Madhya Pradesh

This tag is associated with 47 posts

Allotment of Water to Kutuch District fro Sardar Sarovar =Aggrieved by the meager allocation of water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch they approached the Gujarat High Court in a public interest litigation inter alia praying for issuance of a writ in the nature of mandamus or any other appropriate writ, order or direction directing the respondent, the State of Gujarat and its functionaries to allocate more water from Sardar Sarovar Project to the District of Kutch. By the impugned order the prayer made by the appellants has been rejected and against the dismissal of the writ petition they are before us with the leave of the Court.= “We are of the opinion that the prayer for allocation of adequate water in Kuchchh district is not one which can be a matter of judicial review. It is for the executive authorities to look into this matter= The complaint of the appellants of non-adherence to the mandate of Article 38(2) of the Constitution is also misconceived. The State, in our opinion, is to strive to minimize the inequalities in income and endeavour to eliminate inequalities in status, facilities and opportunities not only amongst individuals but also amongst group of people residing in different parts or engaged in different vocations. But this does not mean that for achieving that the State Government has to apply it on the basis of the number of people residing in different parts only. Other factors just cannot be forgotten. We are in total agreement with the conclusion and reasoning given by the High Court and we reiterate that there being no judicially manageable standards for allocation of water, any interference by this Court would mean interference with the day-to-day functioning of the State Government. In view of separation of powers, this Court cannot charter the said path. In the result, we do not find any merit in this appeal which is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40555       REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2957 OF 2013 KACHCHH JAL SANKAT NIVARAN SAMITI & ORS. ..APPELLANTS VERSUS STATE OF GUJARAT & ANR. …RESPONDENTS   JUDGMENT   CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. Appellant no. 1, Kachchh Jal Sankat Nivaran Samiti, claims to be a … Continue reading

MERE ABSENCE OF EXTERNAL INJURIES ON BODY OF VICTIM – IT CAN NOT BE SAID AS CONSENT PARTY TO SEX = In the absence of pleading in defence , no court can presume the same wrongly = We are of the considered opinion that as the appellant had not taken any defence of consent of PW-5, the trial court was not correct in recording the finding that there was consent of PW-5 to the sexual intercourse committed by the appellant ;When benifit of doubt arose = The settled position of law is that the prosecution is required to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt by adducing evidence. Hence, if the prosecution in a given case adduces evidence to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court cannot acquit the accused on the ground that there are some defects in the investigation, but if the defects in the investigation are such as to cast a reasonable doubt in the prosecution case, then of course the accused is entitled to acquittal because of such doubt. In the present case, as we have seen, the evidence of PW-5 as corroborated by the evidence of PW-2 and the FIR establish beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant has committed rape on PW-5 and thus the appellant is not entitled to acquittal. 16. In the result, we are not inclined to interfere with the finding of the guilt recorded by the High Court against the appellant as well as the minimum sentence of 7 years imprisonment for the offence under Section 376 IPC imposed by the High Court. The appeal is accordingly dismissed.

PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40522 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1118 of 2004 Ganga Singh …… Appellant Versus State of Madhya Pradesh ….. Respondent J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. This is an appeal by way of special leave under Article 136 of … Continue reading

