Madras High Court

This tag is associated with 45 posts

Tamil Nadu Teacher Eligibility Test (TNTET) -2013 Notification/Advertisement No.13/2013 dated 22nd May, 2013 – fixing cut off marks at 60% with out considering communal basis reservations- Writ petition to quash the notification as unconstitutional – High court rejected the writ as it is a matter of policy , court’s have no business to interfere – Apex court confirmed the same and dismissed the SLP = Prof. A. Marx. …. Petitioner Verses Government of Tamil Nadu & Anr. …. Respondents = Published in judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41085

Tamil Nadu Teacher Eligibility  Test  (TNTET)  -2013 Notification/Advertisement No.13/2013 dated 22nd May,  2013  – fixing cut off marks at 60%  with out considering communal basis reservations- Writ petition to quash the notification as unconstitutional – High court rejected the writ as it is a matter of policy , court’s have no business to interfere – Apex court … Continue reading

Service matter = The Diploma holders after obtaining Degree , on their application , can be re-designated as Assistant engineers and while considering their promotion for Assistant Executive Engineer (Electrical) – They can, therefore, be considered only against the 25% quota reserved for the Subordinate Service and not against 75% reserved for the State Service members directly recruited to that service or appointed by transfer in terms of the Rules. = apex court dismissed the appeal. = B. Thirumal …Appellant Versus Ananda Sivakumar and Ors. …Respondents = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=41001

The Diploma holders after obtaining Degree , on their application , can be re-designated as Assistant engineers  and while considering their promotion for Assistant  Executive  Engineer (Electrical) –    They can, therefore, be considered  only  against  the 25% quota reserved for the Subordinate Service and not against 75%  reserved for the  State  Service  members  directly  recruited  to  that  service  or appointed by transfer … Continue reading

RENT EVICTION SUIT WITH OUT SURRENDERING THE POSSESSION, A TENANT CAN NOT CHALLENGE THE TITLE OF OWNER =Rent Control and Eviction – Suit for ejectment and resumption of possession of land filed by respondents on the ground that appellant-tenant failed to pay rent from 1986 – Plea of appellant in written statement that suit land actually belonged to him and the lease deed was executed and rent was paid to respondents by mistake of fact – Trial court decreed suit for eviction after recording finding that the appellants had failed to prove the title to the land – First appellate court and High Court upheld the decision of trial court. =It is well settled that the tenant who has been let into possession by the landlord cannot deny the landlord’s title however defective it may be, so long as he has not openly surrendered possession by surrender to his landlord – Although, there are some exceptions to this general rule, none of the exceptions were established by the appellants in this case – Therefore, appellants who were the tenants of the respondents would have to surrender possession to the respondents before they can challenge the title of the respondents – Although an averment was made in the plaint that respondents were owners of the suit land, no relief for declaration of title as such was claimed by the respondents – Only the relief of eviction was sought in the plaint on the ground that the lease had not been renewed after 1986 and the rent had not been paid since 1986- Therefore, this being not a suit of declaration of title and recovery of possession but only a suit for eviction, trial Court, first appellate court and High Court were not called upon to decide the question of title – The findings of courts below on title is, therefore, set aside, but the decree for eviction is maintained – The appellants are directed to vacate the suit land within six months – Suit, if any, filed by the appellants for declaration of title and consequential relief cannot be entertained by the court unless the appellants first vacate and handover possession to the respondents. = STATE OF A.P. & ORS. Appellant(s) VERSUS D. RAGHUKUL PERSHAD (D) BY LRS & ORS. Respondent(s) = published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/helddis.aspx

Rent Control and Eviction – Suit for ejectment and resumption of possession of land filed by respondents on the ground that appellant-tenant failed to pay rent from 1986 – Plea of appellant in written statement that suit land actually belonged to him and the lease deed was executed and rent was paid to respondents by … Continue reading

