//
archives

Mumbai

This tag is associated with 52 posts

Novation of Contract = IMS Learning Resources Private Limited, the respondent herein, filed CS (OS) No.2316 of 2011 in the High Court of Delhi at New Delhi for a permanent injunction restraining infringement of a registered trademark, infringement of copyright, passing off of damages, rendition of accounts of profits and also for other consequential reliefs against the appellant herein. Appellant preferred IA No.18 of 2012 under Section 8, read with Section 5 -of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 for rejecting the plaint and referring the dispute to arbitration and also for other consequential reliefs. The High Court rejected the application vide its order dated 16.04.2012 holding that that earlier agreements dated 01.04.2007 and 01.04.2010, which contained arbitration clause stood superseded by a new contract dated 01.02.2011 arrived at between the parties by mutual consent. = Exit paper would clearly indicate that it is a mutually agreed document containing comprehensive terms and conditions which -admittedly does not contain an arbitration clause. = We may indicate that so far as the present case is concerned, parties have entered into a fresh contract contained in the Exit paper which does not even indicate any disputes arising under the original contract or about the settlement thereof, it is nothing but a pure and simple novation of the original contract by mutual consent. Above being the factual and legal position, we find no error in the view taken by the High Court. The appeal, therefore, lacks merit and stands dismissed, with no order as to costs.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40682 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 6997 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.33459 of 2012) M/s Young Achievers ….. Appellant Versus IMS Learning Resources Pvt. Ltd. ….Respondent   J U D G M E N T K.S. Radhakrishnan, J. Leave granted. 2. IMS Learning Resources … Continue reading

Section 13(2) read with 13(1)(e) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988 read with Section 109 of the Indian Penal Code.- Non- filing of original complaint not fatal when not relied upon it = whether the prosecution is bound to produce the original complaint/application filed by an unknown person, based on which an inquiry was initiated by the Anti Corruption Bureau.= the prosecution has categorically taken the stand that they do not propose to rely upon the information passed on to the Anti Corruption Bureau leading to an open inquiry against the accused persons. We fail to see how the accused persons are prejudiced by non-disclosure of the name of the person who sent the complaint as well as the original copy of the complaint received by the Anti Corruption Bureau. Situations are many where certain persons do not want to disclose the identity as well as the information/complaint passed on them to the Anti Corruption Bureau. If the names of the persons, as well as the copy of the complaint sent by them are disclosed, that may cause embarrassment to them and sometimes threat to their life. This complaint only triggered an enquiry. Ultimately, the first information was lodged on the basis of an open inquiry bearing VER No.31/1987 and it is based on that inquiry the first information report dated 13.10.1992 was registered. After completion of the investigation and after getting the sanction to prosecute accused No.1, charge-sheet was filed. PW1 also did not depose anything about the receipt of complaint/application in his examination-in-chief but receipt of the complaint/application and its contents having been relied upon by the defence during cross-examination of PW1. 11. We also emphasize that in the instant case the prosecution has relied upon the material which was collected during the investigation. It is not a case where some materials/documents were collected by the investigating agency during the investigations which are in favour of the prosecution and the prosecution is suppressing those documents. We are of the opinion that non-supply of the complaint or contents thereof do not, at all, violate the principle of fair trial. The said complaint has no relevancy in the context of this prosecution and in no manner, it would prejudice the petitioner. 12. Above being the factual and legal position, we find no reason to interfere with the order of the Bombay High Court and dismiss this special leave petition.

 published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40662    REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (CRIMINAL) NO.5897 OF 2013   Manjeet Singh Khera …. Petitioner Versus State of Maharashtra ….Respondent O R D E R   K.S. Radhakrishnan, J.   1. We are, in this case, concerned with the question whether the … Continue reading

