Madras High Court

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M.V. ACT = whether compensation in a motor vehicle accident case is payable to a claimant for both heads, viz., loss of earning/earning capacity as well as permanent disability. = The Tribunal, after holding that the accident was caused due to the negligence of the driver of the bus belonging to the Transport Corporation, by order dated 30.11.2000, awarded a sum of Rs. 9,42,822/- as total compensation by adopting the multiplier of 13 in terms of the second schedule to the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988 (hereinafter referred to as “the Act”). (c) Dis-satisfied with the award of the Tribunal, the appellant preferred an appeal being CMA No. 150 of 2001 before the High Court praying for higher compensation, on the other hand, the Transport Corporation also preferred an appeal being CMA No. 82 of 2001 for reduction of the compensation. (d) The High Court, by impugned common judgment dated 29.01.2007, reduced the compensation from Rs. 9,42,822/- to Rs. 6,72,822/-. Aggrieved by the reduction in the compensation amount, the appellant has preferred the present appeals by way of special leave for enhancement of the compensation. = In the light of the above discussion, the appellant is entitled to the following additional amount: a) Towards 85% permanent disability … Rs. 1,00,000/- b) Towards loss of earning/earning capacity by applying the multiplier 13 … Rs. 80,000/- (in addition to the amount of Rs. 3,20,000/- fixed by the High Court) Accordingly, in addition to the amount awarded by the High Court, the claimant/the appellant herein is entitled to an additional amount of Rs. 1,80,000/-. Further, we make it clear that altogether the appellant is entitled to a total compensation of Rs. 8,52,822/- with interest at the rate of 9% from the date of claim petition till the date of deposit. 19) The appeals filed by the claimant/appellant are allowed in part to the extent mentioned above with no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40482 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 4816-4817 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 15531-15532 of 2007) S. Manickam …. Appellant (s) Versus Metropolitan Transport Corp. Ltd. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P. Sathasivam, J. 1) Leave granted. 2) … Continue reading

CHEATING – HAVING SEXUAL INTERCOURSE ON THE PROMISE OF MARRYING = The facts as they unfold from the statement of the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) are, that even before the first act of sexual intercourse, the accused-appellant Karthick used to tease her. He also used to tell her, that he wished to marry her. The fact that he had sexual intercourse with her, when the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) was all alone in her house, is not disputed. The prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) has confirmed in her deposition, that at the time of the first sexual intercourse with her at her house, the accused- appellant Karthick had gagged her mouth with his right hand. He had promised to marry her, by placing his hand on her head, after having ravaged her. The subsequent acts of sexual intercourse, were actions of actively cheating her, by giving her the impression that he would marry her. The occurrence at the Murugan temple, is of significant importance. At the temple, for the first time the accused-appellant Karthick told the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), that he would not marry her. The instant factual position has been confirmed by Chandran (PW9) and Ilangovan (PW10). Despite lengthy cross-examination, the accused-appellant has not been able to create any dent in the testimony of the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1). In the aforesaid view of the matter, we confirm the concurrent determination of the courts below, that the accused-appellant Karthick committed deceit with the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) by promising to marry her. On the strength of the said deception, in the first instance persuaded her not to disclose the occurrence to anyone, and thereafter, repeatedly had sexual intercourse with her. Therefore, in the facts and circumstances of this case, it is not possible for us to accept the contention advanced on behalf of the accused-appellant Karthick, that sexual intercourse by the accused- appellant Karthick with the prosecutrix Poomari was consensual. Obtaining consent by exercising deceit, cannot be legitimate defence to exculpate an accused.; NO DELAY IN FILING A CASE = there has been no delay whatsoever at the hands of the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1). As long as commitment of marriage subsisted, the relationship between the parties could not be described as constituting the offence of rape under Section 376 of the Indian penal Code. It is only after the accused-appellant Karthick declined to marry the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), that a different dimension came to be attached to the physical relationship, which had legitimately continued over the past six months. Things changed when the accused-appellant declined to marry the prosecutrix. After the promised alliance was declined, the prosecutrix without any delay disclosed the entire episode to her immediate family. Without any further delay, the brother and father of the Poomari (PW1) approached the village elders. The village elders immediately summoned the accused-appellant Karthick by holding a panchayat. The village elders made all efforts to settled the issue amicably. The family, as is usual in such matters, wished to settle the matter amicably by persuading the accused-appellant to view the matter realistically. It is only on the refusal of the accused-apellant Karthick, to marry the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), that the question of making a criminal complaint arose. After the meetings of the panchayat, wherein the accused-appellant declined to marry the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1), without any further delay, the prosecutrix Poomari (PW1) reported the matter to the police on 10.10.2003. In the above view of the matter, in the peculiar facts of this case, it is not possible for us to hold, that any doubt can be said to have been created in the version of the prosecution, merely on account of delay in the registration of the first information report. 18. No other submission, besides those noticed hereinabove, was advanced at the hands of the learned counsel for the appellant. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in this appeal. The same is accordingly dismissed.= “The accused-appellant Karthick was ordered to be released on bail by this Court vide order dated 4.4.2008. He shall now be taken into custody, to serve the remaining part of the sentence.”