Service matter – promotion = Appellants were absorbed in the RD Department as Overseers. Their previous service in Highways Department was also on the post of Overseers. In Rooplal’s case (supra), the Appellants were Sub- Inspectors of Boarder Security Force who were initially taken on deputation in Delhi Police as Sub- Inspectors (Executive) and were later on absorbed in Delhi Police in the same capacity. While fixing their seniority in Delhi Police, service already rendered by them as Sub-Inspectors in BSF was not taken into consideration. – The Appellants herein claimed the benefit of the previous service on the lower post of Overseer for determining the seniority on the higher post of Assistant Engineer. The aforesaid submission cannot be accepted for the simple reason that the Appellants had voluntarily accepted and given the option to be absorbed in the RD Department on the post of Overseer. No claim was made at that stage to be either absorbed or promoted as Assistant Engineer or to be given the benefit of the service already rendered by them in the Highways Department. Having considered the entire matter, we see no reason to differ with the view taken by the High Court. 32. The appeals are accordingly dismissed.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40839 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.8758 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C.) No. 20986 of 2007) Tamil Nadu Rural Development Engineers Association …Appellant VERSUS The Secretary to Government Rural Development Department & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.8759 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C.) … Continue reading

Inquiry by CBI – rejected due to delay – with liberty to file fresh application on fresh grounds if any = the High Court has rejected the prayer of the appellant to transfer the investigation of his case/complaint to Central Bureau of Investigation (hereinafter referred to as the `CBI’). – His request to the Judicial Magistrate in regard to medical examination of the injuries which had been caused to him was rejected. = In sum and substance, firstly, the facts and circumstances of the instant case do not present special features warranting transfer of investigation to CBI, and that too, at such a belated stage where the final report under Section 173(2) Cr.P.C. has already been submitted before the competent criminal court. The allegations are only against the then RDO who might have been transferred to various districts during these past 15 years. Similarly various other police officials might have investigated the case and it is difficult to assume that every police official was under his influence and all of them acted with malafide intention. In view of the earlier order of this Court dated 2.9.2008, no subsequent development has been brought to the notice of the court which could warrant interference by superior courts and transfer the investigation to CBI. 15. In view of the above, we do not see any cogent reason to interfere with the impugned judgment and order of the High Court. The appeal lacks merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.

   published in         http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40664 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.1167 of 2013 Prof. K.V. Rajendran …Appellant   Versus   Superintendent of Police, CBCID South …Respondents Zone, Chennai & Ors. J U D G M E N T   Dr. B.S. CHAUHAN, J.   1. This … Continue reading

Hindu succession Act sec. 8 order of succession = In the personal/ self acquired property of Grand father, No Grand son can file a suit for partition against his father as the property fell to the father is his personal property and as the grand son is not the class I heir = A serious objection to the maintainability of the suit has been filed by the grandchildren of late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri in the life time of their father.= The present suit has been filed by Gaurav Sikri and Khushal Sikri, who are both minor sons of the defendant No.2. The suit has been filed through their mother Smt. Neha Sikri.= as per the averments made in the plaint late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri was the owner of the suit properties- on the death of late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri his heirs succeeded to the same as per the law of succession. In view of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the plaintiffs would not fall in the category of Class I heirs and only their father (defendant No.2) would be entitled to inherit CS(OS)944/2004 Page No.3 of 8along with his brothers, sister and mother. = In view of the preamble to the Act, i.e., that to modify where necessary and to codify the law, in our opinion it is not possible when Schedule indicates heirs in class I and only includes son and does not include son’s son but does include son of a predeceased son, to say that when son inherits the property in the situation contemplated by Section 8 he takes it as karta of his own undivided family. – late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri was the owner of the suit properties and that upon his death the same were inherited by his legal heirs. That being the case, the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of Wealth Tax Commissioner v. Chander Sen (supra) would be clearly applicable and, therefore, the plaintiffs being the grandsons would not have any share in the property left by late Sh. Vilayati Ram Sikri during the life time of the defendant No.2 (Rajesh Sikri). Consequently, the plaint, on the basis of the averments made therein, does not disclose any cause of action and the same is accordingly rejected.

