Municipal Corporation

This tag is associated with 9 posts

Khasara entries do not convey title = Suit for declaration of title and injunction – trial court dismissed the suit as it belongs to Municipality /defendant – High court reversed the trial court order basing on revenue entries by saying that ” when the respondents- defendants did not produce property register to show that this property was ever recorded as property of the Municipal Corporation. At one stage it was recorded as Nazul land belonging to the State when the area had not come within the municipal limits. When the area came within the municipal limits it was mentioned to be Behatnam (under management) of the Municipal Corporation. But the possession and title of the plaintiffs has been recorded throughout even thereafter and to have established Abadi over this land, and therefore, the defendants-respondents could not object to the title and possession of the plaintiffs and the suit for declaration of title and injunction ought to have been decreed.” – Apex court set aside the judgment of High court and held that The High Court committed a grave and manifest error of law in reversing the well reasoned judgment and decree passed by the Trial Court by simply placing reliance upon Khasaras entries even without properly appreciating the settled law that Khasara entries do not convey title of the suit property as the same is only relevant for the purposes of paying land revenue and it has nothing to do with ownership.= MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, GWALIOR … APPELLANT VERSUS PURAN SINGH ALIAS PURAN CHAND & ORS. … RESPONDENTS = 2014 – July. Part – http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/filename=41724

Khasara entries do  not  convey  title  = Suit for declaration of title and injunction – trial court dismissed the suit as it belongs to Municipality /defendant – High court reversed the trial court order basing on revenue entries by saying that ” when  the respondents- defendants did not produce property register to show that this property  was … Continue reading

A Daily worker on termination of his service not entitled for re-employment as of right as the termination is not amounts to retrenchment of an employee = whether termination of services of the respondent on the expiry of the contract period would amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2(oo) of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1948 (for short “the ID Act”). = Section 2(bb) says that if the termination of the service of workman is as a result of non-renewal of the contract between the employer and the workman on its expiry of such contract being terminated under a stipulation in that behalf contained therein, the same would not constitute retrenchment.= Facts would clearly indicate that the respondent’s service was terminated on the expiry of the fixed periods mentioned in the office orders and that he had worked only for 54 days. The mere fact that the appointment orders used the expression “daily wages” does not make the appointment “Casual” because it is the substance that matters, not the form. The contract of appointment consciously entered into by the employer and the employee would, over and above the specific terms of the written agreement, indicates that the employment is short-lived and the same is liable to termination, on the fixed period mentioned in the contract of appointment.= “25G. Procedure for retrenchment.- Where any workman in an industrial establishment, who is a citizen of India, is to be retrenched and he belongs to a particular category of workmen in that establishment, in the absence of any agreement between the employer and the workman in this behalf, the employer shall ordinarily retrench the workman who was the last person to be employed in that category, unless for reasons to be recorded the employer retrenches any other workman. 25H. Re- employment of retrenched workmen.- Where any workmen are retrenched, and the employer proposes to take into his employ any persons, he shall, in such manner as may be prescribed, give an opportunity 2[ to the retrenched workmen who are citizens of India to offer themselves for re- employment and such retrenched workman] who offer themselves for re- employment shall have preference over other persons.”= Section 25H will apply only if the respondent establishes that there had been retrenchment. Facts will clearly indicate that there was no retrenchment under Section 2(oo) read with Section 2(bb) of the ID Act. Consequently, Section 25H would not apply to the facts of the case. Similar is the factual and legal situation in the civil appeal arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012 as well. We are sorry to note that the Labour Court, learned Single Judge and the Division Bench have not properly appreciated the factual and legal position in this case. When rights of parties are being adjudicated, needless to say, serious thoughts have to be bestowed by the Labour Court as well as the High Court. For the above-mentioned reasons we allow both the appeals, set aside the award passed by the Labour Court and confirmed by the High Court. However, there will be no order as to costs.

 published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgst.aspx?filename=40563 REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPEALLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5498 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5387 of 2012) Bhavnagar Municipal Corporation Appellant Versus Salimbhai Umarbhai Mansuri Respondent with CIVIL APPEAL NO. 5510 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No.5390 of 2012) J U D G M E N … Continue reading