‘ ‘ PUBLISHED IN http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40457 “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.601 OF 2008 Karthi @ Karthick … Appellant Versus State Rep. by Inspector of Police, Tamil Nadu … Respondent J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. 1. The appellant, Karthi @ Karthick was convicted for … Continue reading

a complaint against the respondents alleging commission of offences punishable under Sections 468 and 471 of the IPC. Crime No.41/10 was accordingly registered in the Central Crime Branch, Chennai Suburban, St. Thomas Mount for the said offences against respondents 2, 3 and 4. Aggrieved, the respondents filed Criminal O.P. No.15917 of 2010 for quashing of the FIR as also investigation in connection therewith =suit based on two forged sale deeds = In Iqbal Singh Marwah’s case (supra) a Constitution Bench of this Court had authoritatively declared that Section 195(1)(b)(ii) Cr.P.C. was attracted only when the offences enumerated in the said provision have been committed with respect to a document after it has been produced or given in evidence in any court and during the time the same was in custodia legis.= It would be a strained thinking that any offence involving forgery of a document if committed far outside the precincts of the Court and long before its production in the Court, could also be treated as one affecting administration of justice merely because that document later reached the court records.- The sequitur of the above discussion is that the bar contained in Section 195(1)(b)(ii) of the Code is not applicable to a case where forgery of the document was committed before the document was produced in a court.”- the bar contained in Section 195 against taking of cognizance was not attracted to the case at hand as the sale deeds relied upon by GWL for claiming title to the property in question had not been forged while they were in custodia legis.= In the light of the above, the High Court was wrong in quashing the FIR on the ground that the allegations did not constitute an offence even when the same were taken to be true in their entirety. It was also, in our view, wrong for the High Court to hold that the respondents were not the makers of the documents or that the filing of a civil suit based on the same would not constitute an offence. Whether or not the respondents had forged the documents and if so what offence was committed by the respondents was a matter for investigation which could not be prejudged or quashed by the High Court in exercise of its powers under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. or under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.

  ‘ ITEM NO. Judgment Court No.10 SECTION IIA     S U P R E M E C O U R T O F I N D I A RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS   CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. …. OF 2013 @ SLP(Crl.) No. 1962 of 2011   C.P.SUBHASH Appellant (s)   VERSUS   INSPECTOR OF … Continue reading

whether the suit was maintainable without seeking any consequential relief. Section 42 of the Specific Relief Act 1877, (analogous to Section 34 of the Act 1963), and held, that where the defendant was not in physical possession, and not in a position to deliver possession to the plaintiff, it was not necessary for the plaintiff in a suit for declaration of title to property, to claim the possession.”……It is also now evident that she was not in exclusive possession because admittedly Keshav Chandra and Jagdish Chandra were in possession. There were also other tenants in occupation. In such an event the relief of possession ought to have been asked for. The failure to do so undoubtedly bars the discretion of the Court in granting the decree for declaration.”= A mere declaratory decree remains non-executable in most cases generally. However, there is no prohibition upon a party from seeking an amendment in the plaint to include the unsought relief, provided that it is saved by limitation. However, it is obligatory on the part of the defendants to raise the issue at the earliest.= “……a declaratory decree simpliciter does not attain finality if it has to be used for obtaining any future decree like possession. In such cases, if suit for possession based on an earlier declaratory decree is filed, it is open to the defendant to establish that the declaratory decree on which the suit is based is not a lawful decree.” In view of the above, it is evident that the suit filed by the appellants/plaintiffs was not maintainable, as they did not claim consequential relief. The respondent nos. 3 and 10 being admittedly in possession of the suit property, the appellants/plaintiffs had to necessarily claim the consequential relief of possession of the property. Such a plea was taken by the respondents/defendants while filing the written statement. The appellants/plaintiffs did not make any attempt to amend the plaint at this stage, or even at a later stage. The declaration sought by the appellants/plaintiffs was not in the nature of a relief. A worshipper may seek that a decree between the two parties is not binding on the deity, as mere declaration can protect the interest of the deity. The relief sought herein, was for the benefit of the appellants/plaintiffs themselves. As a consequence, the appeals lack merit and, are accordingly dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

