESPONDENT: State of Punjab & Anr. DATE OF JUDGMENT: 05/08/2005 BENCH: CJI R.C. LAHOTI,G.P. MATHUR & P.K.BALASUBRAMANYAN JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T R.C. LAHOTI, CJI Ashok Kumar Sharma, the respondent no.2 herein … Continue reading

Criminal Law-Attempt to murder-Accused attempting to starve a person gradually to accelerate his death-Ingredients of the offence-Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), ss. 307, 308, 511. =B was married to the appellant in October, 1951, but their relations got strained by 1953. She was ill-treated and her health deteriorated due to maltreatment and under-nourish- ment. In 1956 she was deliberately starved and not allowed to leave the house in which they were living and only sometimes a morsel or so used to be thrown to her as alms are given to beggars. On June 5,1956, she managed to escape from the house and went to the Civil Hospital at Ludhiana. Her brother came down to Ludhiana on learning of the facts and made a complaint to the police. The doctor who attended on B sent a note to the police saying that she was seriously ill and might collapse any moment. The appellant was prosecuted for the offence of attempting to murder B under s. 307 Of the Indian Penal Code. The trial Court acquitted him but, on appeal, the High Court came to a finding, on the evidence, that the object of the appellant was to confine B and deprive her of regular food in pursuance of a scheme of regular starvation in order to accelerate her end, and convicted him under S. 307 Of the Indian Penal Code. On behalf of the appellant it was contended, inter alia, that whereas under S. 511 Of the Code for an Act to amount to the offence of attempting to commit an offence it need not be the last act and can be the first act towards the commission of the offence, under S. 307 it is the last act which, if effective to cause death, would constitute the offence of an attempt to commit murder, and that even if B had been deprived of food for a certain period, the act of so depriving her did not come under s. 307 as that act could not, by itself have caused her death, it being necessary for the period of starvation to continue for a longer period to cause death. Held, that a person commits an offence under s. 307 Of the Indian Penal Code when he has an intention to commit murder and in pursuance of that intention does an act towards its commission irrespective of the fact whether that act is the penultimate act or not. Abhayanand Mishra v. The State of Bihar, [1962] 2 S.C.R. 241, followed. Rex v. White, [1910] 2 K.B. 124, relied on. Queen v. Nidha, [1892] I.L.R. 14 All. 38 and Emperor v. Vasudeo Balwant Gogte, (1932) I.L.R. 56 BOM. 434, considered, 255 Jeetmal v. State, A.I.R. 1950 Madhya Bharat 21, disapproved. The word ‘act’ in S. 307 did not mean only a particular act of a person, but denoted, according to S. 33 Of the Code, as well, a series of acts. In the present case the course of conduct adopted by the appellant in regularly starving his wife B, comprised a series of acts which though they fell short of completing the series sufficient to kill her, came within the purview Of S. 307 Of the Indian Penal Code. The High Court was, therefore, right in convicting the appellant under that section.

PETITIONER: OM PARKASH Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF PUNJAB DATE OF JUDGMENT: 24/04/1961 BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR BENCH: DAYAL, RAGHUBAR SUBBARAO, K. CITATION: 1961 AIR 1782 1962 SCR (2) 254 CITATOR INFO : R 1965 SC 843 (6) ACT: Criminal Law-Attempt to murder-Accused attempting to starve a person gradually to accelerate his death-Ingredients of the offence-Indian … Continue reading