JURISDICTION OF SMALL CAUSE COURTS IN EVICTING GRATUITOUS LICENSEE = i) Whether the expression “Licensee” used in section 41(1) in Chapter VII of PSCC Act, not having been defined therein, would derive its meaning from the expression “licensee” as used in sub- section (4A) of section 5 of the Rent Act and/or whether the expression “licensee” used in section 41(1) of PSCC Act is a term of wider import so as to mean and include a “gratuitous licensee” also? ii) Whether a suit by a “licensor” against a “gratuitous licensee” is tenable before the Presidency Small Cause Court under section 41 of PSCC Act? = whether a suit filed by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee under Section 41(1) of the Presidency Small Causes Courts Act, 1882 (for short “the PSCC Act”), as amended by the Maharashtra Act No.XIX of 1976 (for short “1976 Amendment Act”) is maintainable before a Small Causes Court, Mumbai. 3. The Division Bench of the Bombay High Court in Ramesh Dwarikadas Mehra v. Indirawati Dwarika Das Mehra (AIR 2001 Bombay 470) held that a suit by a licensor against a gratuitous licensee is not tenable before the Presidency Small Causes Court under Section 41 (1) of the PSCC Act, and it should be filed before the City Civil Court or the High Court depending upon the valuation. The Division Bench held that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act has the same meaning as in Section 5 (4A) of the Bombay Rents, Hotels and Lodging House Rates (Control) Act, 1947 (in short “the Rent Act”). Further it was held that the expression “licensee” as used in Section 5(4A) does not cover a gratuitous licensee. The Division Bench in that case rejected the ejectment application holding that the Small Causes Court at Bombay lacked jurisdiction. We are of the view that in such a situation the court also should give a liberal construction and attempt should be to achieve the purpose and object of the legislature and not to frustrate it. In such circumstances, we are of the considered opinion that the expression licensee employed in Section 41 is used in general sense of term as defined in Section 52 of the Indian Easement Act. 52. We have elaborately discussed the various legal principles and indicated that the expression ‘licensee’ in Section 41(1) of the PSCC Act would take a gratuitous licensee as well. The reason for such an interpretation has been elaborately discussed in the earlier part of the judgment. Looking from all angles in our view the expression ‘licensee’ used in the PSCC Act does not derive its meaning from the expression ‘licensee’ as used in Sub-section (4A) of Section 5 of the Rent Act and that the expression “licensee” used in Section 41(1) is a term of wider import intended to bring in a gratuitous licensee as well. 53. We are, therefore, in complete agreement with the reasoning of the Full Bench of the High Court. In such circumstances, the appeals lack merits and are, therefore, dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

PUBLISHED IN         http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40640   REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 6726-6727 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP (Civil) NO.20763-764 OF 2007)   Prabhudas Damodar Kotecha & Ors. …. Appellants v. Manhabala Jeram Damodar & Anr. …Respondents   J U D G M E N T K. … Continue reading