Mining lease – cancellation – When the litigation raised by original lessee ends in abatement, and after giving lease to third party, the legal heirs of original lessee can not claim any rights for renewal of lease or any rights conferred by the virtue of orders of high court which passed infavour of deceased with out knowledge, after the lapse of 14 years and the Delhi Highcourt has no jurisdiction over the mines of M.P. and over the orders of M.P. High court =In view of the aforesaid fact, we hold that after the death of the original lessee, Rajendra Nath Bhaskar, all rights come to an end and the first respondent or any other legal heir(s) were neither entitled to continue with the lease nor entitled for renewal of lease. The Original Lessee died on 7th September, 1982 during the pendency of Miscellaneous Petition No. 805/81 and much before the final order dated 16th July, 1986 passed in the said case by the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In the absence of petition for substitution of legal heirs, the said case got abated. The legal heirs including the first respondent cannot derive the advantage of the order dated 16th July, 1986, which was inadvertently passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court in absence of knowledge of death of the original petitioner/lessee.= Admittedly, the third party rights were created in the meantime in favour of the Mining Corporation pursuant to the order of Madhya Pradesh High Court dated 16th July, 1986. The order passed by the Madhya Pradesh High Court was not challenged in any appeal.= failed to decide the jurisdiction of the High Court to entertain the appeal against the order passed in favour of the Mining Corporation which was passed pursuant to the direction of the Madhya Pradesh High Court. In this back­ground, it was not desirable for the Delhi High Court to entertain the writ petition. Even though the revisional order was passed by the Central Government, the Delhi High Court ought to have asked the first respondent to move before the Madhya Pradesh High Court for appropriate relief. In view of our findings given in the preceding paragraph, the order dated 21st September, 2010 passed by the Single Judge of the High Court of Delhi and the impugned order dated 20th April, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court cannot be upheld. They are accordingly set aside. Both the appeals are allowed but there shall be no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40494 Page 1 -1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION Civil Appeal No.   4950    of 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.13053 of 2011) M.P. STATE  MINING  CORPORATION LTD. … APPELLANT Versus SANJEEV  BHASKAR & ORS.     … RESPONDENTS With Civil Appeal No.  4951   of 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.29421 of 2011) J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. These two appeals are preferred by the   appellants   M.P.   State   Mining   Corporation   Ltd. (hereinafter referred to as the “Mining Corporation”) and the State of Madhya Pradesh (hereinafter referred to as the “State”)   against the common judgment dated 20th April, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of Delhi High Court in LPA No. 742 of 2010 with LPA No. 284 of 2011.   By   its   impugned   judgment,   the   Division   Bench dismissed … Continue reading

NO REDUCTION OF SENTENCE ON THE GROUND OF COMPROMISE IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY CHALLENGE TO THE CONVICTION = Just punishment is the collective cry of the society. While the collective cry has to be kept uppermost in the mind, simultaneously the principle of proportionality between the crime and punishment cannot be totally brushed aside. The principle of just punishment is the bedrock of sentencing in respect of a criminal offence…..”= In view of the above, we reiterate that in operating the sentencing system, law should adopt the corrective machinery or deterrence based on factual matrix. The facts and given circumstances in each case, the nature of the crime, the manner in which it was planned and committed, the motive for commission of the crime, the conduct of the accused, the nature of weapons used and all other attending circumstances are relevant facts which would enter into the area of consideration. We also reiterate that undue sympathy to impose inadequate sentence would do more harm to the justice system to undermine the public confidence in the efficacy of law. It is the duty of every court to award proper sentence having regard to the nature of the offence and the manner in which it was executed or committed. The Courts must not only keep in view the rights of the victim of the crime but also the society at large while considering the imposition of appropriate punishment. Though it is stated that both the parties have amicably settled, in view of the fact that the offence charged under Section 326 is non compoundable and also in the light of serious nature of the injuries and no challenge as to conviction, we are of the view that the High Court is not justified in reducing the sentence to the period already undergone. 17) Accordingly, we set aside the order of the High Court and restore the sentence imposed on the respondents herein. Consequently, the appeal filed by the State is allowed and the respondents-accused (A-1 to A-3) are directed to surrender within a period of four weeks from today, failing which, the trial Judge is directed to take appropriate steps for sending them to prison to undergo the remaining period of sentence.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40484 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 809 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7211 of 2012) State of M.P. …. Appellant(s) Versus Najab Khan & Ors. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) This … Continue reading

