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Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.- Non- filing of original complaint not fatal when not relied upon it = whether the prosecution is bound to produce the original complaint/application filed by an unknown person, based on which an inquiry was initiated by the Anti Corruption Bureau.= the prosecution has categorically taken the stand that they do not propose to rely upon the information passed on to the Anti Corruption Bureau leading to an open inquiry against the accused persons. We fail to see how the accused persons are prejudiced by non-disclosure of the name of the person who sent the complaint as well as the original copy of the complaint received by the Anti Corruption Bureau. Situations are many where certain persons do not want to disclose the identity as well as the information/complaint passed on them to the Anti Corruption Bureau. If the names of the persons, as well as the copy of the complaint sent by them are disclosed, that may cause embarrassment to them and sometimes threat to their life. This complaint only triggered an enquiry. Ultimately, the first information was lodged on the basis of an open inquiry bearing VER No.31/1987 and it is based on that inquiry the first information report dated 13.10.1992 was registered. After completion of the investigation and after getting the sanction to prosecute accused No.1, charge-sheet was filed. PW1 also did not depose anything about the receipt of complaint/application in his examination-in-chief but receipt of the complaint/application and its contents having been relied upon by the defence during cross-examination of PW1. 11. We also emphasize that in the instant case the prosecution has relied upon the material which was collected during the investigation. It is not a case where some materials/documents were collected by the investigating agency during the investigations which are in favour of the prosecution and the prosecution is suppressing those documents. We are of the opinion that non-supply of the complaint or contents thereof do not, at all, violate the principle of fair trial. The said complaint has no relevancy in the context of this prosecution and in no manner, it would prejudice the petitioner. 12. Above being the factual and legal position, we find no reason to interfere with the order of the Bombay High Court and dismiss this special leave petition.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40662 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.5897 OF 2013 Manjeet Singh Khera …. Petitioner Versus State of Maharashtra ….Respondent O R D E R K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. 1. We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether the … Continue reading
Prohibition imposed under Bombay police Act on the dances at Bars, Hotels by way of amendment was quashed by the Bombay High court and confirmed by the Apex Court =the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby Section 33A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 as inserted by the Bombay Police (Amendment) Act, 2005 has been declared to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.= “the cure is worse than the disease”= Of course, the right to practise a trade or profession and the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 are, by their very nature, intermingled with each other, but in a situation like the present one, such right cannot be equated with unrestricted freedom like a run-away horse. As has been indicated by my learned Brother, at the very end of his judgment, it would be better to treat the cause than to blame the effect and to completely discontinue the livelihood of a large section of women, eking out an existence by dancing in bars, who will be left to the mercy of other forms of exploitation. The compulsion of physical needs has to be taken care of while making any laws on the subject. Even a bar dancer has to satisfy her hunger, provide expenses for her family and meet day to day expenses in travelling from her residence to her place of work, which is sometimes even as far as 20 to 25 kms. away. Although, it has been argued on behalf of the State and its authorities that the bar dancers have taken to the profession not as an extreme measure, but as a profession of choice, more often than not, it is a Hobson’s choice between starving and in resorting to bar dancing. From the materials placed before us and the statistics shown, it is apparent that many of the bar dancers have no other option as they have no other skills, with which they could earn a living. Though some of the women engaged in bar dancing may be doing so as a matter of choice, not very many women would willingly resort to bar dancing as a profession. Women worldwide are becoming more and more assertive of their rights and want to be free to make their own choices, which is not an entirely uncommon or unreasonable approach. But it is necessary to work towards a change in mindset of people in general not only by way of laws and other forms of regulations, but also by way of providing suitable amenities for those who want to get out of this trap and to either improve their existing conditions or to begin a new life altogether. Whichever way one looks at it, the matter requires the serious attention of the State and its authorities, if the dignity of women, as a whole, and respect for them, is to be restored. In that context, the directions given by my learned Brother, Justice Nijjar, assume importance. 