Upgrade to Municipal corporation = Section 8-AA(1) of the Act -under Section 3(2) of the Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporations Act, 1959 (for short ‘the Act’) as applicable in Uttarakhand read with Article 243Q(2) of the Constitution = Principal Secretary Urban Development Department, Government of Uttarakhand has provided an opportunity of hearing to the objectors on their respective objections on 16.07.2011 from 11.00 a.m. to 3.00 p.m. at Kumbh Fair Controlling House, Haridwar and amongst the objectors there were several Municipal Councilors of Haridwar Municipality, namely Dinesh Joshi, Rakesh Prajapati, Yashoda Devi, Leela Devi, Ashok Sharma, Jagdhir Singh, Nikhil Mehta, Idris Ansari, Satya Narayan, Karuna Sharma, Sanjay Sharma, Radhey Krishna, Prabha Ghai and Ram Ahuja. Hence, the appellant, who was the Chairman of the Municipal Council, Haridwar could have also participated in the hearing in support of his objections. We cannot, therefore, find any infirmity in the impugned judgment of the Division Bench of the High Court that an opportunity of hearing was actually given to all persons likely to be affected by the two notifications dated 21.07.2011. 13. At the time of hearing of this appeal, we were inclined to consider the other contention of Mr. Hansaria that the State Government must form an opinion that until the due constitution of the Municipal Corporation for an area, “it is expedient” to dissolve the Municipal Council from a specified date and to direct that all powers, functions and duties of the Corporation shall as from the specified date, be vested in and be exercised, performed and discharged by the Administrator appointed by the State Government in view of the language of sub-section (1) of Section 8-AA of the Act. But we find that this ground was not raised in the Writ Petition before the High Court nor raised in the special leave petition before this Court. We further find that pursuant to the two notifications dated 21.07.2011, the elections to the Municipal Corporation have been notified to be held and completed by 30.04.2013. Hence, even if the appellant succeeds on this point, we cannot direct restoration of the Haridwar Municipality after the constitution of the Municipal Corporation, Haridwar. For these reasons, we refrain from considering this question in this appeal and leave this question open to be decided in some other appropriate case.

published in http://judis.nic.in/supremecourt/imgs1.aspx?filename=40467 Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL No. 4835 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) No. 1889 of 2012) Kamal Jora … Appellant Versus State of Uttarakhand & Anr. … Respondents J U D G M E N T A. K. PATNAIK, J. Leave granted. 2. … Continue reading

Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short ‘the Rules’) = While they were working in the Ara Municipal Corporation, the Bihar Municipal Officers and Servants Pension Rules, 1987 (for short ‘the Rules’) came into effect. = The Ara Municipal Corporation, however, did not give effect to the Rules until 19th June, 2004 on which date it adopted resolution to give pensionary benefits to its employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards in accordance with the Rules.- the Division Bench of the High Court upheld the finding of the learned Single Judge that the Rules came into effect on 13-11-1987 but held that as the two writ petitioners had not exercised their option for the pension as required by Rule 4 of the Rules and as their right to pension under the Rules was dependent upon the exercise of their option for pension, they were not entitled for the pension under the Rules. = In the facts of the present case, the Ara Municipal Corporation itself had taken a view that the Rules were not applicable until a resolution is adopted by the Corporation and adopted the resolution only on 19th June, 2004 saying that the pensionary benefits of the Rules will be given to those employees who had retired from service from the year 2000 onwards. The resolution was clearly in contravention of the Rule 1 as well as Rule 4(ii) of the Rules. If the Corporation had taken the correct view that the rules would be effective from 13th November, 1987, the two employees Ramashish Prasad and Vishwanath Ram who were employees of the Ara Municipal Corporation on that date, could have exercised their respective options to switchover to pension scheme under the Rules. This is a case where the Ara Municipal Corporation by taking the view that the Rules were not applicable until adopted by the Corporation had disabled the aforesaid two employees from exercising their option and cannot take advantage of such a disability caused by the Municipal Corporation itself and deny their statutory right to pension under the Rules. Moreover, the two employees have also not received part or whole of provident fund contribution although they have retired in 1996 and 1997 and hence they could not have been deemed to have exercised their option to retain existing provident fund. 9. For the aforesaid reasons, we set aside the impugned judgment of the Division Bench and direct that the appellants will be given the pensionary benefits including pension and family pension, as the case may be, in accordance with the Rules within three months from today. We make it clear that this judgment has been delivered in the facts of the present case and will not be treated as a precedent applicable to all other cases the facts of which are not before this Court.