Fire Accident – Insurance = Surveyor’s report has significant and evidentiary value = It is well settled law that a Surveyor’s report has significant and evidentiary value unless it is proved otherwise which the complainants have failed to do so in the instant case. This view finds support from the judgment of this Commission, in D.N.Badoni Vs. Oriental Insurance Co.Ltd, 1 (2012) CPJ 272 (NC). In United India Insurance Co. Ltd., & Ors. Vs. Roshan Lal Oil Mills Ltd. & Ors., (2000) 10 SCC 19, the Hon’ble Apex court was pleased to hold :- “The appellant had appointed joint surveyors in terms of Section 64-UM(2) of the Insurance Act, 1938. Their report has been placed on the record in which a detailed account of the factors on the basis of which the joint surveyors had come to the conclusion that there was no loss or damage caused on account of fire, was given and it was on this basis that the claim was not found entertainable. This is an important document which was placed before the Commission, but the Commission, curiously, has not considered the report. Since the claim of the respondent was repudiated by the appellant on the basis of the joint survey report, the Commission was not justified in awarding the insurance amount to the respondent without adverting itself to the contents of the joint survey report, specially the facts enumerated therein. In our opinion, non-consideration of this important document has resulted in serious miscarriage of justice and vitiates the judgment passed by the Commission. The case has, therefore, to be sent back to the Commission, for a fresh hearing”. He has placed reliance on ‘Panchanama’, prepared at the place of incident by the independent ‘Panchas’. He stated that ‘Panchas’ and Police, have stated that damage in the sum of Rs.76,39,090/- was accrued. It is noteworthy to see that no ‘Pancha’ was produced before this Commission. No affidavit of the ‘Pancha’ saw the light of the day. The said ‘Panchanama’ has an exiguous value. Moreover, in view of the Surveyor’s Report, the ‘Panchanamas’, prepared by self-appointed ‘Panchas’, pales into insignificance. It is, therefore, ordered that rest of the amount in the sum of Rs.2,10,000/-, with interest @ 9% p.a., be paid to the complainant, M/s. Keshav Trading Co., from the date of filing of the claim, till its realization. It may be mentioned here that there is inordinate delay in settling the claim of the complainant. Even if the complainant was not available, the claim should have been settled and the amount should have been sent at the given address. Keeping in view of these facts and circumstances, we also award compensation in the sum of Rs.50,000/-, which be paid within sixty days, by the insurance company, or else, it will carry interest @ 9% p.a. The Original Petition stands disposed of, in above terms.

published in http://164.100.72.12/ncdrcrep/judgement/00130807131226383OP6405.htm NATIONAL CONSUMER DISPUTES REDRESSAL COMMISSION NEW DELHI            ORIGINAL PETITION NO. 64 OF 2005 Keshav Trading Company Bhilwada Circle, Talati Road Palitana, District Bhavnagar Gujarat Through Attorney, Sh.Nasruddin Bhai S/o Noor Muhammad Sneh Milan, ‘A’ Wing, Ground Floor Room No.1, Dewan Maan Vasai, Mumbai                                                                      … Complainant Versus Divisional Manager United India Insurance Co.Ltd Nava Para, … Continue reading

Prohibition imposed under Bombay police Act on the dances at Bars, Hotels by way of amendment was quashed by the Bombay High court and confirmed by the Apex Court =the High Court of Judicature at Bombay, whereby Section 33A of the Bombay Police Act, 1951 as inserted by the Bombay Police (Amendment) Act, 2005 has been declared to be ultra vires Articles 14 and 19(1)(g) of the Constitution of India.= “the cure is worse than the disease”= Of course, the right to practise a trade or profession and the right to life guaranteed under Article 21 are, by their very nature, intermingled with each other, but in a situation like the present one, such right cannot be equated with unrestricted freedom like a run-away horse. As has been indicated by my learned Brother, at the very end of his judgment, it would be better to treat the cause than to blame the effect and to completely discontinue the livelihood of a large section of women, eking out an existence by dancing in bars, who will be left to the mercy of other forms of exploitation. The compulsion of physical needs has to be taken care of while making any laws on the subject. Even a bar dancer has to satisfy her hunger, provide expenses for her family and meet day to day expenses in travelling from her residence to her place of work, which is sometimes even as far as 20 to 25 kms. away. Although, it has been argued on behalf of the State and its authorities that the bar dancers have taken to the profession not as an extreme measure, but as a profession of choice, more often than not, it is a Hobson’s choice between starving and in resorting to bar dancing. From the materials placed before us and the statistics shown, it is apparent that many of the bar dancers have no other option as they have no other skills, with which they could earn a living. Though some of the women engaged in bar dancing may be doing so as a matter of choice, not very many women would willingly resort to bar dancing as a profession. Women worldwide are becoming more and more assertive of their rights and want to be free to make their own choices, which is not an entirely uncommon or unreasonable approach. But it is necessary to work towards a change in mindset of people in general not only by way of laws and other forms of regulations, but also by way of providing suitable amenities for those who want to get out of this trap and to either improve their existing conditions or to begin a new life altogether. Whichever way one looks at it, the matter requires the serious attention of the State and its authorities, if the dignity of women, as a whole, and respect for them, is to be restored. In that context, the directions given by my learned Brother, Justice Nijjar, assume importance. 6. I fully endorse the suggestions made in paragraph 123 of the judgment prepared by my learned Brother that, instead of generating unemployment, it may be wiser for the State to look into ways and means in which reasonable restrictions may be imposed on bar dancing, but without completely prohibiting or stopping the same. It is all very well to enact laws without making them effective. The State has to provide alternative means of support and shelter to persons engaged in such trades or professions, some of whom are trafficked from different parts of the country and have nowhere to go or earn a living after coming out of their unfortunate circumstances. A strong and effective support system may provide a solution to the problem. 8. These words are in addition to and not in derogation of the judgment delivered by my learned Brother.