published in http://lobis.nic.in/dhc/BDA/judgement/07-11-2007/BDA24092007S9442004.pdf THE HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT NEW DELHI Judgment delivered on : 24.09.2007 CS(OS) 944/2004 MASTER GAURAV SIKRI & ANR. …….Plaintiffs – versus – SMT. KAUSHALYA SIKRI & ORS. ……..Defendants Advocates who appeared in this case: For the Plaintiffs : Mr Viraj R. Datar with Mr Aditya Jhanji For the Defendants : Mr … Continue reading

Whether the promises at the time of election amounts to corrupt practices – apex court held No.: Whether the free gifts to the voters in their Manifesto amounts to corrputs practices – apex court held yes = distribution of free gifts by the political parties (popularly known as ‘freebies’). The Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam (DMK)- Respondent No. 8 herein, while releasing the election manifesto for the Assembly Elections 2006, announced a Scheme of free distribution of Colour Television Sets (CTVs) to each and every household which did not possess the same, if the said party/its alliance were elected to power. Thus, promises in the election manifesto do not constitute as a corrupt practice under the prevailing law.- the promises in the election manifesto cannot be read into Section 123 for declaring it to be a corrupt practice. ; Although, the law is obvious that the promises in the election manifesto cannot be construed as ‘corrupt practice’ under Section 123 of RP Act, the reality cannot be ruled out that distribution of freebies of any kind, undoubtedly, influences all people. It shakes the root of free and fair elections to a large degree. = we hereby direct the Election Commission to frame guidelines for the same in consultation with all the recognized political parties as when it had acted while framing guidelines for general conduct of the candidates, meetings, processions, polling day, party in power etc. = Model Code of Conduct for the Guidance of Political Parties & Candidates. We are mindful of the fact that generally political parties release their election manifesto before the announcement of election date, in that scenario, strictly speaking, the Election Commission will not have the authority to regulate any act which is done before the announcement of the date. Nevertheless, an exception can be made in this regard as the purpose of election manifesto is directly associated with the election process. We hereby direct the Election Commission to take up this task as early as possible owing to its utmost importance. We also record the need for a separate legislation to be passed by the legislature in this regard for governing the political parties in our democratic society. In the light of the above discussion, taking note of statutory provisions of the RP Act, which controls only candidate or his agent, mandates provided under the directive principles, various guidelines such as income limit, preference to women, agricultural labourer etc as detailed in the counter affidavit by the State, we find no merit in the appeal as well as in the transferred case. With the above observation as mentioned in paragraph Nos. 77-80, the appeal and the transferred case are dismissed. No order as to costs. of

 published in   http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40527  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION 1 2 CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5130 OF 2013 3 (Arising out of SLP (C) No. 21455 of 2008) S. Subramaniam Balaji …. Appellant(s) Versus The Government of Tamil Nadu & Ors. …. Respondent(s) WITH TRANSFERRED CASE NO 112 OF 2011 S. Subramaniam … Continue reading