Supreme Court, Criminal Appellate jurisdiction of–Certif- icate of fitness, if can be granted by High Court on a question of fact Dying declaration evidiantry value of-If must be corroborated in order to sustain conviction-Consti- tution of India, Art. 134(1)(c)- Indian Evidence Act (.1 of 1872), s. 32(1).= HEADNOTE: The Supreme Court does not ordinarily function as a Court of criminal appeal, and it is not competent for a High Court under Art. 134(1)(c) of the Constitution to grant a certifi- cate of fitness for appeal to this Court on a ground which is essentially one of fact. Haripada Dey v. The -State of West Bengal” – (1956) S.C.R. 639, followed. There is no absolute rule of law, not even a rule of pru- dence that has- ripened -into a: rule of law- that a dying declaration in order-that it may sustain an order of convic- tion must be corroborated by, other independent evidence. The observations made by this Court in Madhoprasad v. The State of Madhya Pradesh are in the nature of obiter dicta and do not lay down the law. Madhoprasad v. The State of Madhya Pradesh, A.I.R. (1953) S.C. 420, considered. In re Guruswami Tevar, I.L.R. (1940) Mad. I58, approved. Case-law reviewed.The provision of s. 32(I) of the Indian Evidence Act ” which makes the statement in a dying declaration as to the cause of death and the circumstances that brought it about rele- vant, is an exception to the general rule of exclusion of hearsay evidence and evidence untested by cross-examination. The special sanctity which the Legislature attaches to such a declaration must be respected unless such declaration can be shown not to have been made in expectation of death or to be otherwise unreliable and any evidence adduced for this purpose can only detract from its value but not affect its admissibility. Although a dying declaration has to be very closely scruti-nised, and tested as any other piece of evidence, once the Court comes to the conclusion, in any particular case, that it is true, no question of corroboration arises. A dying declaration cannot be placed in the same category as the evidence of an accomplice or a confession. Consequently, in a case where the trial judge as also the High Court founded their orders of conviction of an accused person under S. 302 Of the Indian Penal Code mainly on three dying declarations made by the murdered person in quick succession one after the other, and the High Court, relying on a decision of this Court, sought for corroboration of such dying declarations in the fact that the accused person had absconded and was arrested in suspicious circumstances, but was in doubt as to the sufficiency of such evidence of corroboration and granted the certificate of fitness under= Held, that the certificate granted by the High Court was incompetent and as the case disclosed no grounds on which this Court could possibly grant special leave to appeal under Art. 136 of the Constitution, the appeal must be dismissed.

reported in/ published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=609 http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 12 PETITIONER: KUSHAL RAO Vs. RESPONDENT: THE STATE OF BOMBAY DATE OF JUDGMENT: 25/09/1957 BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. BENCH: SINHA, BHUVNESHWAR P. MENON, P. GOVINDA KAPUR, J.L. CITATION: 1958 AIR 22 1958 SCR 552 ACT: Supreme Court, Criminal Appellate jurisdiction of–Certif- icate of … Continue reading

A person having 100 per cent burns can make a statement, and a certificate of fitness provided by a doctor is not a condition precedent for placing reliance upon a dying declaration.= In our opinion, as the defence did not put any question either to the executive magistrate, or to the I.O., or to the doctors who had examined her or conducted the post-mortem, with respect to whether any part of the thumb had skin on it or not, as in both the dying declarations, ridges and curves had been clearly found to exist, we do not see any reason to dis-believe the version of events provided by the executive magistrate and the I.O., who had recorded the dying declarations. No suggestion was made to either of them in this regard, nor was any explanation furnished with respect to why these two independent persons who had recorded the dying declarations, would have deposed against the respondents accused. In the event that both of them had found the deceased to be in a fit physical and mental condition to make a statement, there exists no reason to disbelieve the same.

Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 2303 of 2009 State of Madhya Pradesh …Appellant Versus Dal Singh & Ors. …Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J. 1. This appeal has been preferred against the impugned judgment and order dated 30.8.2006, passed … Continue reading