published in    http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40565  REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2705 OF 2006 State of Maharashtra & Anr. …Appellants VERSUS Indian Hotel & Restaurants Assn. & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO.2704 OF 2006 State of Maharashtra & Ors. Etc. Etc. ..Appellants VERSUS Ramnath Vishnu Waringe Etc. Etc. …Respondents … Continue reading

Hindu Marriage Act – Jurisdiction of Indian court in respect of couples who applied for foreign citizenship =Whether the petition by the wife for judicial separation under Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act and custody of the children is not maintainable. ? Since the marriage was taken place at India and since the wife is of Indian Domicile and since the husband failed to prove that he is domicle of Australia and also failed to prove of his giving up of indian Domicle = “the husband has miserably failed to establish that he ever abandoned Indian domicile and/or intended to acquire domicile of his choice”.- “A conjoint reading of Ss. 1 and 2 of the Act would indicate that so far as the second limb of S. 1(2) of the Act is concerned its intra territorial operation of the Act applied to those who reside outside the territories. First limb of sub-section (2) of S. 1 and Cls. (a) and (b) of S.2(1) would make it clear that the Act would apply to Hindus reside in India whether they reside outside the territories or not.”- Hindu marriage Act sec. (2) It extends to the whole of India except the State of Jammu and Kashmir, and applies also to Hindus domiciled in the territories to which this Act extends who are outside the said territories.”; The general principle underlying the sovereignty of States is that laws made by one State cannot have operation in another State. A law which has extra territorial operation cannot directly be enforced in another State but such a law is not invalid and saved by Article 245 (2) of the Constitution of India. Article 245(2) provides that no law made by Parliament shall be deemed to be invalid on the ground that it would have extra-territorial operation. – whether a nexus with something in India is necessary.= In our opinion, this extra-territorial operation of law is saved not because of nexus with Hindus but Hindus domiciled in India.; “It is, thus, clear that a condition of a domicile in India, as contemplated in Section 1(2) of H.M.Act, is necessary ingredient to maintain a petition seeking reliefs under the H.M.Act. In other words, a wife, who is domiciled and residing in India when she presents a petition, seeking reliefs under H.M.Act, her petition would be maintainable in the territories of India and in the Court within the local limits of whose ordinary civil jurisdiction she resides.”- Therefore, in our considered opinion, the Act will apply to Hindu outside the territory of India only if such a Hindu is domiciled in the territory of India.; law permits raising of alternative plea but the facts of the present case does not permit the husband to take this course. = It is specific case of the appellant that he is a Swedish citizen domiciled in Australia and it is the Australian courts which shall have jurisdiction in the matter. In order to succeed, the appellant has to establish that he is a domicile of Australia and, in our opinion, he cannot be allowed to make out a third case that in case it is not proved that he is a domicile of Australia, his earlier domicile of choice, that is Sweden, is revived. ; Domicile of origin is not necessarily the place of birth. The birth of a child at a place during temporary absence of the parents from their domicile will not make the place of birth as the domicile of the child.; Domicile of origin prevails until not only another domicile is acquired but it must manifest intention of abandoning the domicile of origin.- when we consider the husband’s claim of being domicile of Australia we find no material to endorse this plea. The residential tenancy agreement is only for 18 months which cannot be termed for a long period. Admittedly, the husband or for that matter, the wife and the children have not acquired the Australian citizenship. In the absence thereof, it is difficult to accept that they intended to reside permanently in Australia. The claim that the husband desired to permanently reside in Australia, in the face of the material available, can only be termed as a dream. It does not establish his intention to reside there permanently. Husband has admitted that his visa was nothing but a “long term permit” and “not a domicile document”. Not only this, there is no whisper at all as to how and in what manner the husband had abandoned the domicile of origin. In the face of it, we find it difficult to accept the case of the husband that he is domiciled in Australia and he shall continue to be the domicile of origin i.e. India. In view of our answer that the husband is a domicile of India, the question that the wife shall follow the domicile of husband is rendered academic. For all these reasons, we are of the opinion that both the husband and wife are domicile of India and, hence, shall be covered by the provisions of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. As on fact, we have found that both the husband and wife are domicile of India, and the Act will apply to them, other contentions raised on behalf of the parties, are rendered academic and we refrain ourselves to answer those. In the result, we do not find any merit in the appeal and it is dismissed accordingly but without any order as to costs. CIVIL APPEAL NO.487 OF 2007 In view of our decision in Civil Appeal No. 4629 of 2005 (Sondur Gopal vs. Sondur Rajini) holding that the petition filed by the appellant for judicial separation and custody of the children is maintainable, we are of the opinion that the writ petition filed by the respondent for somewhat similar relief is rendered infructuous. On this ground alone, we allow this appeal and dismiss the writ petition filed by the respondent.