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973: s.482 – Order of High Court quashing criminal proceedings, relying upon the finding of civil court on the same issue as involved in the criminal proceedings, in respect of the same subject matter – HELD: Is not sustainable – The findings of fact recorded by civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa – However, in the instant case, the complainant having approached the civil court and failed, filing of the complaint by him, pending his civil appeal, with inordinate delay without any plausible explanation and with the sole intention of harassing the other party amounted to an abuse of the process of law and, therefore, the order of High Court, though not sustainable in law, is not interfered with – Penal Code, 1860 – ss.420/323/ 467/468/471/120-B – Practice and Procedure – Simultaneous civil and criminal proceedings – Administration of justice – Abuse of the process of law – Delay/Laches. An agreement to sell the suit land was executed on 4.1.1988 by the owner, namely, `KL’ in favour of respondents 1 to 4, to whom the land had already been mortgaged. Since the sale deed was not executed by the stipulated date i.e. 10.6.1989, the respondents filed a suit for specific performance and pursuant to the decree dated 8.5.1996, passed in the said suit, the sale deed was executed in favour of respondents 1 to 4 on 17.5.1996. Meanwhile, the father of the appellants also filed on 6.2.1996 a suit for specific performance against the said `KL’ stating that he had executed on 22.10.1988 an agreement to sell in his favour stipulating that the sale deed would be executed and registered by 15.6.1989. He filed another suit seeking cancellation/setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996, which was dismissed on 10.6.2002, and consequently he filed a regular first appeal. Thereafter, he filed an FIR on 22.7.2002 against the respondents alleging commission of offences punishable u/ss 420/423/ 467/468/120-B IPC. On the petition filed by the respondents, the High Court quashed the FIR and the consequent criminal proceedings. In the instant appeal the question for consideration before the Court was: “whether criminal proceedings can be quashed by the High Court relying upon a finding of civil court on an issue involved in criminal proceedings in respect of the same subject matter.” =Disposing of the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The findings of fact recorded by the civil court do not have any bearing so far as the criminal case is concerned and vice-versa. Standard of proof is different in civil and criminal cases. In civil cases it is preponderance of probabilities while in criminal cases it is proof beyond reasonable doubt. There is neither any statutory nor any legal principle that findings recorded by the court either in civil or criminal proceedings shall be binding between the same parties while dealing with the same subject matter; and both the cases have to be decided on the basis of the evidence adduced therein. However, there may be cases where the provisions of ss. 41 to 43 of the Evidence Act, 1872, dealing with the relevance of previous judgments in subsequent cases may be taken into consideration. [para 19] [26-F-H; 27-A] M.S. Sherrif Vs. The State of Madras & Ors., 1954 SCR1229= AIR 1954 SC 397; K.G. Premshankar Vs. Inspector of Police & Anr., 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR 350= AIR 2002 SC 3372; Iqbal Singh Marwah & Anr. Vs. Meenakshi Marwah & Anr., 2005 (2 ) SCR708 = (2005) 4 SCC 370; P. Swaroopa Rani Vs. M. Hari Narayana alias Hari Babu, 2008 (3) SCR900 = AIR 2008 SC 1884; Syed Aksari Hadi Ali Augustine Imam & Anr. Vs. State (Delhi Admn) & Anr., 2009 (3) SCR1017=  (2009) 5 SCC 528; and Vishnu Dutt Sharma Vs. Daya Prasad, 2009 (7) SCR977 = (2009) 13 SCC 729, relied on. M/s Karamchand Ganga Pershad & Anr. Vs. Union of India & Ors., AIR 1971 SC 1244, stood overruled V.M. Shah Vs. State of Maharashtra & Anr., 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR79= (1995) 5 SCC 767 – disapproved. Emperor Vs. Khwaja Nazair Ahmad, AIR 1945 PC 18, referred to. 1.2. In cases where there is a delay in lodging an FIR, the court should carefully examine the facts before it for the reason that a frustrated litigant who failed to succeed before the civil court may initiate criminal proceedings just to harass the other side with mala fide intentions or the ulterior motive of wreaking vengeance on the other party. Chagrined and frustrated litigants should not be permitted to give vent to their frustrations by cheaply invoking the jurisdiction of the