‘     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOs. 7605-7606 of 2004 Venkataraja & Ors. … Appellants Versus Vidyane Doureradjaperumal (D) Thr.Lrs. & Ors … Respondents J U D G M E N T Dr.B.S.Chauhan, J. 1. These appeals have been preferred against the impugned judgment and order … Continue reading

Code of Civil Procedure, 1908-Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2-Interim Injunction-Contractual transaction-Money advanced to second party and third party secured the loan by hypothecation and charge-Notice by lender to the securing party seeking repayment of the amount-Suit by securing party against the lender for mandatory injunction and application for interim injunction-Claim of lender before Debt Recovery Tribunal-Interim injunction granted and execution of any order by Tribunal restrained-Held: In the facts and circumstances of the case, the court below could not exercise its discretion to grant any interim injunction-Injunction against enforcement of orders of Tribunal also not correct-Such injunctions against the Tribunal having jurisdiction to pass such orders cannot normally be granted unless it is a case of fraud or the existence of some such vitiating factor is established or prima facie made out. Appellant-defendant No. 1 issued a notice to respondent No. 1 – plaintiff and defendant No. 2, seeking repayment of the amounts advanced by it to defendant No. 2, the repayment of which was secured by hypothecation and charge created by the plaintiff. Pursuant thereto respondent No. 1 – plaintiff filed a suit against defendant Nos. 1 and 2 for mandatory injunction restraining the defendants from interfering with certain capacitor banks systems allegedly supplied by the plaintiff and installed at various substations of Transmission Corporation of Andhra Pradesh. Plaintiff also filed application for interim injunction. Trial Court granted interim injunction. In the meanwhile appellant filed its claim for recovery of the amounts due, before Debts Recovery Tribunal. It also filed application for vacating the interim order and the same was vacated by Single Judge of High Court. Plaintiff’s appeal thereagainst was allowed by Division Bench of High Court on the ground that since the suit was filed earlier to the claim before Debt Recovery Tribunal, the court was competent to entertain the suit and granted interim injunction. It permitted the proceedings before the Tribunal, but restrained the execution of any order that might be passed by the Tribunal. Hence the present appeal. Citation: 2006(8 )Suppl.SCR698 ,2007(1 )SCC106 ,2006(11 )SCALE585 ,2006(10 )JT366 Allowing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1. On the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the court is prima facie satisfied that this is not a fit case for exercise of discretion by the court to grant any interim injunction as sought for by the plaintiff. Division Bench has not properly adverted to or considered the question whether in the nature of the pleadings in the case and the nature of the relief claimed in the suit, an order of injunction as the one granted by it should be granted. The Division Bench did not ask itself the question whether it was open to it on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, to issue an order of injunction restraining one of the contracting parties from enforcing as against the other contracting party, the obligations arising out of that contract. The Division Bench also did not ask itself the question whether the plaintiff had made out a prima facie case for the grant of what it called an interim mandatory injunction – though it appears to this court to be a case of prohibitory injunction – and whether the balance of convenience is in favour of the grant of an interim order of injunction. [702-B-F] 2. Division Bench has clearly acted illegally in purporting to pass an interim order of injunction restraining the enforcement of any order that may be passed by the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The Debts Recovery Tribunal is a special forum created by a special enactment for the purpose of enforcement of special types of claims arising in favour of financial institutions. Thus, competent proceedings are instituted before such a Tribunal by a financial institution seeking to enforce its claimed rights. Whatever defences the plaintiff herein may have against the claims of the first defendant before the Debts Recovery Tribunal, have to be put forward by the plaintiff before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. The mere fact that the plaintiff chose to rush to the Civil Court on receipt of a notice from the first defendant in an attempt to thwart the enforcement of the obligations it has allegedly incurred, does not justify the grant of an interim order of injunction restraining the enforcement of the rights arising out of an alleged hypothecation and a charge created by the plaintiff in favour of the first defendant. That apart, to grant an injunction restraining the enforcement of orders passed by the Tribunal having jurisdiction to pass such orders cannot normally be granted unless it is a case of fraud or the existence of some such vitiating factor is established or prima facie made out. Even then, the order of injunction as now granted could be granted only in exceptional cases. [702-F-H; 703-A-C] 3. It is open to the plaintiff to put forward all its contentions before the Debts Recovery Tribunal and if it is thought appropriate, to get the suit filed by it transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal to be tried as a cross suit or counter claim against the claim of the first defendant before the Debts Recovery Tribunal. [703-E-F] State Bank of India v. M/s Ranjan Chemicals Ltd. and Anr., (2006) 10 SCALE 150, referred to. K.K. Mani for the Appellant. L. Nageshwar Rao, T.G. Narayanan Nair, Nandakumar K.P. Venugopal, and E. Venukumar, K.J. John & Co. for the Respondents.