published in  http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40556 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.4629 OF 2005 SONDUR GOPAL APPELLANT VERSUS SONDUR RAJINI RESPONDENT With CIVIL APPEAL NO.487 OF 2007 RAJINI SONDUR APPELLANT VERSUS GOPAL SONDUR & ORS. RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT CHANDRAMAULI KR. PRASAD,J. CIVIL APPEAL NO.4629 OF 2005 Appellant-husband, aggrieved by the judgment and … Continue reading

Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act,=Chapter VIII-A, which was introduced into the the Maharashtra Housing and Area Development Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as “the 1976 Act”, in 1986, pertains to the acquisition of “cessed properties” for co-operative societies of occupiers. In view of the questions raised in the writ petitions, the matter was initially referred to a Bench of 7-Judges, but, thereafter, by order dated 20.02.2002, the matters have been referred to a Bench of Nine-Judges and are still pending decision. Since no final decision seems to be in the offing, the writ petitioners have filed IA No. 3 of 2012, for interim reliefs.= Whether MHADA has any obligation to provide similar accommodation to others in respect of the 30% surplus land, is a controversy which we need not go into and will surely be decided, whenever the Nine-Judge Bench sits to take up these matters. But for the purposes of this case, we regret that in spite of the inordinate delay in the working of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act, which was intended for the benefit of a certain section of tenants and occupants of cessed buildings, we are unable to grant the relief prayed for, as the same goes against the very grain of the provisions of Chapter VIII-A of the 1976 Act.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40501 Page 1 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION I.A. NO. 3 OF 2012 IN WRIT PETITION (C) NO. 342 OF 1999 KAMLESH C. SHAH & ORS. …PETITIONERS Vs. STATE OF MAHARASHTRA AND ORS. …RESPONDENTS J U D G M E N T ALTAMAS KABIR, CJI. 1. Chapter VIII-A, which … Continue reading