6. I fully endorse the suggestions made in paragraph 123 of the judgment prepared by my learned Brother that, instead of generating unemployment, it may be wiser for the State to look into ways and means in which reasonable restrictions may be imposed on bar dancing, but without completely prohibiting or stopping the same. It is all very well to enact laws without making them effective. The State has to provide alternative means of support and shelter to persons engaged in such trades or professions, some of whom are trafficked from different parts of the country and have nowhere to go or earn a living after coming out of their unfortunate circumstances. A strong and effective support system may provide a solution to the problem. 8. These words are in addition to and not in derogation of the judgment delivered by my learned Brother.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40565 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2705 OF 2006 State of Maharashtra & Anr. …Appellants VERSUS Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.2704 OF 2006 State of Maharashtra & Ors. Etc. Etc. ..Appellants VERSUS Ramnath Vishnu Waringe Etc. Etc. …Respondents … Continue reading
Land Acquisition Act = The reference court like an appellant authority enhanced the compensation basing on the award of land acquisition officer even though the claimants not adduced any evidence and passed separate awards . High court set aside the award of lower court , Apex court granted an opportunity to adduce evidence to the claimants with conditions and remanded the matter to the trail court = The failure or the omission to lead evidence to prove the claim appears in the above context to be a case of some kind of misconception about the legal requirement as to evidence needed to prove cases of enhancement of compensation. We do not in that view see any reason to deny another opportunity to the landowners to prove their cases by adducing evidence in support of their claim for enhancement. Since, however, this opportunity is being granted ex debito justitiae, we deem it fit to direct that if the Reference Court eventually comes to the conclusion that a higher amount was due and payable to the appellant-owners, such higher amount including solatium due thereon would not earn interest for the period between the date of the judgment of the Reference Court and the date of this order. These appeals are with that direction allowed, the judgments and orders impugned in the same modified to the extent that while the enhancement order by the Reference Court shall stand set aside, the matters shall stand remanded to the Reference Court for a fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving to the landowners opportunity to lead evidence in support of their claims for higher compensation. No costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40531 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.5160 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.354 of 2012) Ramanlal Deochand Shah …Appellant Versus The State of Maharashtra & Anr. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.5161 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No.395 of 2012) Kantilal … Continue reading
Land Acquisition Act = Advance possession payment of compensation like rents as fixed by LAO – enhanced by District court under sec.18 reference = pending appeal interim orders to deposit half of the compensation is legal = whether the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench was justified in directing the State to deposit the rental compensation with the Appellate Court at the rate of 8% per annum on the award value passed by the Reference Court for the period of occupation before formal acquisition, allowing the appellant to withdraw only 50% of such rental compensation during the pendency of the appeal. = It is not in dispute that in most of the cases the rental compensation has not been paid. If that factual position continues, it clearly is a case where the amount to which a person is entitled is withheld without any legitimate excuse. The learned counsel for the appellants strenuously urged that in most of the cases the proceedings have not yet attained finality and are pending either before the Reference Court or in appeal. That does not provide a legitimate excuse to the appellants to withhold payment of the rental compensation. The amount calculated on the basis of award by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be below than the amount to be ultimately fixed. If in appeal or the reference proceeding, there is any variation, the same can be duly taken note of as provided in law. There is no difficulty and we find none as to why the compensation on the basis of value determined by the Land Acquisition Officer cannot be paid. If there is upward revision of the amount, the consequences will follow and if necessary, redetermination of the rental compensation can be made and after adjustment of the amount paid, if any, balance can be paid. If, however, the Land Acquisition Officer’s award is maintained then nothing further may be required to be done. In either event, payment of the rental compensation expeditiously would be an appropriate step. Looking at the problem from another perspective, one thing is clear that authorities have clearly ignored the sense of urgency highlighted in the various resolutions.”