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Madhya Pradesh High Court

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M.V. Act – Death of a 19 year old Engineer student – Apex court enhanced compensation to Rs.7,00,000 from Rs. two lakhs = Radhakrishna and another ….Appellants versus Gokul and others ….Respondents = Reported in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40944

M.V. Act – Death of a 19 year old Engineer student – Apex court enhanced compensation     to Rs.7,00,000  from Rs. two lakhs =       Thus  the  grand  total compensation of the applicants is Rs.1,92,000/- entitled to  get  from Res 1-3 jointly or separately.”   The appellants challenged the award  of  the  Tribunal  by  filing  an … Continue reading

service matter = High Court has allowed all the Writ Petitions and set aside the Circular No. 17 of 2009 dated 30th November, 2009 and Circular dated 12th July, 2010 in so far as they make a provision to exclude the employees from consideration for promotion, who are otherwise eligible to be considered for promotion and are within the zone of consideration, on the basis that they have either obtained the ‘D’ rating in the annual performance report or have been penalized for any misconduct in the preceding 5 years. = Different rules/regulations of the banks provide specific punishments such as “withholding of promotion, reduction in rank, lowering in ranks/pay scales”. However, there is another range of penalty such as censure, reprimand, withholding of increments etc. which are also prescribed under various staff regulations. To debar such an employee from being considered for promotion would tantamount to also inflicting on such employee, the punishment of withholding of promotion. In such circumstances, a punishment of censure/ reprimand would, in fact, read as censure/reprimand + 5 years debarment from promotion. Thus the circulars issued by the bank debarring such employees from being considered would be clearly contrary to the statutory rules. The circulars clearly do not fall within the ratio in Sant Ram’s case (supra). 41. In our opinion, the observations made by this Court in the case of Ram Ashish Dixit (supra) are a complete answer to the submissions made by the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Dhruv Mehta. Therefore the High Court, in our opinion, has rightly quashed the aforesaid two Circulars and directed that the respondent be considered for promotion in accordance with the applicable rules. 42. We, therefore find no merit in the civil appeals filed by the appellant-bank, and are accordingly dismissed. No costs.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2970-2975 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) NOS.9181-9186 OF 2011] Rani Laxmibai Kshetriya Gramin Bank & Ors. …Appellants VERSUS Manoj Kumar Chak …Respondent WITH CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 2989-2992 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) NOS.9306-9309 OF 2011] Vidur Gramin … Continue reading

Criminal Law: Indian Penal Code, 1860 : Sections 302 and 307. Murder of wife and two children-Attempt to murder other three children- Provocation-Absence of-Commission of crime-Premediated one-Not due to sudden provocation or mental derangement-Held : offence gruesome, cold- blooded, heinous, atrocious and cruel -No mitigating circumstances but only aggrevating circumstances-“Rarerest of rare cases”-Death sentence imposed by courts below upheld. Epistolary jurisdiction-Exercise of by Supreme Court-Letter Petition from convict facing death sentence-Treating of as Special Leave Petition-Grant of leave and hearing of the criminal appeal. The appellant was convicted under Sections 302 and 307 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 and was sentenced to death. According to the prosecution, the appellant committed murder of his wife and two daughters at night by inflicting several injuries by sword. He further caused grievous injuries to his daughter and two sons with intend to commit murder. However, these three survived. On receiving information that many persons have sustained injuries and some of them have died at the residence of the appellant, P.W. 3, the Police officer, reached the spot and found the appellant’s daughter and sons in a seriously injured condition. A blood stained sword was recovered on the spot He was arrested on the same day and during investigation, it was found that he made extra judicial confession of having committed murder of his wife and children before, P.W. 6 and P.W. 7. A case was registered and a post-mortem was held. On the basis of the evidence adduced on behalf of the Prosecution the Sessions Judge came to the conclusion that the charge levelled against the appellant was fully established. The death sentence was confirmed by the High Court. In this appeal it was contended that the murder was not a pre-planned one and was on account of sudden provocation; and that the death sentence should be reduced to one of life imprisonment. On behalf of the respondent-State it was contended that the appellant had committed murder of his wife and children without any provocation against helpless dependents during night; and that the death sentence awarded to the appellant did not call for any interference. =Dismissing the appeal, this Court HELD : 1.1. The appellant-accused had caused in all 64 sword injuries to all the six persons including the three deceased persons viz., his wife and two children and those injuries speak for themselves about the gruesome nature of the crime committed by the accused. There was no provocation and there is nothing to suggest that there was any quarrel between the accused and his wife or among any one of the family members. The way in which the crime was executed clearly shows that it was a premeditated one and not on account of sudden provocation or any mental-derangement. [1166-E-F] 1.2. The crime indulged in by the accused is undoubtedly gruesome, cold blooded, heinous, atrocious and cruel. On the facts established, there appears to be no mitigating circumstances whatsoever, but only aggravating circumstances which justify the imposition of death sentence. Looking into the manner in which the crime was committed the weapon used, the brutality of the crime, number of persons murdered, the helplessness of the victims, there can be no other conclusion except the one, the Sessions Judge and the High Court arrived at to award the capital sentence to the appellant. [1166-G-H; 1167-A-B] Anshad and Others v. State of Karnataka, [1994] 4 SCC 381 Jshubha Bharatsinh Gohil& Others v.State of Gujarat, [1994] 4 SCC 353 and Suresh Chandra Bahri v. State of Punjab, [1985] Supp. 1 SCC 80, relied on. CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Criminal Appeal No. 771 of 1995.