Section 498A and Section 302 read with Section 34 of the IPC.= where some part of evidence is not believable, it does not mean that entire case is false, court can take aid of sec.106 of Indian Evidence Act to do justice = “The maxim “falsus in uno falsus in omnibus” has no application in India and the witnesses cannot be branded as liars. This maxim has not received general acceptance nor has it come to occupy the status of a rule of law. It is merely a rule of caution. All that it amounts to is that in such cases testimony may be disregarded, and not that it must be disregarded. The doctrine merely involves the question of weight of evidence which a court may apply in a given set of circumstances, but it is not what may be called “a mandatory rule of evidence”. The doctrine is a dangerous one, especially in India for if a whole body of the testimony were to be rejected, because a witness was evidently speaking an untruth in some aspect, it is to be feared that administration of criminal justice would come to a dead stop. Witnesses just cannot help in giving embroidery to a story, however true in the main. Therefore, it has to be appraised in each case as to what extent the evidence is worthy of acceptance, and merely because in some respects the court considers the same to be insufficient for replacing reliance on the testimony of a witness, it does not necessarily follow as a matter of law that it must be disregarded in all respects as well. The evidence has to be sifted with care. Falsity of a particular material witness or a material particular would not ruin it from the beginning to end. The aforesaid dictum is not a sound rule for the reason that one hardly comes across a witness whose evidence 2 (2003) 7 SCC 643 does not contain a grain of untruth or at any rate exaggeration, embroideries or embellishment.” – while dealing with Section 106 of the Evidence Act, this Court observed as under: “A fact otherwise doubtful may be inferred from certain other proved facts. When inferring the existence of a fact from other set of proved facts, the court exercises a process of reasoning and reaches a logical conclusion as to the most probable position. The above position is strengthened in view of Section 114 of the Evidence Act, 1872. It empowers the court to presume the existence of any fact which it thinks likely to have happened. In that process, the courts shall have regard to the common course of natural events, human conduct, etc. in addition to the facts of the case. In these circumstances, the principles embodied in Section 106 of the Evidence Act can also be utilized. Section 106 however is not intended to relieve the prosecution of its burden to prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but it would apply to cases where the prosecution has succeeded in proving facts from which a reasonable inference can be drawn regarding the existence of certain other facts, unless the accused by virtue of his special knowledge regarding such facts, has offered an explanation which might drive the court to draw a different inference.” – PW-5 Dr. Rajabalan has stated that if poison had been consumed prior to the head injury, it would have reached the liver and kidney. He has added that if poison is administered to a person when he is in an unconscious state there is a possibility that it would reach the stomach and intestine. = A1-Babu first caused the head injury to the deceased and when she became unconscious in order to create evidence to suggest that the deceased committed suicide, he administered poison to her. It reached her stomach and intestine but before it could reach the kidney and liver she died. When she succumbed to the head injury, the poison did not pass on to the liver and kidney. The High Court has rightly observed that this is the reason why there is no evidence of any resistance being offered by the deceased and no bruises were found on her lips. The trial court has convicted A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC and not for offence punishable under Section 302 of the IPC on the ground that the deceased had suffered only one head injury. The High Court has concurred with the trial court. We see no reason to interfere with the impugned order. In the circumstances, we confirm the conviction of A1- Babu and A2-Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the sentence imposed on A1- Babu for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We find from the letter dated 17/5/2013 sent by the Principal District and Sessions Judge, Coimbatore that A2-Pappathi has already undergone one year and four months sentence. In the peculiar facts of the case we direct that the sentence already undergone by A2-Pappathi be treated as sentence for the offence under Section 498A of the IPC. We confirm the conviction and sentence of A1-Babu for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I of the IPC. However, we quash and set aside the conviction and sentence of A2- Pappathi for offence punishable under Section 304 Part I read with Section 109 of the IPC. There is, therefore, no question of her surrendering to the Court. As per order passed by this Court on 8/10/2007, she is on bail. Her bail bond shall stand discharged. As per the order of this Court dated 8/10/2007, A1-Babu is also on bail. Since we have confirmed his conviction and sentence, we direct that he should surrender before the Principal Sessions Judge, Coimbatore to serve out the remaining sentence. His bail bond shall stand cancelled. Needless to say that A1-Babu’s sentence for offences punishable under Sections 498A and 304 Part I of the IPC shall run concurrently.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40478 Page 1 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 1738 OF 2007 BABU @ BALASUBRAMANIAM AND ANR. …Appellants Versus THE STATE OF TAMIL NADU …Respondent J U D G M E N T (SMT.) RANJANA PRAKASH DESAI, J. 1. The appellants (A1-Babu and A2-Pappathi respectively, for convenience) … Continue reading