http://JUDIS.NIC.IN SUPREME COURT OF INDIA Page 1 of 3 CASE NO.: Appeal (civil) 4728 of 2006 PETITIONER: Industrial Investment Bank of India Ltd RESPONDENT: Marshal’s Power & Telecom (I) Ltd.& Anr DATE OF JUDGMENT: 08/11/2006 BENCH: H.K. SEMA & P.K. BALASUBRAMANYAN JUDGMENT: J U D G M E N T (Arising out of SLP(C) No.2962 … Continue reading

Whether the course leading to a degree of Master of Computer Applications is a technical course within the purview of the definition of ‘technical education’ as contained in Section 2(g) of the AICTE Act as it stands today?= the amended Regulation Nos. 8(c) and 8(iv) of 2000 were introduced by the AICTE in exercise of its power under section 10(k) of AICTE Act by adding the MBA and MCA courses within the purview of the provisions of AICTE as it is included in the Regulation as a technical education. = the amended Regulation has not been placed before the Parliament which is mandatory as per the provisions of Section 24 of the AICTE Act, the said contention has not been disputed by the AICTE in these cases. = “24. Rules and regulations to be laid before Parliament:- Every rule and every regulation made under this Act shall be laid, as soon as may be after it is made, before each House of Parliament, while it is in session, for a total period of thirty days which may be comprised in one session or in two or more successive sessions, and it before the expiry of the session immediately following the session or the successive sessions, aforesaid, both Houses agree that the rule or regulation should not be made, the rule or regulation shall thereafter have effect only in such modified form or be of no effect, as the case may be; so, however, that any such modification or annulment shall be without prejudice to the validity of anything previously done under that rule or regulation.” The position of law is well settled by this Court that if the Statute prescribes a particular procedure to do an act in a particular way, that act must be done in that manner, otherwise it is not at all done.- The civil appeals are allowed. The relief sought for in the Writ Petitions is granted in so far as not to seek approval from the AICTE for MBA and MCA courses are concerned.


the plea of insanity under Section 84 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (in short ‘the IPC’).= Another factor which goes against the appellant accused is that he himself was examined as a defence witness No.3. According to learned trial Judge, as a witness, he made his statement clearly and cogently and it was also observed that he was meticulously following the court proceedings, acting suitably when the records were furnished for perusal. The trial Judge has also pointed out that during the entire proceedings, the accused has nowhere stated that he was insane earlier to the date of incident. The trial Judge, after noting his answers in respect of the questions under Section 313 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 has concluded that the accused could not be termed as an “insane” person. – there is no evidence as to the unsoundness of mind of the appellant-accused at the time of the occurrence, namely, on 05.11.2001 and also taking note of the fact that the accused failed to discharge the burden as stated in Section 105 of the Evidence Act, we fully agree with the conclusion arrived at by the trial Court and affirmed by the High Court.

Page 1     REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 926 OF 2009 Mariappan …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Tamil Nadu …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam, J. 1) This appeal has been filed against the final judgment and order dated 17.10.2006 passed by … Continue reading