Cheque dishonor case = under Section 138 of the N.I. Act, in case of issuance of cheque from joint accounts, a joint account holder cannot be prosecuted unless the cheque has been signed by each and every person who is a joint account holder. The said principle is an exception to Section 141 of the N.I. Act which would have no application in the case on hand. The proceedings filed under Section 138 cannot be used as an arm twisting tactics to recover the amount allegedly due from the appellant. It cannot be said that the complainant has no remedy against the appellant but certainly not under Section 138. The culpability attached to dishonour of a cheque can, in no case “except in case of Section 141 of the N.I. Act” be extended to those on whose behalf the cheque is issued. This Court reiterates that it is only the drawer of the cheque who can be made an accused in any proceeding under Section 138 of the Act.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=40479 Page 1 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 813 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (Crl.) No. 9794 of 2010) Mrs. Aparna A. Shah …. Appellant(s) Versus M/s Sheth Developers Pvt. Ltd. & Anr. …. Respondent(s) J U D G M E N T P.Sathasivam,J. 1) Leave … Continue reading

HINDU MARRIAGE ACT SEC. 13 [1] [1A] & [III]She merely suffered from cognitive deficiency. which is not a ground for granting divorce = the appellant-husband Darshan Gupta had never given the respondent, moral or emotional support, during the time of her distress. Despite the request of her treating doctor, he never accompanied her during the course of her consultations with doctors. The Family Court expressed the view, that the appellant husband Darshan Gupta himself, was responsible for the state of affairs of his wife-Radhika Gupta, inasmuch as, he did not heed the advise of the gynecologist, after the abortion of her first pregnancy in June 1999. The consulting Gynecologist had advised the couple against planning any further conception, for a period of at least two years. Despite the aforesaid advice, Darshan Gupta impregnated his wife Radhika Gupta, just after eight months of the said abortion. His desires had overridden, the health advisory of the gynecologist. The Family Court also concluded, that the appellant-husband had failed to establish, that the mental unsoundness of mind or mental disorder of the respondent-wife was of such degree, that he could not be expected to live with her.= Darshan Gupta had not been able to prove, that his wife was suffering from any incurable unsoundness of mind and/or mental disorder. Insofar as the solitary expert witness produced by the appellant-husband Darshan Gupta is concerned, Dr. M. Veera Raghawa Reddy-PW4, had admitted that while examining Radhika Gupta, he did not observe any signs of aggressiveness in the respondent-wife. On the contrary, he affirmed, that she was having a smiling face, and also,observed a calm and cool conduct.= Radhika Gupta left the company of the appellant-husband Darshan Gupta on 3.10.2011. On the said date itself, Radhika Gupta addressed a letter to the Registry of this Court. The said letter read thus : “The Hon’ble Supreme Court, by the order dated 19.09.2011 directed us to live happily for a period of six months. In pursuance to the directions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court, my husband taken me into his matrimonial company on 29.09.2011 and kept me separately at his row (sic) house situated at Jubilee Hills. However, I am reporting from that day i.e. 29.09.2011 my husband is not behaving properly with me. Instead of showing love and affection, he is abusing me with filthy language without any reason. He is calling me “PAGAL” as and when he is addressing me. He is further saying that I have no sense and intelligence. Further he repeating me to leave him by taking money. He is further saying that even though his appeal before Supreme Court is dismissed he is not going to live with me. My in-laws also compelling me to agree for divorce by accepting money. My husband threatening me to agree for Divorce. The torture of my husband is beyond my tolerance. Hence under the above compelling circumstances I am leaving to my mothers’ place.”= whether the relief sought by the learned counsel for the appellant, on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of marriage is available to him. The reason for us to say so, is based on a judgment rendered by this Court in Vishnu Dutt Sharma vs. Manju Sharma, (2009) 6 SCC 379, wherein this Court has held as under:- “10. On a bare reading of Section 13 of the Act, reproduced above, it is crystal clear that no such ground of irretrievable breakdown of the marriage is provided by the legislature for granting a decree of divorce. This Court cannot add such a ground to Section 13 of the Act as that would be amending the Act, which is a function of the legislature.= We would, in our endeavour to determine the issue in hand, examine the matter, by reversing the roles of the parties. We will examine the matter as if, the wife had approached the Family Court seeking divorce, on the ground that her husband had suffered brain damage leading to cognitive deficiencies. Yet, despite the said deficiencies, his working memory had returned to “near normal” after treatment. And his mental condition was such, that it would not have any effect on his matrimonial obligations. And the wife’s family is agreeable to pay an amount to be determined by this Court (just as the husband-Darshan Gupta, has offered), so as to enable their daughter to break away, and find a more suitable match. Should she have been granted freedom from her matrimonial ties, in the given facts, in order to do complete justice to the parties? We would ask ourselves, whether the husband would have accepted such a plea, in the facts denoted above? In such situation, if this Court had, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, granted compensation to the husband, and had dissolved his marriage on the pretext of doing complete justice between the parties, would the same be acceptable to the husband? We have no doubt in our mind, that on a reversal of roles, the husband, without any fault of his own, would have never accepted as just, the dissolution of his matrimonial ties, even if the couple had been separated for a duration, as is the case in hand. Specially, if the husband had, right from the beginning, fervently expressed the desire to restore his matrimonial relationship with his wife, and to live a normal life with her.= For the reasons recorded hereinabove, we find no merit in these appeals, and the same are accordingly dismissed.