criminal court. The court proceedings ought not to be permitted to degenerate into a weapon of harassment and persecution. [para 22] [28-A-D] Chandrapal Singh & Ors. Vs. Maharaj Singh & Anr., AIR 1982 SC 1238; State of Haryana & Ors. Vs. Ch. Bhajan Lal & Ors., 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR259= AIR 1992 SC 604; G. Sagar Suri & Anr. Vs. State of U.P. & Ors., 2000 (1) SCR417=AIR 2000 SC 754; and Gorige Pentaiah Vs. State of A.P. & Ors., 2008 (12) SCR623 = (2008) 12 SCC 531 – relied on. 1.3. In the instant case, the judgment and order of the High Court dated 13.02.2009 quashing the criminal proceedings against the respondents, though not sustainable in the eyes of law, is not interfered with in view of the facts and circumstances of the case. The agreement to sell in favour of the appellants’ father is dated 22.10.1988 and sale deed was to be executed and registered by 15.06.1989. Respondent Nos. 1 to 4 filed the suit in 1989. It is difficult to believe that the appellants’ father was not aware of the pendency of that suit. No explanation has been furnished as to why after expiry of the date of execution of the sale deed in favour of appellant’s father, i.e. 15.06.1989, he did not file the suit for specific performance which was subsequently filed on 6.2.1996. Even if it is presumed that he was not aware of pendency of the suit filed by respondent Nos. 1 to 4, no explanation could be furnished that while he filed another suit in 1996 for setting aside the decree dated 8.5.1996 in the suit of the respondents, why did he wait till the decision of that suit for lodging the FIR, as the civil and criminal proceedings could have proceeded simultaneously. The FIR was filed only on 23.07.2002 i.e. after filing the appeal before the High Court on 15.07.2002. Therefore, there is an inordinate delay on the part of the complainant in filing the FIR and there is no explanation whatsoever for the same. [para 20] [27-B-E] Sahib Singh Vs. State of Haryana, 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR95=AIR 1997 SC 3247, relied on. 1.4. The allegations made in the FIR were substantially similar to the allegations made by the appellants in the civil suit, which had been decided against them. The FIR was lodged only after loosing in the civil court. Thus, it is evident that the FIR was lodged with the sole intention of harassing the respondents and enmeshing them in long and arduous criminal proceedings. Such an action on the part of the appellants’ father would not be bona fide, and the criminal proceedings initiated by him against the respondents amount to an abuse of the process of law. [para 24] [29-B-D] Case Law Referene: AIR 1971 SC 1244 stood overruled para 12 1954 SCR1229 relied on para 13 1995 (3) Suppl. SCR79 disapproved para 14 2002 (2) Suppl. SCR350 relied on para 15 AIR 1945 PC 18 referred to para 15 2008 (3) SCR900 relied on para 16 2005 (2) SCR708 relied on para 17 2009 (3) SCR1017 relied on para 18 2009 (7) SCR977 relied on para 18 1997 (3) Suppl. SCR 95 relied on para 21 AIR 1982 SC 1238 relied on para 22 1990 (3) Suppl. SCR 259 relied on para 22 2000 (1) SCR417 relied on para 22 2008 (12) SCR623 relied on para 22 CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 1500 of 2010. From the Judgment & Order dated 13.2.2009 of the High Court of Punjab & Haryana at Chandigarh in Crl. Misc. M. No. 4136 of 2003. K.T.S. Tulsi, Priyanka A., Niraj Gupta for the Appellant. Abhinav Ramkrishna, Rakesh Dahiya, Kuldip Singh for the Respondents.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1500 OF 2010 (Arising out of SLP (Crl.) No. 5440 of 2009) Kishan Singh (D) through L.Rs. …Appellants Versus Gurpal Singh & Ors. …Respondents JUDGMENT Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. This appeal has been preferred against the Judgment and … Continue reading

Abolition of Death Sentence 101. It is only the legislature which can abolish the death penalty and not the courts. As long as the death penalty exists in the statute book it has to be imposed in some cases, otherwise it will tantamount to repeal of the death penalty by the judiciary. It is not for the judiciary to repeal or amend the law, as that is in the domain of the legislature vide Common Cause vs. Union of

1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1969 OF 2009 Ajitsingh Harnamsingh Gujral .. Appellant -versus- State of Maharashtra .. Respondent J U D G M E N T MARKANDEY KATJU, J. “Qareeb hai yaaron roz-e- mahshar, Chupega kushton ka khoon kyonkar, Jo chup rahegi zubaan-e- khanjar, Lahu … Continue reading

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