- For the reason aforesaid, if the High Court recalled the order dated 5th October, 2010 and directed the State Government to deposit rental compensation at the rate of 8% of the amount awarded by the Reference Court with the appellate Court, allowing the appellant to withdraw the half of the amount, no interference is called for. However, this order will not stand in the way of appellant to claim proportionate higher rental compensation, if the order of the Reference Court is upheld or further enhancement of compensation is made by the Appellate Court. 20. We find no merit in this appeal. It is, accordingly, dismissed with observations as made above. No costs.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40514 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5084 OF 2013 (arising out of SLP(C)No.31318 of 2011) KAZI AKILODDIN SUJAODDIN … APPELLANT Versus STATE OF MAHARASHTRA & ORS. … RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T SUDHANSU JYOTI MUKHOPADHAYA, J. Leave granted. The appellant is aggrieved by impugned order dated 15th September, 2011 passed by the Division Bench of the High Court of Bombay, Nagpur Bench, Nagpur in a Review Application, MCA No.774/2011. By the impugned order the Division Bench reviewed and recalled the judgment and order dated 5th October, 2010 passed in Writ Petition No.3883/2010(D) … Continue reading
Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act,=Chapter VIII-A, which was introduced into the the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as “the 1976 Act”, in 1986, pertains to the acquisition of “cessed properties” for co-operative societies of occupiers. In view of the questions raised in the writ petitions, the matter was initially referred to a Bench of 7-Judges, but, thereafter, by order dated 20.02.2002, the matters have been referred to a Bench of Nine-Judges and are still pending decision. Since no final decision seems to be in the offing, the writ petitioners have filed IA No. 3 of 2012, for interim reliefs.= Whether MHADA has any obligation to provide similar accommodation to others in respect of the 30% surplus land, is a controversy which we need not go into and will surely be decided, whenever the Nine-Judge Bench sits to take up these matters. But for the purposes of this case, we regret that in spite of the inordinate delay in the working of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act, which was intended for the benefit of a certain section of tenants and occupants of cessed buildings, we are unable to grant the relief prayed for, as the same goes against the very grain of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act.
published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40501 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 3 OF 2012 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 342 OF 1999 KAMLESH C. SHAH & ORS. …PETITIONERS Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. Chapter VIII-A, which … Continue reading
Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai- pull down the building numbers 13,14,15 and 16 which are in dilapidated condition. = petitioners have no legal right to continue to live in the existing buildings as this Court by its previous order, sought to be modified, has already passed an order for their eviction from the premises in question.= In view of the existing precarious nature and status of the buildings in question which is informed to be extremely grave, we cannot permit the petitioners to continue to live in the existing buildings for more than a fortnight which they have been ordered to vacate. Therefore, we permit them to exercise their option of shifting either to Mahul, Chembur or the Transit Camps Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight when the transit camps are made fit for habitation with essential and basic amenities. However, if some of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 wish to continue in the existing buildings at their own risk even after a fortnight, they are at liberty to seek permission from the Bench which had passed the order sought to be modified as we have taken up this application for modification only in view of its urgency.- However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances as also taking into account the humanitarian consideration for the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14, we accede to the request of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 communicated through their counsel that if they wish to continue to live in the existing buildings beyond of a period of fortnight until they move the Regular Bench, they may do so at their own risk and in case the buildings in question falls down in the meantime and the occupants suffer loss in any manner, the whole and sole responsibility shall be of the occupants of the those buildings and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai shall not be liable in any manner for any consequence that might follow. 