‘ published in ‘ http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp “REPORTABLE” IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 6332-6333 OF 2009 Darshan Gupta … Appellant Versus Radhika Gupta … Respondent J U D G M E N T Jagdish Singh Khehar, J. 1. The marriage between the appellant-husband, Darshan Gupta and the respondent-wife, Radhika Gupta, was solemnized … Continue reading

Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai- pull down the building numbers 13,14,15 and 16 which are in dilapidated condition. = petitioners have no legal right to continue to live in the existing buildings as this Court by its previous order, sought to be modified, has already passed an order for their eviction from the premises in question.= In view of the existing precarious nature and status of the buildings in question which is informed to be extremely grave, we cannot permit the petitioners to continue to live in the existing buildings for more than a fortnight which they have been ordered to vacate. Therefore, we permit them to exercise their option of shifting either to Mahul, Chembur or the Transit Camps Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight when the transit camps are made fit for habitation with essential and basic amenities. However, if some of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 wish to continue in the existing buildings at their own risk even after a fortnight, they are at liberty to seek permission from the Bench which had passed the order sought to be modified as we have taken up this application for modification only in view of its urgency.- However, considering the peculiar facts and circumstances as also taking into account the humanitarian consideration for the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14, we accede to the request of the occupants of the building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 communicated through their counsel that if they wish to continue to live in the existing buildings beyond of a period of fortnight until they move the Regular Bench, they may do so at their own risk and in case the buildings in question falls down in the meantime and the occupants suffer loss in any manner, the whole and sole responsibility shall be of the occupants of the those buildings and the Municipal Corporation of Greater Mumbai shall not be liable in any manner for any consequence that might follow. 14. The Applicant/respondent No.1 however, shall make the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B habitable with all basic amenities within a fortnight but not later than 30.6.2013. It was further stated by the learned Attorney General that the respondent No. 1 will offer all assistance and logistic support to the evacuees for shifting them from the existing building No. 13 and top floor of building No. 14 to Mahul, Chembur and continue to live there until they reshift to the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B after a fortnight or till such time when the Transit Camps are complete to their satisfaction. 15. It is made clear that the Transit Camp Nos. 13A and 13B shall provide all basic amenities required for human habitation but the word “habitation” will not be construed so as to insist for fancy fittings in the Transit Camps. = published in http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp

‘     IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA   CIVIL ORIGINAL JURISDICTION   I.A. NO. 5 OF 2013 IN SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) NO. 39114 OF 2012   | MAZAGAON TADWADI BTT CHAWL NIWAS VASAHAT BACHAV KRUTI |…| PETITIONER(s) | |SAMITY AND OTHERS | | |   | Versus |   |MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,881,339 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,905 other followers

Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com