Specific Relief Act, 1963: s.6 – Suit filed by landlord under s.6 against trespasser when tenant in exclusive possession of suit property is dispossessed forcibly by a trespasser/third party – Maintainability of – Held: Maintainable – Non-impleadment of tenant is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit as tenant is not necessary party in such suit. Words and phrases: Word `dispossessed’ – Meaning of – In the context of s.6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963. The questions which arose for consideration in the present appeal were whether landlord can maintain suit under Section 6 of Specific Relief Act, 1963 against a trespasser for immediate possession where a tenant in exclusive possession was dispossessed forcibly by the trespasser and whether tenant is a necessary party in such suit.- Dismissing the appeal, the Court HELD: 1.1. The key words in Section 6(1) of Specific Relief Act, 1963 are “dispossessed” and “he or any person claiming through him”. A person is said to have been dispossessed when he has been deprived of his possession; such deprivation may be of actual possession or legal possession. Possession in law follows right to possession. The right to possession, though distinct from possession, is treated as equivalent to possession itself for certain purposes. A landlord by letting out the property to a tenant does not lose possession as he continues to retain the legal possession although actual possession, user and control of that property is with the tenant. By retaining legal possession or in any case constructive possession, the landlord also retains all his legal remedies. As a matter of law, the dispossession of tenant by a third party is dispossession of the landlord. The word “dispossessed” in Section 6(1) must be read in this context and not in light of the actual possession alone. If a tenant is thrown out forcibly from the tenanted premises by a trespasser, the landlord has implied right of entry in order to recover possession (for himself and his tenant). Similarly, the expression “any person claiming through him” would bring within its fold the landlord as he continues in legal possession over the tenanted property through his tenant. As a matter of fact, on plain reading of Section 6(1), it is clear that besides the person who has been dispossessed, any person claiming through him can also file a suit seeking recovery of possession. Obviously, a landlord who holds the possession through his tenant is competent to maintain suit under Section 6 and recover possession from a trespasser who has forcibly dispossessed his tenant. A landlord when he lets out his property to the tenant is not deprived of his possession in the property in law. What is altered is mode in which the landlord held his possession in the property inasmuch as the tenant comes into physical possession while the landlord retains possession through his tenant. [Paras 16 and 19] [1082-f-h; 1084-c- d] Veeraswami Mudali v. P.R. Venkatachala Mudali and others AIR 1926 Madras 18; Ramchandra v. Sambashiv AIR 1928 Nagpur 313; (Kanneganti) Ramamanemma v. (Kanneganti) Basavayya AIR 1934 Madras 558, overruled. Nobin Das v. Kailash Chandra Dey (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924; Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai and Mohideen avuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1898) 21 Madras 288; Sailesh Kumar and ANOTHER v. Rama Devi AIR (1952) Patna 339; Gobind Ram Jamna Dass v. Mst. Mewa w/o Parbhati AIR (1953) Pepsu 188, approved. Ramanadhan Chetti v. Pulikutti Servai (1898) 21 Madras 288; Mohideen Ravuther v. Jayarama Aiyar (1921) 44 Madras 937, referred to. Halsbury’s Laws of England (Fourth Edition, page 617), referred to. 1.2. Section 6 of the Act provides that suit to recover possession under the said provision could be filed by the person who is dispossessed or any person claiming through him. The tenant having lost the possession though without his consent to a third party, may not be interested in recovery of possession. He may not be available. He may not like to involve himself in litigation. In such circumstances, if a landlord brings the suit to recover possession against trespasser under Section 6, it cannot be laid down as an absolute proposition that tenant must necessarily be impleaded as party to such suit. It may be desirable that a landlord in a suit under Section 6 of the Act against a trespasser for immediate possession when, at the date of dispossession, the house was in occupation of a tenant, impleads the tenant, but his non-impleadment is not fatal to the maintainability of such suit. [Para 20] [1085-c-g] Case Law Reference: AIR 1926 Madras 18 overruled Para 7 (1898) 21 Madrass 288 referred to Para 7 (1921) 44 Madras 937 referred to Para 7 AIR 1928 Nagpur 313 overruled Para 8 AIR 1934 Madras 558 overruled Para 9 (1910) Vol. VII Indian Cases 924 approved Para 11 (1898) 21 Madras 288 approved Para 12 AIR (1952) Patna 339 approved Para 13 AIR (1953) Pepsu 188 approved Para 14 CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION : Civil Appeal No. 1930 of 2010. From the Judgment AND Order dated 28.3.2008 of the High Court of Judicature at Bombay in Civil Revision Application No. 1235 of 2001. Amol Chitale, Abhijat P. Medh for the Appellants. Sushil Karanjka, Vishal A. Patil, K.N. Rai for the Respondent.