legality of an order passed by the Joint Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, Sagar Division, Sagar, M.P., superseding the Board of Directors of District Cooperative Central Bank Ltd., Panna without previous consultation with the Reserve Bank of India, as provided under the second proviso to Section 53(1) of the Madhya Pradesh Cooperative Societies Act, 1960= In such circumstances of the case, we are inclined to dismiss both the appeals with costs directing re-instatement of the first respondent Board of Directors back in office forthwith and be allowed to continue for the period they were put out of office by the impugned order which has been quashed. We also direct the State of Madhya Pradesh to pay an amount of Rs.1,00,000/- to the Madhya Pradesh Legal Services Authority within a period of one month by way of costs and also impose a cost of Rs.10,000/- as against the Joint Registrar, Co-operative Societies, Sagar, the officer who passed the order, which will be deducted from his salary and be deposited in the Panna DCB within a period of two months from today. Ordered accordingly. Further, we are inclined to give the following general directions in view of the mushrooming of cases in various Courts challenging orders of supersession of elected Committees: (1) Supersession of an elected managing Committee/Board is an exception and be resorted to only in exceptional circumstances and normally elected body be allowed to complete the term for which it is elected. (2) Elected Committee in office be not penalised for the shortcomings or illegalities committed by the previous Committee, unless there is any deliberate inaction in rectifying the illegalities committed by the previous committees. (3) Elected Committee in Office be given sufficient time, say at least six months, to rectify the defects, if any, pointed out in the audit report with regard to incidents which originated when the previous committee was in office. (4) Registrar/Joint Registrar are legally obliged to comply with all the statutory formalities, including consultation with thePage 34 34 financing banks/Controlling Banks etc. Only after getting their view, an opinion be formed as to whether an elected Committee be ousted or not. (5) Registrar/ Joint Registrar should always bear in mind the consequences of an order of supersession which has the effect of not only ousting the Board out of office, but also disqualify them for standing for election in the succeeding elections. Registrar/Joint Registrar therefore is duty bound to exercise his powers bona fide and not on the dictation or direction of those who are in power. (6) Registrar/Joint Registrar shall not act under political pressure or influence and, if they do, be subjected to disciplinary proceedings and be also held personally liable for the cost of the legal proceedings. (7) Public money not to be spent by the State Government or the Registrar for unnecessary litigation involving disputes between various factions in a co-operative society. Tax payers money is not expected to be spent for settling those disputes. If found necessary, the same be spent from the funds available with the concerned Bank

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4691 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP (C) No. 6860 of 2012] State of M.P. and Others .. Appellants Versus Sanjay Nagayach and Others .. Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4692 OF 2013, (Arising out of SLP (Civil) No. 13125 … Continue reading

Panch Faisla. interpretation which contains a rider on the property not to alienate, mortgage etc., = “The house No. 512 is in Kotwali ward. Part of which shown in yellow colour on the eastern side is assigned to Phoolchand and the western part thereof shown in green colour is assigned to Dulichand. However, in view of the fact that financial condition of Phoolchand is very weak and he has a large family he can retain the portion of Dulichand also on a condition that neither he nor his descendants would be entitled to alienate the same by sale, gift, etc. and if they violate the same it would be open for Dulichand or his descendants to get the possession of their portion. Secondly for the portion assigned to Dulichand in case Phoolchand pays a sum of rupees eight thousand to Shyama Bai, he would be entitled to retain the same and subsequent thereto Phoolchand would not have any right on this part.” In fact Phoolchand had purchased the said limited rights on paying the family debt to Shyama Bai.- It has been admitted by the respondents/defendants in the plaint itself that an amount of rupees eight thousand had been paid by the appellants to Shyama Bai. Therefore, in view of the above, Phoolchand could have been permitted to retain the said portion of Dulichand’s share, as he had fulfilled the condition stipulated therein. Giving literal effect to the last sentence that on making the payment of rupees eight thousand to Shyama Bai, the rights of Phoolchand would be extinguished, leads to absurdity. In fact, Phoolchand had purchased the share of Dulichand with a further rider, that neither he nor his descendants would be able to alienate the suit property in future. Under no circumstance, could phoolchand be asked to make the payment of debt to Shyama Bai and get nothing in lieu thereof. In fact the said amount of rupees eight thousand was paid by Phoolchand in 1960, when money had a substantial value and a person could purchase immovable property for such a handsome amount. 10. In order to do complete justice between the parties, in the facts of this case, the appeal is allowed. The judgment and decree of the courts below are set aside. ‘

‘ ITEM NO.104 COURT NO.7 SECTION IV S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS CIVIL APPEAL NO(s). 2435 OF 2005 RAJESH AGRAWAL & ORS. Appellant (s) VERSUS KASTURIBAI & ORS. Respondent(s) (With office report ) Date: 11/03/2013 This Appeal was … Continue reading