14. The Applicant/respondent No.1 however, shall make the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B habitable with all basic amenities within a fortnight but not later than 30.6.2013. It was further stated by the learned Attorney General that the respondent No. 1 will offer all assistance and logistic support to the evacuees for shifting them from the existing building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 to Mahul, Chembur and continue to live there until they reshift to the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight or till such time when the Transit Camps are complete to their satisfaction. 15. It is made clear that the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B shall provide all basic amenities required for human habitation but the word “habitation” will not be construed so as to insist for fancy fittings in the Transit Camps. = published in http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp
‘ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 5 OF 2013 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 39114 OF 2012 | MAZAGAON TADWADI BTT CHAWL NIWAS VASAHAT BACHAV KRUTI |…| PETITIONER(s) | |SAMITY AND OTHERS | | | | Versus | |MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF … Continue reading
MEDICAL NEGLIGENCE – JURISDICTION- LIMITAION – LOCUS STANDI OF THIRD PARTY TO CONTINUE AFTER THE DEATH OF COMPLAINANT= initially complaint was filed before Delhi Forum and subsequently, complaint was filed before Mumbai Forum. But, both fora had no territorial jurisdiction to try the complaint. Late Ms.Mohsena in her complaint has stated that she had undergone Ayurvedic treatment in the year 2001, at Calicut, Kerala. Further, as per Ms.Mohsena’s case, she did not get desire relief for treatment, hence, she came to Mumbai and had undergone some treatment. Thereafter, she shifted to Delhi for further treatment. The mere fact that Ms. Mohsena after getting her initial treatment at Calicut, got further treatment at Mumbai and Delhi will not give these two fora any territorial jurisdiction. Hence, on this short point alone, consumer complaint ought to have been rejected. 15. The second question for consideration is as to whether petitioner has any locus standi to file the present revision petition. It is an admitted case that it was late Ms.Mohsena, who initially had under gone medical treatment provided by Taj Residency at Calicut. There is nothing on record to show that petitioner is the legal heir of Ms.Mohsena, as per Hindu Succession Act. Moreover, it has nowhere been stated by the petitioner as to when parents of Ms.Mohsena died, nor their death certificates have been filed. Thus, we have no hesitation in holding that petitioner is not the legal heir of Ms.Mohsena and as such she does not fall within the definition of “Consumer” as defined in the Act. 16. Next question to be seen is as to whether complaint was filed within the period of limitation. 17. As observed hereinabove, Ms.Mohsena got her initial treatment in Taj Residency, Calicut, in the year 2001. However, complaint was filed only in the year 2008 before the Mumbai forum. Thus, the complaint was hopelessly barred by limitation. = Petitioner who was having no locus standi to file the complaint has been pursuing this meritless litigation from day one, just to harass eight respondents out of whom seven are doctors. During last ten years, petitioner has taken the respondents to different consumer fora by filing one petition or the other, just to cause harassment to them. 22. Under these circumstances, present revision petition is liable to be dismissed with punitive cost. Accordingly, we dismiss the present revision petition with punitive cost of Rs.40,000 (Rupees Forty thousand only).
PUBLISHED IN http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130606113118111RP23492011.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI REVISION PETITION NO. 2349 OF 2011 (Against the order dated 24.06.2010 in Appeal No. A/10/267 of the State Commission, Maharashtra) Ms. Raika Bandukwalla D/o Abdeali 25, Colaba causeway Mumbai – 400039 ……. Petitioner Versus Dr. Anuradha Nayyar Samaj Ayurvedic Centre 14, Kohinoor Road Dadar East Mumbai – 400014 Dr.G.R. Verma The Arya Vaidya Pharmacy (Cbe) Ltd. 8-A/42, W.E.A. Karol Bagh New Delhi-110005 Ayurvedic Trust & Research … Continue reading
Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881= “Whether the work of quality audit of roads or work of similar nature involves “the execution of any work or supply of any materials or goods” within the meaning of Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881 and can be awarded by the Commissioner only by inviting tenders, as contemplated by that provision?”= In the result, our answers to the question referred by the Division Bench is as under: “The work of quality audit of roads or work of similar nature to be done by a person who must enjoy trust and confidence of the public authority is not covered by the expression “the execution of any work or supply of any materials or goods” within the meaning of Subsection (1) of Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, Hence, it is not necessary for Municipal Commissioner to assign such work only by inviting tenders as contemplated by the proviso, i.e. sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the said Act.”