PETITIONER: UMASHANKAR PANDA Vs. RESPONDENT: STATE OF MADHYA PRADESH DATE OF JUDGMENT: 28/02/1996 BENCH: VENKATASWAMI K. (J) BENCH: VENKATASWAMI K. (J) ANAND, A.S. (J) CITATION: JT 1996 (2) 747 1996 SCALE (2)563 ACT: HEADNOTE:JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T K. Venkataswami.J. The appellant who is in Central Jail, Indore has sent through … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908: s.47 – Execution of decree – Executing court – Jurisdiction of – Scope – Held: Executing court has no jurisdiction to modify a decree – It cannot go behind the decree and must execute the decree as it is. Default clause contained in a compromise decree – Nature of – Held: It is not penal in nature – s.74 of the Contract Act is not attracted – Stipulation to pay interest @ 18% p.a. for default in payment within agreed period not unreasonable. In a suit for declaration and permanent injunction between brothers and sisters in respect of ancestral property, compromise petition was filed by the parties which was accepted by the Court. A decree was passed thereupon. Some of the terms of compromise decree were that the respondents-defendants would pay Rs.10 lakhs to the appellants-plaintiffs and in case of failure of payment within stipulated time, appellant would be entitled to claim interest thereon @ 18% p.a. and that respondents would be at liberty to alienate/sell the suit property. As payment was not made in terms of the consent decree, the appellants filed an application for execution. Respondents filed objection under s.47 CPC before the executing Court, which was rejected. A revision petition was filed thereagainst contending that the respondents were not liable to pay interest @ 18% p.a. The High Court rejected the objection holding that the consent decree was beyond the subject matter of the suit. Moreover, it opined that the question as to whether the stipulation of payment of interest @ 18% p.a. on the judgment debtors is in the nature of penalty and is unreasonable within the purview of s.74 of the Contract Act, 1872 or not, should be considered afresh by the Executing Court. The Executing Court directed payment of interest @ 14% p.a. Respondents filed writ petition. High Court reduced the rate of interest to 9% p.a. holding that the litigating parties were real brothers and sisters, the consent decree was not in respect of any commercial transaction and in the circumstances, the stipulation of interest in default of payment within the agreed period was by way of penalty, and thus the rate of interest of 18% p.a., looking at the nature of decree, was unreasonable and excessive. Hence the present appeal. =Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. A decree remains valid unless set aside. Respondents never challenged the validity or otherwise of the said consent decree. It was acted upon. They disposed of the suit property pursuant thereto and, thus, took advantage of a part thereof. It was, therefore, impermissible for them to resile therefrom. There is no doubt or dispute as regards interpretation or application of the said consent terms. [Paras 10 and 11] [643-d-e] 2. An executing court cannot go behind the decree. It has no jurisdiction to modify a decree. It must execute the decree as it is. A default clause contained in a compromise decree even otherwise would not be considered to be penal in nature so as to attract the provisions of Section 74 of the Indian Contract Act. [Para 11] [643-f] Sova Ray & Anr. v. Gostha Gopal Dey & Ors. AIR (1988) SC 981, referred to. 3. Interest becomes leviable either under a statute or under a contract. The stipulation to pay interest at the rate of 18% per annum cannot, by itself, be said to be unreasonable. [Para 14] [645-d] P. D’Souza v. Shondrilo Naidu (2004) 6 SCC 649, distinguished Yogesh Mehta v. Custodian appointed under the Special Court & Ors. (2007) 2 SCC 624, held inapplicable. 4. The question as to whether the executing court had any jurisdiction to travel beyond the decree was not raised. The executing court had no such jurisdiction. The High Court while exercising the revisional jurisdiction also had no jurisdiction to invoke the provisions of Section 74 of the Contract Act which for all intent and purport amounts to modification of a valid decree passed by a competent court of law. The decision of the High Court, therefore, was wholly without jurisdiction. Furthermore, the High Court did not hold that Section 74 of the Contract Act will have application. It only remitted the matter to the executing court. [Para 17] [646-d-e] 5. No legal principle was adverted to by the executing court in reducing the rate of interest to 14 per cent and the High Court in reducing the same further to 9 per cent. In a large number of decisions, interest has been directed to be paid even at the rate of 18 per cent or 21 per cent per annum. The executing court is directed to proceed to execute the decree as it is. [Paras 18 and 19] [646-f] Case Law Reference: AIR (1988) SC 981 referred to Para 12 (2004) 6 SCC 649 distinguished Para 15 (2007) 2 SCC 624 held inapplicable Para 16 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal Nos. 7310-11 of 2008. From the Judgment and final Order dated 29.9.2006 of the High Court of Madhya Pradesh at Jabalpur in Writ Petition Nos. 4112 of 2006 & 4173 of 2006. Arvind Kumar Shukla, Alok Shukla, G.P. Mishra, Purcham Mubarak and Irshad Ahmad for the Appellants. Shiv Sagar Tiwari, Varun Thakur and Rajesh Singh for the Respondent. =, , , 2008(16 )SCALE305 , 2009(1 )JT151