‘ ‘ PUBLISHED IN http://courtnic.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.asp REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL Nos. 4802-4803 OF 2013 ARISING OUT OF SPECIAL LEAVE PETITION (C) Nos. 14922-14923 OF 2009 SANCHARI DEVI & ORS Appellant(s) VERSUS ARA MUNICIPAL CORPORATION & ORS Respondent(s) JUDGMENT Leave granted. 2. These appeals are against the judgment dated 4th March, 2009 … Continue reading

Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881= “Whether the work of quality audit of roads or work of similar nature involves “the execution of any work or supply of any materials or goods” within the meaning of Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, 1881 and can be awarded by the Commissioner only by inviting tenders, as contemplated by that provision?”= In the result, our answers to the question referred by the Division Bench is as under: “The work of quality audit of roads or work of similar nature to be done by a person who must enjoy trust and confidence of the public authority is not covered by the expression “the execution of any work or supply of any materials or goods” within the meaning of Subsection (1) of Section 72 of the Mumbai Municipal Corporation Act, Hence, it is not necessary for Municipal Commissioner to assign such work only by inviting tenders as contemplated by the proviso, i.e. sub-section (3) of Section 72 of the said Act.”

reported / published in http://bombayhighcourt.nic.in/judgements/2012/&fname=OSWP1312.pdf&smflag=N     Bombay High Court kambli 1 PIL-9.12 dt.12-12-12 IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE AT BOMBAY. ORDINARY ORIGINAL CIVIL JURISDICTION PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO.9 OF 2012 … Niyaz Ahmed Vanu …Petitioner v/s. 1.Municipal Corporation of Gr.Mumbai (M.C.G.M.) 2.The Municipal Commissioner, (M.C.G.M.) 3.The Chief Engineer (Roads Transport & Bridges) (M.C.G.M.) 4.M/s.SGS … Continue reading

SAUGHT EXEMPTION FROM URBAN LAND CEILING FOR DONATION, LATER WITHDRAWN BY THE GOVT. AND LATER ALLOTTED THE SAME ON CONSIDERATION TO THE SAME PROPOSED DONEE UNDER SEC.23 [4] OF ACT, SO THE DONEE BECOMES ABSOLUTE OWNER BUT NOT DONEE= We are of the considered opinion that, since the Appellant-Society has become the absolute owner of the land by virtue of the order dated 13.02.2006 passed by the State Government, the Appellant- Society is at liberty to use the property in question to its benefit and advantage and the Writ Court, therefore, was not justified in making certain observations, which would come in the way of Appellant-Society in utilizing the land to its maximum advantage. 16. In the result, while allowing this appeal, we set aside the following observations made by the High Court in paragraph 9 of the impugned judgment and order: “…Accordingly, we can only direct M/s. Indo Arab league to strictly adhere to the laws applicable for the purpose of making any construction and as per the undertaking given by it in paragraph – 5 of their counter affidavit. The construction made also shall not be alienated in any manner, but have to be used only for cultural or religious purpose.”

‘ IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO. 237 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 5615 of 2007) INDO ARAB LEAGUE Appellant THROUGH ITS CHAIRMAN VERSUS A.FAIZUDDIN & ORS. Respondents O R D E R 1. Delay condoned. 2. Leave granted. 3. This appeal by special leave is directed … Continue reading

Since the Special Land Acquisition Officer did not take steps in furtherance of the directions contained in the aforesaid order, respondent No.1 issued purchase notice dated 25.7.2007 under Section 127 of the 1966 Act, which was duly served upon the Corporation. After one year, respondent No.1 submitted plan dated 28.7.2008 for construction of a library building on the land owned by it. The same was rejected by the Competent – Authority vide order dated 29.9.2008 on the ground that the land was reserved for the college and the acquisition proceedings had already been initiated.= if any private land is shown as reserved in the Development plan, the same can be acquired within 10 years either by agreement or by following the procedure prescribed under the 1894 Act and if proceedings for the acquisition of the land are not commenced within that period and a further period of six months from the date of service of notice under Section 127 of the 1966 Act, reservation will be deemed to have lapsed and the land will be available for development by the owner. By applying the ratio of the above-noted judgments to the facts of this case, we hold that the High Court did not commit any error by declaring that reservation of the land owned by respondent No.1 had lapsed and the rejection of its application for construction of library building was legally unsustainable. Consequently, the appeal is dismissed.