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 1930 OF 2010 [Arising out of SLP [C] No. 10418 of 2008] Sadashiv Shyama Sawant [D] …. Appellants Through L.Rs., & Ors. Vs. Anita Anant Sawant ….Respondent JUDGEMENT R.M. LODHA,J. Leave granted. 2. The main question for consideration in this appeal by … Continue reading

environmental clearance= the appellant company applied and obtained ‘No Objection Certificate’ on 01.08.1994 from the Tamil Nadu Pollution Control Board (forPage 2 short ‘the TNPCB’) for setting up a copper smelter plant (for short ‘the plant’) in Melavittan village, Tuticorin. On 16.01.1995, the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, granted environmental clearance to the setting up of the plant of the appellants at Tuticorin subject to certain conditions including those laid down by the TNPCB and the Government of Tamil Nadu. On 17.05.1995, the Government of Tamil Nadu granted clearance subject to certain conditions and requested the TNPCB to issue consent to the proposed plant of the appellants. Accordingly, on 22.05.1995, the TNPCB granted its consent under Section 21 of the Air (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1981 (for short ‘the Air Act’) and under Section 25 of the Water (Prevention and Control of Pollution) Act, 1974 (for short ‘the Water Act’) to the appellants to establish the plant in the SIPCOT Industrial Complex, Melavittan village, Tuticorin Taluk.- The environmental clearance granted by the Ministry of Environment and Forests, Government of India, and the consent orders under the Air Act and the Water Act granted by the TNPCB were challenged before the Madras High Court in W.P. Nos.15501, 15502 and 15503 of 1996 by the National Trust for Clean Environment. = There is no doubt that there has been misrepresentation and suppression of material facts made in the special leave petition but to decline relief to the appellants in this case would mean closure of the plant of the appellants. The plant of the appellants contributes substantially to the copper production in India and copper is used in defence, electricity, automobile, construction and infrastructure etc. The plant of the appellants has about 1300 employees and it also provides employment to large number of people through contractors. A number of ancillary industries are also dependent on the plant. Through its various transactions, the plant generates a huge revenue to Central and State Governments in terms of excise, custom duties, income tax and VAT. It also contributes to 10% of the total cargo volume of Tuticorin port. For these considerations of public interest, we do not think it will be a proper exercise of our discretion under Article 136 of the Constitution to refuse relief on the grounds of misrepresentation and suppression of material facts in the special leave petition. – In the result, the appeals are allowed and the impugned common judgment of the High Court is set aside. The appellants, however, are directed to deposit within three months from today a compensation of Rs.100 crores with the Collector of Thoothukudi District, which will be kept in a fixed deposit in a Nationalized Bank for a minimum of five years, renewable as and when it expires, and the interest therefrom will be spent on suitable measures for improvement of the environment, including water and soil, of the vicinity of the plant of the appellants after consultation with TNPCB and approval of the Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu. In case the Collector of Thoothukudi District, after consultation with TNPCB, finds the interest amount inadequate, he may also utilize the principal amount or part thereof for the aforesaid purpose after approval from the Secretary, Environment, Government of Tamil Nadu. By this judgment, we have only set aside the directions of the High Court in the impugned common judgment and we make it clear that this judgment will not stand in the way of the TNPCB issuing directions to the appellant-company, including a direction for closure of the plant, for the protection of environment in accordance with law. We also make it clear that the award of damages of Rs. 100 Crores by this judgment against the appellant Company for the period from 1997 to 2012 will not stand in the way of any claim for damages for the aforesaid period or any other period in a civil court or any other forum in accordance with law.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 2776-2783 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (C) Nos. 28116-28123 of 2010) Sterlite Industries (India) Ltd. Etc. Etc. … Appellants Versus Union of India & Ors. Etc. Etc. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, … Continue reading

foreign divorce, – The short lived marriage which got solemnized on 24.6.1999 was dissolved on 17.4.2000 by a decree passed by Superior Court of California, County San Diego, Family Division, in Case No.D.454571 ABC, filed by the husband/appellant herein. 1.1. The wife filed the suit before the 1st Additional Principal Family Court, Chennai, for a declaration that the decree of divorce passed by the Superior Court of California is abinitio void, inoperative and not binding on the plaintiff, which came to be decreed. What is crucial is that the wife has challenged jurisdiction of the Foreign Courts. Only, if a party applies for leave to participate in the proceedings without challenging the jurisdiction one can infer that the party has submitted to the jurisdiction of the Court. But, in this case, the wife on receipt of summons has challenged the jurisdiction of the Foreign Court.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT MADRAS DATED: 24.02.2012 CORAM: THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE R.BANUMATHI and THE HONOURABLE MRS. JUSTICE S.VIMALA C.M.A.No.929 of 2002 against O.S.No.38 of 2000 Bhashyam Ramesh @ Rajagopalan rep. by Power Agent Mr.V.S.Vhasyam … Appellant/Defendant .. Vs .. R.Saroja @ K.K.Saroja 35/2, T.P.Koil Street, Triplicane, Chennai-5. … Respondent/Plaintiff Civil Miscellaneous … Continue reading

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