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 7310-7311 OF 2008 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos.19271-19272 of 2007) Deepa Bhargava & Anr. … Appellants Versus Mahesh Bhargava & Ors. … Respondents JUDGMENT S.B. Sinha, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Whether the terms of a consent decree can be varied … Continue reading

APEX COURT OVERRULED THE CLAUSE 13 OF KUMARI MADHURI PATILS CASE WHEREIN THE THEN APEX COURT GAVE NEARLY 15 DIRECTIONS IN UPHOLDING CASTE CERTIFICATES = Respondents 1 to 3 claimed that they belonged to `Dhobi’ caste, a scheduled caste in Bhopal district of Madhya Pradesh, and secured appointment to posts reserved for Schedule Castes. The appellant, who was the President of the Schedule Caste Employees Association, made a complaint to the Sub-Divisional Magistrate that respondents 1 to 3 did not belong to any scheduled caste and had produced false caste certificates. = These two appeals have been referred by a two Judge bench, to a larger bench by order of reference dated 31.3.2010 doubting the legality and validity of the directions issued in Madhuri Patil. We extract below the relevant portion of the order of reference: “In Kumari Madhuri Patit’s case, as many as fifteen directions were given, which, in our opinion, are all legislative in nature. In our opinion, if a Court feels that some law should be made, then it can only make a recommendation to that effect to the legislature but it cannot itself legislate. It is upto the legislature to accept the recommendation or not. =we hold that the second sentence of clause 13 providing that where the writ petition is disposed of by a single judge, no further appeal would lie against the order of the division bench (even when there is a vested right to file such intra-court appeal) and will only be subject to a special leave under Article 136, is not legally proper and therefore, to that extent, is held to be not a good law. The second sentence of direction No.(13) stands overruled.

Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.3467 of 2005 WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.3468 of 2005 Dayaram … Appellant Vs. Sudhir Batham & Ors. … Respondents J U D G M E N T R.V. RAVEENDRAN, J. Respondents 1 to 3 claimed that they belonged to `Dhobi’ caste, a scheduled … Continue reading

The letter of credit established by the issuing bank, inter alia, made the following stipulations: ” . . . . . . . . THIS DOCUMENTARY CREDIT WHICH IS AVAILABLE BY NEGOTIATION OF 2

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1709 OF 2007 State Bank of India & Anr. …. Appellants Versus M/s. Emmsons International Ltd. & Anr. ….Respondents JUDGMENT R.M. Lodha, J. This civil appeal, by special leave, is from the judgment and decree of the Madhya Pradesh High Court whereby … Continue reading

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