Page 1 NON-REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.2906 OF 2013 (Arising out of SLP(C) No. 19003 of 2009) State of Maharashtra …Appellant versus Bhakti Vedanta Book Trust and others …Respondents J U D G M E N T G. S. Singhvi, J. 1. Leave granted. 2. Respondent No.1 is … Continue reading

partition – Will Deed – whether he is a beneficial owner or is a benami, is a question of fact. There was no averment made in the plaint with regard to the aforestated allegation. No issue to the said fact had been raised before the trial court. The said issue had been raised for the first time before the appellate court and in our opinion, the issue with regard to the fact could not have been raised before the appellate court for the first time and therefore, all submissions made in relation to the provisions of Benami Transfer (Prohibition) Act, 1988 and with regard to real ownership of the suit property cannot be looked into at this stage.the mental capacity of Sumitra Devi at the time of execution of the Will cannot also be looked into at this stage because the mental capacity of the testator to execute a Will being a question of fact, we would like to accept the findings arrived at by the court below and all allegations with regard to soundness of mind of Sumitra Devi at the time of execution of the Will or allegation with regard to undue influence of the present appellant with whom Sumitra Devi was residing at the time of her death cannot be looked into by this Court as they are the issues pertaining to fact. = the Will executed by Sumitra Devi was just and proper, the consequences of the Will would be like this: Rao Gajraj Singh was survived by his eight children and his widow – Sumitra Devi. As Rao Gajraj Singh died intestate, according to the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act, his property would devolve upon all his nine heirs i.e. his widow and eight children. So, everyone would get 1/9th share in the property of Rao Gajraj Singh. Though Sumitra Devi had executed her Will and had bequeathed the entire property in question to the present appellant namely Narinder Singh Rao, Sumitra Devi could not have bequeathed under her Will what she did not own. She was only 1/9th owner of the suit property so she could have bequeathed only her share i.e. 1/9th share in the suit property. As a result of the Will of Sumitra Devi, Narinder Singh Rao- the appellant would not only inherit his own share in the property, which he had inherited from his father Rao Gajraj Singh but he would also inherit share of his mother Sumitra Devi as per her Will. Thus, the present appellant would become the owner of 2/9th share of the suit property. In our opinion the final finding of the High Court that the appellant is the owner of 2/9th share of the suit property is, therefore, absolutely correct. 18. The averments with regard to court fee are not of importance at this stage as looking to the facts of the case, the court below has rightly come to the conclusion that the issue with regard to the court fee was a matter between the litigant filing the suit and the court and the defendants need not have bothered about the same. In view of the findings of fact arrived at by the courts below and the legal position clarified hereinabove and by the High Court, in our opinion, the High Court has committed no error and therefore, we see no reason to interfere with the impugned judgment. 21. For the aforestated reasons, the appeals are dismissed with no order as to costs.


What is the nature and significance of the planning process for a large Municipal town area? In that process, what is the role of the Municipal Corporation, which is the statutory planning authority? Can the State Government interfere in its decisions in that behalf and if so, to what extent? Does the State Government have the power to issue instructions to the Municipal Corporation to act in a particular manner contrary to the Development Plan sanctioned by the State Government, and that too a number of years after the Municipal Corporation having taken the necessary steps in consonance with the plan? Can the State Government instruct a Municipal Corporation to shift the reservation for a public amenity such as a primary school on a plot of land, and also instruct it to grant a development permission for residential purposes thereon without modifying the Development Plan?

REPORTABLE IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NOS. 198-199 OF 2000 Shri Girish Vyas & Anr. …Appellants Versus The State of Maharastra & Ors. …Respondents WITH CIVIL APPEAL NO. 2450 OF 2000 Dr. Laxmikant Madhav Murudkar (since deceased) Through LRs Mrs. Ranjana Laxmikant Murudkar & Ors. …Appellants Versus The State … Continue reading

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