Application for Intervention is allowed. 1. We have been called upon to decide the necessity of a second home for Asiatic Lion (Panthera leo persica), an endangered species, for its long term survival and to protect the species from extinction as issue rooted on eco-centrism, which supports the protection of all wildlife forms, not just those which are of instrumental value to humans but those which have intrinsic worth.= Cheetah to Kuno- We notice that while the matter was being heard, a decision has been made by MoEF to import African Cheetahs from Namibia to India and to introduce the same at Kuno. Amicus Curiae filed I.A. No. 3452 of 2012. This Court granted a stay on 8.5.2012 of the decision of MoEF to import the Cheetahs from Namibia to India for introducing them to Kuno. Serious objections have been raised by the Amicus Curiae Shri P.S. Narasimha against the introduction of foreign species at Kuno. Learned Amicus Curiae pointed out that the decision to introduce African Cheetahs into the same proposed habitat chosen for re-introduction of Asiatic lion has not been either placed before the Standing Committee of NBWL, nor has there been a consistent decision. Learned Amicus Curiae pointed out that IUCN Guidelines on translocation clearly differentiated between introduction and re-introduction.= We may indicate that our top priority is to protect Asiatic lions, an endangered species and to provide a second home. Various steps have been taken for the last few decades, but nothing transpired so far. Crores of rupees have been spent by the Government of India and the State of Madhya Pradesh for re- introduction of Asiatic lion to Kuno. At this stage, in our view, the decision taken by MoEF for introduction of African cheetahs first to Kuno and then Asiatic lion, is arbitrary an illegal and clear violation of the statutory requirements provided under the Wildlife Protection Act. The order of MoEF to introduce African Cheetahs into Kuno cannot stand in the eye of Law and the same is quashed. – MoEF’s decision for re-introduction of Asiatic lion from Gir to Kuno is that of utmost importance so as to preserve the Asiatic lion, an endangered species which cannot be delayed. Reintroduction of Asiatic lion, needless to say, should be in accordance with the guidelines issued by IUCN and with the active participation of experts in the field of re-introduction of endangered species. MoEF is therefore directed to take urgent steps for re-introduction of Asiatic lion from Gir forests to Kuno. MoEF has to constitute an Expert Committee consisting of senior officials of MoEF, Chief Wildlife Wardens of the States of Madhya Pradesh and Gujarat. Technical experts should also be the members of the Committee, which will include the Secretary General and Chief Executive Officer of WWF. Dr. Y.S. Jhala, senior scientist with Wildlife Institute of India, Dr. Ravi Chellam, senior scientist, Dr. A.J.T. Johnsingh, since all of them had done lot of research in that area and have national and international exposure. Any other expert can also be co-opted as the members of the Committee. Needless to say, the number of lions to be re-introduced would depend upon the density of prey base and other related factors, which the Committee will assess. I.A. is allowed as mentioned above. The order be carried out in its letter and spirit and within a period of 6 months from today. We record our deep appreciation for the assistance rendered by all the senior counsel and learned amicus curiae Shri P.S. Narasimha and also Dr. Ravi Chellam who was present in the Court throughout and made valuable suggestions with regard to the various environmental and scientific issues. We are also inclined to highlight the necessity of an exclusive parliamentary legislation for the preservation and protection of endangered species so as to carry out the recovery programmes before many of the species become extinct and to give the following directions: (a) NWAP (2002-2016) has already identified species like the Great Indian Bustard, Bengal Florican, Dugong, the Manipur Brow Antlered Deer, over and above Asiatic Lion and Wild Buffalo as endangered species and hence we are, therefore, inclined to give a direction to the Government of India and the MoEF to take urgent steps for the preservation of those endangered species as well as to initiate recovery programmes. (b) The Government of India and the MoEF are directed to identify, as already highlighted by NWAP, all endangered species of flora and fauna, study their needs and survey their environs and habitats to establish the current level of security and the nature of threats. They should also conduct periodic reviews of flora and fauna species status, and correlate the same with the IUCN Red Data List every three years. (c) Courts and environmentalists should pay more attention for implementing the recovery programmes and the same be carried out with imagination and commitment

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. No. 100 In WRIT PETITION (CIVIL) NO. 337 OF 1995 Centre for Environment Law, WWF-I .. Applicants Versus Union of India & Others .. Respondents WITH IA No.3452 in WP(C) No.202 of 1995 J U D G M E N T K. … Continue reading