suit for partition of joint family properties = even suit items 1 and 2 though were also purchased in the name of the first defendant yet they were joint family properties and therefore, the plaintiffs were entitled to claim a share in all the three items of the suit schedule properties.= The trial Court while granting the relief in favour of the appellants, considered the oral evidence of P.W.1, the mother and Ex.A-17 in particular. The High Court while reversing the judgment of the Trial Court placed reliance upon the release deed executed by the first respondent in the year 1959 viz., Ex.A-3 and partition deed of the year 1973, which was entered into between the four plaintiffs in which document the first respondent affixed his signature. the release deed of the year 1959 viz. Ex.A-3 and the partition deed of the year 1973 viz., Ex.A-28, it was established that the first and second items of the suit scheduled properties which were purchased in the name of the first respondent were the exclusive properties of the first respondent and therefore, the appellants were not entitled for partition in those properties. whether there was total misreading of evidence by the High Court by not considering or referring to Ex.A-17 while interfering with the judgment of the Trial Court and whether legal principles of gift were established in regard to the first item of the suit schedule property.”; Section 17 of the Evidence Act reads as under: “S.17. Admission defined:- An admission is a statement, oral or documentary or contained in electronic form, which suggests any inference as to any fact in issue or relevant fact, and which is made by any of the persons, and under the circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.” 24. As far as the principle to be applied in Section 17 is concerned, the Section as it reads is an admission, which constitutes a substantial piece of evidence, which can be relied upon for proving the veracity of the facts, incorporated therein. When once, the admission as noted in a statement either oral or documentary is found, then the whole onus would shift to the party who made such an admission and it will become an imperative duty on such party to explain it. In the absence of any satisfactory explanation, it will have to be presumed to be true. It is needless to state that an admission in order to be complete and to have the value and effect referred to therein, should be clear, certain and definite, without any ambiguity, vagueness or confusion. – “admissible evidence irrespective of whether the party making them appeared in the witness box or not and whether that party when appearing as witness was confronted with those statements in case it made a statement contrary to those admissions.” – when we consider the contents of Ex.A-17, which is in Tamil, is a letter written by the first respondent himself on 24.06.1974. The said letter was addressed to the third plaintiff Mr.Manickavasagam. The contents of the said letter read as under: “The second plaintiff Saravanamurthi, came to my house the day before yesterday at around 09.30 p.m. He stated that something should be immediately arranged, as regards the house properties. He also asked what is the justification in all the three house properties in my name. I told him that you can be called and some arrangement can be made. I am not able to explain everything in this letter. He was in a very rash mood and was behaving in an unruly manner. At one stage, I was driven to the position that he can do whatever he likes. At 10.00 clocks in the night, I told him what arrangement could be made. But he was not in a sane mood. However much I told him that it was not my fault in purchasing all the three properties in my name and that I am not keen to have all the three properties. I was terribly upset by his behavior. At one stage, I asked him to get out. While going out, he expressed that the relationship cannot be continued thereafter. About this you need not inform mother or murthi himself.” While examining the contents of the said letter, the Trial Court concluded that the three house properties, referred to therein, only related to the suit scheduled properties. Going by the statements made by the first respondent himself in the said letter Ex.A-17, it was explicit and apparent that the first respondent was fully aware that even though the properties were in his name, he was not responsible for purchasing the same in his name and that he was not interested in having all the three properties for himself.; The ingredients of Section 122 of the Transfer of Property Act relating to gifts were not shown to have been complied with in order to support the said claim. In fact, while considering the relevance of Ex.A-17 and its application to the case on hand, the Trial Court noted the contradictory statement of the first respondent made in his written statement, vis-à-vis the oral evidence. The Trial Court has specifically noted the funds, which were available with the first respondent pursuant to his father’s demise, which was to the tune of Rs.20,887.93/- and which was kept in deposit in two accounts in the name of the first respondent himself. One account was under Ex.A-25, which was a current account in which a sum of Rs.10,919.44/- was available and the other one was under Ex.A.26, which was a savings bank account, where a sum of Rs.9,968.49/- was available. Both put together a sum of Rs.20,887.93/- was available and therefore, even after the purchase of the third item of the suit schedule property, the first respondent had a further sum available with him. The trial Court has also noted that except the ipse dixit of D.W.2 and 3 that a sum of Rs.10,000/- was paid to the first respondent by way of gift at the time of marriage of the first respondent with his daughter, there was no other evidence to support and provide credence to the said version. Unfortunately, the Division Bench of the High Court completely omitted to examine the above material piece of evidence, which was considered in detail by the trial Court, while decreeing the suit. In the light of our above conclusions, the judgment of the Division Bench cannot be sustained. The appeal stands allowed and the judgment of the Division Bench is set aside and the judgment and decree of the Trial Court shall stand restored.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40476 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1241 OF 2005 Vathsala Manickavasagam & Ors. …. Appellants VERSUS N. Ganesan & Anr. …. Respondents J U D G M E N T Fakkir Mohamed Ibrahim Kalifulla, J. 1. This appeal is directed against the Division Bench judgment of … Continue reading