reported / published in http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/judgements/2012/&fname=OSWP1312.pdf&smflag=N Bombay High Court kambli 1 PIL-9.12 dt.12-12-12 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY. ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.9 OF 2012 … Niyaz Ahmed Vanu …Petitioner v/s. 1.Municipal Corporation of Gr.Mumbai (M.C.G.M.) 2.The Municipal Commissioner, (M.C.G.M.) 3.The Chief Engineer (Roads Transport & Bridges) (M.C.G.M.) 4.M/s.SGS … Continue reading
pari passu= whether the claims of the workmen who claimed to be entitled to payment pari passu have to be considered by the official liquidator or whether their claims have to be adjudicated upon by the Debts Recovery Tribunal (for short, ‘DRT’) is likely to arise in a large number of cases where recoveries are sought to be made pursuant to the certificates issued by the DRT and, therefore, these appeals required consideration preferably by a Bench of three-Judges. This is how these appeals have come up before us.= (i) If the debtor company is not in liquidation nor any provisional liquidator has been appointed and merely winding up proceedings are pending, there is no question of distribution of sale proceeds among secured creditors in the manner prescribed in Section 19(19) of the 1993 Act. (ii) Where a company is in liquidation, a statutory charge is created in favour of workmen in respect of their dues over the security of every secured creditor and this charge is pari passu with that of the secured creditor. Such statutory charge is to the extent of workmen’s portion in relation to the security held by the secured creditor of the debtor company. (iii) The above position is equally applicable where the assets of the debtor company have been sold in execution of the recovery certificate obtained by the bank or financial institution against the debtor company when it was not in liquidation but before the proceeds realized from such sale could be fully and finally disbursed, the company had gone into liquidation. In other words, pending final disbursement of the proceeds realized from the sale of security in execution of the recovery certificate issued by the debt recovery tribunal, if debtor company becomes company in winding up, Section 529A read with Section 529(1)(c) proviso come into operation and statutory charge is created in favour of workmen in respect of their dues over such proceeds. (iv) The relevant date for arriving at the ratio at which the sale proceeds are to be distributed amongst workmen and secured creditors of the debtor company is the date of the winding up order and not the date of sale. (v) The conclusions (ii) to (iv) shall be mutatis mutandis applicable where provisional liquidator has been appointed in respect of the debtor company. (vi) Where the winding up petition against the debtor company is pending but no order of winding up has been passed nor any provisional liquidator has been appointed in respect of such company at the time of order of sale by DRT and the properties of the debtor company have been sold in execution of the recovery certificate and proceeds of sale realized and full disbursement of the sale proceeds has been made to the concerned bank or financial institution, the subsequent event of the debtor company going into liquidation is no ground for reopening disbursement by the DRT. (vii) However, before full and final disbursement of sale proceeds, if the debtor company has gone into liquidation and a liquidator is appointed, disbursement of undisbursed proceeds by DRT can only be done after notice to the liquidator and after hearing him. In that situation if there is claim of workmen’s dues, the DRT has two options available with it. One, the bank or financial institution which made an application before DRT for recovery of debt from the debtor company may be paid the undisbursed amount against due debt as per the recovery certificate after securing an indemnity bond of restitution of the amount to the extent of workmen’s dues as may be finally determined by the liquidator of the debtor company and payable to workmen in the proportion set out in the illustration appended to Section 529(3)(c) of the Companies Act. The other, DRT may set apart tentatively portion of the undisbursed amount towards workmen’s dues in the ratio as per the illustration following Section 529(3)(c) and disburse the balance amount to the applicant bank or financial institution subject to an undertaking by such bank or financial institution to restitute the amount to the extent workmen’s dues as may be finally determined by the liquidator, falls short of the amount which may be distributable to the workmen as per the above illustration. The amount so set apart may be disbursed to the liquidator towards workmen’s dues on ad hoc basis subject to adjustment on final determination of the workmen’s dues by the liquidator. (viii) The first option must be exercised by DRT only in a situation where no application for distribution towards workmen’s dues against the debtor company has been made by the liquidator or the workmen before the DRT. (ix) Where the sale of security has been effected in execution of recovery certificate issued by the DRT under the 1993 Act, the distribution of sale proceeds has to be made by the DRT alone in accordance with Section 529A of the Companies Act and by no