//
archives

Nalgonda

This tag is associated with 4 posts

ELECTION CASE = DISQUALIFICATION FOR HAVING MORE THAN TWO ISSUES = Birth of third child on or after incorporation of sec. 19 (3) fasten the person with disqualification irrespective of the death of a child after birth = it is settled law that the burden of proving an exception to a rule is on the person who wants the benefit of the exception; if the 4th respondent’s case is that the fourth child born to him is dead, the burden of proving the said fact should have been placed on him and not on 6th respondent (he relied upon the decision in B. Kantha Reddy v. Mandal Development Officer-cum-Additional District Election Authority, Manopad Mandal, Mahabubnagar District and others2 in this regard); the mere act of procreation of more children than permitted after the relevant date for seeking elected office under the Act creates a disqualification as held by this Court in B.K. Parthasarathi and others v. Govt. of A.P., Panchayat Raj Dept. and others3 and Are Gangadhar v. Zilla Praja Parishad, Karimnagar and others4; that in Javed and others v. State of Haryana and others5, the Supreme Court had held that the disqualification is attracted no sooner the third child is born; in the A.P. Panchayat Raj Act,1994 there is no specific provision like in Haryana Panchayat Raj Act, 1994 and Haryana Municipal Act, 1973 that the additional child should also be alive; therefore, whether the fourth child of the 4th respondent was alive or dead is unnecessary to be gone into; this principle of law has also been ignored by the election tribunal; in any event, the order of the election tribunal is perverse and is unsustainable.= whether by death of the 4th child of 4th respondent his disqualification is erased? For the above reasons, the writ petition is allowed with costs and the order dt.22.07.2003 in O.P.No.5 of 2001 on the file of the Election Tribunal- cum- Principal Junior Civil Judge, Hyderabad (East and North), Ranga Reddy District, is quashed and it is declared that the 4th respondent has incurred the disqualification u/S.19(3) of the Act disentitling him from contesting for any post in the Grampanchayat of Bata Singaram Village, Hayath Nagar Mandal, Ranga Reddy District under the Act.

reported in / published in http://judis.nic.in/judis_andhra/filename=9881 THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE M.S.RAMACHANDRA RAO W.P.No.23648 of 2003 29.04.2013 A.Yadagiri …PETITIONER The Chief Election Commissioner, Hyderabad and others …RESPONDENTS <GIST: >HEAD NOTE: Counsel for the Petitioner : Sri S.Ramachandra Rao representing Sri K.R.Prabhakar. Counsel for the respondents 2 and 3: G.P. for Panchayat Raj and Rural Development Counsel for … Continue reading

service matter – The maximum punishment that could have been imposed on an employee after conducting due departmental enquiry was dismissal from service. The rule making authority, by way of amendment, has bifurcated the rule 9(vii) into two parts, namely, 9(vii)(a) and 9(vii)(b). As is evincible, the chargesheet only referred to the imposition of major penalty or to be dealt with under the said rules relating to major penalty. In this backdrop, it would be difficult to say that the employee had the vested right to be imposed a particular punishment as envisaged under the unamended rules. Once the charges have been proven, he could have been imposed the punishment of compulsory retirement or removal from service or dismissal from service. The rule making authority thought it apposite to amend the rules to introduce a different kind of punishment which is lesser than the maximum punishment or, for that matter, lesser 47Page 48 punishment than that of compulsory retirement from service. The order of compulsory retirement is a lesser punishment than dismissal or removal as the pension of a compulsorily retired employee, if eligible to get pension under the Pension Rules, is not affected. Rule 9(vii) was only dealing with reduction or reversion but issuance of any other direction was not a part of it. It has come by way of amendment. The same being a lesser punishment than the maximum, in our considered opinion, is imposable and the disciplinary authority has not committed any error by imposing the said punishment, regard being had to the nature of charges. It can be looked from another angle. The rule making authority has splitted Rule 9(vii) into two parts – one is harsher than the other, but, both are less severe than the other punishments, namely, compulsory retirement, removal from service or dismissal. The reason behind it, as we perceive, is not to let off one with simple reduction but to give a direction about the condition of pay on restoration and also not to 48 Page 49 impose a harsher punishment which may not be proportionate. In our view, the same really does not affect any vested or accrued right. It also does not violate any Constitutional protection. 51. In view of the aforesaid analysis, the order passed by the High Court that a double punishment has been imposed does not withstand scrutiny. 52. Consequently, the appeals are allowed. The orders passed by the High Court are set aside and the order of punishment imposed by the disciplinary authority is restored. In the facts and circumstances of the case, there shall be no order as to costs.

Page 1 Reportable IN THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA CIVIL APPELLATE JURISDICTION CIVIL APPEAL NO.1428-1428 OF 2013 (Arising out of S.L.P. (C) Nos. 24224-24225 of 2008) The Government of Andhra Pradesh and Others … Appellants Versus Ch. Gandhi …Respondent J U D G M E N T Dipak Misra, J. Leave granted. 2. The present appeals … Continue reading

land acquisition act=whether the reference court rightly awarded interest from the date of taking possession or not? The said issue is no longer res integra. It is now fairly well settled that the starting point for granting of interest is from the date of issuance of the notification, but not anterior to it. Therefore, the claimants are entitled to interest from the date of issuance of the notification i.e., on 30.08.1985 on the compensation including Solatium and additional market value with all statutory benefits, as per the law declared by the Supreme Court in V.Sunder v. Union of India (AIR 2001 SC 3516). The Appeal Suit (SR) is, accordingly, allowed in part. No order as to costs.

IN THE HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE, ANDHRA PRADESHAT HYDERABAD WEDNESDAY, THIS THE THIRD DAY OF AUGUST, TWO THOUSAND AND ELEVEN PRESENT HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE A.GOPAL REDDY AND HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE K.S.APPA RAO   LA.AS.No.770 OF 2011 Between: Sub-collector, (Land Acquisition Officer) … appellant                     And Kumbam Ramlingam and others … Respondents This Court made the following: … Continue reading

time was essence of the contract and that the appellant did not pay the balance of the consideration, within the stipulated time. =The trial Court has also analyzed the evidence pertaining to the financial solvency of the appellant. It was observed that the appellant did not possess adequate means to pay the balance of consideration as on the date of filing of the suit much less the date stipulated for payment of balance of consideration. This Court does not find any substantial question of law nor is it inclined to interfere with the concurrent findings of fact.

THE HON’BLE SRI JUSTICE L.NARASIMHA REDDY Second Appeal No.587 OF 2011 20-06-2011 Komatireddy Buchi Reddy Pannala Narsimha Reddy COUNSEL FOR PETITIONER: Sri G.Machusudhan Reddy COUNSEL FOR RESPONDENT: N.Ramachandra Rao :JUDGMENT: The appellant filed O.S.No.50 of 2002 in the Court of the Senior Civil Judge, Bhongir against the respondent for the relief of specific performance of … Continue reading

Blog Stats

  • 2,891,651 hits

ADVOCATE MMMOHAN

archieves

Enter your email address to subscribe to this blog and receive notifications of new posts by email.

Join 1,906 other followers
Follow advocatemmmohan on WordPress.com