LAND ACQUISITION – FIXATION OF COMPENSATION FOR DIFFERENT LANDS UNDER ONE NOTIFICATION = the High Court almost on a uniform basis awarded compensation at the rate of Rs.235/- per sq. yard notwithstanding the type of land involved. Although a distinction had been made between “chahi” lands, “pahar gair mumkin” lands and “gair mumkin” lands while assessing compensation, ultimately, a uniform rate was awarded in respect of the different types of lands which had been acquired. Different reasons have been given by the High Court in arriving at the uniform figure of Rs.235/- per sq. yard, but what is important is that ultimately by applying different methods, the compensation worked out to be same. In the said cases, the High Court had assessed the compensation payable for the acquired lands at the rate of Rs.805/- per sq. yard along with the statutory sums available under Section 23(1A) of the Land Acquisition Act and solatium on the market value under Section 23(2) thereof. It was also indicated that the land owners would also be entitled to interest as provided under Section 28 of the Act. ; The general cut imposed is at a flat rate of 40%, which, in our view, is not warranted on account of the fact that the lands in question have lost their character and potentiality as agricultural lands and have more or less been converted into lands which were ready for use for the purpose of construction. Taking Ms. Agarwal’s submissions regarding the factors which determine deduction towards development cost, such as location and potentiality, into account, we are of the view that a deduction of 331/3 per cent would be reasonable on account of the passage of time and the all round development in the area which has made it impossible for the lands to retain their original character. 47. Accordingly, we direct that except where we have provided otherwise, wherever a deduction of 40% had been made, the same should be altered to 331/3 per cent and the compensation awarded is to be modified accordingly.; the Collector had awarded compensation at a uniform rate of Rs. 1,81,200/- per acre along with statutory benefits. The Reference Court determined the compensation at the uniform rate of Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The High Court modified the said award and awarded compensation at the rate of Rs. 260/- per sq. yard for the land acquired up to the depth of 100 meters abutting National Highway No. 10. The value of the rest of the acquired land was maintained at Rs. 206/- per sq. yard. The area in question being already developed to some extent, a cut of 50% on the value is, in our view, excessive. We agree with Mr. Swarup that resorting to the belting system by the High Court was improper and that at best a standard cut of 1/3rd would have been sufficient to balance the smallness of the exhibits produced. It has been pointed out by Mr. Swarup that on a comparative basis, the price of lands in the area in 1991 was on an average of about Rs. 420/- per sq. yard. Given the sharp rise in land prices, the value, according to Mr. Swarup, would have doubled to about Rs. 800/- per sq. yard by 1993. Even if we have to apply the formula of 12% increase, the valuation of the lands in question in 1993 would be approximately Rs. 527/- per sq. yard. Imposing a deduction of 1/3rd, valuation comes to about Rs. 350/- per sq. yard, which, in our view, would be the proper compensation for the lands covered in the case of Mukesh (supra) and other connected matters.

Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS.3279-3287 OF 2013 [Arising out of SLP(C)Nos.24704-24712 of 2007] Ashrafi and Ors. …Appellants Vs. State of Haryana and Ors. …Respondents WITH C.A.Nos.3288-3299/2013@SLP(C)Nos.13415-13426/2008, C.A.Nos.3300-3319/2013@SLP(C)Nos.12263-12282/2008, C.A.No.3320/2013@SLP(C)No.15648/2008, C.A.Nos.3321-3323/2013@SLP(C)Nos.5392-5394/2008, C.A.Nos.3324-3325/2013@SLP(C)Nos.15485-15486/2009, C.A.Nos.3326-3330/2013@SLP(C)Nos.8592-8596/2009, C.A.Nos.3331-3333/2013@SLP(C)Nos.34118-34120/2010, C.A.Nos.3334-3337/2013@SLP(C)Nos.4176-4179/2010, C.A.Nos.3338-3340/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11156-11158/2009, C.A.No.3341/2013@SLP(C)No.28895/2008, C.A.Nos.3342-3344/2013@SLP(C)Nos.14409-14411/2013 (CC 863-865/2011), C.A.No.3345/2013@SLP(C)No.33257/2010, C.A.Nos.3346-3347/2013@SLP(C)Nos.11171-11172/2009, C.A.Nos.3348-3349/2013@SLP(C)Nos.3125-3126/2011, C.A.Nos.3350-3351/2013@SLP(C)Nos.29721-29722/2009, C.A.No.3352/2013@SLP(C)No.31281/2009, C.A. No.8719 … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,886,951 hits



Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,905 other followers
Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com