compensation for wrongful detention by abusing the police powers – apex court granted 2 lakhs – Crime No.11/98 was registered against the appellant under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code = the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A. No.1426 of 2010 is under challenge. By the impugned judgment the Division Bench u­pheld the judgment dated 27th April, 2010 passed by the learned Single Judge in W.P. No.1243 of 2003 and dismissed the appeal, affirming the finding recorded by the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge by his judgment dismissed the writ petition preferred by the appellant claiming the damages and praying for issuance of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to pay him jointly and severally a sum of Rs.10,00,000/­ for his alleged illegal detention and confinement. = Mala fides means want of good faith, personal bias, grudge, oblique or improper motive or ulterior purpose. The administrative action must be said to be done in good faith, if it is in fact done honestly, whether it is done negligently or not. An act done honestly is deemed to have been done in good faith. An administrative authority must, therefore, act in a bona fide manner and should never act for an improper motive or ulterior purposes or contrary to the requirements of the statute, or the basis of the circumstances contemplated by law, or improperly exercised discretion to achieve some ulterior purpose. The determination of a plea of mala fide involves two questions, namely (i) whether there is a personal bias or an oblique motive, and (ii) whether the administrative action is contrary to the objects, requirements and conditions of a valid exercise of administrative power.= It has already been noticed that the respondents before the Advisory Board or before the trial court failed to bring on record any evidence to frame the charges against the appellant under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC or under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982. In spite of the same, Ist respondent, 2nd respondent, V.Jegannathan, the then Inspector General and Commissioner of Police, Salem City and the 3rd respondent, M. Ramasamy, the then Inspector of Police, Fairlands Police Station, Salem City before this Court have taken similar plea that the appellant was inciting the police personnel in Tamil Nadu to form an association to fight for their rights and toured the districts of Coimbatore, Tiruchirapalli, Pudukottai and Chennai City and incited the serving police personnel over forming of an association, and acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order. By way of additional affidavit certain so called statements of persons have been enclosed which have been filed without any affidavit and were neither the part of the trial court record or material placed before the Advisory Board. The aforesaid action on the part of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondent in support of their act of detaining the appellant illegally by placing some material which has beyond the record justifies the appellant’s allegation that the respondents abused their power and position to support their unfair order. In view of the observation made above, though we do not give specific finding on mala fide action on the part of the Ist, 2nd, 3rd and 4th respondent but we hold that the respondent­State and its officers have grossly abused legal power to punish the appellant to destroy his reputation in a manner non­oriented by law by detaining him under the Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982 in lodging a Criminal Case No.11/98 under Section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1992 and under Section 505(1)(b) of the IPC based on the wrong statements which were fully unwarranted.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40488 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 4815    OF 2013 (ARISING OUT OF SLP(C) NO.32704 OF 2010) N. SENGODAN        … APPELLANT VERUS SECRETARY TO GOVERNMENT, HOME (PROHIBITION & EXCISE) DEPARTMENT, CHENNAI AND OTHERS            … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. 2. In   this   appeal   the   judgment   dated   16th  August,   2010 passed by the Division Bench of the Madras High Court in W.A.   No.1426   of  2010   is  under   challenge.   By  the  impugned judgment the Division Bench u­pheld the judgment dated 27th April,   … Continue reading

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