other forum or authority. (x) The workmen of the company in winding up acquire the standing of the secured creditors on and from the date of winding up order (or where provisional liquidator has been appointed, from the date of such appointment) and they become entitled to the distribution of sale proceeds in the ratio as explained in the illustration appended to Section 529(3)(c) of the Companies Act. (xi) Section 19(19) of the 1993 Act does not clothe DRT with jurisdiction to determine the workmen’s claim against the debtor company. The adjudication of workmen’s dues against the debtor company in liquidation has to be made by the liquidator. In other words, once the company is in winding up the only competent authority to determine the workmen’s dues is the liquidator who obviously has to act under the supervision of the company court and by no other authority. (xii) Section 19 (19) is attracted only where a debtor company is in winding up or a provisional liquidator has been appointed in respect of such company. If the debtor company is not in liquidation or if in respect of such company no order of appointment of provisional liquidator has been made and merely winding up proceedings are pending, the question of distribution of sale proceeds among secured creditors in the manner prescribed in Section19(19) of the 1993 Act does not arise.= the claims of the workmen who claim to be entitled to payment pari passu have to be considered and adjudicated by the liquidator of the debtor company and not by the DRT. We answer the question accordingly. 74. The impugned judgment is set aside. The Debt Recovery Tribunal, Mumbai III and the official liquidator of the Company shall proceed further now concerning workmen’s dues as indicated in this judgment. The appeals are allowed with no order as to costs. All pending applications stand disposed of.
‘ REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7045 OF 2005 Bank of Maharashtra … Appellant Vs. Pandurang Keshav Gorwardkar & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 7046 OF 2005 JUDGMENT R.M. LODHA,J. These two appeals from the Bombay High Court came up before atwo-Judge Bench (B.P. … Continue reading
On 04.06.2005, A newspaper by name “Tarun Bharat” published an article in which it was alleged that the petitioners have purchased agricultural land showing Ramesh as alive while he was dead. It was further alleged that one Ramesh Shikaji Rathod had signed the sale deed as Ramesh Shika Jadhav. = On 07.07.2005, the officials of Ghatanji P.S. registered offences punishable under Sections 420, 419, 468 and 34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short ‘IPC’) for the acts of fraud, criminal breach of trust and impersonation against the said accused persons vide Crime No. 88 of 2005. (g) On 09.09.2005, one Rajnikant Deluram Borele, claiming himself to be a Social Worker, filed a Criminal Complaint in the court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Ghatanji, which was registered as Case No. 92 of 2005 against the appellants-herein, Sub-Registrar and few more persons. In the complaint it was alleged that the accused had purchased the land from a dead person, namely, Ramesh Shikaji Jadhav, while the appellants were acting in their official capacity under the said Scheme. (h) Learned Magistrate, by order dated 27.09.2005, directed the Police to investigate the matter under Section 156(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (in 5Page 6 short the “Code”) and to submit a detailed report within one month. -It is clear that any judicial magistrate before taking cognizance of the offence can order investigation under Section 156(3) of the Code. If he does so, he is not to examine the complainant on oath because he was not taking cognizance of any offence therein. = 14) Where a Magistrate chooses to take cognizance he can adopt any of the following alternatives: (a) He can peruse the complaint and if satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can straightaway issue process to the accused but before he does so he must comply with the requirements of Section 200 and record the evidence of the complainant or his witnesses. (b) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by himself. (c) The Magistrate can postpone the issue of process and direct an enquiry by any other person or an investigation by the police. 15) In case the Magistrate after considering the statement of the complainant and the witnesses or as a result of the investigation and the enquiry ordered is not satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for proceeding he can dismiss the complaint. 16) Where a Magistrate orders investigation by the police before taking cognizance under Section 156(3) of the Code and receives the report thereupon he can act on the report and discharge the accused or straightaway issue process against the accused or apply his mind to the complaint filed before him and take action under Section 190 of the Code.
Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 684 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7293 of 2009) Madhao & Anr. …. Appellant(s) Versus State of Maharashtra & Anr. …. Respondent(s) WITH CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 685 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 7324 … Continue reading
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